^{page 424 note 1} Tib. gtsug lag k'aṅ.

^{page 424 note 2} Since it is subject to destruction by fire, etc.

^{page 425 note 1} There are four kinds of officers: (a) those entrusted with spiritual affairs (c'os dpon); (b) ministers (bka'la gtogs pa); (c) generals (dmag dpon); (d) ministers of finance (nor gyi gñer).

^{page 426 note 1} That is those for which there is no other expiation but hell.

^{page 426 note 2} Tib. Snod med pa yi bu dag la | snod du ruṅ bar gyi ạdod Itar ‖‖ sñiṅ rje yis ni ts'ar bead pa yi | sdaṅ bas ma yin nor p'yir min ‖‖

^{page 427 note 1} “Policy of the fish”, viz. the pre-eminence of mere strength.

^{page 427 note 2} Viz. getting even in a future life a royal status instead of rebirth in one of the bad conditions of existence.

^{page 428 note 1} A long discussion here begins meant to show that no pleasure (and therefore, for necessary implicatioen, no pain) is per se existent or possessed of characteristics per se existent. This leads Nāgārjuna to discuss also perception in its various aspects and to conclude that no such fact as perception can be said to be existent.

^{page 429 note 1} This to meet the objection that there must be objects and their perception through the senses, since consciousness (vijñāna) exists.

^{page 429 note 2} In these two stanzas Nāgārjuna meets the objection that vijñāna exists since its objects exist; but while the contents of consciousness are distinct in accordance with their temporal succession, the Mādhyamika does not admit any time to be per se existent; present is only existent in relation to a past or a future. The perception of something as present is due to mental bewilderment, as when we wrongly take a turning firebrand to be a wheel.

^{page 429 note 3} This stanza replies to the objection that senses and objects of senses exist since their cause, viz. material elements, exist; but since no material element can be demonstrated to be in se existent, their effect must necessarily be unreal.

^{page 430 note 1} Its contents being in this case already given in it.

^{page 430 note 2} They renounce to disappear into nirvāṇa in order to benefit creatures.

^{page 431 note 1} The wrong interpretation of the unsubstantiality (sūnya) of things.

^{page 431 note 2} This refers to the duṣkara-caryā implicit in the practice of Mahāyāna.

^{page 431 note 3} “Mano-puvvaṅgamā dhammā, manoseṭṭhā maṇomayā,” Dhamma pada, 1, 2.

^{page 432 note 1} On account of attachment to small pleasures one cannot miss greater pleasures. The objection here refuted is that sorrow is always sorrow and should therefore be given up.

^{page 433 note 1} So, according to Tib.: yon tan mk'a' ltar bsam yas pas; but MS.: puṇyatvād.

^{page 433 note 2} This greatness of the Buddha implies also that his revelation, viz. Mahāyāna, must be accepted.

^{page 433 note 3} This means that unsubstantiality of things is not a novelty preached by Mahāyāna; it is also asserted by other schools (Hīnayāna). The only difference is that while for Hīnayāna it is kṛtaka, viz. the result of a destruction of something existent, for Mahāyāna this unsubstantiality is in fact non-production.

^{page 433 note 4} The teaching of the Buddha being manifold, one must avoid dogmatism; there are, in fact, various degrees of revelation according to the different mental and moral fitness of individuals.

^{page 434 note 1} This criticism is directed against the Arhats as a stage superior to that of the Auditors.

^{page 434 note 2} Viz. the teaching must be gradual according to the fitness of those to be converted. VV. 94–6 are quoted by Candra-kīrti P.P., p. 359, ll.11 sqq.

^{page 434 note 3} One is freed from sin after he abstains from ahiṃsā; the result of meritorious deeds is rebirth among gods, etc.

^{page 434 note 4} Viz. the theory of unsubstantiality of things.