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Citizens Strike a Balance: Discontent With Taxes, Content With Spending

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Axel Hadenius
Affiliation:
Political Science, University of Uppsala

Abstract

This article presents the findings of a public opinion survey of the level of taxation in Sweden. The study demonstrates that opinions depend to a large extent on the framing of the problem. On general questions regarding taxes, the answers are usually negative. But when asked about both taxes and benefits, people normally express a positive attitude to both. The opinions about different kinds of taxes vary greatly, but the variation does not correspond to the predictions of the fiscal illusion theory. Opinions about taxes can be assigned to three underlying attitude dimensions. A comparison with an earlier Swedish survey shows that discontent with the level of taxation has not increased since the 1960s, with but one exception, marginal taxes.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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