It has always been usual to approach the question of Thucydides' narrative of Pylos and Sphacteria with all its difficulties on the assumption that the main object of Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet was originally the affairs of Corcyra and Sicily, and afterwards the rescue of Demosthenes and the garrison of Pylos. Yet this view involves a manifest contradiction. Eurymedon was in a hurry; he left Demosthenes with an insignificant force, with the absolute certainty that he would be attacked and that he himself would have to come back and help him; all this must have been thought of beforehand ; why then did he leave him? or having left him, why did he come back to help him, stultifying thereby his own plan of operations?

The answer may perhaps be found in strategical considerations. The expedition was first fitted out with a view to interference in the affairs of Sicily; but there intervened a more immediate object, for a chance presented itself of catching the Peloponnesian fleet. Let us assume therefore that Eurymedon's main purpose was the destruction of the Peloponnesian fleet wherever found, and then let us see what this involves (i) in regard to the strategy at Pylos, (ii) in regard to the local difficulties in Thucydides. It will be found to have the greatest influence upon both.