¹ Maj.-Gen. Kirby, S. Woodburn, The War Against Japan, v. 1, The Loss of Singapore (History of the Second World War) (London, 1957), pp. 90–91.Google Scholar

² Pre-war Japanese planners seem never to have been clear about their intentions of including India n i Greater East Asia. Early plans (1940) sometimes envisioned including India “ultimately”, but it did not become a part of strategic planning until the Burma campaign was almost over. ( Ghosh, K. K., The Indian National Army [Meerut, 1969], pp. 13–16, 85–86.) The Japanese hoped that their conquest of Burma and Southeast Asia would foment sufficient anti-British sentiment to result in open revolt within India and facilitate recruitment of a National Army outside of India to employ in combat and propaganda roles later onGoogle Scholar.

³ , Arnold and Toynbee, Veronica (eds.), Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946, v. 11Google Scholar; The Initial Triumph of the Axis (London, 1958), p. 654Google Scholar.

⁴ Jones, F. C., Japan's New Order in East Asia (London, 1954), pp. 231–32.Google Scholar

⁵ Burma Operations Record, Phase I, Nov. 1941–Dec. 1942 (Tokyo: U. S. Army Headquarters Far East Command, Military History Section, Japanese Research Division, n. d.), p. 4. Japanese monograph no. 57.Google Scholar

⁶ , Jones, op. cit., p. 322.Google Scholar

⁷ Allen, Louis, The End of the War in Asia (London, 1976), p. 27.Google Scholar

⁸ , Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, p. 93Google Scholar; Ibid., v. 2, India's Most Dangerous Hour (London, 1958), p. 442Google Scholar. Japanese and Chinese proper names throughout this essay follow the Oriental tradition of family or patronimic first, given name last.

⁹ Burma Operations Record: Outline of Burma Area Line of Communications (Tokyo: U. S. Army Headquarters Far East Command, Military History Section, Japanese Research Division, n. d.), p. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁰ , Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 13Google Scholar. Correspondent Alfred Wagg reported later that a Colonel Ottaway and a group of men operated a sabotage and intelligence net behind the Japanese lines i n eastern Burma but that this was the only successful and aggressive attempt at gathering intelligence. (Wagg, Alfred, A Million Died [London, 1943], p. 119.)Google Scholar

¹¹ Lt.-Gen. SirEvans, Geoffrey, The Johnnies (London, 1964), p. 12.Google Scholar

¹² Lowe, Peter, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War (London, 1977), p. 45.Google Scholar

¹³ Brig. -Gen. SirSmyth, John, Before the Dawn (London, 1957), p. 120.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Butler, J. R. M., Grand Strategy (History of the Second World War) (London, 1964), p. 466.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Pogue, Forrest C., George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope (New York, 1966), p. 355.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Connell, John, Wavell: Supreme Commander, 1941–1943 (London, 1969), p. 41.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 215.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

¹⁹ , Smyth, Before the Dawn, p. 140.Google Scholar

²⁰ Bryant, Arthur, The Turn of the Tide (London, 1957), pp. 294–95.Google Scholar

²¹ Leighton, Richard M. and Coakley, Robert W., Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943 (U. S. Army in World War II: The War Department) (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955), p. 525.Google Scholar

²² Tuchman, Barbara, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York, 1970), pp. 238–39.Google Scholar

²³ After the war, the Chinese were found to have quietly moved boundary stones into Burma during the Japanese occupation of the country. (Letter, Riley Sunderland to author, Mar. 1977). Also, the Chinese Ministry of Information published a map in July 1943 showing all northern Burma as Chinese territory. (SirWoodward, Llewellyn, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War [History of the Second World War] [London, 1962], p. 425, n. 2.) See alsoGoogle ScholarYung-chi, Ho, The Big Circle (New York, 1948), pp. 89–90, 131–32Google Scholar, for a discussion of other territorial ambitions in Burma.

²⁴ Romanus, Charles and Sunderland, Riley, Stilwell's Mission to China (U. S. Army in World War II: China Burma India) (Washington: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), pp. 53–55.Google Scholar

²⁵ , Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, pp. 17–18.Google Scholar

²⁶ , Connell, Wavell, pp. 63–64Google Scholar; , Kirby, op. cit., p. 102Google Scholar.

²⁷ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 1. Unpublished manuscript by Stilwell's staff written after the campaign, in Supporting Documents to Historical Publication U. S. Army in World War II-CIB Theater (Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. Location hereafter cited as WNRC).

²⁸ , Allen, The End of the War in Asia, p. 15.Google Scholar

²⁹ Hutton had been sent to Burma by Wavell on 27 December. Previously, he had served as Wavell's Chief of Staff in India and, while a brilliant staff officer, was, by his own admission, unsuited for fighting command (SirSmyth, John, Leadership in War, 1939–1945 [London, 1974], pp. 152–53)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Capt.Hart, B. H. Liddell, The Tanks, 2 vols. (London, 1959), vol. 2, p. 297Google Scholar. The brigade had been in combat in North Africa and was destined for Singapore. It was equipped with light American-made M3 Stuart tanks which the British called “Honeys”. They mounted a 37mm gun and two. 30 calibre machine guns.

³¹ Maj. -Gen. Kan Li-ch'u was characterized by Stilwell's staff after the campaign as doing well when he had no problems, but broke down under adversity. He lacked ability and foresight, feeding in his troops piecemeal. He was blamed by Stilwell for having a major share in the collapse of the Shan States front. (“Campaign in Burma”, p. 93. )

³² “Campaign in Burma”, p. 1.

³³ General P'eng was considered by the Americans to have been an able and forceful commander of well-disciplined soldiers, but was crippled by not being allowed to take offensive action by the weak Sixth Army commander, General Kan. (Ibid., p. 94. )

³⁴ General Lu was judged post-bellum by Stilwell's staff to have lacked ability and either was reluctant to or actually refused to follow orders that would have moved his troops into combat. “His interest apparently was financial and political. … His sole idea was to escape Burma with his division intact and his booty in his personal possession. ” (Ibid.)

³⁵ Ibid.; , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 85Google Scholar.

³⁶ , Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 44Google Scholar. The Sixth Army had been in action earlier at Changsha, had suffered heavy losses, and its ranks were filled with many raw recruits. This was especially true of the Temporary-Fifty-fifth Division. (See Hendershot, Clarence, “The Role of the Shan States in the Japanese Conquest of Burma”, Far Eastern Quarterly 2 [May 1943]: 254.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁷ Mackay, Col. J. N., History of the 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles (London, 1962), p. 176.Google Scholar

³⁸ Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan), The Retreat from Burma, 1941–42 (Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939–45) (Calcutta, 1959), p. 406. (Hereafter cited as The Retreatfrom Burma.)

³⁹ , Connell, Wavell, pp. 203–4.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ , Butler, Grand Strategy, 3 (2): 476.Google Scholar

⁴¹ , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 73.Google Scholar

⁴² , Kirby, The Loss of Singapore, pp. 266–67.Google Scholar

⁴³ Ibid., p. 155.

⁴⁴ Maj. -Gen. Tai “had ability and force, and considerable courage”. Once given a chance to demonstrate his abilities, he could carry out “skillful and bold tactics” (“Campaign in Burma”, p. 93).

⁴⁵ General Liao had been given military training in France. “He had ability, but was lacking in force. He was one of the few Chinese commanders who displayed any real interest in the welfare of his troops. ” (Ibid.)

⁴⁶ White, Theodore (ed.), The Stilwell Papers (New York, 1948), pp. 66–68Google Scholar; , Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 155Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 106–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ General Tu was characterized by Stilwell's staff as being seemingly “incapable of conceiving offensive action. … He lacked any sense of responsibility towards either the policies of his government or to his troops. … Though personally courageous, he was a moral coward and a whiner.” (“Campaign in Burma”, p. 93.) Tu was born in 1903 and graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy. He became commander of the 200th Division in 1938 and commander of Fifth Army in 1941. In 1943, he took command of Y-Force and after the war, served in the Nationalist army until captured at Hwai-Hai in January 1949. He was imprisoned by the Communists until 1959.(Boorman, Howard L. (ed. ), Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4 vols. [New York, 1967–1979] 3: 326–28. )Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The Stilwell Papers, pp. 78-79.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 76-78.

⁵² “Report on Visit to China, 24 Aug 42”, quoted in , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 118, n. 2(3)Google Scholar.

⁵³ The Stilwell Papers, p. 79.

⁵⁴ , Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 280.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 30.

⁵⁶ , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 97.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ , Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 163.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Brig.Bowerman, John, “Notes on Duties with the Chinese Expeditionary Force”, p. 3Google Scholar. (Unpublished manuscript provided with author's permission.)

⁵⁹ , Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 86.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ The Retreat from Burma, p. 467. Chiang Kai-shek had suggested the Ledo-Ft. Hertz-Myitkyina road while visiting Delhi in February. Wavell agreed to start at once on the jeep track from Ledo to Shingbwiyang through the Hukawng Valley and the Indian Tea Association was asked to recruit coolies t o build it. Construction continued until early May when all labour was put to the task of stocking refugee camps. (, Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 54.) The Americans did not share the opinion that the road would add much. Capt. Richard Jones, in charge of expediting traffic on the Burma Road, reported in April that the road would be impassable in wet weather and “jeeps can only carry 500 lbs. at a time”. Office of Strategic Services, Research & Analysis 280, Coordinator of Information, Far Eastern Section, “Evacuation of Rangoon” (28 Apr. 1942), p. 4. [OSS Reports, Modern Military Section, National Archives & Records Service, Washington, D. C.]Google Scholar

⁶¹ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 34.

⁶² Ibid., p. 35; , Bowerman, “Notes on Duties… ”, p. 4Google Scholar.

⁶³ Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 128–29. Roberts filed a report after the campaign in which he called the failure to recognize the immense importance of the Loikaw-Loilem-Lashio corridor “the big strategic error of the allies”. He laid the blame on Alexander who was, along with his staff, “very lackadaisical about the whole campaign; they didn't seem to care what happened on the left flank, once their own troops were out of that sector”. “Roberts' Notes on the 1st Burma Campaign”, no pagination, n. d. (WNRC).

⁶⁴ Romanus and Sunderland, op. cit.; , Bowerman, “Notes on Duties…”, p. 4Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ General Ch'en was described by the Americans as “an utter incompetent [who] lacked force, ability of any kind, and displayed no knowledge of any kind of tactics. … ” (“Campaign in Burma”, p. 95.)

⁶⁶ Carew, Tim, The Longest Retreat (London, 1969), p. 236.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ The Thirty-eighth Division had been organized in 1938 at Changsha as Salt Guards, originally having the duty of guarding the Government's salt revenues. (Yung-chi, Ho, The Big Circle, p. 3.)Google Scholar

⁶⁸ General Sun was born in 1900 and was trained at Virginia Military Institute in the United States. He became commander of the Thirty-eighth Division in 1938 and was regarded as the most capable of the Chinese generals in Burma. The Americans believed he showed “ability, force, and determination. His division was well-disciplined. He believed in personal direction and supervision when necessary, and did not spare himself. ” (“Campaign in Burma”, p. 94. ) After the war, he rose eventually to become Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army (1950), but a few years later fell from favour and was eased out of the army, allegedly for consorting with Communist plotters against the Generalissimo. (Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol. 3, pp. 165–67.)

⁶⁹ , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 125–26.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 44.

⁷¹ The Stilwell Papers, p. 90.

⁷² Field Marshal the Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory (New York, 1961), p. 57.Google Scholar

⁷³ Feis, Herbert, The China Tangle (Princeton, N. J., 1953), p. 30.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ , Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 363.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ , Feis, op. cit., p. 32.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ , Bowerman, “Notes on Duties…”, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ , Hendershot, “The Role of the Shan States…”, p. 256.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Dorn, Frank, Walkout: With Stilwell in Burma (New York, 1971), p. 85Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Japanese monograph no. 57, p. 52.

⁸⁰ U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, 2 vols. (Washington, D. C., 1970), vol. 1, p. 187Google Scholar.

⁸¹ , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 134Google Scholar; , Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 288Google Scholar.

⁸² , Romanus and , Sunderland, op. cit., p. 136.Google Scholar

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ The Stilwell Papers, p. 92.

⁸⁶ “General Lo Cho-ying's Report to the Generalissimo on the Operation of the Chinese Expeditionary Force in Burma”, 25 June 1942, p. 2Google Scholar. (Unpublished manuscript in Stilwell Papers, SNF-21, Hoover Library, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif.)

⁸⁷ , Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 364.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 137Google Scholar; “Campaign in Burma”, p. 54 ; , Bowerman, “Notes on Duties…”, pp. 8–9Google Scholar; Col.Foucar, E. V. C., “Draft Narrative of the First Burma Campaign” (1945), p. 202 (Unpublished manuscript in Reference Branch, Center for Military History Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. [Location hereafter cited as CMH]Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ The Retreatfrom Burma, p. 467.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 468.

⁹¹ Two battalions which had been in Lashio had marched south towards Loilem on 23 April and subsequently saw action on the roads between there and Lashio and Hsipaw in the days following. The rest of the division had arrived in Maymyo and was forced to stay there when British railway officials refused to send trains to Hsipaw. The division received an order from General Lo to move to the Myitnge River line o t reinforce the Twenty-second Division, but the commander of the Twenty-eighth Division refused to obey and appealed to Gen. Lin Wei. Lin, who had no authority to do so, ordered the division to Lashio. It was while enroute there that it was trapped on the Burma Road by the Japanese. (“Campaign in Burma”, pp. 58, 62, 63, 70, 72; The Stilwell Papers, p. 93. )

⁹² , Bowerman, “Notes on Duties…”, p. 6.Google Scholar

⁹³ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 69.

⁹⁴ Its loss, it should be pointed out, meant a long and costly campaign to re-establish this critical link i n the LOC two years later.

⁹⁵ The Japanese Account of Their Operations in Burma, Dec. 1941-Aug. 1945 (edited and issued by Headquarters Twelfth Army from documents submitted by Headquarters Japanese Burma Area Army, Rangoon, Dec. 1945, p. 20 [CMH]).

⁹⁶ “Interrogation of General Tanaka Shinichi, 25 Oct. 47” (In Interrogations of Japanese Officials on World War II) (GHQ Far East Command, Military Intelligence Division, Historical Division), p. 13 (CMH).

⁹⁷ The Stilwell Papers, p. 97.

⁹⁸ Part of the reason for the blockage was that General Lo had commandeered a train in a wild attempt to flee the general chaos and had collided head-on with a southbound freight on 1 May, blocking the single-track line. (See “General Lo Cho-ying's Report… ”, p. 4. )

⁹⁹ Stilwell radio, 6 May 1942 (WNRC).

¹⁰⁰ , Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 300.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ One observer later felt that Stilwell foresaw ultimate victory over Japan resulting from a huge land battle in China and viewed the reopening of the Burma Road as crucial in supplying this battle. (Letter, Patrick Hurley to Orlando Ward, 11 Jan. 1952. Hurley Papers, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma Library, Norman, Oklahoma.)

¹⁰² , Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 182.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 140Google Scholar; , Kirby, op. cit., p. 212Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ “Operations - Chinese Army (Trek from Burma)”, unpaginated (WNRC).

¹⁰⁵ Letter, Gruber to Wavell, 16 May 1942 (WNRC).

¹⁰⁶ History of China-Burma-India Theater, 21 May 1942 to 25 October 1944 (“General Stilwell's Report on CBI”) (1945), pp. 38–39 (Historical Manuscripts File, CMH).

¹⁰⁷ “Report on Activities in the Dibrugarh-Ledo-Tipang Area from June 20th to August 16th [1942]”, by Boatner, H. L. (New Delhi, 23 Aug. 1942), p. 2Google Scholar (Historical Manuscripts File, CMH).

¹⁰⁸ “General Lo Cho-ying's Report…”, p. 6; “Campaign in Burma”, pp. 80, 83-85.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 86.

¹¹⁰ Tyson, Geoffrey, Forgotten Frontier (Calcutta, 1945), p. 56.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Dr.Taylor, Joe G., Air Supply in the Burma Campaign (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1957), pp. 1–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brig.Whitworth, Dysart, “The Evacuation of Refugees and the Chinese Fifth Army from the Hukawng Valley into Assam, Summer 1942”, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 30, 2 (Sept. 1943): 312CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹² Col.Scott, Robert L., God Is My Co-Pilot (New York, 1962), p. 81.Google Scholar

¹¹³ , Whitworth, op. cit., p. 315.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 90; radio, Maj. -Gen. Lui [Liao?] to Stilwell's HQ India, 25 June 1942 (WNRC).

¹¹⁵ History of the China-Burma-India Theater, p. 36; “Campaign in Burma”, p. 87.

¹¹⁶ Boatner, H. L., “Memorandum for General Sibert”, 11 July [1942], unpaginated (WNRC).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 12 July, unpaginated (WNRC).

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 11, 12, and 14 July (WNRC).

¹¹⁹ , Tyson, Forgotten Frontier, p. 69.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Radio, Minister Ho Ying-chin to Gen. Lo Cho-ying, 1 July 1942 (WNRC).

¹²¹ Boatner, H. L., “Memorandum for General Sibert”, Dibrugarh, 29 June [1942], unpaginated (WNRC).Google Scholar

¹²² C. W. North, “Starvation in the Hukawng Valley 1942”, report contained in Military Attache Report no. 655, 21 Sept. 1942, New Delhi, p. 4 (WNRC).

¹²³ Boatner, H. L., “Memo for General Sibert”, Dibrugarh, 5 Aug. 1942, p. 2 (WNRC).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 3–12.

¹²⁵ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 90.

¹²⁶ , Romanus and , Sunderland, Stilwelt's Mission to China, p. 141.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 86.

¹²⁸ Letter, Boatner to Sibert, 24 July 1942; radio, Maj. -Gen. Yu to Stilwell's HQ India, 19 June 1942 (WNRC).

¹²⁹ Fellowes-Gordon, Ian, The Battlefor Naw Seng's Kingdom (London, 1971), p. 19.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Letter, Col. Robert L. Scott to General Sibert (extract), 26 June 1942. (Contained in file “Getting the Chinese Out of Burma”) (WNRC).

¹³¹ Radio, Maj. -Gen. Yu, 29 June 1942 (WNRC).

¹³² Boatner, H. L., “Memo for General Sibert”, Dibrugarh, 30 June 1942Google Scholar , unpaginated (WNRC).

¹³³ “Report on Activities in the Dibrugarh-Ledo-Tipang Area…”, p. 6.

¹³⁴ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 90.

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 82, 83.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 79.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 86.

¹³⁸ , Dorn, Walkout, p. 85.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ The Retreat from Burma, p. 10.

¹⁴⁰ , Kirby, India's Most Dangerous Hour, p. 210.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ “Campaign in Burma”, p. 90.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁴³ Kirby, op. cit., reports casualties at 4, 597. Romanus and Sunderland (Stilwell's Mission to China) give a figure of 4, 438.