Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-75dct Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-01T12:12:47.452Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Identity, Conflict and Discourse: Understanding Military Contestation in Brazil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2023

Ned Littlefield  and
Douglas Block Open the ORCID record for Douglas Block [Opens in a new window]
Ned Littlefield
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Douglas Block*
Affiliation:
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, US Department of Health and Human Services
*
Corresponding author: Douglas Block; Email: douglasablock@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The Brazilian military has recently executed an unexpected return to politics by engaging more actively in domestic policymaking and implementation both before and during the Bolsonaro government, thus jeopardising democratic consolidation. To help understand this development, we examine why the military openly challenges civilian authority over some issues, while remaining silent on others. Whereas prior work emphasises external factors like civilians’ threats to military prerogatives, we argue that contestation of civilian authority stems in no small part from internal military conflict over how to utilise power. The military uses contestation to coordinate prerogatives with civilians and to communicate within the armed forces to increase cohesion. We illustrate this argument with case studies of military contestation surrounding political leadership selection and internal security, using the Army Commander's discourse via Twitter posts and public statements, plus key informant interviews and military publications.

Identidad, disputa y discurso: entendiendo la controversia militar en brasil

Identidad, disputa y discurso: entendiendo la controversia militar en Brasil

Los militares brasileños han mostrado recientemente un inesperado retorno a la política al participar más activamente en la formulación e implementación de políticas internas tanto antes como durante el gobierno de Bolsonaro, poniendo así en riesgo la consolidación democrática. Para ayudarnos a entender este desarrollo, examinamos por qué los militares desafían abiertamente a la autoridad civil sobre ciertos temas, en tanto que permanecen en silencio sobre otros. Mientras que trabajos previos ponen énfasis en factores externos como la amenaza civil a las prerrogativas militares, aquí argumentamos que la contestación de la autoridad civil se origina en buena parte a partir de los conflictos militares internos sobre cómo ejercitar el poder. Los militares utilizan la contestación para coordinar prerrogativas con civiles y para comunicar dentro de las fuerzas armadas para incrementar a su cohesión. Nosotros ilustramos este argumento con estudios de caso de contestación militar alrededor de la selección de la dirigencia política y la seguridad interna, usando el discurso de la Comandancia del Ejército a través de publicaciones en Twitter y de declaraciones públicas, junto con entrevistas a informantes clave y publicaciones militares.

Identidade, conflito e discurso: entendendo a contestação militar no brasil

Identidade, conflito e discurso: entendendo a contestação militar no Brasil

Os militares brasileiros realizaram recentemente um retorno inesperado à política, envolvendo-se mais ativamente na formulação e implementação de políticas domésticas antes e durante o governo Bolsonaro, colocando assim em risco a consolidação democrática. Para ajudar-nos a entender esse desenvolvimento, examinamos por que os militares desafiam abertamente a autoridade civil em algumas questões, mas permanecem em silêncio sobre outras. Considerando que trabalhos anteriores enfatizam fatores externos, como ameaças de civis a prerrogativas militares, argumentamos que a contestação da autoridade civil decorre em grande parte do conflito militar interno sobre como utilizar o poder. Os militares usam a contestação para coordenar prerrogativas com civis e para se comunicar dentro das forças armadas para aumentar a coesão. Ilustramos esse argumento com estudos de caso de contestação militar em torno da seleção de liderança política e segurança interna, usando o discurso do Comandante do Exército por meio de postagens no Twitter e declarações públicas, juntamente com entrevistas com informantes-chave e publicações militares.

Keywords

civilian–military relationsdemocracydemocratic consolidationpublic securitypresidential electionsrelaciones cívico-militardemocraciaconsolidación democráticaseguridad públicaelecciones presidencialesrelações civis-militardemocraciaconsolidação democráticasegurança públicaeleições presidenciais
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 55 , Issue 3 , August 2023 , pp. 491 - 518
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

The views presented herein do not represent the views of the US Federal Government.

References

1 Pion-Berlin, David and Martínez, Rafael, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 20–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 77–124.

2 We use the terms ‘military’ and ‘armed forces’ interchangeably throughout this paper.

3 Flores-Macías, Gustavo A. and Zarkin, Jessica, ‘The Militarization of Law Enforcement: Evidence from Latin America’, Perspectives on Politics, 19: 2 (2021), pp. 519–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Diamint, Rut, ‘A New Militarism in Latin America’, Journal of Democracy, 26: 4 (2015), pp. 155–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Kuehn, David and Trinkunas, Harold, ‘Conditions of Military Contestation in Populist Latin America’, Democratization, 24: 5 (2017), pp. 859–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Angelo Attanasio, ‘Protestas en América Latina: Cómo los militares volvieron al primer plano de la política de la región’, BBC News Mundo, 2 Dec. 2019; Max Fisher, ‘“A Very Dangerous Game”: In Latin America, Embattled Leaders Lean on Generals’, New York Times, 10 Nov. 2019; Gustavo Flores-Macías, ‘Latin America's Generals, Back in the Political Labyrinth’, Washington Post, 14 Nov. 2019; Adam Isacson, ‘What is Latin America's Political Turmoil Doing to Civilian Control of the Military?’, Washington Office on Latin America, 10 Dec. 2019, https://www.wola.org/analysis/latin-america-political-turmoil-doing-to-civilian-control-of-the-military (all URLs last accessed 12 May 2023); Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, ‘The Coup Temptation in Latin America’, New York Times, 26 Nov. 2019; Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, ‘La nueva sombra del poder militar en América Latina’, La Nación (Buenos Aires), 18 Nov. 2019.

7 Stepan, Alfred, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Hunter, Wendy, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Bruneau, Thomas Charles and Tollefson, Scott D., ‘Civil–Military Relations in Brazil: A Reassessment’, Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6: 2 (2014), pp. 107–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pion-Berlin and Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians.

9 Hunter, Wendy and Power, Timothy J., ‘Bolsonaro and Brazil's Illiberal Backlash’, Journal of Democracy, 30: 1 (2019), pp. 68–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Michael Albertus, ‘The Military Returns to Brazilian Politics’, Foreign Policy, 8 Oct. 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/08/the-military-returns-to-brazilian-politics-bolsonaro/.

11 Ibid., p. 81.

12 Andres Schipani and Bryan Harris, ‘Brazil's Generals Viewed as Voice of Moderation in Populist Government’, Financial Times, 31 March 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/978ddc5c-5246-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294.

13 Luiza Franco, ‘Militares se desgastaram muito no 1° ano do governo Bolsonaro, diz cientista político João Roberto Martins Filho’, BBC News Brasil, 11 Jan. 2020, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/geral-50989313; Brian Winter, ‘“It's Complicated”: Inside Bolsonaro's Relationship with Brazil's Military’, Americas Quarterly, 16 Dec. 2019, https://www.americasquarterly.org/its-complicated-bolsonaro-military.

14 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, pp. 68–92.

15 Ibid., pp. 45–54.

16 Ibid., pp. 93–127.

17 Stepan, Alfred C., The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 217–60Google Scholar; ‘Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations’, in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, vol. 3: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 75–8; Rethinking Military Politics, pp. 30–40.

18 Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond, ‘Power in International Politics’, International Organization, 59: 1 (2005), pp. 39–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p. 93.

20 Ibid., p. 98.

21 Ibid., p. 106.

22 Aurel Croissant et al., ‘Theorizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies: Agency, Structure and Institutional Change’, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 5 (2011), pp. 75–98.

23 Pion-Berlin and Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians, pp. 20–4; 77–84.

24 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p. 68.

25 Ibid., p. 45.

26 Ibid., p. 68.

27 Ibid., p. 69.

28 Filho, João R. Martins and Zirker, Daniel, ‘The Brazilian Military under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42: 3 (2000), pp. 143–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 See also Maria Celina D'Araujo, ‘Ainda em busca da identidade: Desafios das Forças Armadas na Nova República’, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC), Working Paper 36, 2000, https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/6582/778.pdf?Sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Cláudio de Carvalho Silveira, ‘Construção de identidade e educação militar brasileira no início do século XXI’, in Daniel Zirker and Suzeley Kalil Mathias (eds.), Militares e democracia: Estudos sobre a identidade militar (São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2016), pp. 87–102.

30 Stanley, Ruth, ‘Modes of Transition v. Electoral Dynamics: Democratic Control of the Military in Argentina and Chile’, Journal of Third World Studies, 13: 2 (2001), pp. 71–91Google Scholar.

31 Jaskoski, Maiah, ‘Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru’, Armed Forces & Society, 38: 1 (2012), pp. 70–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Kuehn and Trinkunas, ‘Conditions of Military Contestation in Populist Latin America’.

33 Schmidt, Vivien, ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11: 1 (2008), pp. 303–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Ibid.

35 Rawi Abdelal et al., ‘Identity as a Variable’, Perspectives on Politics, 4: 4 (2006), p. 700.

36 Kimberly A. Neuendorf and Paul D. Skalski, ‘Quantitative Content Analysis and the Measurement of Collective Identity’, in Rawi Abdelal et al. (eds.), Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 211; original emphasis.

37 Kobi J. Michael, ‘The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil–Military Relations: The “Discourse Space” Model and the Israeli Case during the Oslo Process’, Armed Forces & Society, 33: 4 (2007), pp. 518–46.

38 Stepan, The Military in Politics; ‘Paths toward Redemocratization’; Rethinking Military Politics.

39 Thomas Charles Bruneau, ‘Democratic Politics in Brazil: Advances in Accountability Mechanisms and Regression in Civil–Military Relations’, University of Pittsburgh, Panoramas Scholarly Platform, 10 April 2018, https://panoramas.secure.pitt.edu/content/democratic-politics-brazil-advances-accountability-mechanisms-and-regression-civil-military; Adriano de Freixo, ‘Os militares e a política no Brasil de Bolsonaro’, Teoria e Debate, 1 July 2020, https://teoriaedebate.org.br/2020/07/01/os-militares-e-a-politica-no-brasil-de-bolsonaro/.

40 Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 273.

41 Smallman, Shawn C., Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, 1889–1954 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 1–8Google Scholar.

42 Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 61.

43 King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 28–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 Levy, Jack S., ‘Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25: 1 (2008), pp. 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 Abdelal et al., ‘Identity as a Variable’, p. 702.

46 Neuendorf and Skalski, ‘Quantitative Content Analysis’, p. 211.

47 King et al., Designing Social Inquiry; Gerring, John, Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)Google Scholar.

48 Fernanda Odilla, ‘“Exército é o mesmo de 1964, mas circunstâncias mudaram”, diz comandante sobre pedidos de intervenção militar’, BBC Brasil, 13 Nov. 2017, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-41929572.

49 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil; Bruneau and Tollefson, ‘Civil–Military Relations in Brazil’.

50 Albertus, ‘The Military Returns to Brazilian Politics’; Bruneau, ‘Democratic Politics in Brazil’.

51 Hunter and Power, ‘Bolsonaro and Brazil's Illiberal Backlash’.

52 Thais Bilenky, ‘Forças Armadas lideram confiança da população; Congresso tem descrédito’, Folha de S. Paulo, 24 June 2017, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2017/06/1895770-forcas-armadas-lideram-confianca-da-populacao-congresso-tem-descredito.shtml.

53 Marcelo Roubicek, ‘Como os militares pressionam o Supremo em horas decisivas’, Nexo Jornal, 18 Oct. 2019, https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2019/10/17/Como-os-militares-pressionam-o-Supremo-em-horas-decisivas.

54 Isadora Peron, ‘Exército defende declarações de general Villas Bôas no Twitter’, O Estado de São Paulo, 4 April 2018, https://www.estadao.com.br/politica/exercito-defende-declaracoes-de-general-villas-boas-no-twitter/.

55 Bruno Góes and Amanda Almeida, ‘Senado usa frase que causou polêmica para homenagear General Villas Bôas’, O Globo, 12 Aug. 2019, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/senado-usa-frase-que-causou-polemica-para-homenagear-general-villas-boas-23872621; ‘Gen Ex Villas BOAS Homenagem do Senado’, DefesaNet, 13 Aug. 2019, https://www.defesanet.com.br/pr/noticia/33862/gen-ex-villas-boas-%c2%96-homenagem-do-senado/.

56 Castro, Celso, Exército e nação: Estudos sobre a História do Exército Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2012)Google Scholar; Hayes, Robert A., The Armed Nation: The Brazilian Corporate Mystique (Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1989)Google Scholar; McCann, Frank D., Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar; Skidmore, Thomas E., The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Smallman, Fear and Memory; Stepan, The Military in Politics; Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics.

57 Franco, ‘Militares se desgastaram muito no 1° ano do governo Bolsonaro’.

58 King et al., Designing Social Inquiry, p. 30.

59 Luis Bitencourt, ‘Brazil: The Evolution of Civil–Military Relations and Security’, in Gabriel Marcella, Orlando J. Pérez and Brian Fonseca (eds.), Democracy and Security in Latin America: State Capacity and Governance under Stress (New York: Routledge, 2022), p. 119.

60 Pion-Berlin and Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians, p. 272.

61 Robert Adcock and David Collier, ‘Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research’, American Political Science Review, 95: 3 (2001), p. 540.

62 As per the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol, only the lead author (Ned Littlefield) examined the transcripts. The IRB protocol also required anonymising all interviews.

63 See e.g. OMNIDEF, Oct. 2020, Year 6, Issue 36, https://www.gov.br/esg/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/boletim-de-defesa-e-seguranca/omnidef/arquivos/ano6/omnidefano6edio036outubrode2020.pdf.

64 Cowan, Benjamin A., Securing Sex: Morality and Repression in the Making of Cold War Brazil (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Smallman, Fear and Memory; Stepan, The Military in Politics; Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics.

65 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, pp. 93–127.

66 Pion-Berlin and Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians, pp. 77–84.

67 Ibid., p. 93.

68 Luciano Nascimento, ‘Law Scholar Says Fiscal Backpedaling is Ground to Impeach Rousseff’, Agência Brasil, 31 March 2016, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2016-03/law-scholar-says-fiscal-backpedaling-ground-impeach-rousseff.

69 Heloisa Cristaldo, ‘Comandante-geral do Exército refuta possibilidade de intervenção militar’, Agência Brasil, 19 April 2016, http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2016-04/comandante-geral-do-exercito-refuta-possibilidade-de-intervencao-militar.

70 Thaís Oyama and Robson Bonin, ‘Exército foi sondado para decretar estado de defesa, diz general’, Veja, 24 April 2017, https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/exercito-foi-sondado-para-decretar-estado-de-defesa-diz-general/.

71 Leonardo Sakamoto, ‘Bolsonaro, o incontrolável’, UOL Notícias, 31 July 2019, https://noticias.uol.com.br/reportagens-especiais/entrevista-dilma-rousseff/#video-1.

72 Sergio Luis de Deus, ‘“É triste que a população veja como alternativa uma intervenção militar”, diz chefe do Exército’, Gazeta do Povo, 22 June 2017, https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/politica/republica/e-triste-que-a-populacao-veja-como-alternativa-uma-intervencao-militar-diz-chefe-do-exercito-2tb3utb80pncfu9w5qmqmd0vq/.

73 ‘Comandante do Exército diz que “malucos” apoiam intervenção militar’, Gazeta do Povo, 11 Dec. 2016, https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/vida-publica/comandante-do-exercito-diz-que-malucos-apoiam-intervencao-militar-2jhvsf7kipzus59d9z7a0uvn4/.

74 Lula began a third term in office in 2023.

75 ‘Tuíte do general Villas Bôas sobre Lula foi atenuado; atuais ministros de Bolsonaro discutiram o texto’, Folha de São Paulo, 21 Feb. 2021, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2021/02/tuite-do-general-villas-boas-sobre-lula-foi-atenuado-atuais-ministros-de-bolsonaro-discutiram-o-texto.shtml.

76 Eliana Cantanhêde, ‘Militares mostram apreensão com crise’, Folha de São Paulo, 22 Aug. 2005, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2208200525.htm.

77 Pablo Marques, ‘Em evento da maçonaria, general do Exército propõe intervenção militar’, Poder 360, 17 Sept. 2017, https://www.poder360.com.br/brasil/em-evento-da-maconaria-general-do-exercito-propoe-intervencao-militar/.

78 Rubens Valente, ‘Comandante do Exército reúne generais e fala em “coesão”’, DefesaNet, 26 Sept. 2017, http://www.defesanet.com.br/crise/noticia/27225/Comandante-do-Exercito-reune-generais-e-fala-em-coesao/.

79 Daiene Cardoso, ‘Lula segue líder em pesquisa eleitoral; sem petista, Bolsonaro e Marina disputariam 2.° turno’, O Estado de São Paulo, 6 March 2018, https://www.estadao.com.br/politica/lula-segue-lider-em-pesquisa-eleitoral-sem-petista-bolsonaro-e-marina-disputariam-2-turno/.

80 Igor Gielow, ‘“Bolsonaro não é volta dos militares, mas há o risco de politização de quartéis”, diz Villas Bôas’, Folha de São Paulo, 11 Nov. 2018, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/11/bolsonaro-nao-e-volta-dos-militares-mas-ha-o-risco-de-politizacao-de-quarteis-diz-villas-boas.shtml.

81 Ibid.

82 Prerogatives constitutive of constitute latent military power: Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, pp. 93–127; military power itself: Pion-Berlin and Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians, pp. 77–84.

83 Stepan, Alfred, ‘The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion’, in Stepan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47–65Google Scholar; Rethinking Military Politics, pp. 13–29.

84 Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 229.

85 Fitch, J. Samuel, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 186–94Google Scholar.

86 https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/exercicios-e-operacoes/garantia-da-lei-e-da-ordem.

87 Pion-Berlin and Martínez, Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians, p. 97.

88 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p. 68.

89 Ministério da Defesa, ‘Ocorrências de GLO por tipo’, 31 Jan. 2022, https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arquivos/exercicios_e_operacoes/glo/5-tabelas-glo_grafico_por_ano_barras_jan_22.pdf.

90 ‘Comandante do Exército diz que uso de militares na segurança pública é “perigoso”’, O Globo, 22 June 2017, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/comandante-do-exercito-diz-que-uso-de-militares-na-seguranca-publica-e-perigoso.ghtml.

91 João Paulo Charleaux, ‘Por que o Exército quer mudar o jeito de julgar militar que mata civil’, Nexo Jornal Expresso, 17 Aug. 2017, https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2017/08/16/Por-que-o-Ex%C3%A9rcito-quer-mudar-o-jeito-de-julgar-militar-que-mata-civil.

92 Luis Kawaguti, ‘Comandante do Exército diz que insegurança jurídica pode inibir ação de tropas no Rio’, DefesaNet, 2 Oct. 2017, https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2017/10/02/comandante-do-exercito-diz-que-e-preciso-debater-efeitos-colaterais-do-combate-ao-crime-organizado.htm.

93 Tânia Monteiro, ‘Contaminação de tropas federais por facções criminosas preocupa, diz general’, UOL Notícias, 15 Jan. 2018, https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/agencia-estado/2018/01/15/contaminacao-de-tropas-federais-por-faccoes-criminosas-preocupa-diz-general.htm.

94 Fabio Victor, ‘Mal-estar na caserna’, Revista Piauí, issue 138, March 2018, http://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/mal-estar-na-caserna/.

95 Gabinete de Intervenção Federal no Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Office for the Federal Intervention in the State of Rio de Janeiro, GIFRJ), ‘Portaria Normativa’ [Regulatory Ordinance] No. 22, 11 Oct. 2018, approving the ‘Plano Estratégico da Intervenção Federal na Área de Segurança Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro’, 2nd edition, http://olerj.camara.leg.br/entenda/planorevisado.pdf, p. 17.

96 Even though we did not explicitly ask about the distinction between GLOs and the Federal Intervention, ten out of 18 interviewees (56 per cent) suggested that GLOs are more tactical and operationally oriented while the Federal Intervention was more strategic and institutionally oriented. Only two out of 18 interviewees (11 per cent), in contrast, suggested that the distinction was negligible as soldiers, politicians and civilians nonetheless associated the Federal Intervention with soldiers on the streets conducting law-enforcement actions. Notwithstanding the importance of public opinion, we therefore consider it reasonable to distinguish between GLOs and the Federal Intervention in terms of tactical and operational policing missions versus strategic and institutional policing missions, respectively.

97 Felipe Betim, ‘Intervenção federal no Rio decretada por Temer abre inédito e incerto capítulo’, El País, 17 Feb. 2018, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/02/16/politica/1518803598_360807.html.

98 Victor, ‘Mal-estar na caserna’.

99 ‘Interventor diz que não há previsão de ocupação permanente em favelas do Estado’, A Tribuna, 27 Feb. 2018, https://tribunadepetropolis.com.br/noticias/interventor-diz-que-nao-ha-previsao-de-ocupacao-permanente-em-favelas/.

100 Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), A Intervenção Federal no Rio de Janeiro e as organizações da sociedade civil (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2019), p. 29.

101 Governo do Estado Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Segurança Pública, ‘Dados Visualização’, 31 March 2021, http://www.ispvisualizacao.rj.gov.br/. To view statistics on killings by and of police officers during the 2018 Federal Intervention, go to the ‘Título’ field and select ‘Morte por intervenção de agente do Estado’ (‘Death at the hand of an agent of the State’), ‘Policiais civis mortos em serviço’ or ‘Policiais militares mortos em serviço’ (‘Civil/military police officers killed on duty’). Navigate down on the same page to the ‘Tabela de dados’ for the selected metric and, specifically, to the row headed ‘2018’. Subtract the January 2018 total from the yearly total (to account for the fact that the Federal Intervention began in mid-February).

102 Observatório da Intervenção and Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania (CESeC), ‘Intervenção no Rio, 1: À deriva: sem programa, sem resultado, sem rumo’, 16 Feb. – 16 April 2018, http://observatoriodaintervencao.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/RELATORIO_01_observ-interv_bx.pdf.

103 Afonso Benites, ‘Intervenção federal no Rio desperta fantasmas sobre o papel do Exército’, El País, 21 Feb. 2018, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/02/20/politica/1519155351_378130.html.

104 Rodolfo Costa, ‘Exército atribui insucessos da intervenção no Rio à falta de empenho’, Correio Braziliense, 24 Aug. 2018, https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2018/08/24/interna-brasil,701696/exercito-atribui-insucessos-da-intervencao-no-rio-a-falta-de-empenho.shtml.

105 ‘Intervenção critica proposta de Witzel de extinguir Secretaria de Segurança’, UOL, 11 Dec. 2018, https://www.bol.uol.com.br/noticias/2018/12/11/proposta-de-witzel-sobre-seguranca-causa-grande-preocupacao-diz-general.htm.

106 Jaskoski, Maiah, Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Civilian Control of the Armed Forces’.

107 Harig, Christoph, ‘Soldiers in Police Roles’, Policing and Society, 30: 9 (2020), pp. 1097–1114CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108 GIFRJ, ‘Plano Estratégico’, p. 9.

109 Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos, ‘Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988’: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm.

110 Betim, ‘Intervenção federal no Rio’.

111 Please see our OMNIDEF dataset in the online appendix.

112 Franco, ‘Militares se desgastaram muito no 1° ano do governo Bolsonaro’.

113 Informed by Gregory Weeks, ‘Understanding Latin American Politics’, Episode 70: ‘Latin American Civil–Military Relations: What the &%$*&?’, 1 Feb. 2020, https://pages.charlotte.edu/gregory-weeks/tag/podcast/.

114 Jenne, Nicole and Martínez, Rafael, ‘Domestic Military Missions in Latin America: Civil–Military Relations and the Perpetuation of Democratic Deficits’, European Journal of International Security, 7: 1 (2022), pp. 58–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

Supplementary material: File

Littlefield and Block supplementary material

Littlefield and Block supplementary material

Download Littlefield and Block supplementary material(File)
File 230.6 KB