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The Jones Bills 1912–16: A Reappraisal of Filipino Views on Independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Wong Kwok Chu
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Extract

Many historians have accepted the view that the two prominent Filipino leaders — Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena — were not really in favour of immediate Philippine independence despite their constant open advocacy of such an aspiration. For instance, Roy W. Curry wrote that “… the eloquent Quezon was playing independence as a necessary political expedience while privately fearing that it might be granted”, whereas Bonifacio S. Salamanca suggested “… at least the two foremost leaders of the Filipino elite — Quezon and Osmena — did not really desire immediate independence, or even want to have a date fixed for the future recognition of Philippine independence”.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , September 1982 , pp. 252 - 269
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1982

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References

1 Curry, Roy W., Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy 1913–1921 (New York, 1957), p. 81Google Scholar.

2 Salamanca, Bonifacio S., The Filipino Reaction to American Rule 1901–1913 (Norwich, 1968), p. 174Google Scholar.

3 Memorandum No. 1 — 1913, dated 29 Dec. 1913, F. McIntyre to L. Garrison, in ibid., p. 172.

4 Ibid., pp. 173–74.

5 Ibid., p. 173; see also W. Cameron Forbes' views on Osmena, cited in ibid., p. 171.

6 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 22 Feb. 1914, Quezon Papers (hereafter cited as QP), Box 39.

7 The Democratic Party in the United States had adopted a plank favouring Philippine independence since 1900. For instance, in the Baltimore convention of the Party in 1912, its Philippine plank stated that: “We favor an immediate declaration of the Nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established; such independence to be guaranteed by us until the neutralization of the Islands could be secured by treaty with other powers”. For full text of the 4 Democratic Party platforms on the Philippine question, see Kalaw, Maximo M., The Case for the Filipinos (New York, 1916), Appendix EGoogle Scholar.

8 On 21 June 1911, Quezon sent letters to Congressmen, giving them details of his schemes for Philippine independence, QP, Box 37.

9 Congressman William A. Jones of Virginia, in a reply to Quezon's 21 June letter, favoured Philippine independence. As Quezon understood Jones, the latter strongly believed that the continuous possession of the Philippines by the United States would inject the virus of imperialism into the American body politic; cf. Quezon, Manuel L., The Good Fight (New York, 1946), p. 122Google Scholar.

10 M.L. Quezon to E. Winslow, 9 Mar. 1912, p. 1, QP, Box 38.

11 M.L. Quezon to E. Winslow, 13 Mar. 1912, QP, Box 38.

12 Report to Accompany the House Joint Resolution 278, p. 1. A copy of this Report is in QP, Box 72.

13 Casambre, Napoleon J., “Quezon and the Jones Bill”, Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review XXIII (June/Dec. 1958): 266–67Google Scholar; see also the news reported by The Philippine Republic, a biweekly journal published in Hong Kong, on 15 June 1912; also Quezon's undated article (probably mid-1912) entitled “The Democratic Party and the Philippines”, QP, Box 72.

14 Philippine Assembly Resolution No. 61, 10 Dec. 1912. A copy of this Resolution is kept in QP, Box 141.

15 M.L. Quezon to Editor, Post Dispatch, St. Louis, 26 Mar. 1912; M.L. Quezon to Editor, Times Dispatch, Richmond, 27 Mar. 1912; also on 29 Mar. 1912, Quezon sent hundreds of letters to all Congressmen, Presidents of American universities and famous law offices, requesting their support of the first Jones Bill, copies of these letters are kept in QP, Box 141.

16 See M.L. Quezon to Editor, Post Dispatch, St. Louis, op. cit.; Quezon's undated article, “The Democratic Party and the Philippines”, op. cit.

17 See Quezon, Manuel L., Philippine Independence Bill, Remarks of Honorable Manuel L. Quezon in the House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1912)Google Scholar.

18 The Republican Party in the United States and President William H. Taft were not in favour of granting the Filipinos independence until they showed themselves capable of self-government. See Casambre, “Quezon and the Jones Bill”, pp. 267–68; also, Oscar W. Underwood to M.L. Quezon, 7 July 1912, and M.L. Quezon to E. Winslow, 7 July 1912, QP, Box 38.

19 When Governor-General Francis B. Harrison arrived at Manila on 6 Oct. 1913, he delivered a message from Wilson to the Filipinos which declared that “every step we [Americans] take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence”.

20 Cf. Wilson's Message to Congress, 2 Dec. 1913; full text in Kalaw, The Case, Appendix F.

21 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 20 May 1913, QP, Box 38; M.L. Quezon to McDill, 3 July 1913, QP, Box 38; and M.M. Kalaw to A.V. Villanueva, 17 Nov. 1913, QP, Box 141.

22 Stanley, Peter W., A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States 1899–1921 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974), p. 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Memorandum No. 2 — 1914, dated 17 Jan. 1914, F. McIntyre to L. Garrison, in Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction, p. 174.

24 A copy of Quezon's memorandum to Wilson in QP, Box 39.

25 M.L. Quezon to E. Winslow, 19 Jan. 1914, QP, Box 39.

26 Quezon's memorandum to Wilson, 11 Feb. 1914, pp. 1–2, QP, Box 39.

27 M.L. Quezon to M. Storey, 3 Feb. 1914, and M.L. Quezon to E. Winslow, 3 Feb. 1914, QP, Box 39.

28 M. Storey to M.L. Quezon, 9 Feb. 1914, pp. 1–3, QP, Box 39.

29 M.L. Quezon to M. Storey, 12 Feb. 1914, p. 1, QP, Box 39.

30 M.L. Quezon to M. Storey, 12 Feb. 1914, pp. 3–4, QP, Box 39.

31 M.L. Quezon to M. Storey, 12 Feb. 1914, p. 4, QP, Box 39.

32 M.L. Quezon to E. Winslow, 19 Feb. 1914, QP, Box 39.

33 Both Congressman Jones, Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs and Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines told Quezon that they were not going to do anything with regard to the Philippines unless they learnt what Wilson was determined to do. Cf. M.L. Quezon to E. Winslow, 8 Mar. 1913 and 30 June 1913, QP, Box 38.

34 M.L. Quezon to E. Winslow, 17 Jan. 1914, QP, Box 39.

35 Good accounts of the pressure groups that were working against the movement for Philippine independence during discussions of the Jones Bills are Casambre, “Quezon and the Jones Bill”, pp. 267–68, 278; and Beadles, John A., “The Debate in the United States Concerning Philippine Independence, 1912–1916”, Philippine Studies XVI (July 1968): 426–31Google Scholar.

36 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 25 Feb. 1914, QP, Box 39.

37 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 4 Mar. 1914, QP, Box 39; Stanley, A Nation, pp. 214–15.

38 Cf. M.L. Quezon to F.B. Harrison, 23 June 1914, and M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 6 July 1914, QP, Box 39. Earlier communication between Quezon and Osmena concerning merits and circumstances leading to the second Jones Bill could not be located in the Quezon Papers.

39 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 20 June 1914, QP, Box 39.

40 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 22 June 1914, QP, Box 39.

41 Stanley, A Nation, pp. 215–17.

42 Ibid., pp. 217–18.

43 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 26 Jan. 1915, QP, Box 41.

44 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 9 Oct. 1914, in Pacis, Vicente A., President Sergio Osmena, A Fully Documented Biography (Quezon City, 1971), p. 199Google Scholar.

45 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 28 Jan. 1915, QP, Box 41.

46 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 28 Jan. 1915, QP, Box 41.

47 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 20 Feb. 1915, QP, Box 41.

48 For reasons of Clarke's advocacy of his amendment, see Curry, Woodrow Wilson, p. 90, and Stanley, A Nation, p. 221.

49 Senate of the United States-Amendment, 12 Jan. 1916. A copy of this amendment is in QP, Box 142; see also M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 11 Jan. 1916, QP, Box 41.

50 A copy of the Clarke Amendment is in QP, Box 142; for text of the neutralization clause, see Kalaw, The Case, pp. 225–26.

51 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 24 Jan. 1916, QP, Box 41. Despite his official endorsement of the Clarke Amendment, Wilson was personally against it. He told the resigning Secretary of War, Garrison, that “it is my own judgement that the action embodied in the Clarke Amendment is unwise at this time, but it would be clearly more inadvisable for me to take the position that I must dissent from the action should House of Congress concur in a bill embodying the amendment”. W. Wilson to L. Garrison, 10 Feb. 1916, cited in Caballero, Isabelo P. and de Gracia, M. Conception, Quezon, The Story of a Nation and Its Foremost Statesman (Manila, 1935), p. 148Google Scholar. See also Congressional Record – House, Vol. 53 (1 May 1916): 142.

52 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 13 Feb. 1916, p. 1, QP, Box 41.

53 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 6 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

54 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 1 Jan. 1915, QP, Box 41.

55 Philippine Assembly Resolution, 25 Jan. 1916. The text of this Resolution was communicated to Quezon in a cable on the same day; S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 25 Jan. 1916, QP, Box 41.

56 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 6 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

57 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 8 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

58 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 8 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41; S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 10 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

59 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 8 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

60 Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 11 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

61 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 15 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

62 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 11 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

63 Quezon's draft cablegram dated 12 Feb. 1916, pp. 1–2, QP, Box 41; underlining supplied.

64 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 19 Feb. 1916, pp. 1–2, QP, Box 41.

65 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 21 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

66 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 19 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

67 M.L. Quezon to S. Osmena, 21 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

68 S. Osmena to M.L. Quezon, 23 Feb. 1916, QP, Box 41.

69 Alfonso, Oscar M., Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines 1897–1909 (Quezon City, 1970), pp. 74–75Google Scholar.

70 I did not come across any material on this aspect in my reading of the Quezon Papers. To the best of my knowledge, the only relevant research available is Goodman's, Grant K. article entitled “The Problem of Philippine Independence and Japan, The First Three Decades of American Colonial Rule”, Southeast Asia. An International Quarterly I (Summer 1971): 165–90Google Scholar.

71 Cf. Press Release on 26 Apr. 1912, QP, Box 72; Quezon's article “The Philippine Problem” dated 15 Apr. 1912, QP, Box 71; and Quezon's speech on 25 Mar. 1916, “Philippine Independence and the Preparedness Programme”, QP, Box 72.

72 The Philippine Republic, 15 Oct. 1912.

73 The Philippine Republic, 15 May 1913.

74 El Renacimiento, 22 Feb. 1906, reprinted in the Manila Times, 23 Feb. 1906.

75 Manila Times, 7 Apr. 1906.

76 The Philippine Republic, 1 July 1913.

77 The Philippine Republic, 11 Oct. 1911.

78 The Philippine Republic, 15 Oct. 1912.

79 Quoted in Philippine Free Press, 29 Jan. 1916; cited in Diamonon, Victoriano D., The Development of Self-Govemment in the Philippine Islands (Iowa City, 1920), p. 62Google Scholar.

80 Quoted in Philippine Free Press, 29 Jan. 1916, and in Diamonon, The Development.

81 The Philippine Review, Apr. 1916.

82 What surprises me in my research of the Quezon Papers is the lack of discussion by Filipino leaders in the mid-1910s of the economic consequences that would follow Philippine independence. Free trade between the Islands and the United States, fully introduced by 1913, would no doubt affect Philippine independence by making the Philippines dependent on American markets and manufactured goods. However, the effects of this adverse factor would assume greater importance in the 1920s than in the mid-1910s.