¹ The definition does not comprise the range of phenomena covered by François Perroux's concept of economic domination. This includes involuntary as well as voluntary subordination by one economic entity of another, whether at the level of enterprises, national economies, or regional groups of economies; there may or may not be control or constraint. Such a concept is at once more comprehensive than imperialism as defined above, in that it embraces all interrelationships of strong and weak economic units, whether or not there is dominion; and at the same time less comprehensive, in that it does not include imperialisms of non-economic origin or character. See Perroux, F., “Esquisse d'une theórie de l'économie dominante,” Economie appliquée, I (1948), 243–300Google Scholar.

² Koebner, R., “The Concept of Economic Imperialism,” Econ. Hist. Rev., 2d Sen, II (1949),Google Scholar

³ These points are as phrased by Lenin. The edition used is that of Varga, E. and Mendelsohn, L. (eds.), New Data for V. I. Lenin's 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism' (New York: International Publishers, n.d.). PP. 174, 182Google Scholar.

⁴ Commander Popham took it upon himself to sail his squadron from African waters to Buenos Aires in time of war. When His Majesty's Navy took umbrage at this and instituted court-martial proceedings, Popham saved himself by rallying the British mercantile community to his defense. See Ferns, H. S., Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), ch. I.Google Scholar Note that Britain's interest in new markets in this period was much stimulated by the commercial dislocations of war. Even before the formal institution of the Continental Blockade, the rich European market had become precarious and costly of access—a foretaste of things to come. See Crouzet, F., l'économie brilannique et le blocus continental (1806–1813) (2 vols.; Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1958).Google Scholar On Raffles, there is abundant literature. See especially the article by Wright, H. R. C., “The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in the East, 1814–1824,” Econ. Hist. Rev., 2d ser., III (1950), 229–39;Google Scholar also the highly critical Dutch viewpoint of Vlekke, Bernard H. M., Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), ch. XIIGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Saul, S. B., “The Economic Significance of ‘Constructive Imperialism,’ ” The Journal of Economic History, XVII, No. 2 (June 1957), 184–86;Google ScholarKen, Wong Lin, “Western Enterprise and the Development of the Malayan Tin Industry to 1914” (mimeographed paper presented to the Study Group on the Economic History of Southeast Asia of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 1961).Google Scholar

^5a The point is to distinguish between relationships real or latent in any market situation and those specific to imperialism, that is, to separate out from the range of phenomena embraced by the concept of the économic dominante those deriving from the exercise or threat of superior force. The two definitions most current in the economic literature will not do this. One—payment to labor of less than its marginal product—relates to any deviation from perfect competition; the second—payment of less than marginal revenue product—is relevant to cases of monopsony or collusion. A third definition, the Marxian one, is based on a normative judgment of social deserts: the appropriation by employers of the so-called surplus value of labor. Because of its tautological character—exploitation is built into the Marxian definition of capitalism—it is neither susceptible of verfication or disproof nor applicable to exploitation by noncapitalist systems.

⁶ Thus the Dutch gave their officials a portion of the proceeds of the system; and crops that required processing, such as sugar, were turned over to factories managed by Europeans or Chinese and worked for or financed by die government. Caldwell, J. A. M., “Indonesian Export Production from the Decline of the Culture System to the First World War” (mimeographed paper presented to the Study Group on the Economic History of East and Southeast Asia of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 1961)Google Scholar; Day, C., The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904), clis. VII–IXGoogle Scholar.

^6a Cf. Campbell, Persia C., Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire (London: P. S. King, 1923); alsoGoogle ScholarStewart, Watt, Chinese Bondage in Peru: A History of the Chinese Coolie in Peru, 1849–1874 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁷ Cabaton, A., Java, Sumatra, and the Other Islands of the Dutch East Indies (New York: Scribners; London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911), p. 301 fGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Biobaku, S. O., The Egba and Their Neighbours, 1842–1872 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), P. 40Google Scholar(Ironically, the Dahomi were famous—or infamous—throughout West Africa for their women soldiers.)

⁹ Ellis, A. B., A History of the Gold Coast of West Africa (London, 1893), p. 117 fGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ There is material on this in the archives of the banking house of S. Bleichröder, graciously lent me by Mr. F. H. Brunner, of Arnhold and S. Bleichröder, New York. Among the numerous but scattered printed sources, see Feis, H., Europe, the World's Banker, 1870–1514 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930)Google Scholar; and Diouritch, G., L'expansion des banques allemandes a I'étranger (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1909), pp. 738–63Google Scholar.

¹¹ Again there is information in the Bleichröder archive on Leopold's efforts to draw in German capital. The story of the reserved reaction of the Belgian business community remains to be examined in detail. Cf. Roeykens, P. A., La période initiale de l'oeuvre africaine de Leopold II [Memoires de l'Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales, Brussels, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Nouvelle Serie in —8°, Tome III, fasc. 3] (Brussels, 1957), P. 85Google Scholar.

¹² Schnapper, B., “La politique des ‘points d'appui’ et la fondation des comptoirs fortifiés dans le golfe de Guinée (1837–1843),” Revue historique, CCXXV (1961), 99–120Google Scholar.

¹³ Henderson, O., “British Economic Activity in the German Colonies, 1884–1914,” Econ. Hist. Rev. XV (1945), 56–66.Google Scholar In the case of the Congo, it was Leopold's declared intention from the start to establish a free-trade area, not only because any other policy would1have alienated potential support from abroad, but because this was the way to maximize return from what was intended to be the biggest personal domain of the age (or the ages). At the same time, he wooed his countrymen by stressing the contribution the Congo would1make to Belgian prosperity, without, however, making any promises of special treatment. This all-things-for-all-men technique is closely analogous to that employed by Lesseps in his promotion of the Suez canal.

¹⁴ Even with those colonies that clearly paid, however, the historian must take care not to overestimate their contribution to the economy of the imperial country, the more so as this contribution hardly requires exaggeration. It was greatest for small nations like Belgium and Holland. It was less important for Britain. It is an article of faith among many Indian historians that the Indian market was the key to British industrial growth and prosperity; indeed, that the “exploitation” of India accounts for the Industrial Revolution. In fact, it was not until after 1815 that exports of British manufactures to the East began their rapid growth. Thus in 1814 less than one million yards of cotton cloth were sent to ports east of Suez, or less than one half of 1 per cent of the total export. By 1830 the figure was 57 million; by 1860, 825 million to India alone. At the last date, British shipments accounted for perhaps 35 per cent of the consumption of the Indian market, as against some 4 per cent in the early thirties, and almost a third of total British exports of cloth. In the course of these yean, therefore, Indian production for home consumption actually increased; but Indian exports were virtually driven from the world market. Ellison, Th., The Cotton Trade of Great Britain (London, 1886), p. 63Google Scholar; Saul, S. B., Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870–1914 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1960), p. 14 and n. 2Google Scholar.

¹⁵ MacDonald, A. J., Trade, Politics and Christianity in Africa and the East (London: Longmans, Green, 1916), p. 114Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Gwynn, S. and Tuckwell, G. M., The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke (2 vols.; London: J. Murray, 1917), II, 86Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Thus Britain made repeated efforts to defend the government of Egypt in the 1850's and 1860's against the extortions of foreign businessmen, adventurers, and confidence men, extortions condoned and connived at by the consular representatives of the European powers and effected thanks to a system of extraterritorial privilege and the threat of superior force; to no avail. See Landes, D. S., Bankers and Pashas (London: Heinemann, 1958), ch. III, especially the sources cited in p. 94 n. 3Google Scholar.

¹⁸ , Gwynn and , Tuckwell, Life of Dilke, II, 87Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Masson, P., Marseille et la colonisation française (Marseilles: Barlatier, 1906), p. 387Google Scholar.

²⁰ Oliver, Roland, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (New York: St. Martin's, 1958), p. 198 £Google Scholar.

²¹ The records of the Service du Mouvement des Fonds of the French Ministry of Finance are full of evidence of this subordination of banking to politics. The dossiers on Rumania (Archives Nationales, F³⁰ 327) are particularly suggestive, not only for what they show of government attitudes, but also for the evidence they offer of the ability of the state to impose its will on reluctant enterprises in a nominally free economy. The Deutsches Zentral Archiv in Potsdam contains similar material on German lending policy, among other things, on Bismarck's famous decision to cut off credit to Russia in 1887 in order to bring pressure on the Tsarist government.

²² Gallagher, J. and Robinson, R., “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” Econ. Hist. Rev., 2d ser., VI (1953), 1–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ Ibid., p. 15.

²⁴ Galbraith, J. S., “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, II (1960), 150–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Thus in the enforcement in 1868–1869 of British claims against the Egyptian government in the liquidation of the Société Agricole. F. O. 78–2166 and 2167, especially F. O. 78–2167, Clarendon to Stanton, teleg. 23–4–1869, letter 30–4–1869.

²⁶ On the Araucanian Indians, see Padden, R. C., “Cultural Change and Military Resistance in Araucanian Chile, 1550–1730,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, XIII (1957), 103–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the Plains Indians of North America, the discussion of Walter Webb, P., The Great Plains (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1931), chs. IV and V, is a classic.Google ScholarWalker, Eric A., A History of Southern Africa (London: Longmans, Green, 1957), p. 429,Google Scholar has a ghastly phrase about the effect of military technology on British dominion over the Matabele: “The machine guns, a novelty in warfare in those days [1893], worked wonders at Shangani and Imbembezi, and the volunteers entered the ruins of Bulawayo to find the king fled.” Compare the change in British fortunes (and policy) in the Sudan, from the days of Gordon (fall of Khartum, 1885) to those of Kitchener (battle of Omdurman, 1898). It is one of the ironies of history that the machine gun, which long met with skepticism in the planning rooms of European war ministries, was proved and perfected in combat with the colonial peoples of the world, so that when World War I came, with its trench warfare, the now much improved weapon was able to slaughter the children of its European developers. Cf. Hutchison, G. S., Machine Guns: Their History and Technical Employment (London: Macmillan, 1938)Google Scholar.