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How does neopatrimonialism affect the African state's revenues? The case of tax collection in Zambia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 November 2007
Abstract
Following the neopatrimonialism paradigm, it can be hypothesised that in African states informal politics of the rulers infringe on the collection of taxes and in turn reduce state revenue. This article tests this proposition for the case of Zambia. Neopatrimonial continuity in the country is evidenced by three factors: the concentration of political power, the award of personal favours, and the misuse of state resources. Despite this continuity, the revenue performance increased considerably with the creation of the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority. Donor pressure has been the most important intervening variable accounting for this improvement. Yet, strengthening the collection of central state revenue has been consistent with a neopatrimonial rationale, and may even have fed neopatrimonialism overall, by providing increased resources for particularistic expenditure.
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- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007
References
REFERENCES
Newspapers (published in Lusaka)
Financial Mail; The Post; Times of Zambia; Zambia Daily Mail.
Interviews cited
Chanda, Donald, former Economic Advisor to President Chiluba, Lusaka, 22.4.2004.
Customs Officer, ZRA, Chirundu border post, 20.5.2004.
Former Commissioner General, ZRA, Maseru, 16.8.2004.
Former representative, Forum for Democratic Process (FODEP), Lusaka, 26.4.2004.
Former Tax Officer with the Department of Taxes and the ZRA (1969 to 2003), Lusaka, 14.4.2004.
Manager, ZRA, Human Resources Unit, 7.4.2004.
Member of the ZRA Governing Board, Lusaka, 26.5.2004.
Mutati, Felix, former Deputy Minister of Finance and National Planning, Lusaka, 20.4.2004.
Official from the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Budget Office, Lusaka, 25.3.2004.
Project Manager, DFID, Lusaka, 11.3.2004.
Tax Officer, ZRA, Taxes Division, Lusaka, 23.3.2004.
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