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Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Gabriel L. Negretto*
Affiliation:
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico City

Abstract

A widely accepted argument among scholars of Latin American presidential regimes is that interbranch cooperation is impaired when the president's party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to consider three factors that affect the performance of minority presidents: the policy position of the president's party, the president's capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. This article argues that the greatest potential for conflict in a presidential regime occurs when the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed. This hypothesis is supported using data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1978–2003.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2006

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