This paper is an attempt to make more specific the familiar sociological notion of the ‘unanticipated consequences of social action’. Reasons for the relative neglect by practitioners and analysts of the side-effects of legislative action are suggested. The discussion of unintended and unanticipated social action is related to the work of classic sociologists, to theorists of diffusion, and to the study of innovations and inventions. Previous studies of Congress (including those by the author) are shown to have focussed on process and representation at the expense of the legislation itself and its consequences, examples of which are considered in this paper. An economic law about the creation of demands by legislation, explaining the development of many side-effects, is proposed. The relationship between rules expressed in enactments and the whole system of formal and informal rules in the life of a society is explored. A number of considerations for future work are outlined, and the paper concludes by arguing that greater awareness of the problem of side-effects will have two valuable consequences: (1) the identification of general tendencies may help to avoid gross perversion of purposes; (2) even where there are no clear regularities of response, the observation of patterns of side-effects and their correlation with other factors may enable analysts to anticipate likely side-effects and suggest readjustments.

Recent social science research – particularly evaluation research and cost-benefit analysis – has produced a substantial and very useful literature on the impact of public policy and on the relationship of program inputs to outputs and outcomes. However, the explicit focus of these analytic techniques on impacts and outcomes does not systematically yield useful information on why programs have been successes or failures. Policy-makers faced with an evaluation of program success or failure obviously need to know something about the why question if they are to make needed adjustments in the program or carry the lessons of one program to other areas. This article attempts to present a comprehensive framework for explaining and understanding program performance. It is meant to have two uses and to serve two clienteles. First, it presents for social scientists a set of research questions to guide research into the determinants of program performance. Second, it provides public policy-makers with a set of action questions which should be asked and answered appropriately in the actual formulating and carrying out of public policy, as a means of enhancing the chances of program success. The framework is divided into two parts, the formulating process and the carrying out process, although these two processes may overlap considerably, both in time and in terms of substantive concerns. Program success may be impeded by problems or inadequacies in one or more of the components in either the formulating stage or the carrying out stage or in both.

In the extensive literature on the rules versus discretion debate three related, but logically distinct, areas of debate are frequently confused: the active versus passive policy debate, the rules versus discretion debate proper, and the open-loop (i.e. fixed) rule versus closed-loop (i.e. contingent) rule debate. Section 2 of this paper examines the nature of and interrelations between these three areas of debate. In section 3 the contributions of economic analysis to the debate are explored in an apolitical framework, in particular, the arguments for rules proposed by Friedman and Kydland and Prescott are assessed. Section 4 extends this framework to take into account the political dimension and the rules versus discretion debate is viewed as a cost-benefit problem involving both political and economic factors. A general conclusion is that since the rules versus discretion debate is an exercise in political economy, the debate cannot be properly assessed in the sterile apolitical framework of pure economic analysis.

The first of these papers (Copeman, 1981) gave a general description of the British system of public expenditure, and of the different price bases required in times of inflation, and considered recent changes and possible simplification.

The present paper considers how and why the figures (on a given price base) are designed as they are, relating this to requirements of Parliamentary or governmental control (central or local), to operational efficiency, and to the need for open exposition of intentions and restraints. Examples are given from allocations to the Health Service. There are various degrees of control and audit of money voted to non-governmental bodies; where does public expenditure end? Are their accounts in line with control requirements? The comprehensiveness of expenditure planning in the United Kingdom, compared with most other countries, and the extension beyond the year ahead, has been a severe technical challenge. There is an interesting field of research into up-to-date international comparisons. An appendix discusses figures published for public expenditure, general government, central government and local authorities and provides a guide to sources of data about all aspects of public expenditure in Britain.

Few commentators on the state of the housing market in the UK express satisfaction at the outcome of public policy in this field. From widely differing ideological presuppositions and with divergent views as to causes and cures, researchers nevertheless tend to agree that past policies have failed. This dissatisfaction arguably stems from the departure of housing policy from commonly held views about appropriate objectives. Housing policy is usually viewed as a response to some variety of ‘market failure’ or as a means of income redistribution. In the nineteenth century, externalities of a public health nature were important in encouraging the state to concern itself in the housing market, while the twentieth century has seen growing state involvement ostensibly as a response to so-called ‘distributional externalities’ or possibly on the grounds that housing service represents a ‘merit good’.