Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-cnmwb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-20T00:33:46.346Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Definability of r. e. sets in a class of recursion theoretic structures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Robert E. Byerly*
Affiliation:
Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas 79409

Extract

It is known [4, Theorem 11-X(b)] that there is only one acceptable universal function up to recursive isomorphism. It follows from this that sets definable in terms of a universal function alone are specified uniquely up to recursive isomorphism. (An example is the set K, which consists of all n such that {n}(n) is defined, where λn, m{n}(m) is an acceptable universal function.) Many of the interesting sets constructed and studied by recursion theorists, however, have definitions which involve additional notions, such as a specific enumeration of the graph of a universal function. In particular, many of these definitions make use of the interplay between the purely number-theoretic properties of indices of partial recursive functions and their purely recursion-theoretic properties.

This paper concerns r.e. sets that can be defined using only a universal function and some purely number-theoretic concepts. In particular, we would like to know when certain recursion-theoretic properties of r.e. sets definable in this way are independent of the particular choice of universal function (equivalently, independent of the particular way in which godel numbers are identified with natural numbers).

We will first develop a suitable model-theoretic framework for discussing this question. This will enable us to classify the formulas defining r.e. sets by their logical complexity. (We use the number of alternations of quantifiers in the prenex form of a formula as a measure of logical complexity.) We will then be able to examine the question at each level.

This work is an approach to the question of when the recursion-theoretic properties of an r.e. set are independent of the particular parameters used in its construction. As such, it does not apply directly to the construction techniques most commonly used at this time for defining particular r.e. sets, e.g., the priority method. A more direct attack on this question for these techniques is represented by such works as [3] and [5]. However, the present work should be of independent interest to the logician interested in recursion theory.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1]Byerly, R., An invariance notion in recursion theory, this Journal, vol. 47 (1982), pp. 4866.Google Scholar
[2]Friedman, H., Axiomatic recursive function theory, Logic Colloquium '69 (Gandy, R. O. and Yates, C. M. E., Editors), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971, pp. 113137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3]Jockusch, C. and Soare, R., Post's problem and his hypersimple set, this Journal, vol. 38 (1973), pp. 446452.Google Scholar
[4]Rogers, H., Theory of recursive functions and effective computability, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967.Google Scholar
[5]Soare, R., The Friedberg-Muchnik theorem re-examined, Canadian Journal of Mathematics, vol. 24(6) (1972), pp. 10701078.CrossRefGoogle Scholar