¹ Grey minute, 15 Aug. 1894, on “Memorandum on the Present Political Situation in Siam” by R.L. Morant of July 1894, in Public Record Office archives, Kew, FO17/1223. See my Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation (Arran: Kiscadale, 1989Google Scholar).

² This was the point at which France annexed Siam's eastern Lao dependencies. See my Two Views of Siam, p. 2. The orthodox British focus on French imperialism is now best represented by Tuck, P.J., The French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb: The French Threat to Siamese Independence 1858-1907 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1995Google Scholar). “Siam” was as much a foreign name for the country as “Persia” was for Iran, and was to be displaced at around the same time, the late 1930s, in favour of the indigenous “Thailand”. However, in this era it was conventional to talk of “Siam” and “Persia” Questions.

³ J.G. Scott, seconded from British Burma, revived the idea to the Foreign Office's great displeasure while serving as Chargé d'Affaires in Bangkok 1893-94. Jeshurun, Chandran, The Contest for Siam, 1889-1902 (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Kebangsaan Press, 1977), pp. 107–108Google Scholar.

⁴ He had also been Foreign Secretary under Disraeli 1878-80, and Prime Minister alone 1886-87, and was to continue as such 1900-1902.

⁵ Rolo, P.J.V., Entente Cordiale: The Origins and Negotiation of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April 1904 (London: Macmillan, 1969Google Scholar). Cf. Hargreaves, J.D., “Entente Manquee: Anglo-French Relations, 1895-1896”, Cambridge Historical Journal 9 (1953): 65–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar (for Salisbury's belief in “sick men” everywhere in the oriental world), Andrew, C., Theophile Delcasse and the Entente Cordiale (London: Macmillan, 1968Google Scholar), and Monger, G., The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 (London: T. Nelson, 1963Google Scholar). See also Tuck, The French Wolf, who stresses even the years 1904-1907.

⁶ Minute by Salisbury on Lord Knutsford to Under-Sec, F.O. 4 July 1892. FO69/147.

⁷ Grenville, J.A.S., Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, 1895-1900 (London: Athlone, 1966Google Scholar), introd.

⁸ See especially my “Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trials of a Diplomat in the Age of High Imperialism”, Cambridge Historical Journal 35,1 (1992): 115–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Eastman, L., Throne and Mandarins: China's Search for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversy, 1880-1885 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967Google Scholar).

¹⁰ Satow Diary, 5 Mar. 1884. PRO30/33/15/7. The Satow Papers are also held at Kew under PRO30/33.

¹¹ Satow Diary, 26 Nov., 5-6 Dec. 1884, printed in Brailey, N.J. (ed.), The Satow Siam Papers I, 1884-85 (Bangkok: The Historical Society, 1997Google Scholar), hereafter SSP I, pp. 103, 104-105.

¹² Tuck, French Wolf, pp. 69-70.

¹³ J. Chailley-Bert quoted in Brunschwig, H., Mythes et Réalités de l'Imperialisme Colonial Français (Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), p. 150Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See especially Parkinson, C.N., British Intervention in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1960)Google Scholar

¹⁵ Woodside, A.B., Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 146CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This contrasts with “the Chinese-Vietnamese formula of direct, permeative, bureaucratic management”, with the emphasis on bureaucracy. Cf. also Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua, Thai-Malay Relations (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988Google Scholar).

¹⁶ For example, “Our Miniature India & the Colonial Office”, Pall Mall Gazette, 15 Jul. 1893, or Keyser, A., “The Malay Peninsula”, The Nineteenth Century 34 (Sep. 1893): 437–51Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See Hobson, J.A., Imperialism: A Critical Study (London: Allen & Unwin, 1902, 1905 edns.), table p. 39Google Scholar. For the classic study of the Malayan story, see Sir Swettenham, F., British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya (London: Allen & Unwin, 1906Google Scholar, 7th edn. 1955). For 1880s outsiders' views, cf. also Joseph Conrad, The End of the Tether (various edns.), including the growing local desire for the appointment of a British aristocrat governor, on a par at least with the Lieut. Governors of the three Indian Presidencies, and the quite admiring French civil engineer Morgan, J. de, Exploration dans la Presqu'ile de Malacca (Paris: A. Lehure, 1886Google Scholar; Songkhla: Prince of Songkla University, 1993), pp. 11-12, 17.

¹⁸ In 1885, CO. Under-Secretary Meade rejected Weld's proposal that the Straits Settlements be renamed “British Malaya” as likely to alarm Siam. Minute of 13 Mar. 1885 on Weld to Bramston, 8 Mar. 1885. CO273/138. For the twentieth-century sequel, when Siam was incorporated into local British imperial interests on an informal basis, see Aldrich, R.J., The Key to the South (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993Google Scholar). But the extreme sensitivity of the whole issue is illustrated by the firm secrecy maintained right through to the 1980s over an account of “Relations between Thailand and the Southern States of the Malay Peninsula” (CO537/7335), written in 1941 by the MCS (Malayan Civil Service) historian, W. Linehan. During 1942-45, the Malay states ceded by Siam to Britain in 1909, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, were briefly restored to Bangkok control.

¹⁹ Weld to Lord Kimberley, 3 June 1882, in FO422/8. Three detailed accounts of the story already exist. Kiernan, V.G., “Britain, Siam and Malaya, 1875-1885”, Journal of Modern History 28 (Mar. 1956): 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar, while in fact, quite appropriately, carrying it through to 1887, is now very dated, particularly in its Eurocentric approach. Also, quite misleadingly, it puts the main emphasis on the east coast states of Kelantan and Trengganu. The unpublished second half of Thio's, E. very comprehensive, “British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1910” (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1956Google Scholar) similarly written at a time when Thailand scholarship was in its infancy, despite the evident best efforts of its author, and her reference (p. 416) to “the customary attitude of Singapore towards Siam”, is very Singapore/Kuala Lumpur-centric, misrepresents southern Thailand as a kind of “no-man's-land up for grabs”, and also exaggerates the influence of India. Chulasiriwongs, Chayachoke, “Thai-British Relations concerning the Southern Malay states, 1880-1899”(Ph.D. diss., Ohio University, 1980Google Scholar), by focusing almost exclusively on the Perak-Raman affair, highlights its critical role. But while his work employs extensive Thai documentation, on the British side it is limited largely to official correspondence. Also, he never places the story clearly in the context of Siam's general predicament, and with his description (p. 325) of the 1902 Anglo-Siamese treaty as the ultimate “break-through” for Britain in terms of the peninsular situation as a whole, rather undermines his emphasis on the October 1899 Anglo-Siamese treaty as the final settlement of the Perak-Raman frontier. For another Malaya-centric study, see Barlow, H.S., Swettenham (Kuala Lumpur: Southdene, 1995Google Scholar). Tuck, , “Britain, France and Siam, 1885-1896” (D. Phil, diss., University of Oxford, 1970), 45Google Scholar, registered Satow as “in the main a failure”, and barely mentions him in The French Wolf.

²⁰ In 1933, by which time Betong town had become predominantly ethnically Chinese, it was the location of an unusually severe labour protest against the government in Bangkok. See Skinner, G.W., Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 252Google Scholar. For the events of 1941-42, see my Thailand and the Fall of Singapore (Boulder: Westview, 1986Google Scholar).

²¹ Palgrave, in charge 1880-83, still held the title of Agent and Consul-General inherited from his predecessor Sir Thomas G. Knox. For Palgrave, the former Arabian explorer, see Allen, Mea, Palgrave of Arabia (London: Macmillan, 1972Google Scholar).

²² See my “The Scramble for Concessions in 1880s Siam”, forthcoming in Modern Asian Studies.

²³ Weld to Colonial Office, 4 May 1882, 9 and 30 May 1883, 12 Mar. 1885 (CO273/114, 120, 138) cited in Thio, “British Policy”, pp. 256-57, 273, 283, 310-11. The railway idea seems to have been Weld's own, and not one he ever mentioned to Satow. Cf. also Weld to Newman, 19 Jun. 1883 and Satow Diary, 26 Feb. 1884, PRO30/33/2/9, 15/7.

²⁴ Thewawong to Palgrave, 16 Oct. 1882, and Palgrave to Lord Granville, 20 Oct. 1882, in FO422/8.

²⁵ Weld to Newman, 18 May, 19 Jun., 7 Sep., 11 and 31 Dec. 1883, in PRO30/33/2/9.

²⁶ Undated memorandum in SSP I, pp. 106-110. Tuck, “Britain, France and Siam”, p. 31, attributes it to earlier in the year, but it seems based on diary entries right up to the end of August 1884.

²⁷ Surawong was the only son and Phanuwong the principal younger brother of the late ex-Regent, Somdet Chaophraya Si Suriyawong (Chuang), who had died at the beginning of 1883, and whose funeral obsequies Satow still found himself attending in 1884 after his arrival.

²⁸ The Wangna, Prince Bowon Wichaichan, had formerly, in the days of Agent and Consul-General Thomas Knox, that is, up to 1878, enjoyed special British support and protection.

²⁹ Never having undertaken the legal studies his father had favoured when he was young (instead, his youngest brother became the family lawyer), Satow had eventually spent some months studying at the University of Marburg in 1875, and then transferred to the English system, and taken his Bar finals in quite outstanding fashion just prior to his appointment to Bangkok. He was not to be called to the bar, at Lincoln's Inn, until his next home leave, in November 1887.

³⁰ During the first half of 1885, Satow sought to cooperate with the acting German consul, Dr. Gabriel, on transfer from China, and busy giving Prince Thewawong special lessons in international law. But Gabriel's unwillingness to reciprocate alienated him even prior to the return later in the year of the duller Von Krencki. Diaries, 15 Apr., 6 May, 3 July, and Satow to Currie, 16 Mar., 7 May, 10 Nov. 1885. SSP I, pp. 149, 155, 173-74, 140, 157, and II (forthcoming). That same autumn, Currie had visited Germany as Lord Salisbury's special emissary in a vain effort to promote an Anglo-German understanding, the failure of which appears to have cast a lasting blight on the premier's attitudes to Germany. Cf. Greaves, R., Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892 (London: Athlone, 1959), pp. 90-95, 223Google Scholar.

³¹ Bernard to Satow, 27 Jan., PRO30/33/2/6, in reply to Satow to Bernard, 5 Jan. 1885, 30/33/14/1. See also SSP I, pp. 117-18, 138n. In early 1885, Satow was repeatedly pressed by the Siamese regarding Anglo-Burmese relations, and was ultimately advised by Lord Kimberley via Currie regarding “interference” with King Thibaw: “We have no present intention of doing so, but it is by no means impossible (though it is not likely that we shall annex)….” Currie to Satow, 16 Mar. 1885. PRO30/33/1/6.

³² This vice-consul, initially E.B. Gould, had been in position since early the previous year as a consequence of longstanding Indo-Burmese interests in the area, and a new Anglo-Siamese “Chiangmai” treaty of 1883. His appointment was substantially financed by Indian funds. In connection with this proposal, in a letter to Bernard of 14 Mar. 1885, SSP I, pp. 138-39, Satow makes a rare reference to equivalent Indian political agents at “Bushire” in Iran and Baghdad in modern Iraq, then a part of the Ottoman Empire.

³³ Satow to Wallace, 14 Mar., and Wallace to Satow, 13 May 1885, in PRO30/33/2/8, printed in full in SSP I, pp. 136-38.

³⁴ In his diary for 5 Aug. 1885 (30/33/15/9), see SSP II, Satow again explains Bernard's opposition to an “Imperial guarantee” of [central?] Siam's independence: “India c[ou]ld not afford it; also he xsdoes not think it right to fight in order to defend a market. Neither do I, but I dare say it is the way people have of looking at things, and one must use arguments w[hi]ch people consider to have weight.”

³⁵ A copy of this printed report of 12 Aug. 1885 also appears in PRO30/33/2/7.

³⁶ That is, Satow to F.O., 22 Jan. 1885, FO69/99. See also Satow to Currie, 22 Jan. 1885, PRO30/33/14/1, printed in SSP I, pp. 123-24.

³⁷ See my “Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia”.

³⁸ Ramm, A., ed., The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville (London, 1952) I, p. 349Google Scholar. Parkes even more than Satow was an Eastern Asian specialist, having served as Minister in Tokyo 1865-83 after many years spent in China, only to return to Peking for the two years prior to his death.

³⁹ Minute by Kimberley, 23 Mar. 1883, on Satow to Granville, FO69/99, and Kimberley memorandum from his private papers quoted in Thio, “British Policy”, p. 316.

⁴⁰ Under-Secretary Walpole to Currie, 17 Sep. 1885, FO422/12.

⁴¹ Satow to Currie in PRO30/33/14/2. The particular instance of this was the recent death of the Wangna or “Second King”, complicating the prospects for the succession to King Chulalongkorn. See also Satow to Currie, 8 Aug., 11 Sep. in 30/33/14/1-2 and SSP II.

⁴² Smith to Satow, 30 Oct. 1885, PRO30/33/2/9. He had written to Satow on 5 Jan.: “I hear from home that matters are going against Perak in its contention with Siam. Your views, alas! are carrying the day.”

⁴³ See his A Diplomat in Siam (Falkirk: Kiscadale, 1996Google Scholar), ed. by the present author.

⁴⁴ As a prescription for substantial German expansion in East Africa over the next few years, it was not a happy model. See Robinson, R. and Gallagher, J., Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 195–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁵ See Satow to Currie, 23, 30 Nov., 1 Dec, and Satow Diaries, 28, 30 Nov. 1885, PRO30/33/14/2, 15/10. Cf. SSP II, and Salisbury to Sir John Walsham, British Minister (effectively Chargé d'Affaires in the absence of the ambassador, Lord Lyons) in Paris, 28 Sep. 1885, FO410/28, based word for word on his own aide-memoire in FO27/2779. This is, however, brief and rather unenlightening. The Siamese had heard reports of Anglo-French plans to delimit their frontiers via The Times Paris correspondent Blowitz, and their own Minister in Paris, Prince Pritsdang. Cf. H. Norman, “Old and New Siam: An Interview with H.R.H. the Siamese Minister of Foreign Affairs”, Pall Mall Gazette, 30 Aug. 1890: “We are aware, by the way, that the French Ambassador proposed to Lord Salisbury that an imaginary line should be laid down the middle of Siam, and that the country to the west of that should be considered the sphere of British interests, and that to the East the sphere of French interests.”

⁴⁶ I.O. to F.O., 8 Oct. 1885, FO27/2779. The current Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Julian Pauncefote, a legal expert not normally concerned with such affairs, minuted on this, 9 Oct., “In view of French activity in the Indo Chinese Peninsula, it will be difficult to maintain British influence, without entering into defensive alliances with Siam & the other States.” What “other States” he meant is difficult to imagine, but the minute was then initialled “S” by Salisbury.

⁴⁷ In FO69/112.

⁴⁸ Cady, J.F., A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 130–32Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ FO69/112. Weld's report to the CO. of 17 Mar. 1886. Kiernan, “Britain, Siam and Malaya”, p. 18, quotes a more reasonable remark by Rosebery rather later.

⁵⁰ Indeed, with the death shortly, while Satow was out of the country, of the King's half-uncle, the Kromphra Prince Mahamala, he was to become the last survivor of the quartet of great magnates Satow had identified earlier as the main obstacle to the centralization of governmental authority in the person of the King. The former Kromatha, Chaophraya Phanuwong, had resigned his government offices the previous year.

⁵¹ Enclosures in Weld report above. Apparently Satow had similarly had warning of this new initiative in a Weld letter of 24 Feb. 1886 (missing), see Satow to Currie, 26 Mar. 1886, SSP II. In a further letter to Satow of 25 Mar., Weld declared, “I am much obliged to you for your letters public & private. It is of course one thing my pursuing my claims & [quite another?] your doing so, but what I want is to keep the matter before the Foreign Office. One thing is clear that these repeated insults added to the refusal to deliver up country which the Foreign Office admits to be justly ours, is ruinous to our credit with Malays & the Siamese so far have succeeded in placing us in a most contemptible position.” PRO30/33/2/9.

⁵² Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, p. 106 n. 144, indicates Currie's heavy involvement in the Persian Question in the first half of 1886.

⁵³ Currie to Satow, 5 Sep. 1885, PRO30/33/1/6.

⁵⁴ Currie minutes on CO. to F.O., 11 Aug., 29 Oct., FO69/99, 104. He also dismissed Satow's advice as being “to menager Siam”. To the first, Salisbury had replied “Wait a little. There are some awkward negotiations commencing with France about French concessions &c. in Burmah. I should rather try to get from Siam some security against these than fight over this bit of desert.” He now replied “I do not like acting on this till we know what line the new French govt. when it comes [in] will take about this peninsula.”

⁵⁵ This was perhaps the first occasion when Salisbury employed his famous term “a little bit of desert” for potential imperial territory, but his previous term as Foreign Secretary, 1878-80, had featured a mission of protest from Bangkok led by a younger half-brother of the ex-Regent, at the interference in local affairs of Knox, the earlier British Agent and Consul-General. Salisbury's solution had been to recall and replace Knox. For a somewhat fanciful account, see Minney, R.J., Fanny and the Regent of Siam (London: Collins, 1962Google Scholar), and my own Two Views of Siam, p. 14.

⁵⁶ See his own rather aggressive sentiments expressed to his old Japan friend F.V. Dickins, 5 Nov. 1885, in SSP II. Bernard was withdrawn to a senior position in the India Office in London in 1887, in favour of the less fastidious Charles Crosthwaite.

⁵⁷ Satow to Dickins, 4 Apr. 1886. SSP II.

⁵⁸ Satow to Secretary of Foreign Dept., Govt. of India, 8 Apr. 1886, in Satow to Rosebery, 27 Apr. 1886, FO69/109. See also my forthcoming article, “Ernest Satow and Extraterritoriality in Eastern Asia”.

⁵⁹ This war, which can be said to have led on almost irresistibly to the ultimate extinction of Burmese independence some 60 years later, was prompted originally by fairly trivial border disputes along the R. Naaf. See Cady, A History of Modern Burma, pp. 72-73.

⁶⁰ This does not appear to have been authorized by Bangkok, unless by Chaophraya Surawong. Verney had been somewhat disaffected from the cause of his employers since the previous year, see my Two Views of Siam, p. 19 n., and in 1887, was to be refused the opportunity to visit Siam for the first time by Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong, on the latter's visit to London.

⁶¹ Thio, “British Policy”, p. 294, and Satow letter in PRO30/33/2/9. Cf. also SSP II.

⁶² Gould to Satow, 4, 13 Jul. 1886, PRO30/33/2/1.

⁶³ Currie to Satow, 30 Apr. 1886. Cf. Currie minute, 11 Jun., on CO. to F.O., 31 May 1886, FO69/113, and Currie to Satow, 8 Aug. 1884, 17 Feb. 1885, in PRO30/33/1/6. Barlow, Swettenham, pp. 36, 338, 340-41, talks repeatedly of his tactlessness.

⁷⁰ Weld to Satow, 25 Mar. 1886 (Private). Satow had replied dismissively, 9 Apr., regarding “Swettenham's pamphlet” of 1882, SSP II. See also Chayachoke, “Thai-British Relations”, pp. 93-98.

⁶⁵ See his British Malaya, pp. 316-28. For Swettenham's notorious expansionism, see Thio, “British Policy”, esp. pp. 4, 31-32, or pp. xvi, 4, in the published vol. I (British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1969Google Scholar). Barlow, Swettenham, p. 352, observes, “Swettenham's consistent failure adequately to resolve the problems posed by Siam was a source of dissatisfaction and even bitterness, up to the end of his life”.

⁶⁶ Weld to Satow, 17 Mar. 1886 (conf.), PRO30/33/2/9.

⁶⁷ As early as 1875, on a visit with Governor Jervois, Swettenham discovered that even at Songkhla, only about one per cent of the population spoke Malay. Barlow, Swettenham, p. 116. Nakhon Sithammarat's Wat Mahathat, reckoned to date from at least the sixteenth century, is one of the glories of Thai Buddhist temple architecture.

⁶⁸ As Weld put it, to Gould, 17 Jun. 1886, PRO30/33/2/9: “We would pay a tenth of the revenue, or if preferred a fixed sum of [Straits] $5,000 to Siam for 10 y[ea]rs, besides giving the Rajah a larger revenue than the country now produces which is something about $1,200 or $1,500 & a little plunder occasionally wh[ich] hardly I imagine reaches Bangkok. Free transport down the river Muda the direct outlet for Reman mines should be stipulated.” And he viewed a lease as preferable to purchase, as likely to afford better opportunity for interference further north. Thio, “British Policy”, pp. 296-97.

⁶⁹ Both published in London. See also the “Report of Mr. Holt Hallett upon the present State and Political Aspect of Indo-China”, Apr. 1885, in FO69/103, compiled for the Foreign Office at Currie's request. Scott, subsequently an official in British Burma, and eventually the Charge d'Affaires in Bangkok, had acted for a while as Colquhoun's secretary before going as a journalist to report the Sino-French war in Vietnam.

⁷⁰ Dufferin to Lord Cross, 10 Sep. 1886, FO69/113.

⁷¹ See memo by Satow, ? Aug. 1888, on Gould to Salisbury 29 Jun., SSP III (forthcoming). The eventual Anglo-French Joint Declaration on Siam of 16 Jan. 1896 was to bear a more than passing resemblance to this proposal of Harmand's. Satow's successor as British Minister in Bangkok, Capt. H.M. Jones V.C., is recorded as having in 1893 shown the General Adviser to the Siamese Government, G. Rolin Jaequemyns, “confidential documents of the highest importance” regarding “the efforts made by the French in 1886 [misprinted 1866] to push Lord Dufferin to agree to the dismemberment of Siam. It was Harmand who was the negotiator”. Supposedly, “England had refused the proposals as unjust.” Tips, W.E.J., Siam's Struggle for Survival: The 1893 Gunboat Incident at Paknam (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996), p. 29Google Scholar.

⁷² Fook-Seng, P. Loh, The Malay States 1877-1895: Political Change and Social Policy (Kuala Lumpur, 1969), p. 65Google Scholar. He appears to date it 8 Sep. Barlow, Swettenham, p. 357, calls this “cynicism”.

⁷³ Meade to Currie, 16 Sep., in Currie to Satow, 29 Sep. 1886, PRO30/33/1/6. Italics added. Loh, The Malay States, pp. 65-66, prints a version of this phrased slightly differently, which he appears to attribute to 4 Dec.

⁷⁴ Satow Diaries, 2 Dec. 1887, SSP III.

⁷⁵ Satow to Currie, 25 Jul. 1886, and Weld to Satow, 18 Jun. 1886, in PRO30/33/14/2, 2/9. The “if it must be” was repeated in his letter to Weld, 26 Jul., also in 2/9 and SSP II.

⁷⁶ Satow to Weld, 26 Jul. 1886. PRO30/33/14/2. Cf. SSP II. In the 1887 typescript of his Diplomat in Siam, while declaring (p. 26), “Perhaps there is no Eastern country, certainly none of those which have regular diplomatic relations with Europe, where the administration is so utterly bad,” he also observed (p. 215), “I do not think that the benefit we confer on Asiatics by relieving them of corrupt and oppressive rulers quite counterbalances the loss of their independence.”

⁷⁷ Satow to Weld, 3 Nov., and Weld to Satow, 26 Nov. 1886, SSP III. The final arrangement was that King Chulalongkorn was to be offered one-tenth of Raman revenues or Straits $5000 per annum, and if Betong and Padang Limau Nipis were definitely to be included, the Raja of Raman $30,000 and the Governor of Songkhla $10,000.

⁷⁸ Satow's request for leave dated from 18 Jan., but permission to take it was only telegraphed to him on 3 Apr. For this and his frustration regarding the Raman negotiations, see Satow to Currie, 18 Jan., 28 Feb., 14, 23 Mar. 1887, SSP III.

⁷⁹ Following traditional Thai custom regarding royal bloodlines, King Chulalongkorn had married as Queens four of his half-sisters, three of whom were also full sisters to each other and to Prince Thewawong.

⁸⁰ Satow Diary, 7, 10 Apr., and Satow to Currie (two letters), 11 Apr. 1887, SSP III.

⁸¹ Minutes of 13 Jul. by Herbert and Meade on F.O. to CO., 7 Jul., CO273/149.

⁸² Satow Diaries, 21 Jul., 12 Oct., 15, 16 Dec, SSP III.

⁸³ Satow Diaries, 1, 19 Jul. 1887, SSP III. Swettenham to CO. Under-Sec, 21 Jul. 1887, CO273/149, seems to suggest that it was Verney who had put Prince Thewawong up to his “non possumus” line at the 1 July meeting.

⁸⁴ This resembles his reluctance back in Sep. 1885, to put on paper anything but a very brief account of his meeting with ambassador Waddington on the French “spheres of influence” proposal.

⁸⁵ Diaries, 13 Jul., 16 Sep., SSP III.

⁸⁶ The diary entry, 16 Sep., says Perak, which must be wrong. Satow wrote regarding Salisbury to his deputy Gould, who was himself predicting the imminent collapse of Siam, 26 Sep. 1887: “I think he misjudges the situation, but I have no means of influencing his opinion, and we must of course guide ourselves by it. I say this not because it is the best way for a man to secure his own position but because I am firmly convinced that in a public service except in extreme cases, a man is more useful who acts in accordance with what he knows are the views of those who are at headquarters and can survey the whole field. If one disagrees with them, one can remonstrate, but still obey the mot d'ordre, until it is altered.” See SSP III.

⁸⁷ Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, pp. 123, 181-82. The contrast between F. Kazemzadeh's monumental Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914, in which Persia's selfdebasement is openly admitted, and Wyatt's, D.K.The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 and 1969Google Scholar), which was published almost simultaneously, is quite striking. In 1899, Salisbury observed that Britain still “interfered” with the Persian government much more than those of South America, China, and Siam, in the Persian case even giving advice about the appointment and dismissal of provincial governors whether or not direct British interests were involved. McLean, D., Britain and her Buffer State: The Collapse of the Persian Empire, 1870-1914 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1979), p. 140Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ War and India Offices to F.O., 13 Jan., 9 May 1888, Gould to Salisbury, 27 Mar. 1889, and India Office to Foreign Office, 17 Nov. 1891, 22 Aug. 1895, and enclosures, FO422/22, 23, 34, 43, complaints of Secretary to Siamese Legation F. Verney, 1 Dec. 1890, 4 Feb., 6 Mar. 1891, 28 Jul. 1892, FO69/147, his representations to the F.O., memo by Sanderson, 4 Feb. 1891, FO69/145. Cf. Morgan, G., Ney Elias, Explorer and Envoy Extraordinary in High Asia (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971)Google Scholar, ch. 9, and my Two Views of Siam, intro. Indian Government uncertainty was evident in Viceroy Lansdowne's 1891 talk of the difficulties of dealing with “a Power so weak and irresponsible as Siam”, observing, “We do not regard the Siamese as desirable neighbours, owing to their weakness and the unsatisfactory character of their diplomacy. They are, however, we believe, more desirable neighbours than the French would be.” In the F.O. in the early 1890s, there seems to have been some fear that Bangkok would throw itself into the hands of the French. See Sanderson minute, 8 Jul. 1892, on Lord Knutsford to F.O., 4 Jul. 1892. FO69/147.

⁸⁹ Weld Papers cited in Thio, “British Policy”, p. 418.

⁹⁰ See Barlow, Swettenham, ch. 29-31.

⁹¹ Both appear to have been quite good friends of Satow.

⁹² Chayachoke, “Thai-British Relations”, pp. 267-68, and Tuck, “Britain, France and Siam”, p. 200.

⁹³ Thio, “British Policy”, p. 362.

⁹⁴ Barlow, Swettenham, pp. 456, 541.

⁹⁵ Thus he was very much the target of the criticisms of a CO. clerk, F. Graham, in an extended minute of 7 Apr., on F.O. to CO., 29 Mar. 1889, CO273/163, as “ignorant” and “contemptuous” of British influence in the Malay Peninsula. However, Graham's renewed stress on a “line of land communication” between Penang and British Burma, the dangers of buffers such as Siam, “a feeble and crumbling State … that sooner or later will fall a prey to one or more European powers”, and the advisability of cooperating with the India Office to “pressure” the F.O. to ensure the reversion of peninsular Siam to Britain, was quickly sat upon by Meade, Herbert, and even the Colonial Secretary, Lord Knutsford himself. At the same time, Satow could now write in most hostile fashion regarding the Siamese, for instance, 2 Jul. 1888 on Smith to CO., 5 May 1888: “Their constant policy is to preserve their own independence by exciting mutual jealousies betw[een] G.B. & France,” and “All this seems to indicate that the Siamese are not to be trusted and their goodwill not to be relied on.” PRO30/33/1/7. See also SPP III.

⁹⁶ See my Two Views, p. 38, also p. 84, and Chandran Jeshuran, The Contest for Siam, pp. 5-7, 115, 157. Sanderson was also inclined to see the Siamese as “occasionally very slippery”, though earlier commenting, rather kindly in Satow's case, “There can, I suppose, be no doubt that Mr. Satow and Mr. Gould have made some blunders [re. Dr. Gowan and the local expatriate community], which is not much to be wondered at, taking into consideration that they have had no legal training.” Sanderson to Bayley (of the I.O.), 20 Aug. 1891, and minute, 15 Jul. 1889, with F.O. memo on the Bangkok Consular Court, 1 Jul. 1889, FO69/145, 137. At the time of the Paknam crisis in July 1893, Satow happened to be passing through London en route from Montevideo to a new posting in Morocco, and was called into the Foreign Office by Sanderson for advice. Satow Diaries, 11, 25 Jul. 1893, PRO30/33/15/15.

In addition to his broader championing of their cause, with respect to their domestic development, the Siamese owed to Satow early suggestions for the reform of their legal system, including the adoption of Western-style codes, courts and jails, the creation of ministries of Justice and the Interior, the appointment of a Chief Justice, that the King should make incognito tours of inspection, “Haroun al-Rashid style”, etc. He also encouraged them in their ongoing efforts at military and political consolidation, if not expansion, and to think in terms of forming a Thai “nation-state”. Satow Diaries 11, 25 Feb., 12 Mar., 23 Jun., 9 Jul., 13, 14, 24 Sep., 30 Oct., 28 Nov. 1885. SSP I-II. In early 1887, Prince Thewawong reported to Satow as the standard retort of other members of the royal council to any suggestions he made: “That's Mr. Satow!” Satow Diary, 21 Mar. 1887, SSP III.

⁹⁷ Swettenham later claimed to have been its author. Satow Diaries, 11 Dec. 1902. PRO30/33/16/6. Cf. Swettenham to J. Chamberlain (private), 15 Jul. 1902, cited in Linehan, “Relations”, pp. 36-38.

⁹⁸ See Judd, D., Balfour and the British Empire (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 271Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ See especially Chayachoke, “Thai-British Relations”, pp. 300-304.

¹⁰⁰ Thio, “British Policy”, p. 391.

¹⁰¹ He was not appointed Governor of the Straits Settlements until September 1901.

¹⁰² Thio, “British Policy”, p. 503, and cf. Barlow, Swettenham, ch. 39: “The Problem of Siam: Reality of Failure”.

¹⁰³ As it came to be known in the years up to 1914. See especially Andrew, Théophile Délcasse, Rolo, Entente Cordiale, and Monger, The End of Isolation.

¹⁰⁴ Built under British auspices on an autonomous basis, this also ensured that the largely German-run Siamese Railways Department remained excluded from the peninsula. Thio, “British Policy”, pp. 480-81.