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1. Legal and Ethical Problems in Decisions for Death

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2021

Alexander Morgan Capron
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Extract

What has happened to death? Why is this subject—virtually taboo in social and even in medical conversations a few decades ago—now so much a matter of debate in public policy settings, especially the courts? Four factors are primarily responsible, in my view. The first two—changes in the locale of death and development of ever more sophisticated forms of life-support—are by now familiar. Of growing significance are two further factors: increased fear of liability and the polarization of decisions about life-support as those decisions get swept up (at least in the United States) in the ferocious battles between freedom-of-choice and right-to-life supporters.

This paper attempts to analyze these four factors and, I hope, to uncover some of the confusion they have produced. I will then argue that despite consistent judicial endorsement of the right of competent adults to decide what medical care they wish to receive—even if they decide to forgo life-sustaining treatment, that is, to die—legal (like medical) attitudes are in fact ambivalent.

Type
Part II: Death and Dying
Information
Law, Medicine and Healthcare , Volume 14 , Issue 3-4 , September 1986 , pp. 141 - 157
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1986

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References

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