A central question in American policy making is when should courts address complex policy issues, as opposed to defer to other forums? Legal process analysis offers a standard answer. It holds that judges should act when adjudication offers advantages over other modes of social ordering such as contracts, legislation, or agency rule making. From this vantage, the decision to use common law adjudication to address a sprawling public health crisis was a terrible mistake, as asbestos litigation has come to represent the very worst of mass tort litigation. This article questions this view, arguing that legal process analysis distorts the institutional choices underlying the American policy‐making process. Indeed, once one considers informational and political constraints, as well as how the branches of government can fruitfully share policy‐making functions, the asbestos litigation seems a reasonable and, in some ways, exemplary, use of judicial power.

This article analyzes the regulatory reform and implementation process in Australia following three event clusters: an industrial explosion, recent terrorist attacks, and a corporate collapse. The research employed a characteristic analysis where the compliance challenge on the ground is understood as affected not only by the enforcement efforts of the regulator, but also the reform process and the structure of the industry concerned. In each of the cases studied, preferred reforms could be understood as “metaregulatory” and framed around outcomes, principles, and processes rather than a preoccupation with adherence to prescriptive rules. Metaregulation was seen as the most appropriate regulatory framework to maintain the integrity between regulatory goal, regulatory regime, and compliance behavior. Yet, reform pressures that shaped the causal narrative associated with the particular risk, the emotional work involved in compliance, and success strategies of sites all affected what risks were actually reduced and hence the likelihood of a repeat disaster.

This article reports on empirical research undertaken to test the claim made in a law reform project that citizens could be made more certain of their legal obligations by changing the legal paradigm used to express their rights and obligations. Our research tested a number of hypotheses involving different formulations of the claim being made. We find that the alternative paradigm being presented was inferior to current practice and offer some reasons that would explain our results and the significance of this work for other areas of legal research.

This article argues that the cultural self‐understandings of the judiciary can exert a profound effect on legal outcomes under a bill of rights. Utilizing the case of New Zealand, it demonstrates that confinement of expansive case law under the New Zealand Bill of Rights (NZBOR) to the criminal law and freedom of expression arenas is most significantly explained by a British‐descended judicial culture that prioritizes, first, those civil liberty values already cognizable by the common law and, second, rights connected with the policing of parliamentary and legal processes. Nevertheless, judicial culture does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, the opportunity structure facing potential public interest litigants under NZBOR depends also on their politicolegal resource set including the attitude of the political branches (legislature and executive) to the claim being forwarded.

This article investigates the contribution made by the concept of citizenship to contemporary understandings of the widely held business corporation. Because the conventional economic understanding of corporations and corporate law cannot fully explain the nature of the business corporation and the purposes of corporate law, the framework within which teachers and students of corporate law approach the corporation must be enlarged. By looking at the corporation exclusively through the lens of economics we are unable to account for all features of the corporation and corporate law, and we risk mistaking the purpose of these features, or wrongly supposing that they serve no purpose. The article proposes that through resort to a distinct set of conceptual tools—the concept of citizenship, borrowed from political theory—we can attain a fuller comprehension of the meaning of the corporation.

This essay uses three publications—the 1967 President's Crime Commission report on police, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society; the National Research Council's review of research on policing, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence; and David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga's edited collection, Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives—as reference points for reflecting on the extent to which the American police institution has moved toward a progressive and professional ideal over the past forty years. I argue that unless the scope and complexity of the policing function is more fully taken into account, and unless the causes of crime and disorder and the police role in controlling and preventing them are reconsidered, the ideals of police reform will remain elusive.

Drawing on John Witt's 2007 book, Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of American Law, this essay explores the role of the interwar civil liberties movement in rehabilitating the discourse of rights and privatizing the American welfare state. In the years after World War I, most proponents of free speech were hostile to Lochner‐era legalism and preferred to pursue civil liberties through legislative and regulatory measures as a means of advancing the public interest. By the onset of World War II, however, they had instead adopted a court‐centered strategy that emphasized individual autonomy. The popular and political resonance of their new state‐skeptical vocabulary suggests that post‐New Deal liberalism in America was a hybrid of classical and Progressive approaches.

This essay reviews The Cult of Statistical Significance: How the Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives, by Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey. The book's core message is that statistical significance should not be equated with substantive significance and that empirical researchers should convey more information about the magnitude of relationships and effects than many now do. This essay summarizes, approves of, and elaborates on Ziliak and McCloskey's message with special attention to concerns of the legal academy. It clarifies appropriate uses of significance tests within the research framework of controlling for plausible rival hypotheses.