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Party School: Education, Political Ideology, and the Cold War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Abstract

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Type
Review Essay
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. 2004

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References

Notes

1. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (New York, 1988; 1949), 110Google Scholar. On the eve of the end of the cold war, Schlesinger's opinion had changed little. In an updated introduction for a 1988 reprint of The Vital Center, Schlesinger mused: “I did not think then and do not think now that the Cold War is essentially a military conflict amenable to military solutions” (xiii).

2. Zajda, Joseph I., Education in the USSR (New York, 1980), 1011Google Scholar.

3. American commentators portrayed Soviet education as ideologically driven prior to the launch of Sputnik I. But real concern with the use of education as a means of communist indoctrination followed the Soviet Union's first foray into space. For a sampling of the pervasive fear engendered by Sputnik and Soviet education, see, for example, Hechinger, Fred, The Big Red Schoolhouse (New York, 1959)Google Scholar; Counts, George S., The Challenge of Soviet Education (New York, 1957)Google Scholar; Bereday, George Z., The Politics of Soviet Education (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Trace, Arthur S., What Ivan Knows and Johnny Doesn't (New York, 1961)Google Scholar. The ideologically charged inter-pretation of Soviet education described here persisted well beyond the hottest years of the cold war; see Sorrentino, Frank M. and Curcio, Frances R., Soviet Politics and Education (New York, 1986)Google Scholar.

4. The literature on the 1950s Red Scare and the demise of academic freedom is enormous. For several of the best accounts, see Schrecker, Ellen W., No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the University (New York, 1988)Google Scholar; Lewis, Lionel S., Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control (New Brunswick, 1988)Google Scholar; Wang, Jessica, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 1999)Google Scholar.

5. Despite frequent citations and widespread praise, the GI Bill has commanded relatively little scholarly attention. For the only two academic treatments of the GI Bill, see Ross, David R. B., Preparing for Ulysses: Veterans and Politics During World War II (New York, 1969)Google Scholar; Olson, Keith W., The GI Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges (Lexington, Ky., 1973)Google Scholar. The community college movement has generated even less interest. For the best historical overview of the community college movement, see Brint, Steven and Karabel, Jerome, Diverted Dream: Community Colleges and the Promise of Educational Oppor tunity in America, 1900–1985 (New York, 1995)Google Scholar. A creative discussion of the place of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the post–World War II education landscape is available in Iriye, Akira, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore, 1997)Google Scholar. For the growth of area and international studies programs, see McCaughey, Robert A., International Studies and Academic Enterprise: A Chapter in the Enclosur e of American Learning (New York, 1984), especially 141196Google Scholar; Cumings, Bruce, “Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War,” in Simpson, Christopher, ed., Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War (New York, 1998), 159188Google Scholar. Recent studies dealing with the Peace Corps have emphasized its connection to America's cold war containment strategy. For just such an insightful account, see Hoffman, Elizabeth Cobbs, All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s (Cambridge, Mass., 2000)Google Scholar.

6. The exception to this scholarly oversight is the investigation of the use and abuse of social science research during the cold war; see, for instance, Simpson, Christopher, ed., Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War (New York, 1998)Google Scholar; Herman, Ellen, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1995)Google Scholar; Robin, Ron, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Cultur e and Politics in the Militar y-Intellectual Complex (Princeton, 2001)Google Scholar. The early history of the “exceptionalist,” liberal-democratic lineage of American social science, to which all the above scholars are at least partially indebted, has been chronicled most exhaustively by Ross, Dorothy, The Origins of American Social Science (New York, 1991)Google Scholar.

7. Bell, Daniel, The End of Ideology in the West: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York, 1961)Google Scholar. A fine account of the origins and outcomes of the United States' decentralized federal-state education policymaking cycle is provided in Graham, Hugh Davis and Diamond, Nancy, The Rise of American Research Universities: Elites and Challengers in the Postwar Era (Baltimore, 1997), 125Google Scholar. The classic elucidation of the mutually reinforcing relationship between liberalism and freedom of inquiry is provided by Polanyi, Michael, “The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory,” Minerva 1 (1962): 5473CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. Arendt, Hannah, “Ideology and Terror,” The Review of Politics 15 (1953): 303327CrossRefGoogle Scholar. According to Mazower, Mark, Dark Continent: Eur ope's Twentieth Century (New York, 1998)Google Scholar, the equation of ideology and terror has proved remarkably resilient. In an important reconfiguration of the typical characterization of Nazism and Communism as the twentieth-century's two quintessentially ideological regimes, Mazower argues that liberal democratic regimes have been, and continue to be, ideologically motivated. In a departure from other scholars, who, like Arendt, have tended to think of ideology as exclusively a tool of totalitarian states, Mazower persuasively argues that the history of United States' twentieth-century military and diplomatic interventionism is best understood when couched in an ideological frame. I agree. For a similar reading of ideology in the United States during the cold war, see Gould-Davies, Nigel, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1 (Winter 1999): 90109CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. Before World War II, universities relied on foundation support to fund research. Following the entrance of the United States into the war, however, the federal government emerged as the foremost patron of universities, and permanently redirected academic investigation toward applied rather than basic research. For the finest history of the rise of sponsored research during World War II and the cold war, see Geiger, Roger, Resear ch and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II (New York, 1993)Google Scholar. But Geiger, like Talcott Parsons before him, tends to treat research as normative and to view the growth of research universities in highly functional, that is to say, nonideological, terms. For Parson's sociological structure-functionalist interpretation, see The American University (Cambridge, Mass., 1973).

The Parsonian functionalist narrative has found less favor among historians recently, however, as newer scholarship has emphasized the important role that individual researchers and policy-actors perform in the production of academic knowledge; see Leslie, Stuart W., The Cold War and American Science: The Militar y-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993)Google Scholar; Lowen, Rebecca S., Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997)Google Scholar.

10. The scholarly focus on “research” is all the more vexing considering that it did not become a normative activity at American universities until the 1960s. To wit, in 1957–58 a mere fourteen universities controlled 49 percent of all federal research funds while thirty-six universities controlled 73 percent; see Rivlin, Alice M., The Role of the Federal Gover nment in Financing Higher Education (Washington, D.C., 1961), 47Google Scholar. Comparable data are provided in Graham and Diamond, The Rise of American Research Universities, 36–37 and 256 n. 27. Given these figures, the question remains: What other functions beyond research did universities serve in the twentieth century?

11. Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts Under Lunacharsky, October 1917–1921 (London, 1970)Google Scholar.