Despite the old claim in economics that “there is no such thing as a free lunch,” some of the recent work in behavioral economics and in other fields of study implies the contrary. In this paper I study whether French and Italian hotels actually provide a “free” breakfast when, as is done by many hotels around the world, its provision is included in the room price. The data indicate, using both cross-sectional comparisons and hotel-specific changes in breakfast provision, that there is no such thing as a free breakfast. In France and Italy hotels that offer, respectively, “petit dejeuner compris” and “compresa la prima colazione” appear to raise their room prices by 10 to 15 percent.

In this paper, we study if the leading French gastronomic guidebook, the “Guide Rouge Michelin,” only rates the quality of food, as it claims, or if it also considers environmental variables when attributing stars. We then check how Michelin ratings affect the market, and more specifically, the price charged by restaurants. Using some simple econometric techniques, we find that a small improvement in environment boosts the probability of receiving Michelin stars. Since we also find that a Michelin star is associated to a high price premium stuck (independently of the quality of food), we conclude that expertise induces distortions in the market (JEL classification: D4, L15, L66).

Two randomly sampled groups of subjects were endowed with real budgets and placed in 5 different budget/price situations. In each situation they had to evaluate 6 orange juices and complete a demand table. At the end of the experiment, one demand table was randomly selected and participants had to buy the corresponding products. In one group, participants choose after looking at the packaging in the other they could also taste the products. Results show that participants who chose without tasting, made quicker decisions, selected a larger number of variants and were more influenced by prices than those who could taste the products. Although choices appeared very heterogeneous, most participants exhibit coherent behaviors. (JEL classification: C91, D12)

In early 2003, France actively tried to thwart the plans of the Bush administration to build international support for a war to depose Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein. In response, calls in the United States for a boycott of French products, wine in particular, rebounded through all forms of media. In the spring of 2003, French business people even reported that the boycott calls were hurting their U.S. sales. Using a dataset of sales of nearly 4,700 individual wine brands, we show that there actually was no boycott effect. Rather, sales of French wine dipped for two reasons. First, they experience a cyclical peak at holiday time, from November through early January, and the boycott was called during the February to May period. Second, sales of French wine have been in a secular decline in the United States. Sales in February through May 2003 merely stayed on trend. We contrast our results with other recent work that has found evidence of a boycott effect but that omits the holiday effect from several specifications. French wine producers may be having economic problems, but it is not because of their government's foreign policy. (JEL classification: D12, F14, L66, Q17)

The public opinion in the US turned against France and to some extent Germany for not supporting the armed intervention in Iraq. From early 2003 a boycott of French goods, especially wines, by American consumers became an issue which affected sales of French wines in the US. This paper analyses how the boycott affected the demand for French wine on the American market using international trade data. The effect may have been only temporary. We estimate it at some 120 million US dollars. (JEL classification: C22, D12)

Notwithstanding the observed positive correlations between critics' quality ratings and wine prices, the range of these correlations is quite high. In light of this, researchers must consider the factors that either strengthen or weaken the association between quality ratings and prices. In this paper, we propose that the slope of the relationship between quality ratings and wine prices is moderated by the amount of attention that producers receive. Because attention increases with a producer's critical exposure (i.e., its history of critical coverage), price-quality relationships will be steeper for producers with more critical exposure. This prediction is confirmed in an analysis of New World wines selling into the U.S. market over the 1987 to 2001 period. While a wine's price is a positive function of its own quality rating, the strength of the price-quality relationship increases with a producer's critical exposure (JEL classifications: L11, L13, L15).

In wine tastings, in which several tasters (judges) taste several wines, it is important to insure objectivity to the extent possible. This is usually accomplished by holding the tasting “blind,” i.e., covering the bottles so that the tasters do not know which wine is in which bottle. At some agreed upon point in the proceedings, the tasters reveal what they think about the various bottles. Ideally, this revelation would take place by secret ballot, lest a taster's choices be influenced by what he or she hears another taster say. But in any event, there are two standard ways of rating the wines. The older method is to assign them “grades” on a scale of, say, up to 100 points (Parker) or up to 20 points as in the famous face-off between California wines and French Bordeaux wines in 1976 (see Ashenfelter et al., 2007). As Ashenfelter at al. point out, this has the distinct disadvantage that a judge with greater dispersion in his or her grades will have a greater influence on the average score that each wine achieves.