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‘Real Grounds’ in Matter and Things in Themselves

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 August 2018

Rae Langton
Rae Langton*
Affiliation:
Newnham College, Cambridge
*
Email: rhl27@cam.ac.uk
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Abstract

Matter’s real essence is a ground for certain features of phenomena. Things in themselves are likewise a ground for certain features of phenomena. How do these claims relate? The former is a causal essentialism about physics, Stang argues; and the features so grounded are phenomenally nomically necessary. The latter involves a distinctive ontology of things in themselves, I argue; but the features so grounded are not noumenally nomically necessary. Stang’s version of Kant’s modal metaphysics is admirable, but does not go far enough. Kant’s causal essentialism involves the essences of fundamental properties, as well as of matter. And things in themselves are grounds, because they are substances, the ‘substrate’ of phenomena.

Keywords

logical essencereal essencegroundprimary qualitiessecondary qualitiestertiary qualitiesattractionimpenetrabilitylawscausal essentialismthings in themselvesphenomenasubstratumrelational propertiesintrinsic propertiesforcenecessitycontingency
Type
Author Meets Critics
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 23 , Issue 3 , September 2018 , pp. 435 - 448
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2018 

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