¹ Although the 1994 presidential elections have been characterised as clean and transparent, in the aftermath of the elections evidence pointing to numerous irregularities increased. Despite this, and doubts about the fairness of competition, to the extent that free and transparent elections did not oust the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institutional) Mexico could be placed into Sartori's category of ‘fake dominant party system’. See Serrano, M., ‘The end of hegemonic rule?’, in Harvey, N. and Serrano, M. (eds.), Party Politics in “An Uncommon Democracy”: Political Parties and Elections in Mexico (London, 1994), p. 22Google Scholar.

² As Huntington states, not only does professionalisation require a minimum degree of constitutional consensus, but ‘objective civilian control’ requires the armed forces to ‘carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state’. Huntington, S. P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 35–6Google Scholar, 84.

³ The ultimate justification for the existence of a professional military institution has traditionally been linked to the debate about national defence. During the nineteenth century some schemes of territorial defence were implemented in Mexico. In 1846 both the US threat and the lack of a central army led the government to establish the National Guard, which was maintained until 1880 due to the combination of financial constraints and the influence of liberalism. Decentralisation, together with tactical emphasis on local defence, encouraged the formation of alliances among regional strong men. In 1880 Díaz dissolved the National Guard in an attempt to strengthen the central government. It is important to emphasise that the current defence plan, DN-1, designed against the possibility of foreign invasion, contemplates the organisation of popular militia. Howard, M., ‘The armed forces as a political problem’, in Howard, M. (ed.), Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations (London, 1957), p. 13Google Scholar; Roberts, A., Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial defence (London, 1988)Google Scholar; Huntington, The Soldier and the State, chapter 3; Chávez, A. Hernández, ‘Origen y ocaso del ejército porfiriano’, Historia Mexicana, vol. 39 (1989), pp. 265–8Google Scholar; Escalante, F., Ciudadanos imaginarios (México, 1992), pp. 161–207Google Scholar; and Piñeyro, J. L., ‘The modernization of the Mexican armed forces’, in Varas, A. (ed.), Democracy Under Siege: New Military Power in Latin America (New York, 1989), p. 127Google Scholar.

⁴ Sarkesian, S., Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (New York, 1981), p. 239Google Scholar; Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 58.

⁵ This is a subject clearly linked to the discussion of constitutionalism. As Sartori states, ‘constitutions are first, and above all, instruments of government which limit, restrain and allow for the control of the exercise of political power’. Sartori, G., Comparative Constitutional Engineering (London, 1994), p. 198Google Scholar. See also Howard, ‘The armed forces as a political problem’, p. 12.

⁶ Finer, S., The Man on Horseback (London, 1962)Google Scholar. Huntington, The Soldier and the State and Lowenthal, A., ‘Armies and politics in Latin America’, in Lowenthal, and Samuel, F. J., (eds.), Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York, 1986), p. 20Google Scholar.

⁷ Ackroyd, W. S., ‘Descendants of the Revolution: civil-military relations in Mexico’, unpublished PhD diss., University of Arizona, 1988, p. 186Google Scholar.

⁸ A stable and democratic civil-military balance would necessarily involve the stabilisation of expectations of both civilians and soldiers. The literature on the military in Latin America has provided extensive evidence of the civilians' proclivity to seek alliances within the armed forces. Although recent polls have indicated substantial changes in public opinion and attitudes towards the military (especially in Argentina) as well as wide anti-authoritarian electoral majorities, authoritarian practices and patterns of domination remain ingrained in these societies. Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 86–90; Fagen, R. and Cornelius, W., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs, 1972)Google Scholar; O'Donell, G., ‘Transitions, continuities and paradoxes’, in Mainwaring, S. et al. , Issues in Democratic Consolidation (Notre Dame, 1992), p. 21Google Scholar and Whitehead, L., ‘On reform of the state and regulation of the market’, World Development, vol. 21, no. 8 (08 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ In the case of Spain under Franco, as has also been the case in Mexico, the consolidation of the regime reduced the number of military staff in the government. While such trends could temporarily tilt the balance in favour of civilians, and reduce the probability of the use of force, especially as the regime becomes more stable, it is the need for potential force that gives the army a privileged position. Such status could in turn be reinforced by the weakness or underdeveloped state of the police apparatus. Linz, J. J., ‘An authoritarian regime: Spain’, in Ellardt, E. and Rotkan, (eds.), Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York, 1970), pp. 265–8Google Scholar.

¹⁰ As Pion-Berlin states, although there is not a ‘measurable ceiling’ below which civilian supremacy could be guaranteed, civilian control represents a distribution of power. Not only can civilian supremacy be achieved within authoritarian regimes, but apparent distributions of power are not solely the result of the authoritarian or democratic nature of regimes, but also of civilian tactics. The use of ‘tutelaged’ civilian control in this article differs from Zaverucha's – where tutelage refers to the veto power retained by the military – and is closer to the idea of ‘guardian’. For an assessment of civilian tactics in Democratic Argentina, see Pion-Berlin, D., ‘Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Government Policy in Democratic Argentina’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 23 (1991), pp. 545–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an analysis of different distributions of power between civilians and the military and their implications for democratic consolidation see Zaverucha, J., ‘The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions’, journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 25 (1993), pp. 283–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ In the light of its anti-agrarian and pro-landlord attitudes, Tobler questions the ‘popular’ character of the Mexican armed forces. With the single exception of Morelos, Tobler suggests that the armed forces were an additional factor obstructing agrarian reform. See Tobler, W., ‘Las paradojas del ejército revolucionario: su papel social en la reforma agraria mexicana 1920–1935’, Historia Mexicana, vol. 21, no. 1 (1971)Google Scholar.

¹² The signature of the Teleoyucán Treaties of 1914 led to the demobilisation of the Federal Army. This was undoubtedly a key military decision which reduced the chances of the army becoming the ‘supreme arbiter of national life’. Yet subsequently, ex-federal officials re-entered the armed forces. A. Hernández Chávez, ‘Orígen y ocaso’; Garciadiego, J., ‘La política militar del presidente Carranza’, in Hernández, A. and Miño, M. (eds.), Cincmnta años de Historia de México, vol. 2 (Mexico, D.F., 1991)Google Scholar and Camp, R. A., Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York, 1992), P. 17Google Scholar.

¹³ Walker, P. G., ‘The modern Mexican military: political influence and institutional interests in the 1980's’, unpubl. Master's diss., The American University, 1987, pp. 8–13Google Scholar.

¹⁴ According to Sánchez, during the 1940s when civilian supremacy had already been achieved, the rhetoric of a unified, professional and apolitical army enabled civilian elites to discipline or even eliminate ‘politicised’ generals. Sánchez, A., ‘Los militares en la década de los cincuenta’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, no. 3 (07–09 1988), p. 273Google Scholar and Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 85.

¹⁵ The impact and the lessons derived from dramatic events such as wars and revolutions on subsequent generations has been a subject of debate, especially since the First World War. In the case of Spain the stability of the 1950s has been explained more in terms of fears of war and violence, rather than as a consequence of the regime's performance. Similarly, low levels of participation and conformism present in Mexican politics were partially associated with the memories of revolutionary violence. Moreover, during the recent elections the aversion shown by Mexican society towards change has been partly explained as the result of a campaign equating change with violence. Clearly, in both cases it was possible to observe the depolitisation characteristic of ‘stabilised authoritarian regimes’. See Khon, Y. Foong, Analogies at War (Princeton, 1992), p. 33Google Scholar; R. Carr and J. P. Fusi, Spain, Dictatorship to Democracy (London, 1993 reprint), pp. 135–6; Linz, ‘An Authoritarian Regime’, p. 259 and Loaeza, S., ‘El cambio político en México en el siglo XX. Analogías y orígenes de la discontinuidad de 1988’, Memorias del simposio de Historiografia Mexicanista (México, D.F., 1990), p. 533Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See for example Camp, Generals in the Palacio, and Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, pp. 163 and 206.

¹⁷ Professionalisation refers to the internalisation of norms, values and technical knowledge. It is often estimated by parameters which include institutional diferentiation, degree of specialisation, discipline, the complexity of the education system as well as the sophistication of weaponry, doctrine and tactics employed by the armed forces. Huntington's equation between professionalisation and institutionalisation was subsequently criticised in the context of highly professional and equally politised armed forces in Latin America. Yet Huntington emphasised the value attached by professional officers to the ideals of the ‘good soldier’ over political or ideological ambitions. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 74. See also Stepan, A., ‘The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion’, in Stepan, A. (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future (New Haven, 1973), pp. 47–8Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Despite this, the Díaz regime did not succeed in its efforts to consolidate its monopoly over legitimate violence. Decentralisation of military power, a constant feature of 19th century Mexican politics, remained during the porfiriato. As Knight states, the D íaz regime was neither a dictatorship nor a police state. The regime depended on both a withering legitimacy and targeted coercion. Knight, Alan, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 17–18Google Scholar and 35, and A. Hernández Chávez, ‘Orígen y ocaso’, pp. 264, 280–4.

¹⁹ Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 71.

²⁰ Notwithstanding Carranza's personal interest in the professionalisation of the armed forces, to the extent that his pacification strategy encouraged the fragmentation and regionalisation of military power, it clearly undermined efforts towards the centralisation and institutionalisation of the revolutionary armed forces. Nonetheless, under Carranza a number of measures which set the basis for the subsequent stabilisation of civil-military relations were taken. These included: reopening the Military College, the practice of rotation, and the reform of the army involving a reduction in the total number of troops and the reorganisation of the cavalry and infantry corps. Chávez, A. Hernández, ‘Orígen y ocaso’ and ‘Militares y negocios en la Revolución Mexicana’, Historia Mexkana, vol. 34, no. 2 (1984)Google Scholar; J. Garciadiego, ‘La política militar’; and Matute, A., La Revolución Mexicana (México, D.F., 1993)Google Scholar.

²¹ The Constitutional Army had eleven generals: A. Obregón, B. Hill, P. González, C. Aguilar, C. Castro, F. Murguía, F]. Coss, J. B. Treviño, M. M. Diéguez, S. Alvarado and J. A. Castro. By the end of the constitutional period only two of these had survived, Obregón and A. Castro, and new names appeared including F. R. Serrano, A. R. Gómez, J. G. Escobar, F. Mazo, F. Topete and J. Amaro. Not only did the 1928 political pact demilitarise political competition, but it restricted the arena of competition to the new party, the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario). The rules of political competition that derived from this pact were indisputably civilian: loyalty and discipline. See A. Chávez, ‘Militates y negocios’; Tobler, ‘Las paradojas del ejército’; and A. Matute,.La Revolución Mexicana. For a detailed analysis of the 1928–29 pact, see Knight, A., ‘Mexico's Elite Settlement: conjuncture and consequences’, in Higley, J. and Gunther, R. (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge, 1992)Google Scholar.

²² Demilitarisation became evident in the number of military officers appointed in the presidential cabinet as secretary of state, undersecretary of state or major official. Although this figure increased from 28% under Carranza to 59% under Obregon, from 1928 the presence of military men at the highest level of government started to decrease. Cabinet participation by military officers is in fact one of the variables used by Zaverucha to compare military privileges and civil-military distributions of power in the context of democratic transition. Under the Franco administration members of the Brazilian armed forces controlled nine out of 27 cabinet posts. Tobler, ‘Las paradojas del ejército’, p. 44; Zaverucha, ‘The degree of military political autonomy’, p. 289; and Excélsior, 4 March 1994.

²³ Walker, ‘The Moder n Mexican Military’, p. 15.

²⁴ Camp, Generals in the Palacio, p. 195.

²⁵ Ackroyd reminds us how in the analysis of the relationship between professionalisation and military intervention, what is relevant is not precisely the degree or ‘quantity’ of professionalisation but the content of socialisation and professionalisation. His analysis of the education system of the armed forces shows how the hierarchical arrangement of loyalties with civilian authorities at the top is intimately linked to the rhetoric which emphasises the revolutionary legacy. Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, pp. 88–9, 110–24.

²⁶ The incorporation of the military sector within the party was to a certain extent the result of the need to strengthen the control over the army at a time when oil expropriation raised fears of external threats. In addition, this measure sought to ‘protect’ the military institution from the inherently destabilising game of presidential succession. Lozoya, J. A., El ejército mexkano (México, D.F., 1970), p. 76Google Scholar and Chávez, A. Hernández, La mecánica Cardenista: Historia de la Revolutioń Mexicana, 1934–1940, no. 16 (México, D.F., 1979), p. 109Google Scholar.

²⁷ Garrido, L. J., ‘Un partido sin militantes’, in Loaeza, S. and Segovia, R. (eds.), La vida politico mexicana en la crisis (México, D.F., 1987), p. 65Google Scholar.

²⁸ This presidential decision was supported by the majority of active generals. Such support was in turn favoured by the unusual combination of the Second World War and the presence of army officers loyal to the president at the top of the military hierarchy. Garrido, L. J., El partido de la Revolución Institutional. La formatión del nuevo Estado en México (1928–1945) (México, D.F., 1982), pp. 303–4Google Scholar.

²⁹ Sánchez, ‘Los militares en la década de los cincuenta’ and Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 85.

³⁰ Walker, ‘The Modern Mexican Military’, pp. 8–13.

³¹ See, for example, Lieuwen, E., Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary army (Alburquerque, 1968)Google Scholar and Lozoya, El ejército mexicano.

³² See for example Ronfeldt, D. (ed.), The Modern Mexican Military (San Diego, 1984)Google Scholar; A. Sánchez, ‘Lo s militares en la década de los cincuenta’; and Camp, Generals in the Palacio.

³³ Even within the context of neo-liberal reform in 1992 Secretary of Defence Riviello Bazan declared that the armed forces remained as the main pillar of the Revolutionary Principles. Excelsior, 5 November 1992. Ronfeldt has emphasised these residual roles which have been more common in tasks associated with the maintenance of public order. It is important to note that participation in politics could either be the result of civilian strategies or of military demands. While military participation in legislative politics had tended to decrease over the past years, after Chiapas military candidates reentered the PRI lists. D. Ronfeldt, ‘The Mexican army and political order since 1940’, in Ronfeldt (ed.), The Modern Mexican Military. See also Finer's, S. contribution in Bogdanor, V. (ed.), The Blackivell Encyclopaedia of Political Science (Oxford, 1987), p. 101Google Scholar.

³⁴ Walker, ‘The Modern Mexican Military’, p. 4 and Hernández Chávez, ‘Orígen y ocaso’, pp. 258–9.

³⁵ The Joint Defence Commission was established in 1942. Under this scheme the Avila Camacho administration created and coordinated the Military Pacific Region under the command of General Cárdenas, and the US government established three radar stations in Mexican territory and operated by Mexican soldiers. Reynolds, C. W. and Wager, S., ‘Integración económica de México y Estados Unidos. Implicaciones para la seguridad de ambos países’, in Aguayo, S. and Bagley, B. M. (eds.), En busca de la seguridadperdida. Aproximaciones a la seguridad nacional mexicana (México, D.F., 1990), p. 217Google Scholar.

³⁶ Wesson, R. (ed.), The Latin American military institution (New York, 1986)Google Scholar and Pineyro, J. L., Ejércitoy sociedad en México. Pasadoy presente (México, D.F., 1985), pp. 148–9Google Scholar.

³⁷ On the one hand, the presence of Guatemalan refugees not only opened the door to non-governmental organisations, but also raised fears about stability in the southern state of Chiapas. And on the other, the responses offered by the Mexican government to the crisis soon became an important source of tension in Mexico's relations with its northern and southern neighbours.

³⁸ On 25 August 1990 President Salinas offered to send troops as part of a multilateral force under the command of the United Nations (UN). This decision was reversed on 3 January 1991 as a result of pressure from the military and accompanied by declarations reaffirming Mexico 's commitment to ‘peaceful solution of controversies’. Excélsior, 25; August 1994 and 3 January 1991. Mexico's participation in UN peacekeeping efforts has so far been restricted to the presence of 39 civilian police in El Salvador. Similarly, although in private high officials of the PGR have recognised the strategic importance of US cooperation in the war against the drugs, in multilateral fora Mexico remains opposed to multilateral forces. See the declarations of the General Prosecutor E. Alvarez del Castillo to the UN in Excélsior, 21 February 1990; and Mexico's opposition to proposals for a multilateral inter-American force discussed with the Organisation of American States, Excélsior, 8 February 1992.

³⁹ According to J. A. Cope, a US security expert, in 1989 President Bush ordered the revision of the security agreement with Mexico to strengthen relations between the armed forces of the two countries. In 1990 the US government made an open attempt to reactivate the Joint Defence Commission. Although these moves apparently received the support of civilian authorities in Mexico, and led to the creation of a special office in San Diego and to a number of meetings between higher officials from both countries, the Mexican military have not been particularly enthusiastic. El Financiero, 17 March 1994.

⁴⁰ In the case of Spain, integration to the European Union played a stabilising role in civil-military relations. See Story, J. and Pollack, B., ‘Spain's transition: domestic and external linkages’, in Pridham, G. (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Leicester, 1991)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ The possibility of such an outcome would depend on NAFTA's conditionality to democratic change in Mexico. In contrast to the experience of many other countries, for decades Mexico's authoritarian practices were not the object of international pressures or conditionality. Although NAFTA's negotiations paved the way to the internationalisation of Mexican politics, its relation to democratic change in Mexico is not simple or direct. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that in the past close military cooperation between the USA and armed forces in the region played an important role in the rise of military regimes. According to Philip Agee, an ex-CIA agent, the training received by Mexican soldiers in US military academies is partly responsible for human rights abuses recently observed in Mexico. El Financiero, 2 April 1994. On democratisation and integration, see L. Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence in Southern Europe: a comparative politics perspective’, in Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy. On NAFTA's political implications see Bulmer-Thomas, V. et al. , ‘Who will benefit?’ in Bulmer-Thomas, et al. , Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Who Will Benefit? (Basingstoke, 1994)Google Scholar.

⁴² Although prerogatives can be ‘constitutionally sanctioned’, in a consolidated democratic regime this is not the case as no independent roles of the military are constitutionally sanctioned. The exercise of prerogatives, by enabling the military institution to exercise control over the political agenda, to set the boundaries of political competition and even to establish alliances with civilians to protect and advance common interests, represents an important source of power. Stepan, A., Rethinking Military Politics (Princeton, 1988), p. 106Google Scholar.

⁴³ Even in pacted transitions the underlying context to the military's exit or withdrawal from power can significantly influence prospects for stable civil-military relations. Certainly, the prestige of the armed forces is likely to affect its unity, morale and capacity to broaden military dejure and de facto prerogatives. The stronger the prestige of the armed forces, the greater the need of calibrated civilian strategies and social pressure to force the military to cooperate ‘on certain acts and omissions’, and in such a way to avoid an authoritarian relapse. See Hagopian, F., ‘Democracy by Undemocratic Means?’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 22, no. 2 (07 1990)Google Scholar; O1'Donnell, ‘Transitions, Continuities and Paradoxes’, p. 23; Pion-Berlin, ‘Between Confrontation and Accommodation’; and Whitehead, ‘On Reform of the State’.

⁴⁴ For an interesting comparative analysis of the variables included in Stepan's study of military prerogatives in the context of democratic transition, see Zaverucha, ‘The degree of military political autonomy’. On the evolution of military prerogatives and ‘reserved domains of policy’ in Argentine and Brazilian nuclear policies, see Serrano, M., ‘Brazil and Argentina’, in Litwak, R.S. and Reiss, M. (eds.), Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War (Washington, 1994)Google Scholar. In ‘Between Confrontation and Accommodation’, Pion-Berlin examines President Alfonsín's failure to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by transition through military collapse and to establish a solid framework for civilian supremacy.

⁴⁵ Tobler's article ‘Las paradojas del ejército revolucionario’ offers a vivid account of the tasks assigned to the police especially in the period between 1920 and 1935. In 1994 a rural defence militia is still in place involving a total of 14,000 men. ‘Mexico’, The Military Balance (1994–1995) (London, 1994).

⁴⁶ Distortion in promotion patterns was particularly clear during the Alemáan government following the repression of the Henriquista movement. The annual average in this period accelerated to 76 promotions to general rank, and 66 to colonel. Although Camp states that promotions again accelerated under President Echeverná (1970–6), this trend could be explained in terms of the expansion of the armed forces and not solely as the result of politicisation following the 1968 repression. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, pp. 177–8. While military procurements during this period included 57 airplanes, the expansion of the armed forces brought the total of troops from 60,000 in 1973 to 90,000 in 1977. Piñeyro, , Ejércitoy sociedaden México:pasadoypresente (México, D.F., 1985), pp. 88Google Scholar, 123.

⁴⁷ In this respect it is interesting to note that in Mexico many of the practices that normally provide democratic states with additional regulating mechanisms, such as legislative hearings on defence matters (including budgets), are still lacking. This could be attributed to two main factors: (1) the weakness of the legislature itself, and (2) low defence budgets that stand in contrast to those of other Latin American states.

⁴⁸ See de Brody, O. Pellicer, ‘La seguridad nacional en México’, Cuadernos Politicos, no. 27 (01–03 1981)Google Scholar and Piñeyro, Ejércitoy Sociedad en Mexico, pp. 121–2, 135.

⁴⁹ Charges of corruption reached the highest level in June 1988. Although the US government stated that no evidence confirmed the charges, on 2 June 1988 a drug dealer J. Figueroa involved the Secretary of Defence, J. Arévalo Gardoqui in drug allegations. Two days later Arévalo published an open letter addressed to President de la Madrid denying the charges. Although in 1990 the new Secretary of Defence, Riviello Bazán, again denied charges of close links between the Mexican military and drug traffickers, by 1993 the senator and member of the Navy J. A. Vega Camacho admitted that there were ‘isolated’ cases of members of the armed forces who had been corrupted. Excélsior, 2, 3, and 4 July 1988; Excélsior, 29 July 1990; and El Financiero, 30 June 1993.

⁵⁰ In April 1989 the capture of the drug trafficker Félix Gallardo led the Legislative Assembly of Sinaloa to protest to President Salinas about the abuses perpetrated by the armed forces against the local police. Potential links with drug-traffickers were the apparent motivation for the temporary arrest of members of the local police. Subsequently the Secretary of Defence declared that the armed forces were acting under the instruction of authorities including the Office of the General Prosecutor. In November 1991 the alleged chase of a Colombian airplane carrying drugs led to an armed confrontation between the federal police and members of the armed forces in Tlalixcoyan, , Veracruz, . See Excélsior, 12 and 13 04 1989Google Scholar; and 8 and 14 November 1991.

⁵¹ In Tamaulipas a number of rural defence units have been set up. In May 1994 peasants were ‘officially’ armed to assist the armed forces' anti-narcotics campaigns. La Jornada, 29 May 1994.

⁵² Piñeyro, Ejército y Sociedad, pp. 107, 123. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, The Military Balance (1988–1989) (1989–1990) (1994–1995) and Latin American Weekly Report, 5 November 1992.

⁵³ Constitutional and institutional mechanisms designed to coordinate and reconcile military and civilian beliefs and views are often the result of power struggles. R. Blake, ‘Great Britain’, in Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Governments, pp. 40, 48. According to Stepan, National Security Councils can contribute to ensuring that the military's function as advisor and potential implementor of defence policy is incorporated into the routine mechanisms of democratic control. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p. 141.

⁵⁴ From August 1992 La Jornada had been reporting the existence of a peasant guerrilla. This information was subsequently corroborated by the Latin American Weekly Report, 13 August 1993. For charges of incompetence and lack of preparation, see the various declarations made by experts in The Washington Post, 19 January 1994, and La Jornada 20 January 1994 and 10 June 1994.

⁵⁵ Defence of human rights became a more salient issue at the end of the 1980s due to the combination of pressures from below and increased international surveillance over Mexican authoritarian practices. Under the Salinas administration a National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) was created, but its powers were limited to issuing ‘recommendations’. Charges of human rights abuses involving members of the armed forces precede the Chiapas rebellion. In 1989 an incident involving shootings against three peasants led the Secretary of Defence to state that the armed forces ‘were not against the people’. A year later the head of the Navy, M. Scheleske, declared that the protection of human rights was a distinctive feature of modern states. In January 1992 the press reported that the General Prosecutor of Military Justice had implemented a number of recommendations made by the CNDH. See Excélsior, 2 August 1989, 10 June 1990 and 13 January 1992. The Chiapas uprising has been accompanied by human rights violations and atrocities involving the armed forces. According to the Secretary of Defence, out of 76 claims taken to the CNDH in Chiapas 46 involved members of the armed forces, all of which were duly considered and six remained under investigation. Notwithstanding this, the Canadian International Centre for human rights and democratic development reported disappearances and executions of civilians and recommended the Mexican government to provide the army with a code of conduct. Similarly, the Mexican government became the object of pressures organised by Amnesty International for human rights violations involving the armed forces. Excélsior, 10 March 1994; La Jornada, 2 March 1994; Reforma, 17 March 1994.

⁵⁶ The armed forces in 1994 secured two seats in the Senate, General A. Vallarta for Nayarit, and J. A. Valdivia for Baja California, while Generals Luis Garfias and Jesús Esquinaca entered the lower chamber. El Financiero, 19 September 1994. Apart from the creation of a new military zone (no. 37), new procurements were reported by the press, some of which were justified on the basis of lack of sufficient supplies. Yet these purchases also included anti-riot vehicles and equipment. Although on 29 May 1994 the Defence Secretary declared that post-electoral order was not under the competence of the Secretary of Defence, subsequently he accepted that the equipment had been purchased by the Ministry of Defence for ‘defensive’ purposes. ‘If ever used’, he added, ‘it would be within the limits set by the law and human rights.’ Anti-riot vehicles remained parked in military camp No. 1. With regard to the defence budget, although between 1992 and 1993 military expenditures remained constant, between 1993 and 1994 they increased from US$1.5 bn t o US$1.6 bn. The Military Balance (1994–1995); Excélsior, 30 April 1994; Reforma, 29 May 1994; and La Jornada 29 May 1994 and 6 June 1994.

⁵⁷ Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 163. Knight, ‘Mexico's Elite Settlement’, pp. 134–6; Kaufman, S. and Purcell, J. F. H., ‘State and Society in Mexico: Must a stable polity be institutionalised?’, World Politics, vol. 32, no. 2 (1980)Google Scholar; and Sartori, G., Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge, 1976), p. 235Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ More recently, the pressures opened by political liberalisation led the government to offer military security to the presidential candidates of opposition parties. Despite the casualties suffered by the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) during the Salinas administration, and the assassination of the PRI candidate in March 1994, the PRD candidate, C. Cárdenas, not only rejected, but also criticised such use of members of the armed forces. Camp, Generals in the Palacio, pp. 79–80. See Cárdenas's declarations in La Jornada, 10 June 1994.

⁵⁹ The performance of the PAN (Pattido Acción Nacional) candidate in the 1994 presidential election led some members of the armed forces to express publicly their admiration. For decades, the hegemonic party system made possible the cooptation and inclusion of military within the civil bureaucracy. Most importantly, ordered and stable participation in public administration was to a large extent facilitated by a regime controlled by a single party. Although the number of military participating in politics started to decrease in 1940, according to Ackroyd in 1983 nearly 5,000 soldiers were employed by the civilian bureaucracy. Ackroyd, ‘Descendants of the Revolution’, p. 200; Wesson, The Latin American Military, pp. 51–2; El Financiero, 4 September 1994.

⁶⁰ Rumours of President Alemán's re-election led Henríquez to come back to the electoral arena, but as a candidate of the Revolutionary family. Not only was the head of Alemán's Estado Mayor one of the main promoters of re-election, but apparently fears of exclusion in subsequent promotions provided a powerful incentive for members of the armed forces to join the Henriquista movement. The regime's response was expected: repression followed by the politicisation of promotions. Many ex-Henriquistas soon returned to the public pay-roll. Although Piñeyro states that this event strengthened the subordination of the military, it is important to emphasise that while ‘subjective civilian supremacy’ was reinforced, this was achieved at the cost of objective control. Pellicer, O., ‘La oposición en México: el caso del henriquismo’, in Las crisis del sistema político mexicano 1928–1977 (México, D.F., 1977)Google Scholar; Pellicer, O. and Reyna, J. L., Historia de la Revolución Mexicana. Período 1956–1960, ‘El afianzamiento de la estabilidad política’ (México, D.F., 1978)Google Scholar; Boils, B., Los militares y la político en México 1915–1974 (México, D.F., 1975), p. 79Google Scholar; and Piñeyro, Ejército y Sociedad en México, p. 75.

⁶¹ Traditionally sexennial cycles produced some turbulence within officialdom. To the extent to which the acting president designares both the secretaries of defence and the navy, circulation of officers becomes possible. The rise of a technocratic political elite may have undermined the common ideological legacy shared by both civilian and military elites. Although some authors have emphasised technocratic trends within the military symbolised by the creation of the National Defence College modelled on the Brazilian Escola Superior de Guerra, it is important to bear in mind the destabilising legacy of technocratic inroads within the Brazilian armed forces. For an interesting analysis of the impact of the Salinas government on the unity and discipline of the civilian elite, see Centeno, M. A., Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico (Pennsylvania, 1994)Google Scholar. See also Camp, Generals in the Palacio and Stepan, A., The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971)Google Scholar.

⁶² L. Whitehead, ‘The peculiarities of “Transition” a la Mexicana’, in Harvey and Serrano (eds.), Party Politics in “An Uncommon Democracy”

⁶³ The combination of international and national pressures forced the Mexican government first to declare the ceasefire in Chiapas in January 1994 and, subsequently, obliged the armed forces to address charges of indiscriminate bombing. In January 1994 the European Parliament demanded that the Mexican government respect human rights in Chiapas. Similarly declarations by high US officials, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher, proliferated, and pressure by International Human Rights organisations increased. Financial Times, 6 January 1994, La Jornada, 8 January 1994, Reforma, 21 January 1994, El Financiero, 10 February 1994.

⁶⁴ The neutrality of the armed forces was a crucial element in the Spanish transition. Although the presence of the King may have been the ultimate factor underpinning the neutrality of the military, the programme of reform adopted by Prime Minister Suárez did explicitly tackle this problem. In 1976, two months before the reform was submitted to the courts, Suárez obtained from members of the officialdom their commitment to neutrality. Zaverucha also highlights the weak role played by political parties in Argentina's legislative assembly, as well as in the Constitutional process in Maravall, Brazil. F. J. M. and Santamaria, J., ‘Political change in Spain and the prospects for democracy’, in O'Donnell, G. et al. (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 73Google Scholar, 83. See also Carr and Fusi, Spain, pp. 220–22; Zaverucha, ‘The degree of military political autonomy’, pp. 291–3. The proposal for the military's neutrality was put forward by Demetrio Sodi, an ex-PRI member. See La Jornada, 20 July 1994.

⁶⁵ Although Cárdenas's declarations referred to ‘both armies’ as crucial actors in the democratisation process, the reaction of members of the armed forces, including the chief commander of the militaiy zone in Chiapas, obliged him to offer explanations in which he denied accusations of having equated both armies. See La Jornada, 15 January 1994, 6 February 1994 and 9 July 1994.

⁶⁶ While it is true that the armed forces were forced to repel the Zapatistas' attack on their headquarters itself, Salinas's failure to declare a state of emergency and to secure Congressional approval, meant that his decision to resort to full use of force in Chiapas may have been unconstitutional. El Financiero, 24 February 1994. For a general analysis of Salinas's disregard for institutions, see the interesting article by Hernández, R., ‘Inestabilidad política y presidencialismo en México’, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, vol. 10, no. 1 (1994)Google Scholar.