¹ The editions of the Inscription and comments on it to which I have had access are: Fabkicius (Mittheilungen des deutschen Arehaeologischen Instituts zu Athen, Bd. ix.).—This contains a drawing of the inscription, with an edition founded partly on his own collation and partly on that of Halbherr. Compaketti (Museo Italiano di Antichità Classica, Vol. i.).—This also contains a copy of the original writing, with an edition in modern character as well as a translation and notes. This too is founded on the collation of Halbherr and Fabricius. These are the two authorities for the text: all other editions depend on them. Bücheler, and Zitteljiann, in the Rheinisches Museum, 40^ter Band, 1885Google Scholar, Ergänzungsheft, give an edition of the text with, translation, notes on the language, and full legal commentary. This is the only edition which deals fully with the legal matter of the whole. It is supplemented by an article by the same writers on the two smaller fragments in the Rheinisches Museum for 1886. Lewy (Berlin, 1885) has published an edition of the text with translation and short notes. Baunack (Johannes and Theodor), Leipzig, 1885.—A text and translation, with elaborate notes on the dialect. Jacob Simon (Vienna, 1886).—An edition of the first half, with translation and a valuable legal commentary. There is a translation into English by Roby in the Law Quarterly, Vol. ii., and into French by Dareste in the Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique, Vol. ix.; and an article with useful suggestions on legal points by Bernhöft in the Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, Vol. vi. In transcription I have followed the spelling of the stone. I have however used the letters η and ω, neither of which occurs in the original.

² ix. 37.

³ xi. 26.

⁴ l.c. p. 68, &c.

⁵ °ρκιώ;τερον: for the meaning of this cf. infra, p. 64.

⁶ Reading and meaning are doubtful.

⁷ Fab. ὀμόσας τά αὐτῶν.

⁸ It is impossible to discuss all the difficulties of this passage here: on some points however my translation requires justification. For (or whatever the word really is) no satisfactory explanation has been given, and must refer to some action on the part of the debtor who makes some counter-plea to show why he need not pay. After his death the object of the court is to put the claimant in the same position with respect to the heirs of the debtor as he was to the debtor himself; in order to achieve this object each party has to bring forward proof for each stage in the proceedings which has already been reached. The claimant has (a) in the case of a suit aheady decided to prove this by the officials of the court; (b) in the case of a surety, or other form of debt to bring formal evidence of the contract. If the debtor, while alive, has entered no defence, judgment will then be given for the claimant: if the debtor has made a defence, then his heirs have to bring evidence that he has done so; this is expressed in the words This is evidence not as to the validity of the defence, but as to the fact that there was a defence. If this evidence breaks down (this seems the only possible meaning of cf. xi. 11) then judgment for the claimant follows as though the defence had not been set up. The law then adds two regulations: (a) that the claimant and his witnesses shall take an oath to the truth of their statement; (b) that notwithstanding the failure of an attempt 10 escape payment no fine shall be imposed, but only the simple debt paid. The peculiarity of this interpretation is that I take to refer only to the witnesses for the and . This seems the only possible deduction from the fact that judgment for the claimant follows the refusal. of the witnesses to give evidence. The point of the words is that it guards the heirs from the additional fine or double penalty which was generally imposed on those who sought to evade an obligation. Before the heirs are required to pay, the claimant must make formal proof in court of his claim. In xi. 31, &c, we have further regulations on the matter. The heirs may, if they like, instead of paying the debt, resign the whole inheritance to the debtor. If this is right we shall have for in v. 5 to read . Until a fresh examination of the stone is made it is however improbable that any satisfactory interpretation will be found.

⁹ Bannack, ; Bü. ; Fab. .

¹⁰ i. 55. .

¹¹ C. and Bü.

¹² C.

¹³ In the oldest of the codes, the Lex Salica, this distinction is preserved almost without exception. An apparent exception, ii. 13, is not a real one, for though testes are referred to in connection with the. probatio, the point that they prove is ‘quod votivus fuit,’ i.e. a solemn act of consecration. Similar is xxxiii. 2: ‘Si quis eervum domesticum signum habentem furaverit aut occiderit, qui ad venationem mansuetas est et hoc per testibus fuerit adprobatum quod enm dominus suus in venationem habu-isset.’ The testes prove not the act of theft but the condition of the stag. xxxvi.— ‘Si quis homo ex quolibet quadru pedem domesticum occisus fuerit et hoc per testibus fuerit adprobatum,’ is a real exception. As is also ix. 8, ‘si convinctus cum fuerit ad testibus.’ At least one of the MSS. however adds in the first case the words ‘quod non soluerit.’

¹⁴ Sc. ‘sive’ (as in Codex B).

¹⁵ This passage is quoted from Beaumanoir, xxxix. 57: ‘Nus tesmoins combien qu'il seust de le coze ne soloit rien valoir, s'il n'estoit ap pelés des parties à le coze fere proprement per porter tesinonage de le coze qui feu fête de se mestiere estoit.’

¹⁶ Contrast this with ix. 32.

¹⁷ Brunner, , Entstehung der Schwurgerichte. Cf. also Ib. Geschichte des Deutschen Rechts, ii. 392Google Scholar, &c.

¹⁸ Aeth. i. 10.

¹⁹ Edgar, Supp. 6.

²⁰ Cnut. 24.

²¹ Bruns, i. 1.

²² For the Lex Salica see however Brunner, op. cit. ii. 394–5. This volume did not appear till after the above was written.

²³ On the see an article in the Classical Review, Feb. 1893.

²⁴ Compar, ad loc.

²⁵ Dig. xxxix. 3.

²⁶ Ar. Ἀθ. Πολ. iii.

²⁷ Ar. Pol. ii.

²⁸ G.I.A.