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Appropriate Collaboration between Industry and Government in the Development of an AIDS Vaccine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Nicholas A. Christakis  and
Morris J. Panner
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Extract

On August 22, 1986, as part of its response to the AIDS epidemic, the Public Health Service (PHS) invited U.S. industrial firms to collaborate with the government in the development of an AIDS vaccine. The framework for the collaboration was outlined in a PHS document entitled, “AIDS Vaccine Development: Private Sector/Government Collaborative Efforts.” This document identified the resources the government is prepared to make available to industry, including patents, facilities, data, and assistance with clinical trials. The overall aim of the PHS proposal was to establish a formal framework for coordinating existing government and private efforts and to foster industry participation in the search for an AIDS vaccine.

An example of private sector/government collaboration is provided in the human trial of an AIDS vaccine approved by the FDA in August 1987. The vaccine, named “VaxSyn HIV-1,“ is the product of a joint effort between a company called MicroGeneSys and investigators at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID).

Type
Article
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , Summer 1989 , pp. 130 - 138
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1989

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References

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