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Urban DDR-processes: paramilitaries and criminal networks in Medellín, Colombia*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2008

RALPH ROZEMA
RALPH ROZEMA
Affiliation:
Ralph Rozema is a junior researcher (Ph.D. candidate) at the Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Department of Anthropology, Utrecht University, and a news editor at Radio Netherlands. He has conducted research on the reconstruction process in rural Peru and the armed conflict and the peace process in Medellín, Colombia. Email: R.A.P.Rozema@uu.nl
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Abstract

While most scientific studies on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants focus on the countryside, the case of the paramilitaries in Medellín, Colombia, provides an exceptional opportunity to study such a process in a metropolitan environment. Analysis reveals how an urban DDR-process may lead to highly contradictory results: a strong decrease in the number of homicides and at the same time a consolidation of networks of criminal groups. Extralegal combatants, especially in an urban environment, are able to form extensive networks with criminal organisations. Although DDR-approaches warn of the risk that ex-combatants may resort to violence, scholars tend to disregard existing networks of groups of combatants and powerful criminal organisations in their analyses. Taking theories on DDR as a starting point and reflecting on earlier local peace initiatives, this article analyses the process with paramilitaries in Medellín. It argues that although, the local peace process has led to some significant results, it has to date failed to address the wider network of criminal organisations within which former paramilitaries were and continue to be involved.

Resumen:

Mientras que la mayoría de estudios sobre desmovilización, desarme y reinserción (DDR) de antiguos combatientes se centran en el área rural, el caso de los paramilitares en Medellín, Colombia, provee una oportunidad excepcional para estudiar tal proceso en un ambiente metropolitano. El análisis revela cómo un proceso de DDR urbano puede llevar a resultados altamente contradictorios, como por ejemplo el que un fuerte descenso en el número de homicidios ocurre mientras se consolidan las redes de agrupaciones criminales. Combatientes extralegales, especialmente en un medio urbano, tienen la capacidad de formar extensas redes con organizaciones delictivas. Aunque los enfoques de DDR señalan el riesgo de que los excombatientes puedan recurrir nuevamente a la violencia, los académicos tienden a minimizar en sus análisis las redes existentes de agrupaciones de combatientes y organizaciones criminales poderosas. Al retomar teorías sobre la DDR como punto de partido y reflexionando en iniciativas anteriores de paz, este artículo analiza el proceso con los paramilitares en Medellín. Señala que aunque el proceso de paz local dio algunos resultados significativos, hasta la fecha ha fracasado en enfrentar las redes más amplias de organizaciones criminales en las que los ex paramilitares estuvieron y siguen estando involucrados.

Palabras clave: Colombia, Medellín, paramilitares, DDR, desmovilización, violencia urbana

Resumo:

Enquanto grande parte dos estudos científicos sobre desarmamento, desmobilização e reintegração (DDR) de ex-combatentes concentra-se no campo, uma oportunidade excepcional para o estudo desse tipo de processo em ambiente metropolitano é fornecido pelo caso dos paramilitares em Medellín, na Colômbia. A análise revela como um processo DDR pode levar a resultados altamente contraditórios – uma queda acentuada no número de homicídios, e ao mesmo tempo uma consolidação de redes criminosas. Combatentes extralegais são capazes de estabelecer extensivas redes com organizações criminosas, especialmente em ambientes urbanos. Embora abordagens DDR advirtam sobre o risco de que ex-combatentes possam recorrer à violência, estudiosos tendem a desconsiderar redes existentes de grupos de combatentes e poderosas organizações criminosas em suas análises. Tomando teorias a respeito de DDR como ponto de partida e refletindo sobre iniciativas anteriores pela paz, este artigo analisa o processo com paramilitares em Medellín. Argumenta-se que, posto que o processo de paz local levou a resultados importantes, até agora ele foi incapaz de dirigir-se à rede mais ampla de organizações criminosas nas quais antigos paramilitares foram e continuam envolvidos.

Palavras-chave: Colômbia, Medellín, paramilitares, DDR, desmobilização, violência urbana.

Keywords

ColombiaMedellínparamilitariesDDRdemobilisationurban violence
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 40 , Issue 3 , August 2008 , pp. 423 - 452
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Cambridge University Press

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References

1 Interview during a visit to Comuna 13, in February 2006. The names of former paramilitaries and residents of Comuna 13 have been changed for security reasons.

2 Don Berna's paramilitary group is held responsible for mass graves that have been discovered in the surroundings of Comuna 13. See for instance El Colombiano, 6 October 2006.

3 Medellín counts now around 4,000 demobilised paramilitaries, including former combatants from later demobilisations elsewhere in the country who choose to settle in the city and to participate in the local reintegration project. Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Proceso de paz con las Autodefensas, Informe Ejecutivo de desmovilizaciones colectivas 2003–2006 (Bogotá, 2006), www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/libro/librofinal.pdf (accessed 10 March 2008).

4 Organization of American States OAS (MAPP/OEA), Seventh Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (August 2006), www.oas.org/documents/OEA-Colombia/VII_Informe_IN.doc (accessed 10 March 2008).

5 For a discussion about the authenticity of testimonies see Arthur Schmidt's foreword in R. Gay, Lucia. Testimonies of a Brazilian drug dealer's women (Philadelphia, 2005), p. xii.

6 The interviews were held before revelations appeared in the Colombian press about the participation of European nationals in the guerrilla movement FARC.

7 Although the term DDR is commonly used, some authors prefer CDDR where C stands for ceasefire; others use DDRR, splitting the phase of reintegration in short-term reinsertion and long-term sustainable reintegration. See. K. Koonings and K. Nordquist, Proceso de paz, cese al fuego, desarme, desmovilización y reintegración – CDDR – paramilitar y (apoyo internacional a la) misión de apoyo al proceso de paz de la OEA–MAPP/OEA – en Colombia. Informe final (Bogotá, 2005); Knight, M. and Özerdem, A., ‘Guns, camps and cash: disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion of former combatants in transitions from war to peace’, Journal of Peace Research, 41–4 (2004), pp. 499–516CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 A. Caramés et al., Analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes existing in the world during 2005 (Barcelona, 2006):www.pangea.org/unescopau/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf (accessed 10 March 2008).

9 B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (New York, 1992): http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html; R. J. Fisher, Interactive conflict resolution (New York, 1997), p. 11; Knight & Özerdem, ‘Guns, camps and cash’; SIDDR Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, Final Report (Stockholm, 2006).

10 J. P. Lederach, Building peace. Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (Washington, 1997), pp. 20, 34, 82.

11 UN DDR Resource Centre, Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) (New York, 2006) www.unddr.org

12 SIDDR, Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (Stockholm, 2006), pp. 23, 27 30.

13 M. Fusato, Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (Univ. of Colorado, 2003), www.beyondintractability.org/essay/demobilization

14 S. Faltas, ‘DDR without camps’, in: BICC, Conversion Survey (Bonn, 2005), p. 5, www.bicc.de

15 N. Hitchkock, ‘Disarmament, demobilisation & reintegration: the case of Angola’, Conflict Trends, issue 1 (2004), www.trainingforpeace.org/resources/accord.htm#ct (accessed 10 March 2008); M. Koth, To end a war: demobilisation and reintegration of paramilitaries in Colombia (Bonn, 2005), pp. 16, 25, www.bicc.de.

16 R. Muggah, Reflections on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan (London, 2006): www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2795 (accessed 10 March 2008).

17 D. Pécaut, Midiendo fuerzas. Balance del primer año del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez (Bogotá, 2003), p. 42; D. Kruijt and K. Koonings, Stability Assessment Colombia for the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (The Hague, 2007), p. 22.

18 N. Richani, Sistemas de guerra. La economía política del conflicto en Colombia (Bogotá, 2003), p. 166.

19 Richani, Sistemas de Guerra, p. 172.

20 C. M. Gallego. and M. T. Ardila, La violencia parainstitucional, paramilitar y parapolicial en Colombia (Bogotá, 1994); M. Romero, Paramilitares y autodefensas 1982–2003 (Bogotá, 2003).

21 Although the AUC was independent of the state's forces, its actions were often coordinated with sectors of the army, especially in the early years of the AUC. The army was also decisive in linking the paramilitary group of the Castaño brothers with paramiltaries in Puerto Boyacá. A. Rangel, El poder paramilitar (Bogotá, 2005). See also Richani, Sistemas de Guerra, p. 171.

22 D. García-Peña Jaramillo, ‘La relación del Estado colombiano con el fenómeno paramilitar: por el esclarecimiento histórico’, in: Análisis Político, no. 53 (2005), p. 58–76.

23 El Tiempo 23 August 2006; El Colombiano, 24 August 2006.

24 Koonings and Nordquist, Proceso de paz, cese al fuego, desarme, desmovilización y reintegración, pp. 58.

25 Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Proceso de paz con las Autodefensas, p. 4; C. J. Arnson, The peace process in Colombia with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC (Washington, 2005), p. 4; Koth, To end a war: demobilisation and reintegration of paramilitaries in Colombia; M. Romero, The demobilisation of paramilitaries and self-defences: risky, controversial and necessary (Uppsala, 2005), http://www.kus.uu.se/pdf/publications/Final%20Final%20Romero.pdf (accessed 10 March 2008).

26 Flournoy, M. and Pan, M., ‘Dealing with demons: justice and reconciliation’, The Washington Quarterly, 25–4 (2002), pp. 111–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; SIDDR, Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, p. 30.

27 Some sections of the law were later modified by the Supreme Court to avoid challenges on the grounds of inconstitutionality.

28 Human Rights Watch, Colombia, Librando a los paramilitares de sus responsabilidades (New York, 2005): http://hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/colombia0105-sp (accessed 10 March 2008).

29 El Tiempo (27 July 2006).

30 L. A. Restrepo, ‘Violence and fear in Colombia: fragmentation of space, contraction of time and forms of evasion’, in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), Armed Actors, Organised violence and state failure in Latin America (London, 2004), pp. 172–85.

31 M. A. Alonso, J. Giraldo and D. J. Sierra, ‘Medellín: el complejo camino de la competencia armada’, in: M. Romero (ed.), Parapolítica. La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos (Bogotá, 2007); A. Salazar, La parábola de Pablo. Auge y caída de un gran capo de narcotráfico (Bogotá, 2001).

32 G. Medina Franco, Historia sin fin … Las milicias en Medellín en la decada del noventa (Medellín, 2006); C. E. Londoño, ‘Evaluación de procesos de negociación con y entre actores armados urbanos en la ciudad de Medellín en la década del noventa’, in: A. Monsalve Solórzano and E. Domínguez Gómez (eds.), Colombia. Democracia y paz (Medellín, 2001), pp. 145–83.

33 Melguizo, R. Ceballos and Cronshaw, F., ‘The evolution of armed conflict in Medellín: an analysis of major actors’, Latin American Perspectives, vol. 28. no. 1 (2001), pp. 110–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 A. M. Jaramillo Arbeláez, Milicias Populares en Medellín: entre la guerra y la paz (Medellín, 1994), p. 27.

35 Londoño, ‘Evaluación de procesos de negociación con y entre actores armados urbanos en la ciudad de Medellín en la década del noventa’, p. 171.

36 Sanín, F. Gutiérrez and Jaramillo, A. M., ‘Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security – the case of Medellín, Colombia’, Environment & Urbanization, vol. 16. no. 2 (2004), pp. 17–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 A. M. Jaramillo Arbeláez, R. Ceballos Melguizo and M. I. Villa Martínez, En la encrucijada. Conflicto y cultura política en el Medellín de los noventa (Medellín, 1998), p. 65; Jaramillo, Milicias Populares en Medellín, p. 35.

38 Londoño, ‘Evaluación de procesos de negociación con y entre actores armados urbanos en la ciudad de Medellín en la década del noventa’, p. 173.

39 A. Daza, ‘Entre esquinas, cambuches, cruces y callejones’, in A. Daza, G. Salazar and L. González, Experiencias de intervención en conflicto urbano, tomo II (Medellín, 2001), pp. 82; Jaramillo, En la encrucijada, p. 67.

40 G. Medina, Coosercom (Medellín, 1996), p. 7; Jaramillo, En la encrucijada, p. 81; J. C. Vélez Rendón, ‘Conflicto y guerra: la lucha por el orden en Medellín’, Estudios Políticos, no. 18 (2001), pp. 61–89.

41 Gutiérrez et al., ‘Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security’; Ceballos Melguizo et al., ‘The evolution of armed conflict in Medellín’.

42 Medina, Coosercom, p. 3.

43 Medina, p. 9.

44 Jaramillo, En la encrucijada, p. 82.

45 Jaramillo, En la encrucijada; Vélez Rendón, ‘Conflicto y guerra: la lucha por el orden en Medellín’; Gutiérrez et al., ‘Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security’.

46 Leudo, interview 18 March 2004.

47 Jaramillo, En la encrucijada, p. 140.

48 Leudo, interview 18 March 2004; see also Jaramillo, En la encrucijada, p. 134.

49 Vélez Rendón, ‘Conflicto y guerra: la lucha por el orden en Medellín’, p. 70.

50 Jaramillo, En la encrucijada, p. 142.

51 Vélez Rendón, ‘Conflicto y guerra: la lucha por el orden en Medellín’.

52 Some authors (for example, Gutiérrez et al., ‘Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security’) use the term militias; others speak of guerrilla groups that infiltrated neighbourhoods on the city's outskirts during the second half of the 1990s: see, for example IPC, ‘Breve recuento de los actores armadas en Medellín, década del 90’, Boletín virtual 04 ‘Por la vida (Medellín, 2003). See also A. Restrepo, Jovenes y antimilitarismo en Medellín (Medellín 2007), p. 122.

53 The FARC and the ELN were both established in the 1960s. The FARC had its roots in a peasant movement that demanded land reform, while the smaller ELN was more inspired by the example of the Cuban revolution. Both insurgent groups operate nationally and finance their operations through drug trafficking, extortion and kidnappings. The CAP operated only in certain parts of Medellín between the late 1990s and 2002, when they were incorporated within the ELN.

54 Gutiérrez et al., ‘Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security’, p. 26.

55 Alonso et al., ‘Medellín: el complejo camino de la competencia armada’; Gutiérrez et al., ‘Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security’, p. 26.

56 Restrepo, ‘Violence and fear in Colombia’; R. A. P. Rozema, ‘Medellín’, in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), Fractured Cities. Social exclusion, urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America (London, 2007).

57 Washington Post, ‘Urban Anti-rebel raid a new turn in Colombian war’ (24 October 2002), p. A28.

58 In the years following Operación Orión the FARC and ELN continued to operate nationally, but not in Medellín. In 2007 a small number of FARC-combatants returned to the Comuna 13, some minor bombing attacks were attributed to them, but generally they kept a low profile: Instituto Popular de Capacitación, Población juvenile: objetivo de grupos armados en la Comuna 13 (November 2007). Internet: www.ipc.org.co (accessed 10 March 2008).

59 El Colombiano, ‘Un mes después, la 13 respira otro aire’, 15 November 2002; Y. A. Rendón, Comuna 13 de Medellín. El drama del conflicto armado (Medellín, 2007), pp. 173–94.

60 Noche y Niebla, Comuna 13, la otra versión, nocheyniebla.org (Bogotá, 2003), p. 20; for other testimonies about Operation Orión, see R. Aricapa, Comuna 13: crónica de una guerra urbana, p. 208.

61 Interviews in the Comuna 13, April 2004. The story of the red car was told independently by two informants; several others confirmed that at that time disappearances were still occurring, sometimes of several people a week.

62 Los Angeles Times, ‘Colombia army chief linked to outlaw militias’, 24 March 2007. Based on the CIA-findings, the newspaper stated that ‘in jointly conducting the operation, the army, police and paramilitaries had signed documents detailing their plans. The signatories (…) were army chief General Mario Montoya, the commander of an area police force, and paramilitary leader Fabio Jaramillo, who was a subordinate of Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, the head of the paramilitaries in the Medellín area, known as Don Berna’. Montoya has denied the existence of such an agreement.

63 The war between paramilitary factions in Medellín is the theme of a widely acclaimed documentary La Sierra; see www.lasierrafilm.com (accessed 10 March 2008).

64 The commander of the Bloque Metro, Carlos Mauricio García Fernandez, alias Rodrigo Franco or Doble Cero, withdrew his bloque from the national paramilitary organisation AUC in September 2002. He was assassinated in Santa Marta in May 2004.

65 Salazar, La parábola de Pablo. Auge y caída de un gran capo de narcotráfico, p. 328.

66 Alonso et al., ‘Medellín: el complejo camino de la competencia armada’; Amnesty International, The paramilitaries in Medellín: demobilization or legalization?, September 2005; Revista Cambio, ‘Los archivos de Don Berna’, 29 August 2005; El Colombiano, ‘Don Berna se entregó a las autoridades’, 28 May 2005; El Tiempo, ‘Se acaba la ‘Oficina de Envigado’, una de la más temidas organizaciones del mundo delincuencial', 20 July 2005.

67 D. Pécaut, ‘From the banality of violence to real terror: the case of Colombia’, in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), Societies of fear, the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America (London, 1999); H. Arendt, ‘From Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil’ (New York, 1963); M. I. Villa Martínez, L. A. Sánchez Medina and A. M. Jaramillo Abeláez, Rostros del miedo, una investigación sobre los miedos sociales urbanos (Medellín, 2003).

68 Interview, April 2004.

69 Interview, April 2004.

70 El Tiempo, 18 October 2005.

71 Restrepo, ‘Violence and fear in Colombia’, p. 179.

72 Ibid. p. 181; Villa Martínez, Rostros del miedo.

73 OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the demobilization process in Colombia (2005), www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colombia04eng/chapter1.htm (accessed 10 March 2008); The New York Times, 25 November 2003; Washington Post, 25 November 2003.

74 Caramés et al., Analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes existing in the world during 2005, p. 22.

75 Knight and Özerdem, ‘Guns, camps and cash’.

76 Fusato, Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.

77 El Tiempo, 16 November 2003.

78 Fusato, Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.

79 Alonso et al., ‘Medellín: el complejo camino de la competencia armada’; Caramés et al., Analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes existing in the world during 2005.

80 Some paramilitaries of the BCN participated in later demobilisations elsewhere in Colombia.

81 El Colombiano, 6–16 November 2003, 14, 16, 18 December 2003; El Tiempo, 6 November 2003, 2 December 2003.

82 Koth, To end a war: demobilisation and reintegration of paramilitaries in Colombia.

83 Interview, 3 April 2004. Alonso Salazar was elected mayor of Medellín in November 2007.

84 Alonso Salazar and Clara Restrepo, Secretario de Desarrollo Social, had been affiliated with Corporación Región, an NGO with projects in neighbourhoods most affected by the violence. Salazar is also the author of a bestselling book on armed groups in Medellín, No nacimos pa' semilla (Bogotá, 2002).

85 Investments in the popular neighbourhoods included the building of schools, libraries and the metrocable, a cable car transport system connecting the neighbourhoods in the hills directly with the metro. Special projects (Proyectos Urbanos Integrales) were designed for the Nororiente and the Comuna 13 that included housing and social projects such as training courses for community leaders.

86 Interview held at the Colombian embassy in The Hague, The Netherlands, 12 November 2004 (Fajardo was in Europe for talks aimed at securing additional funds for the paramilitary DDR-process).

87 I. C. Douglas et al., Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, A practical field and classroom guide (Stockholm, 2004), p. 86; SIDDR, Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, p. 28.

88 Caramés et al., Analysis of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes existing in the world during 2005, p. 23; Douglas, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, A practical field and classroom guide; Knight and Özerdem, ‘Guns, camps and cash’; Hitchkock, ‘Disarmament, demobilisation & reintegration: the case of Angola’.

89 El Colombiano, 23 May 2004. The employment projects in Medellín benefited from more funds than those allocated for other demobilisations elsewhere in Colombia.

90 Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007.

91 Interview, at the neighbourhood organisation, Realizadores de Sueños, 1 March 2006.

92 Interview, in the Noroccidente, 3 March 2006.

93 Interviews, March 2006.

94 Interview with a 28 year-old demobilised paramilitary, March 2006.

95 Interview with a 24 year-old demobilised paramilitary, March 2006.

96 Alcaldía de Medellín, 2006.

97 Interview in the Noroccidente, 3 March 2006.

98 Amnesty International, The paramilitaries in Medellín: demobilization or legalization?, p. 49.

99 Hitchkock, ‘Disarmament, demobilisation & reintegration: the case of Angola’, p. 40; Koth, To end a war: demobilisation and reintegration of paramilitaries in Colombia, p. 38.

100 Interview with Alonso, 11 March 2006. See also: Alonso et al., ‘Medellín: el complejo camino de la competencia armada’, p. 127.

101 International Crisis Group, ‘Colombia's new armed groups. Latin-American Report 20’ (10 May 2007), p. 18.

102 Interviews with residents in Comuna 13, March 2006.

103 Interview, 11 March 2006.

104 Interview, 7 March 2006.

105 The Ley de Justicia y Paz (Ley 975, 25 July 2005, article 16, 29) stipulates that former paramilitaries receive sentences between 4 and 8 years for crimes committed as members of paramilitary groups. Other crimes, such as drug trafficking, are not within the framework of this law.

106 Interviews with ex-paramiltaries, March 2006.

107 Castells, ‘La guerra red’, in El País, 18 September 2001.

108 Interview, 11 March 2006.

109 Interviews with residents of the Comuna 13, March 2006. In 2007 small armed groups using the name Aguilas Negras (black eagles) entered some neighbourhoods of Medellín. The Aguilas Negras emerged in several parts of Colombia after the demobilisation of the paramilitaries. There are speculations that they come from criminal organisations or that former paramilitaries are involved (source: residents of Comuna 13 and the Instituto Popular de Capacitación, February 2008).

110 Interviews with residents of the Comuna 13, March 2006.

111 Kimberly Theidon, ‘Transitional subjects: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in Colombia’, The International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 1 (2007), pp. 66–90.

112 Sociologist Jesus Balbín, Instituto Popular de Capacitación, interview, 2 March 2006.