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The First Person and the Moral Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2015

Dean Moyar*
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins University
*

Abstract

In Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account, Jeanine Grenberg argues for the centrality to Kant’s ethics of the experience of the feeling of moral constraint, especially as that feeling is described in Kant’s fact of reason argument. She criticizes interpretations of the fact of reason that interpret it as primarily a certain kind of act. I defend my version of an act-based interpretation against Grenberg’s criticisms, flesh out the Fichtean background of that interpretation and raise some further questions about Grenberg’s account.

Type
Critical Exchange
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2015 

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References

Fichte, J. G. (1971) Johann Gottlieb Fichtes sämtliche Werke. Ed. I. H. Fichte. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.Google Scholar
Fichte, J. G. (1994) Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings. Ed. and tr. Daniel Breazeale. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett.Google Scholar
Fichte, J. G. (2000) Foundations of Natural Right. Ed. Frederick Neuhouser, tr. Michael Baur. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
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Franks, Paul (2005) All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Grenberg, Jeanine (2013) Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1999) Practical Philosophy. Ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
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Kant, Immanuel (2001b) Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Trans. George di Giovanni. In Religion and Rational Theology. Ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Moyar, Dean (2008) ‘Unstable Autonomy: Conscience and Judgment in Kant’s Moral Philosophy’. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 5, 327360.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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