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Democracy, Law, Compliance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Don Herzog
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Abstract

Professors Schauer and McAdams both seek a more or less sweepingly general theory of why we obey the law. But we should split, not lump. There are different reasons different actors in different social settings obey different laws–not only, but not least, out of regard for democratic decision making.

Type
Articles
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , Winter 2017 , pp. 6 - 15
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 2017 

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References

References

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