^{Page 457 note 1} For example, Burgess, S. F., ‘The Political Development of Swaziland’, postgraduate thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, n.d.Google Scholar

^{Page 457 note 2} On this, see Kuper, Hilda, Sobhuza II. Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland: the story of an hereditary ruler and his country (London, 1978), ch. 9;Google ScholarStevens, R. P., Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland: the former High Commission Territories in Southern Africa (London and New York, 1967);Google Scholar and Potholm, Christian P., ‘Changing Political Configurations in Swaziland’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 4, 3, 11 1966, pp. 313–22.Google Scholar

^{Page 458 note 1} Indeed, it was for this reason that Pretoria entertained the hope in 1963 that Swaziland could be persuaded to accept its ‘offer’ to become a South African Protectorate in order to form part of an eventual much larger grouping, an idea that has been mooted several times since, most recently by the proposal for a Constellation of Southern African States in 1979.

^{Page 458 note 2} Cf.Halpern, Jack, South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (Harmondsworth, 1965).Google Scholar

^{Page 458 note 3} The ‘Swazi Nation’ is implicitly characterised to represent the interests of those who publicly identify themselves with, and participate in, a system of councils or tinkhundla, whose ultimate authority is the monarch. On the modern origins of royal control, see Bischoff, Paul-Henri, ‘Swaziland in International Relations: Swaziland's international relations and foreign policy up to 1982’ Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester, 1985, to be published in Bern, 1989.Google Scholar

^{Page 459 note 1} ‘Organic dominance’ refers to the advent of the fully fledged emergence of capitalism in this periphery, where this mode became the leading economic force, influencing all other social and economic relations of production.

^{Page 459 note 2} Kuper, op. cit. p. 39; and Crush, Jonathan S., ‘The Genesis of colonial Land Policy in Swaziland’, in South African Geographical Journal (Braamfontein), 62, I, 1980, pp. 73–88.Google Scholar

^{Page 460 note 1} The events of this period are described by Potholm, Christian P., Swaziland: the dynamics of political modernization (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1972).Google Scholar

^{Page 461 note 1} On the enuciation of multi-racialism as policy, see The Times of Swaziland (Mbabane), 13 12 1974.Google Scholar

^{Page 462 note 1} See Selwyn, Percy, Industries in the Southern African Periphery: a study of industrial development in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (London, 1975), passim.Google Scholar

^{Page 462 note 2} Throughout the colonial period, as reported by Pim, A. W., Swaziland Commission, 1931 (London, 1932), settlers felt that such a railway line was necessary in order to boost their agricultural production and to reach their main markets more easily. Since Pretoria had for years resisted such a project in the absence of any headway being made about the transfer of Swaziland, the latter's Foreign Minister was able to claim in 1986 that South African assistance regarding the railway line amounted to not only a ‘concession’ but also a recognition of Swaziland's political independence.Google ScholarThe Swazi Observer (Mbabane), 20 02 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 462 note 3} See, for instance, The Times of Swaziland, 22 December 1982.

^{Page 463 note 1} See The Swazi Observer, 20, 22, and 26 February 1986.

^{Page 463 note 2} Ibid. 20 February 1986.

^{Page 463 note 3} As reported in the local newspapers, the responsible Minister announced on the radio on 17 March 1986 that 20 investors were waiting to build factories in Swaziland. However, it is periodically emphasised that the country does not want to be misrepresented by the ‘Made in Swaziland’ labels of South African companies wishing to evade sanctions. See, for instance, The Times of Swaziland, 21 July 1988.

^{Page 463 note 4} The Swazi Observer, 25 February 1986, commenting on the bright future of the National Investment Corporation.

^{Page 464 note 1} Ibid. 24 January, 11–12 February, and 18 March 1986. Also The Times of Swaziland, 19 January 1988.

^{Page 464 note 2} On the origins of the work councils, see Fransman, Martin, ‘The State and Development in Swaziland, 1960–1977’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex, Brighton, 1978, and for the tinkhundla, see Bischoff, op. cit.Google Scholar

^{Page 464 note 3} Hence the renewed attempts by workers to strengthen their trade unions in the 1980s, and for those on strike to bypass the works councils and the Ministry of Labour and Public Service by appealing directly to the Head of State in a dispute with management. As illustrated by the unbanning of the teachers' union in 1984 and its vigorous revival since then, the tinkhundla were unable from 1977 onwards to channel the specialised demands of interest groups to the state in a way which would have influenced the making of policies. See The Times of Swaziland, 28 January 1977, and The Swazi Observer, 19 March 1986.

^{Page 464 note 4} A new departure seemed to be the calling of a Libandla or National Council in July 1988, in an attempt to revive communal democratic practices, because members of the public were invited to address themselves critically to national issues. The Times of Swaziland, 21 July 1988.

^{Page 465 note 1} The black population of South Africa in 1980 included 750,000 Swazi-speakers, many of whom continue to pay allegiance to the Swazi monarchy and to have relatives in Swaziland. In 1981, 13·8 per cent of the Swazi labour force was employed on South African mines.

^{Page 466 note 1} On this, see Macmillan, Hugh, ‘The Origins and Consequences of Decolonization: Swaziland, the triumph of tradition’, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 466 note 2} See Halpern, Jack, ‘Swaziland – Recent History’, in Africa South of the Sahara, 1983–4 (London, 1983, 13th edn.), for a résumé of political events during the 1960s and 1970s.Google Scholar

^{Page 467 note 1} See Daniel, John, ‘The Domestic and International Dimensions of the Crisis of Political Legitimacy in Swaziland’, Free University of Amsterdam, February 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 468 note 1} See, for instance, The Swazi Observer, 7 February 1986.

^{Page 469 note 1} For the Government's statement viewing the refugee situation as critical, see The Times of Swaziland, 29 January 1988.

^{Page 469 note 2} Ibid. 7 March 1986.

^{Page 469 note 3} Ibid. 31 December 1987.

^{Page 469 note 4} Ibid. 8 February 1988, and Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 19 02 1988.Google Scholar

^{Page 469 note 5} The Swazi News (Mbabane), 28 12 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 469 note 6} The Times of Swaziland, 15 08 1986, and The Star (Johannesburg), 20 August 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 469 note 7} The Times of Swaziland, 2 February 1987.

^{Page 469 note 8} The political nature of this action is clear from the fact that the man was subsequently handed over to the South Africans under dubious conditions, and that his lawyer in Swaziland appealed for protection against South African harassment. The Observer (Mbabane), 17 12 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 469 note 9} The Times of Swaziland, 26 May 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 470 note 1} The Swazi News, 13 June 1987.

^{Page 470 note 2} The Times of Swaziland, 2 February 1988.

^{Page 470 note 3} Ibid.

^{Page 470 note 4} The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in The Swazi Observer, 31 December 1987.

^{Page 470 note 5} Ibid. 5 December 1988.

^{Page 470 note 6} The Times of Swaziland, 22 January and 2 February 1988.

^{Page 470 note 7} The Swazi Observer, 24 February 1988. Later that year a number of shootings again altered the Government to the dangers involved if conflicts in the region spilled over any further into Swaziland – see e.g. ibid. 17 June 1988.

^{Page 471 note 1} The Times of Swaziland, 24 February 1988.