Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wzw2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-15T06:22:06.444Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2012

P. A. Brunt
P. A. Brunt
Affiliation:
Brasenose College, Oxford
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The work we call the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius was entitled in the lost manuscript that Xylander used for the first printed edition (1559) Μάρκου Ἀντωνίνου αὐτοκράτορος τῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν βιβλίων. This title was apparently unknown to a Byzantine historian of the fourteenth century, and may rest merely on the impression the work made on one reader, who affixed it to his copy. But that impression was surely just; even Book I, of which more later, is an intimate document, and Books II to XII a kind of spiritual diary, which Marcus wrote in moments of leisure, probably with his own hand, just as he continued to the end of his life to send autograph letters to his friends (Dio lxxi, 36, 2), and on parchment books, to which he could most easily refer, like those used by Aelius Aristides (xlviii, 8 K) to record his dreams; such books, intended for his own eyes alone, need have had no title. If this view is correct, the Meditations provide evidence unique in antiquity and perhaps in any age for the inmost thoughts of a ruler. The most cursory perusal will indeed show that Marcus was mainly concerned with the divine order of the universe and with the place of man in that order; overt personal allusions are rare. Yet it would be strange if his reflections were not on closer inspection to reveal traces of his own personal experience. I shall argue later that the very frequency with which he recurs to certain topics indicates the preoccupations of the ruler and has historical implications that have not been recognized, even by those who see the work as a spiritual diary and not in any sense as a philosophical treatise. But since that interpretation has not gone without challenge or modification, more must be said to justify it. I shall first discuss Books II to XII and then Book I.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Roman Studies , Volume 64 , November 1974 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © P. A. Brunt 1974. Exclusive Licence to Publish: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

2 Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopoulos (1295–1360) thought the work was intended for the instruction of Commodus, F. xx.

3 On the general difficulty of applying this concept to antiquity cf. Dover, K. J., Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum, 1968, 151–4Google Scholar.

4 F. xiii ff. F. mistakenly infers that Dio knew the Meditations because he makes Marcus use phrases that recall them; Dio would have known the language Marcus employed in actual speeches and edicts, and Marcus made no secret of his principles, cf. SC de ludis, esp. 25. Even Julian seems unfamiliar with the Meditations, though his contemporary, Themistius, apparently refers to them.

5 See further Appendix I.

6 See iv, 3,2: ἐξ ὅσων ἀπεδείχθη ὅτι ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις; elliptical arguments for this in iv, 4. Cf. v, 16,2: πάλαι δέεικται, but not by M., whose fullest statement of the ‘proof’ is in ix, 9 (F. 659), cf. ii, 1 etc. Some other specimens of M.'s reasoning: iv, 21; vi, 44; vii, 55; viii, 57; ix, 1; 40.

7 F. 290 on ii, 11 suggests that ‘in the later Books Marcus prefers generally to preserve an open mind between belief in the gods and the Epicurean atomism’, but when he puts the alternatives ‘atoms’ (or ‘chaos’ or a ‘medley’) and ‘providence’, ‘gods’, etc, he sometimes (iv, 3,2; 27; x, 39, cf. 40), if not always (vi, 10; vii, 32; viii, 17; ix, 28; 39; xii, 14), rejects the first theory by implication, and in xii, 5; 36 etc. his faith is reasserted; it only wavers in moments. Cf. pp. 14 f.

8 F. lviii ff. discusses such theories rather too favourably.

9 F. xx ff.

9a i, 11; iv, 28; 31; 48; v, 11; vi, 34; xi, 18,11

10 The court: i, 17,3; v, 16; vi, 12; viii, 9. Past courts, iv, 32; viii, 31; x, 27, and rulers, iv, 33; vii, 49; viii, 3; 5; 25; 37; ix, 29; x, 31.

11 Old age: ii, 2; 6; v, 31; x, 15; xii, 1,2 (cf. iii, 1); Dio lxxi, 24,4 (‘speech’ of M.). Fame and death: Appendix II.

12 If the ὑπομνημάτια of iii, 14 are his Meditations (and why not?), he must have written much (now lost, or included in our later books) before making this entry. ‘Acts …’ and anthology: iii, 14 (cf. Philostr. v. Soph. 565 for Herodes Atticus’ anthology). Cf. Appendix I for possible extracts from the anthology.

13 v, 1,1 with Haines' note, cf. ii, 1; vi, 2; viii, 12. Impersonal allusions to health: ix, 11; x, 33,3. Dio continually stresses his physical frailty in die 170's (Fronto i, 150; 178; 182 H. = 35; 68 f. N. and HA, Marc. 4, 9 f. may indicate that this was not true in early life), lxxi, 122, cf. 3; 6,3; 24,4 (‘speech’); 34,2; 36,2. M. is content to thank the gods that his body ‘holds out so long in such a life’ and that dreams had supplied him with antidotes against spitting blood and dizziness (i, 17,6 and 8). A cluster of allusions (vii, 14; 16; 33; 64; 68; viii, 28; 40; ix, 41, earlier only in iv, 39) to physical pain may reflect personal experience in a particular period.

14 ii, 62 Haines = 144 N.

15 He has no use for syllogisms or inquiries into physical phenomena, i, 17,8; viii, x. Even the Stoics find the world hard to comprehend, v, 10. Yet the presentations of the senses (φαντασίαι) must be tested by rules of physics and dialectic, viii, 13. It is vital to see things as they really are, stripped of false judgements, e.g. iii, 13; vii, 2; viii, 49; x, 8,1; xi, 16; xii, 18. Every act must be performed with the consciousness of the links between things divine and human, iii, 13. A man does not know himself without understanding the Universe, viii, 52, cf. xi, 5; 12. Almost everywhere M.'s metaphysics and moral precepts are connected, often expressly; his dogmata are the principles of a more or less coherent system, e.g. ii, 3 and 5.

16 xi, 7, cf. viii, 8; x, 31,2; xii, 27.

17 e.g. v, 20; vi, 50; vii, 58; viii, 35.

18 See Schenkl's Index; the imperative alone is used 22 times.

19 ‘Retiring into oneself’ (iv, 3, 1 and 4); Seneca, ep. 25, 6, cited by F., ascribes the phrase to Epicurus, not then a novelty in authors of the Roman Empire (A. J. Festugière, Personal Religion among the Greeks 58 ff. with many parallels). Cf. iv, 3,4; vi, 11; vii, 28; 59; viii, 48; ix, 42,4. In Marcus at least it is not incompatible with Stoic doctrine that a man must be active; philosophical meditation supports him in his duties, vi, 12, cf. ii, 17. It ‘renews’ him (iv, 3,1); for the meaning of ἀνανεοῦν cf. vi, 15 and F. ad loc. Against total withdrawal, viii, 51. Cf. n. 37.

20 Cf. nn. 36 and 68.

21 iii, 13, cf. iv, 3, 1 and 4; 12; v, 1; vii, 1; 61; 64; 68; ix, 42,1; xi, 4; 18,10; xii, 9; 24. Epict. i, 1, 25 says that philosophers should write down their thoughts daily.

22 Youth: abundant evidence in Fronto. After accession: Dio lxxi, 1,2. Fronto argued that an emperor needed rhetorical skill to persuade the senate and even the people, i, 52; ii, 40; 58; 138 H. = 40; 97; 141; 124 N. Perhaps M. continued his studies after 161 on that account. For such speeches of Pius and M. cf. perhaps v, 36; epit. de Caes. 15,9; HA Marc. 12, 14; note also M.'s speeches to the army, Dio 3,3; 24 f.; fr. Vat. 195. Eventually M. seems to have set little value on rhetoric, cf. i, 7; 11; 17,4; iii, 5 (μήτε κομψεία τὴν διάνοιάν σου καλλωπιζέτω); vi, 30,1, perhaps iv, 51. F. lxvi finds no rhetorical artifice in the Med., but ii, 17 and many other chapters are at least very studied pieces.

23 F. lxv–lxvii.

24 See F.'s introductions to each book; II and III are the most coherent.

25 See nn. 61–77.

26 M. means that he has learned to value certain qualities and practices from the benefactors named, not that he has himself attained perfection in them, cf. n. 32.

27 cf. perhaps xi, 26. He also remembers or recognizes his blessings in vii, 27; v, 31 (with πόσα ὦπται καλά cf. iii, 2, unique in M. for appreciation of natural beauty; vi, 36,2 is rather different). Fronto's correspondence reveals the ease and affection that had informed M.'s relations with one of his preceptors.

28 cf. P. Lambrechts, L'Antiquité class. 1934, 173 ff. Verus' own letters to Fronto (Haines i, 294, 304; ii, 116 = 116, 11, 129 N.) create a favourable impression. Barnes, T. D., JRS 1967, 65 ff.Google Scholar, thinks Verus ‘something of a playboy’, but his analysis of the Life shows that much tittle-tattle, not confirmed by Dio, is from a poor source. Dio lxxi, 3, 1 knows but does not endorse the story that Verus plotted against M. but was poisoned first. Philostr., v. Soph. 560, says that Marcus did not acquit Herodes Atticus of complicity in the plot of which he had suspected Verus. In fact Herodes had to face a quite different charge and could not have been either condemned or acquitted of a crime of which he was not accused. In his defence (561) he allegedly referred to his friendship with Verus as if this were something that might have counted against him; if this be true, it shows that in 175 it could be thought that M. and Verus had not been on good terms. That need attest no more than the prevalence of malicious rumours in Marcus' court. Later still, when this had been blown up into an actual plot, it could be assumed that Herodes was alluding to it. But I feel little confidence in Philostratus and none in the HA. It is particularly absurd and incompatible with the value M. set on candour that M. should be made to cast a slur on Verus at the moment of deifying him (Marc. 20, 1–4).

29 Dio lxxi, 22; 29, 1; 30 f.; 34,3. The abundance of coins commemorating her deification is hardly proof that M. did not accept the gossip (so H. Mattingly, HThR 1948, 147 ff.), but the HA is a poor witness to her misdeeds.

30 G. R. Stanton, Phronesis 1968, 183 ff. seems to me to misconceive this matter.

31 I hope to discuss this elsewhere.

32 e.g. ii, 2; 4f.; iv, 17; v, 5; viii, 1; x, 1; 8; 36 etc.

33 e.g. in half of Bk. II alone (chs. 1; 3 f.; 9; 11 f.; 14–17). Cf. n. 15. Φρόνιμος, φρόνησις occur only 4 times, Φρόνησις etc. 22. All counts come from Schenkl's index.

34 Schenkl, s.v. ἀδικεῖν, δίκαιος (a few instances relate to the just arrangements of the world order), κοινωνία, Πολιτεία and cognate words.

35 Schenkl, s.v. ἀνδρεῖος, ἀνδρικός, ἄρρην, ἀσθενής, ἐρρωμένος, μεγαλοφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία (cf. SVF iv, s.v.), στιβαρῶς, φερέπονος, φιλόπονος, ὑπέρφρων and cognates; for relevant Stoic definitions cf. SVF i, 200 f.; 563; iii, 285 (Chrysippus defined ‘fortidudo’ as ‘scientia rerum perferendarum vel affectio animi, in patiendo ac perferendo summae legi parens sine timore’); 262–6; 269 etc. Cf. v, 31: οἰα ἤρκεσας ὑπομεῑναι; iv, 49,2; but vi, 30,1 ἐρρωμένον πρὸς τὰ πρέποντα ἔργα; iii, 12 and many other texts of course illustrate a more active ideal.

36 Σεφροσύνη, etc., are found 10 times, ἐγκρατεία twice. Words denoting freedom or the reverse (ἐλευθερία etc., δουλεία, ἀνεμπόδιοτος) which are found 31 times are also relevant, since for M. a man is free, if not subject to external things and the passions they arouse; for this idea cf. ii, 9; 17; iii, 5; 8; 12; v, 10,2; vi, 16,3; vii, 16; viii, 16; 48; x, 32 f. W. A. Oldfather, Epictetus, Loeb ed. i, p. xvii, remarks that the words for ‘free’ and ‘freedom’ occur 130 times in Epictetus (he wrongly makes the frequency only twice as great as in M.) and reasonably connects E.'s fondness for these terms with his personal experience as a slave; this suggestion is analogous to my interpretation of frequencies in M. However, E.'s conception of freedom (see esp. iv, 1) is the same as M.'s, and has nothing to do with legal status.

37 In 23 chapters given by Schenkl s.v. ἡδονή M. takes or implies the Stoic view that pleasure is no good and pain no evil, cf. also v, 12; viii, 1; 29; xii, 19 and other texts cited in n. 13. From x, 1, cf. iv, 3, one might guess that he sometimes pined for retirement to some quiet spot with congenial company, cf. n. 19.

38 Sex: i, 16, 1; 17,2; 17,6 (claiming that he had been cured of erotic passions); iii, 2,2; v, 10; 28; vi, 34; viii, 21; x, 13; xi, 18,2; with the last two texts cf. Epict. iv, 1, 143. I have found a score of allusions in Epictetus, esp. ii, 4. Sobriety: i, 16,3; iv, 26; v, 1.

39 πλοῦτος is named 5 times as one of the ἀδιάφορα. Contrast the great frequency with which he rejects glory: ‘cetera principibus statim adesse: unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam’ (Tac., Ann. iv, 38). The vanity of possessions is a very common motif in Epictetus, though he too has much on glory, addressing himself to hearers in the official class.

40 Dio lxxi, 32, cf. 3,3 f.; Med. i, 16,3 and 7. M. is ἀφιλάργυρος in the Acta Appiani (see e.g. Musurillo, H. A., Acts of the Pagan Martyrs, 1954Google Scholar). His congiaria (Chron. of 354, MGH I, p. 147) were in fact rather extravagant; Dio lxxii, 16; lxxiii, 5 permits comparisons, cf. also lxxiii, 8,4 for donative.

41 Reality: e.g. vii, 9; xii, 12: knowledge, e.g. iii, 11,2; iv, 11; 21,3 (cf. for idea vi, 13; vi, 21; vii, 68; xi, 18,3). Truthfulness: relatively rare in Greek, cf. L. and S., s.v., but see also Plato, Hipp. Min. 365B; 369B; 370E (though the meaning is not recognized in Astius' Lexicon); Arist., EN 1127a13 ff. (nameless); 1108a20 (ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω). (Of course ἀληθεύειν, ἀληθὲς λέγειν mean ‘to tell the truth’.)

42 i, 14; iii, 6,1; 11,2; v, 33; vi, 47; x, 8,1; 13; xi, 1,2; xii, 15.

43 ii, 16; 17; iii, 4,2; 12; 16,2; iv, 33; 49,2; ix, 2; x, 32; xi, 19; xii, 1,1; 3; 17; 29. Cf. also vi, 47.

44 See Schenkl, s.v. ἀκίβδηλος, ἁπλοῦς, κίβδηλος, πιστός, ὑπόκρισις and cognates. Note τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν–ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν, Plato, Crat. 405C (cf. Rep. 382E; Hipp. Min. 365A; Laws 738E). M. describes the straightforward man without using the word in i, 14 and 15. F. on iv, 26 seems to me wrong on the meaning of ἀπλοῦς, cf. x, 1, 1 (ψυχή) ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἁπλῆ καὶ μία καὶ γυμνή, φανερωτέρα τοῦ περικειμένου σοι σώματος. Cf. also viii, 30: λαλεῑν καὶ ἐν συγκλήτῳ καὶ πρὸς πάνθ΄ ὁντινοῦν κοσμίως, μὴ περιτράνως, with F.'s note. Also i, 9,1: τὸ σεμνὸν ἀπλάστως.

45 Dio Chrys. lv, 9 says that Socrates and Homer taught men about morality, including ἀληθείας καὶ ἀπάτης. He singles out truthfulness as a virtue in xxxiv, 30; lxxiv, 4; lxxvii/viii, 33.

46 Pythagoras allegedly taught that men approximate to the gods by τὸ ἀληθεύειν (telling the truth) and conferring benefits (Ael., VH xii, 59). Other moralists of course reprehend lying (cf. n. 41; Plato, Laws 730C; 943E, cf. Alcib. 122A) as a general rule, but without Marcus' emphasis. Epictetus constantly uses πιστός of the good man, but men thought that philosophers condoned lying (iv, 6, 33).

47 e.g. Rep. 389 B; 459 C. Cf. SVF iii, 513; 554; ii, 132; but note iii, 629.

48 ‘Verus, veritas’ constantly mean ‘truthful, veracity’ in Latin, see Forcellini's Lexicon, and are often linked with ‘fides’ (on which E. Fraenkel, Kl. Beiträge i, 15 ff.) and simplicitas, cf. nn. 49, 50, 55. Cf. Cic., de Offic. i, 63: ‘itaque viros fortes et magnanimos, eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus’; 109: ‘veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici’; perhaps the Roman (cf. e.g. Verr. ii, 1,4; 3,144; Quinct. 10; Balb. 12), rather than the translator of Panaetius, is speaking. Cf. also ‘apertus et simplex’ (Fam. i, 9, 22 etc.); Pliny, ep. ii, 9,4; iv, 22,3; ix, 25,2.

49 i, 16 H. = 49 N.: ‘verum me (Marcus) dicere satius simul et audire verum me doces’; ii, 118 = 130 N.: Verus has learned from Fronto ‘prius multo simplicitatem verique amorem quam loquendi polite disciplinam’.

50 ii, 230 H. = 235 N.: ‘multa … fideliter … consulta … Verum dixi sedulo, verum audivi libenter.’ ii, 224 H. = 232 N.: ‘Victorinum pietate mansuetudine veritate innocentia maxima’, ii, 154 H. = 135 N.: ‘simplicitas, castitas, veritas, fides Romana plane, φιλοστοργία vero nescio an Romana …, (For the last quality cf. Med. i, 11 with 9,3; 17,7; vi, 30,1; xi, 18,4; Epict. i, 11,16; 23,3; ii, 17,38.)

51 Pliny, Pan. 1,6; 49,8; 54.5;. 67,1; 84,1; 95,3 the same contrast in Mart, x, 72 with Domitian, on whom cf. Tac., Agr. 42; Suet., Dom. 11; Dio lxvii, 1; see also on Tiberius, another ‘tyrant’, Tac., Ann. i, 11,2; vi, 50,1; 51,3 etc.; Suet., Tib. 24,1; 42,1; Dio lvii, 1. The ideal of ‘veri affectus’: Tac., Hist. i, 15,4. On Trajan, Dio lxviii, 5,3; 6,2; Dio Chrys. (cf. n. 45) iii, 2. Veracity and simplicity do not appear in the evidence collected by W. Schubart, ‘Das Hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschr. u. Papyri’, Arch. f. Pap. xii, 1 ff., nor in what we have of Greek treatises on monarchy by ‘Ecphantus’ and ‘Diotogenes’, probably of Roman imperial date (Delatte, L., Les Traités de la royauté…, 1942Google Scholar), yet reflecting Hellenistic thought; there is one reference in Aristeas' letter, s. 206. Dio Chrysostom depicts the ideal king as truthful, sincere and simple (i, 26; ii, 26), perhaps because Trajan was so regarded. Arrian's view that a king like Ptolemy I should tell the truth (Anab. pr.) might simply represent his own (Roman?) view, but in vii, 5,2, perhaps from Ptolemy himself, he ascribes this view to Alexander.

52 The prevalence of such moral cognomina in new families from the municipia and provinces may reflect the old-fashioned moral standards that held out there (Tac., Ann. iii, 55; xvi, 5; Pliny, ep. i, 14,4).

53 Dio lxix, 21,2. Cf. AÉ 1940, 62 (Verissimus Caesar, A.D. 143); Justin, Apol. i, 1; coins ap. RE viii A 1550, where some explanations are discussed which I do not accept.

54 op. cit. (n. 28).

55 Cic., de Offic. i, 23, cf. Med. iii, 7: μὴ παραβῆναι πίστιν; Dio lxxi, 24, 2; 26,2 (‘speech’ of M.).

56 i, 6; 14; 16,3 and 4; vi, 30,4; cf. n. 49; Dio lxxi, 3,4.

57 vi, 30, 1. cf. i, 17,3; Schenkl. s.v. ἀτυφία, τῦφος: the old ideal of civilitas; cf. Dio lxxi, 35, 3–5. See Appendix II on kindness.

58 ii, 1 (there is no adequate translation for περίεργος, see F. ad loc.), cf. iii, 4,2; 7; iv, 18; 28; 31 f.; v, 5; vi. 16,3; 20; 47; viii, 8; ix, 42,4; x, 13; 36; xi, 18.

58a cf. Lucian, Icaromen. 16; 19; Charon 15; 18. Both M. and Lucian are perhaps reminiscent of Cynic diatribes. Cf. also ix, 30; xii, 24; 27 etc.

59 See e.g. Cic., Tusc. Disp. iv, 41 ff; Sen., de Ira i, 5 ff; ii, 6 f.; iii, 3.

60 This is no doubt why he does not bother, like other moralists who wrote on anger, to give practical recipes for avoiding angry acts, e.g. Plut. 459 E–F.

61 cf. Sen., de Ira i, 14,2; ii, 26,6; iii, 26,1; Epict. ii, 22,36.

62 For pity (ἔλεος) cf. ii, 13; vi, 27; vii, 22; 26; 65; ix, 3,2; Sen. o.c. iii, 29,1 (but cf. ii, 15,2; 17,2; de Clem. ii, 5); Epict. i, 18,3; 28.9. Not allowed by the old Stoa, SVF, Index s.v.

63 Sen., o.c. i, 14; ii, 9 f.; 28; iii, 24–6 (‘male inter malos vivimus’) and Plut. 463 E are less personal.

64 διὰ δελίαν ἢ δοξοκοπίαν, xi, 18,4: ‘sensitiveness to public opinion’, F. Cf. pp. 13 f.

65 Sen. o.c. ii, 26,3. On κατ΄ οἰκονομίαν F. on xi, 18,5; cf. iv, 19; 51; Epict. iii, 14,7.

66 Sen., o.c. iii, 42 f.

67 Sen., o.c. iii, 25 f. is not such high doctrine: ‘plus mihi nocitura est ira quam iniuria’, and M. has nothing of his argument (30,2) that vengeance is unnecessary, since ‘dabit poenas alteri quas debet tibi’. Epict. i, 18, 11 ff. is close to Marcus.

68 On this ideal see Schenkl s.v. ἀπάθεια, ἀταρακτεῖν, γαλήνη, εὐθυμεῖν, εὐρροεῖν, θυμηδία and cognate words (30 examples). It goes back to Zeno.

69 Sen., o.c. i, 10,2; 14,1; ii, 12,6; iii, 6,6; 25,4; Plut. 464 C–D; 467 A; 468.

70 v, 28; viii, 55; ix, 42; xii, 26, cf. v, 17; xi, 18, 11. Cf. SC de ludis 12: ‘O magni imperatores, qui scitis altius fundari remedia, quae etiam malis consulunt, qui se etiam necessarios fecerint’. See Sen., o.c. ii, 10, 6–8 (cf. de Benef. i, 10). Epict. iii, 20,9 ff. suggests that the wicked are sent to give good men the chance to exercise their virtue.

71 Sen., o.c. i, 26; ii, 32,2; iii, 5; 25 (also de Const. 12); Plut. 456 F; 457 D.

72 For tact, cf. i, 9 f. Sen., o.c. i, 6; 15; ii, 14; iii, 27, like Cic. (Panaetius), de Offic. i, 88; 136 f.; ii, 10, approves of instruction but allows harsher rebukes.

73 xi, 18,9. Sen., o.c. ii, 10 is less hopeful (like M. in ix, 29; xi, 8), but cf. de Benef. vii, 31.

74 cf. nn. 61-73. Plutarch is cited from his essays on Anger and Tranquillity (non-Stoic, cf. Babut, D., Plutarque et le Stoicisme 94–102Google Scholar).

75 i, 13,2 (cf. Sen. de Ira i, 12,4; ii, 25,1), see also i, 11,37; 12,18–21; 18 passim; 28 passim; ii, 10, 18; 18,5–14; iii, 2,16; 4,18; 5,16; 10,17; 13.11; 15,10; 22,13; 24,58 and 79; iv, 12, 20, mostly mere allusions to duties of avoiding anger and not blaming others. Seneca and Plutarch particularly deprecate anger against slaves and members of the family: not M'.s concern.

76 453 D; 462 E; 463 B; 468 B ff. Cf. Sen., o.c. i, 14; ii, 9; iii, 28; de Tranqu. 15, 1.

77 De Ira i, 6; 15 f.; 19; ii, 31, cf. de Const. 12,3; Plut. 459.

78 His rescript in Dig. i, 18, 14 implies a retributive or deterrent theory.

78a RE vi A 952 ff., cf. now CRAI 1971, 486. (The text in JRS 1973, 87 unfortunately omits the restoration of his name in line 49.) Hdn. i, 2,2; 6 passim; 8,3 idealizes Marcus' advisers.

79 i, 16,5; ix, 29, cf. Epict. ii, 9; iii, 21; 23; iv, 1, 132–43; 8. F. aptly cites Dig. xxvii, i, 6, 7. Contrast Lucian's accounts of Demonax and Nigrinus with the charlatans pilloried in Vitarum Audio, Piscator, and often elsewhere. Victor 16,9 (M.'s dependence on philosophers' advice) is surely absurd.

80 Dio makes M. question if Avidius had not acted only in the mistaken belief that he was already dead (25,3). If so, he would have acted perhaps κατ' οἰκονομίαν (n. 65), and ix, 38 might refer to him (or to Faustina, if she were involved): εἰ μὲν ἣμαρτεν, ἐκεί τό κακόν. τάχα δ΄ ούχ ἥμαρτεν.

80a cf. the stories in Dio lxxi, 29, 1 f.; lxxii, 7,4; Amm. xxi, 16,11.

81 iii, 7; iv, 3,2; 32; vi, 16,3; 20; 30,3; cf. de Ira ii, 24.

82 vi, 53; vii, 3f.; 30; viii, 61; ix, 22; 27; x, 37.

82a Oliver and Palmer (n. 1) argue that the SC de ludis was modified by the free initiative of a senator.

83 Presumably by suicide, cf. iii, 1; v, 29; viii, 47; ix, 2; x, 8,2.

84 iii, 5; v, 3; vi, 22; vii, 15; x, 11; xi, 16; xii, 1,1; note specific allusions to worthlessness of other men's judgements, which should not weigh with him iv, 3,3; vii, 62; ix, 18; 27; 34; x, 9; 23. A man may be godlike without recognition, vii, 67.

85 Marc. 20,4, cf. 23,7 for his replying to criticisms ‘vel sermone vel litteris’, which would accord with his wish to persuade others, particularly (29,5) to charges of meanness (n. 40; the HA wrongly thinks he was sparing in largess), and (23,7) to gossip about Faustina; this is refuted by Dio (n. 29). Ch. 29 is full of silly tales and ch. 20 not re-assuring; it makes M. act out of character (‘occulte ostendit’) and absurdly (n. 28); it contradicts M'.s own testimony on Verus (n. 28); coins show that he was slow to take Verus' titles, Armeniacus and Parthicus, and laid them down after Verus' death, Mattingly-Sydenham, RIC iii, 196 ff. He might have said that he had planned Verus' campaigns (if that was true), but would not have sought to appropriate Verus' glory. Cf. Marc. 9,5 (also unreliable).

86 Schwendemann, J., Der historische Wert der vita Marci, 1923, 97Google Scholar noted that this word appears elsewhere in the HA only in the disreputable Vita Bonosi. In the life of Hadrian (18,1) the distinction between amici principis and jurists is obviously false (cf. Dig. xxxvii, 14, 17 pr.), and it is inconceivable that H. admitted to his consilium only men approved by the senate. In the life of Pius the list of jurists (6,11) includes invention (Syme, R., Emperors and Biography, 1971, 38Google Scholar). In my view all references to the consilium in the HA lead on to the ‘farrago’ of his account of it in the ‘falsified’ life of Severus Alexander (cf. Crook, J. A., Consilium Principis, 1955, 89Google Scholar), and no reliance should be placed on them. Note that Pius 6,11 goes much beyond Medit. i, 16,2; vi, 30 on P.'s relations with his amici.

87 Dig. xxxvii, 14,17, pr.: he follows the most authoritative legal opinions; xxviii, 4,3: he decides a case ‘remotis omnibus’ (but perhaps the barristers rather than his own advisers, cf. Kunkel, W., ZSS lxxv, 1968, 303Google Scholar). Two instances do not in any case permit any generalization. Cf. n. 84 on Pius.

88 J. Beaujeu, La Religion rom. à l'apogée de l'Empire, 1955, i, ch. v, contesting a view of Renan, which I think closer to the truth. (On M. and the Christians, of which Beaujeu makes much, see Barnes, T. D., JRS lviii, 1968, 32 ffGoogle Scholar. There is nothing novel. I hope to argue elsewhere that in xi, 3 ὡς οί χριστιανοι is probably a gloss.)

89 θεοσεβεία, ὁσιότης etc: i, 3; iv, 18; v, 9; vi, 30; 44; vii, 54; 66; ix, 1; xi, 20; xii, 1.

90 Bonhöffer, A., Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet, 1894, 78–85Google Scholar; the full index also covers his Epictet u. die Stoa, 1890—together the best works ever written on late Stoicism.

91 Plural: ii, 3; 5; 13; iii, 4,3; 6,2; 9; v, 27; 31; 33; vi, 16,3; 30,1; 41; viii, 23; ix, 37; 41; x, 1; 8; xi, 13; xii, 12; 27 f. Singular: iii, 16; vi, 7; vii, 31; 67; x, 11; xii, 11.

91 (a) Included in last n. (b)ii, 16; iv,2s; 29; v,8; 10; vi, 42; vii, 66; viii, 5; 7; 18; 46; ix, 1, 3; x, 6; 8,1; 11; 14; 21; 33; xi, 13; 16; 20; xii, 1,1; 26; 36. (c) iv, 10; x, 25. (d) ii, 2; iii, 6,1; 16,2; iv, 34; vii, 57. (e) xii, 24. (f) ii, 5; 17; iii, 4,3; iv, 33; v, 5; 27; viii, 43; ix, 6; 39; x, 28; xii, 3.

93 cf. v, 8 (the Nature of the Whole = Fate = the common Nature = Zeus); vi, 44; xii, 5 (the gods = the divine = Nature = the God).

94 (a) iii, 6,2; 9; 16; vii, 31; 67; x, 11; xii, 27. (b) iii, 9; 12; iv, 1; v, 1,1; 3; 4; 48,2; vii, 56; 74; viii, 29; ix, 1,4; x, 33,2; xii, 1,2.

95 See F. ad loc, and Haines' index, s.v. Cause, Causal and Material. Cf. esp. iv, 40; v, 8; vi, 25; viii, 34; xii, 30.

96 e.g. vii, 23; 75; ix, 1,4. For λόγος and ἡγεμονικόν see indexes in SVF, Bonhöffer and Haines. Zeus as the mind of the world: SVF ii, 937; 1061 ff.; Bonhöffer, Die Ethik 78 ff.

97 Bonhöffer, Epictet…. 83 ff. also detects a rival conception of the daimon both in Marcus and in other Stoics. See Schenkl. s.v.

98 Also ‘godlike’ (ii, 5) or ‘divine’ (vii, 67). Man can ‘touch’ God, ii, 12.

99 ii, 3 f.; v, 22; vi, 54; x, 6 f.; 33,4. That Nature provides for the good of the Whole is more often stated (e.g. v, 8). Perpetual change is itself necessary to her plan, e.g. vii, 18 f.; 23; 25; viii, 6 f.; 20; 50; ix, 35. M. sometimes suggests that we can discern by close study how all is ordered for the best, e.g. iii, 2 (cf. vi, 36); 11,2; iv, 10; x, 9,2, and adumbrates the doctrine of a sympathetic unity pervading the universe, vi, 38; ix, 9 with F.'s notes.

100 xii, 14, giving chaos as a third possibility (cf. n. 7). For εἱμαρμένη or τὸ ἀναγκαῖον see e.g. ii, 3; iii, 11,3; iv, 9; 26; v, 8; ix, 1,4; 28; x, 5.

101 Recent discussions in Rist, J. M., Stoic Philosophy, 1969, ch. 7Google Scholar; Long, A. A., Problems in Stoicism, 1971, ch. vGoogle Scholar; Gould, J. B., Philosophy of Chrysippus, 1971, 137 ff.Google Scholar

102 vi, 43; viii, 19; ix, 35; immortal, vii, 70; heavenly bodies as gods, vi, 43; xii, 28; other gods (besides Zeus) named: v, 8; vi, 4 3; viii, 19; xi, 18, 11 (much rarer than in Epictetus, cf. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik … 75 ff.). Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. iii4, 318 ff.

103 Contra, Beaujeu (n. 88) 366. In the light of the Meditations I can see no ground for supposing that M. had any special devotion to any of the gods named in his coins (who do not include Asclepius). Beaujeu 333 cites letters to Fronto, which belong to his youth, and express formal gratitude to the gods etc. (4; 69; 79 f.; 90 N ); these surely prove nothing. More striking is 47 N = Haines i, 50: ‘deos igitur omnes, qui usquam gentium vim suam praesentem promptamque hominious praebent, qui vel somniis vel mysteriis vel medicina vel oraculis usquam iuvant atque pollent, eorum deorum unumquemque mihi votis advoco, meque pro genere cuiusque voti in eo loco constituo, de quo deus ei rei praeditus facilius exaudiat'; he then pictures himself supplicating Aesculapius at Pergamum, Minerva at Athens etc. Yet all this strikes me as flowery rhetoric to please his teacher. Contrast the personal devotion of Aristides to Asclepius and Serapis.

104 Dio lxxi, 33,3; 34,2. His initiation at Eleusis (Beaujeu 338 f.) followed the precedents set by other emperors who had visited Athens (Augustus, Hadrian, Verus). Epictetus has a livelier concern in the cults, Erich. 31; Bonhöffer (n. 102). Seneca says that the wise perform the cults ‘tamquam legibus iussa, non tamquam dis grata’ (fr. 38 f.).

104a i, 16,6, cf. his approval of τὰ πάτρια ἕθη at Athens (Hesperia, Suppl. xiii, no. 1, 33 f.). See also Dig. xxii, 5, 3, 6.

105 ILS 341, cf. 338; Paus. viii, 43,5; HA, Pius 11,3; 13,3 f.

106 For Stoic view of this, cf. SVF iii, 408 f.; Cic, de Leg. i, 43; Sen., de Ira ii, 27; de Benef. iv, 19; vii, 1,7. Plut., de Superst. takes the same view: the belief that the gods do harm is worse than atheism, 164 E. A false conception of the gods leads to too much praying and sacrificing for the wrong ends, Cic, ND ii, 70–2 (Stoic). In de Div. ii, 148 (non-Stoic) Cic. distinguishes ‘religio’ as keeping up the ancestral cults (cf. ND iii, 5) from ‘superstitio’, but M. surely means more.

107 They mark the deisidaimon in Theophr., Char. 16.

108 HA Marc. 13; 21 and epigram in Aim. xv, 4, 17. On the Rain Miracle, Beaujeu 342 ff. with bibliography; it is notable that the credit was soon transferred from Thoth to Jupiter, the ancestral god. Dio lxxi, 8,4 ('Αρνοῦφίν τινα μάγον Αἰγύπτιον—in fact a priest of Thoth—συνόντα τῷ Μάρκῳ) need not mean more than that Harnouphis was ‘with M.'s army’, especially as M. seems not to have been present at the scene of the Miracle. The credibility of Lucian, Alex. 48, and still more, its relevance to M.'s own attitudes, may be doubted. M.'s revival of the ius fetiale (Dio lxii, 3,3) can be taken as symbolic of his acceptance of Stoic views on the bellum iustum, cf. Cic, Off. i, 34–6, citing the Roman practice to exemplify Panaetius’ doctrine; Paus. viii, 43,6 may show how M. sought to justify his wars as defensive. Beaujeu 361, n. 3 himself admits that Pietas on M.'s coins does not illustrate religious fervour.

109 M. was least divinized of emperors in his life-time, Beaujeu 363. Cf. J. H. Oliver, Hesp. Suppl. no. 11, where M. and Verus say οι γὰρ οὐτ' ἅλλως [ειςτ]ὰς ἡμε[τέ]ρας τιμάς ἐσμεν πρόχειροι The coin types seem to me too conventional to support Beaujeu's claim (359 ff.) that they suggest a novel concept of the emperor's supernatural power, his assimilation to a hero deified for his services, or his divine right.

110 Dio lxxi, 30,2 connects his ‘piety’ with his clemency and constancy to his principles. On piety cf. Epict., Ench. 3 1; Galen, de usu part. iii, 10.

111 Zeller, iii4, 784 ff.

112 E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety 8, citing vi, 36; iv, 3,3; ix, 32; x, 17; xii, 32. Add v, 24; vii, 48 f.; viii, 21.

113 cf. iii, 3,2; vi, 13; 15; 16,1; vii, 1; 3; 47; viii, 37; ix, 14; 36; xii, 24, and nn. 112; 114; pp. 10 f. On loathing for the body, cf. Dodds 29.

114 cf. ii, 2; 12; 14; 17; v, 10; 33.

115 cf. i, 15; ii, 5; 14; iii, 10; 12; vi, 2; 23; 26; 32; vii, s; 8; 68; viii, 2; 32; 36; ix, 6; x, 1; 9; 11 f.; 31; xii, 1,1; 3; 26; one can only act justly etc. ἐπί τῆς δοθείσης ὑλης (xii, 27, cf. x, 33) such acts are ἀναγκαῑα (iv, 24, cf. 32,2; i, 5); it is useless, and wrong, to attempt what Providence does not allow.

116 ix, 29 (τὸ βραχύτατον), cf. iii, 13 (τὸ μικρότατον). Dio lxxi, 6,2 uses τὸ βραχύτατον and ἐλάχιστόν τι. Cf. on Pius' thoroughness i, 16,1 and 2 (τῶν ἐλαχίστων); vi, 30,3; for an instance in M.'s case Dig. i, 18, 14, cf. xxv, 4,1 pr.; xxxvii, 14,17, pr.

117 Chrysippe 4, 1930, 213. Babut (n. 74) 363 contrasts the moral pessimism and metaphysical optimism of the Stoics with Plutarch's pessimism on the world and optimism about man.