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Kant on the Human Standpoint, by Béatrice Longuenesse. Cambridge University Press, 2005, hardback, £45.00 (US$ 80.00)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2011

Lucy Allais
Sussex University


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Copyright © Kantian Review 2007

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1 It might be thought that there is no way of reconciling the idea of there being some kind of representational content, or presentation of particulars, in the absence of concepts with Kant's assertion of the ‘blindness’ of intuitions without concepts. Taking the metaphorical term ‘blind’ on its own, it might suggest something that is in no sense representational. However, given Kant's definition of intuition, blindness cannot mean that intuitions are not singular representations - that they do not present individuals - Kant defines intuitions as immediate singular representations.