¹ A third area directly affected by surplus capital theory was new thinking about reorganization of the banking system. There were two major aspects of this: (1) reforming the international monetary and investment system, and (2) reforming the United States monetary and banking system in the direction of establishing a central bank. See, for example, Andrew, Abram Piatt, “The Treasury and the Banks under Secretary Shaw,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 21 (08 1907), 519–66;CrossRefGoogle ScholarConant, Charles A., A History of Modern Banks of Issue (New York, 1927), chap. 26, et passim;Google ScholarConant, et al., The Currency: Report of the Special Currency Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, Submitted to the Chamber October 4, 1906;Google ScholarConant, , “The Functions of Centralized Banking,” The Bankers Magazine, 89 (10. 1914), 388–98;Google ScholarHepburn, A. Barton, History of Coinage and Currency in the United States (New York, 1903), pp. xv–xx, chaps. 17, 18, and revised edition, 1924 (New York, 1967), prefaces and chaps. 21–23;Google ScholarHull, Walter H., ed., Practical Problems in Banking and Currency (New York, 1907);Google ScholarSeligman, Edwin R. A., ed., The Currency Problem and the Present Financial Situation (New York, 1908).Google Scholar essays by Seligman, , Vanderlip, Frank A., Woodlock, Thomas F., Hepburn, A. Barton, Strauss, Albert, Warburg, Paul M., et al. ;Google ScholarShaw, Leslie M., Current Issues (New York, 1908), pp. 284–304.Google Scholar

² Hadley, Jenks, and Conant are considered together here because of their interrelations and their policy-forming influence. Hadley served as Labor Commissioner of the State of Connecticut before joining the faculty of Yale University. His Railroad Transportation: Its History and Its Laws, published in 1885 by G. P. Putnam's Sons, earned him recognition as one of the leading American authorities on railroad economics. Professor of Political Economy at Yale University, he helped found and served as editor of Yale Review: in 1899, he became President of Yale, serving until 1921. He also served as director of such corporations as the New York, New Haven and Harford, and the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe railroads, and the First National Bank of New Haven. In the years around the turn of the century he frequently advised Theodore Roosevelt privately on matters of policy. Hadley and Conant both published their major treatises (see notes 3 and 10, below) in 1896 with G. P. Putnam's Sons of New York; the president of the publishing company, George H. Putnam, was a leader in the gold standard and banking reform movement in the 1890s, as was Conant. In his essays after 1896, Conant frequently cited Hadley's book. As discussed further, below, Conant and Jenks were closely associated during 1901–1904 in missions for the Departments of State and War under Hay and Root, involving foreign policy formation and implementation.

³ Hadley, , Economics: An Account of the Relations between Private Property and Public Welfare (New York, 1896), pp. 87–90.Google ScholarCarnegie, Cf. Andrew, “The Bugaboo of the Trusts,” North American Review, 148 (02. 1889), 141–50.Google Scholar

⁴ Hadley, , Economics, pp. iii–iv, 78–80, 87–90.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., ch. VI, pp. 151–79. and pp. 294–96 et seq.

⁶ On Jenks's prominent involvement in the work of the Industrial Commission see North, S. N. D., “The Industrial Commission,” North American Review, 168 (06 1899), p. 718;Google ScholarJenks, , The Trust Problem (New York, 1900), pp. 3–9, 235–40, 244n;Google ScholarFurner, Mary O., Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Political Science, 1895–1905 (Lexington, Kentucky, 1975), pp. 248–49, 270–71.Google Scholar

⁷ Jenks, , Trust Problem, pp. 3–5.Google ScholarChamberlin, Edward H., The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933);Google ScholarRobinson, Joan, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (London, 1933).Google Scholar

⁸ Jenks, Trust Problem, chs. I, II, IV; on “capitalistic monopoly,”Google ScholarIbid., pp. 70, 76. On pricing and other measures to discourage competitive entry, see Bain, Joe S., Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956);CrossRefGoogle ScholarChandler, Alfred D. Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977), P. 334.Google ScholarCf. Shepherd, William G., “Bain's Influence on Research into Industrial Organization,” in Masson, Robert T. and Qualls, P. David, eds., Essays on Industrial Organization in Honor of Joe S. Bain (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976), p. 3, note e: Shepherd cites Chamberlin and Robinson as among Bain's “immediate predecessors.”Google Scholar

⁹ A prominent Massachusetts Gold-Democrat, Conant (1861–1915) by the late 1890s was a veteran financial journalist with an international reputation as a banking and monetary authority. From 1889 to 1901 he was Washington correspondent of both the New York Journal of Commerce and Springfield Republican (Massachusetts); he also served as an international financial and banking editor of the New York Bankers Magazine. in 1902, he became Treasurer of the Morton Trust Company of New York. The scholarly neglect of Conant is awesome in its near universality.Google Scholar The lone extended treatment of Conant's thought by a historian drawing directly upon Conant's writings is the useful 16-page chapter in Healy, David, United States Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s (Madison, 1970), pp. 194–209. In the 1930s, William L. Langer, in a reappraisal of John A. Hobson's Imperialism, indicated an awareness of Conant's significance, stating in his first footnote: “I strongly suspect that Hobson … took over the idea [of surplus capital] from the very bourgeois American financial expert, Charles A. Conant, whose remarkable article, “The Economic Basis of Imperiaiism,” … is now forgotten, but deserves recognition.”Google ScholarLanger, , “A Critique of Imperialism,” Foreign Affairs, 14 (1935–1936), 102–19, at p. 102, ni. See also, for exampleCrossRefGoogle Scholar, Weinberg's, Albert K. references to Conant as an expansionist economist in his 1930s book, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History (Baltimore, 1935), pp. 275, 395, 424, 458. Like other scholars, however, neither Langer nor Weinberg indicated a knowledge of Conant's policy-making role or of his broader intellectual significance. We are currently engaged in collecting Conant's papers and letters for publication, with an extended essay on his thinking and policy-making significance.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Conant, , A History of Modern Banks of Issue: With an Account of the Economic Crises of the Present Century (New York and London, 1896), chaps. 19–22, pp. 453–553.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 460–461; Conant, , “Crises and Their Management,” Yale Review, 9 (02 1901), 374–98.Google Scholar

¹² Conant, , History, chap. 19, pp. 453–66, “Crises,” pp. 375–76, 381–82;Google Scholar“The Economic Basis of ‘Imperialism,’,” North American Review, 167 (09 1898), 328–29ff.Google ScholarCf. Thompson, James H., “Mill's Fourth Fundamental Proposition: A Paradox Revisited,” Journal of the History of Political Economy, 7 (Summer 1975), 174–92.Google Scholar

¹³ “Economic Basis,” pp. 328–29ff; “Crises,” pp. 380–82. On high levels of savings in the United States in the 1880s and 1890s, in absolute terms and as a per cent of Gross National Product, see Gallman, Robert E., “Gross National Product in the United States, 1834–1909,” in Output, Employment and Productivity in the United States after 1800, Studies in Income and Wealth by the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 30 (New York, 1966), pp. 10–11;Google ScholarGoldsmith, Raymond W., A Study of Saving in the United States (Princeton, 1955), vol. 1, pp. 83–84;Google ScholarFriedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna Jacobson, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, 1963), pp. 92–93.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See, e.g., Conant's rejoinder (at “Crises,” p. 382, citing Hadley, Economics, p. 294) to John Bates Clark, who in his Introduction (pp. 1–18) to the American edition of Karl Rodbertus, Theory of Crises (brought out as Overproduction and Crises for the American audience in 1898, published by Burt Franklin, New York), denied the possibility of “universal overproduction.”Google Scholar

¹⁵ In addition to “Economic Basis,” see also Conant, , “The Struggle for Commercial Empire,” Forum, 27 (07 1899), 427–40;Google ScholarConant, , “The United States as a World Power. 1. The Nature of the Economic and Political Problem,” Forum, 29 (07 1900), 608–22;Google ScholarConant, , “The United States as a World Power. II. Her Advantages in the Competition for Commercial Empire,” Forum, 29 (08 1900), pp. 673–87. For corporate consolidation as a response to excessive competitionGoogle Scholar, see Chandler, Alfred D. Jr, “The Large Industrial Corporation and Making of the Modern American Economy,” in Ambrose, Stephen E., ed., Institutions in Modern America: Innovation in Structure and Process (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 76–80Google Scholar, and Chandler, Visible Hand, pp. 287–344.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For example, in his review of Conant's, The United States in the Orient: the Nature of the Economic Problem (Boston, 1900), a collection of seven previously published essays, including the four cited in note 15 above, J. B. Clark noted that in making the superabundance of capital his “major premise,” Conant nevertheless avoided “the ancient fallacies about universal overproduction.” Clark cited as the “merits” of Conant's book “the vigor and general soundness of its plea for outlets for exportation and, in particular, its recognition of the fact that the opening of foreign countries means not only a chance to sell goods with profit, but a chance to invest our own capital with an even larger and more permanent profit.”Google ScholarClark, review of Conant's U.S. in the Orient, Adams's, BrooksAmerica's Economic SupremacyGoogle Scholar, and Strong's, JosiahExpansion Under New World Conditions, in Political Science Quarterly, 16 (03 1901), 142–44.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See, e.g., A Special Report on Coinage and Banking in the Philippine Islands, Made to the Secretary of War by Charles A. Conant of Boston, November 25, 1901, Appendix G in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1901 (Washington, D. C., 1901); and Report on Certain Economic Questions in the English and Dutch colonies in the OrientGoogle Scholar, by Jenks, Jeremiah W., Special Commissioner, Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department Doe. No. 168, War Department, 09, 1902 (Washington, D. C., 1902). Hereafter cited, respectively as Conant, Report on Coinage (1901), and Jenks, Report on Colonies (1902).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Conant, , “Economic Basis,” pp. 330, 339.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Hobson to Keynes, 3 02 1936, Keynes to Hobson, 10, 14, 02 1936Google Scholar, in Johnson, Elizabeth and Moggridge, Donald, eds., Keynes, John Maynard, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (London, 1979), 29, pp. 208–211. Keynes treated the relationship between savings and investment, in the years 1891–1896, much as Conant did. In his “A Treatise on Money” (1930)Google Scholar, Keynes, noted (Collected Writings, 6, pp. 148–52) that in those years “new investment per annum … was 40 percent less than in … 1885 to 1890.” He denied that this was “compensated by increased investment in other directions. On the contrary … in 1894 the United States repurchased about $60 million of American securities.” He went on to argue that the total British national savings of £150 million of 1880 had “probably reached £200 million by 1896.” Ordinary bank savings were up by 30 per cent between 1888 and 1893, and the national debt was being actively repaid. “The reasons for the falling off in the rate of investment and for the unreadiness of this rate to recover in spite of interest rates so low as to be unparalleled either before or since were complex … The Baring crisis … caused a severe shock to the confidence of investors … in India and the United States the future of the currency was in grave doubt … Australia was overwhelmed, by her great banking crisis in 1893. Thus foreign investment was brought almost to a standstill, whilst there were no special activities or new investments to absorb the redundant savings at home … the rate of savings in Great Britain was considerably in excess of the rate of investment, … savings by individuals were abortive to the extent of (say) £50 million per annum,” from 1891 to 1896. Here Keynes clearly acknowledged what Conant called “surplus capital.” Like Conant, Keynes argued that “probably the only ways of absorbing current savings and so averting the heavy unemployment of 1892–5,” lay in government investment programs at home and abroad, e.g., “borrowing by the Government … to finance … work on public utilities,” and investment abroad by means of “government guarantees on the lines of the recent Trade Facilities and Export Credit Acts.” But Keynes realized that “any such policy was of course utterly incompatible with the ideas and orthodoxies of the period.”Google Scholar

²⁰ In a letter to the British Laborite politician, Durbin, F. M., 04 24, 1936, Keynes argued that “investment is not a matter which can be left solely to private decision.” Collected Writings. 29. pp. 231–35. In the same letter Keynes stated his approval of “measures designed to increase the propensity to consume, and also public investment independent of the rate of interest.” Later Keynes held that the state had to “influence” from two-thirds to three-fourths of total investment.Google Scholar (Collected Writings, 27, p. 322). “Influence” did not necessarily mean direct government investment, unless private investment were insufficient to yield something approaching full employment.Google Scholar

²¹ Conant, , “Economic Basis,” p. 337; see also Conant, “The Growth of Public Expenditures,” Atlantic Monthly (01 1901), 45–47.Google Scholar

²² “Economic Basis,” p. 337

²³ Robinson, Joan, Economic Philosophy, (Garden City, New York, 1964), pp. 77, 85. As Robinson has noted, Keynes “pointed out that capital yields a return, not because it is productive but because it is scarce.” (Robinson's italics.)Google Scholar See also Thompson, , “Mill's Fourth Fundamental Proposition,” pp. 176–80.Google Scholar

²⁴ Conant, , “The New Economic Problems,” chap. 5 in The United Stales in the Orient, especially pp. 127–28, and “Economic Basis,” pp. 333–34.Google ScholarConant, Cf., “The World's Wealth in Negotiable Securities,” Atlantic Monthly (01 1908), 102–03. Here Conant argued that the creation of markets for negotiable securities had increased the funds available for investment far beyond a ratio proportional to the growth in national wealth: “by dividing properties into coupons of moderate value, they permit the investment without difficulty of sums as low as one hundred dollars, or even twenty dollars.” The effect of this was to bring small savings into the investment stream and thus reduce unconscious but functional hoarding. Although Conant does not cite him in this instance, Marx was one of the first modern economists to argue that as a nation obtains more wealth a growing number of people become wealthy, but that the amount of capital invested grows even more rapidly, thereby tending to reduce the rate of interest. Marx further argued that the “development of the credit system and the attendant evergrowing control of industrialists and merchants over the money savings of all classes of society, that is effected through the bankers and the progressive concentration of these savings in amounts which can serve as money capital, must also depress the rate of interest.”Google ScholarMarx, , Capital, 3 (Moscow, 1971), p. 362.Google Scholar Conant occasionally cited Marx as an authority on monetary matters, but not on broader theoretical or historical matters. In The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York, 1936), p. 31, Keynes pointed out that “the richer the community the wider will tend to be the gap between its actual and its potential production … [for] not only is the marginal propensity to consume weaker in wealthier communities, but owing to its accumulation of capital being already larger, the opportunities for further investment are less attractive.” With respect to duplication of plant, Keynes had much the same view as Conant. Like Conant, Keynes expected the transfer of funds from investment to consumption, but objected to investments that needlessly duplicated existing facilities: “Two pyramids, two masses for the dead, are twice as good as one, but not so two railroads from London to York.”Google ScholarIbid., p. 131.

²⁵ Keynes, , Collected Writings, 29, pp. 203, 80–82;Google ScholarMarx, , Capital, 1 (Moscow, 1971), pp. 145–63.Google Scholar

²⁶ Conant, , “The Law of the Value of Money,” Annals, 16 (09 1900), 19–25.Google Scholar

²⁷ See note I, supra, and [Conant] “A Central Bank of Issue,” a 14-part unsigned editorial series written by Conant and published in the Wall Street Journal weekly, beginning September 22 and ending November 6, 1909; and Conant, , “The Functions of Centralized Banking,” The Bankers Magazine, 89 (10 1914), 388–98.Google Scholar

²⁸ For works that suggest such general continuity of policy and the interrelations of foreign policy and domestic concerns about political economy in the period from the 1890s to 1920, see, e.g., Campbell, Charles S. Jr, Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy (New Haven, 1951);Google ScholarWilliams, William A., “The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy,” Pacific Historical Review, 24 (11 1955), 379–95;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWilliams, W. A., The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, 1959);Google ScholarVevier, Charles, The United States and China, 1906–1913: A Study of Finance and Diplomacy (New Brunswick, 1955);Google ScholarSklar, Martin J., “Woodrow Wilson and the Political Economy of Modern United States Liberalism,” Studies on the Left, 1, no. 3 (1960), pp. 17–47;Google ScholarLeFeber, Walter, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898 (Ithaca, New York, 1963);Google ScholarMcCormick, Thomas J., China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901 (Chicago, 1967);Google ScholarLevin, N. Gordon Jr, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968);Google ScholarParrini, Carl P., Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923 (Pittsburgh, 1969);Google ScholarScholes, Walter V. and Scholes, Marie V.. The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia, Missouri, 1970);Google ScholarIsrael, Jerry, Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905–1926 (Pittsburgh, 1971).Google Scholar

²⁹ Conant, Report on Coinage (1901); Jenks, , Report on Colonies (1902). Conant, for example, stated in his Report on Coinage, p. 16: “… since it is in the gold-standard countries that the great surplus of capital has been accumulated … it is absolutely essential that [in an “undeveloped country”] monetary legislation, as well as that regarding the sanctity of contracts and the security of property, should be such as to attract the investors of these countries.” “Experience has demonstrated that capital seeking investment can be attracted in no other way than by the adoption and maintenance of the gold standard.” To the same effect, see the testimony, explicitly citing Conant, of Philippine Civil Governor William Howard Taft at U.S. Senate hearings in 02 1902Google Scholar: U.S. Senate Committee on the Philippines, , Hearings, “Affairs in the Philippine Islands,” Sen. Doc. No. 331, Part I, 57th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1902), pp. 232, 408. Also, Conant to Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage, 16 10 1900; Gage to Root, 8 11 1900; Conant to Clarence R. Edwards (Chief of Division of Insular Affairs, War Department), 9 07 1901; Root to Taft (Manila), 23 07 1901, all in War Department, National Archives, Record Group 350 (hereafter cited as WD NA RG); and Taft to Root, 14 10 1901, Papers of Elihu Root, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar

³⁰ Among other reasons, this was so because there was a dispute between China and all the indemnity powers, except the United States, as to whether the indemnity was to be paid at exchange rates prevailing in 1901, when the final Protocol was signed, or at subsequent rates that would require the payment of more Chinese silver currency (taels) to discharge periodic gold obligations, so long as the Chinese silver tael continued to depreciate against gold-standard currencies. These matters are detailed in diplomatic correspondence between Washington and the American representatives in China, e.g., Hay to James Fearon (Peking), 24 04 1902, and Hay to Conger (Shanghai), 10 06 1901, Domestic Letters of the Department of State (Diplomatic tnstructions, China), Department of State, National Archives, Record Group 59 (hereafter cited as DS NA RG59). Also, much of the Diplomatic Dispatches, China, 1900–1903, deals with the complex relations between the Chinese indemnity and currency reform. We treat these materials in greater detail in our book in progress on U.S. objectives in China before World War 1.Google Scholar

³¹ [Conant, Charles A., Hanna, Hugh H., and Jenks, Jeremiah W.,] U.S. Commission on International Exchange, Report on the Introduction of the Gold Exchange Standard into China, the Philippine Islands, Panama, and Other Silver Using Countries (Washington, D.C., 1904), pp. 203–26, 254–58, 461–69 (hereafter cited as CIE, Report, 1904); also see U.S. Commission on International ExchangeGoogle Scholar, Stability of International Exchange: Report on the Introduction of the Gold Exchange Standard into China and Other Silver Using Countries (Washington, D.C., 1903), pp. 209–25 (hereafter cited as CIE, Report, 1903).Google Scholar

³² CIE, Report, 1903, pp. 7–15, 37–45;Google ScholarTung, Shen (Chinese Charge d'Affaires in the United States) to Hay, 22 01 1903, with enclosure of the Chinese government's views on monetary reform in China, DS NA RG59;Google ScholarCongressional Record, 57th Congress, 2d Session (1903), Vol. 36, Part 2, pp. 1408–10, 1446, and Part 3, pp. 2542, 2622; also, Hay to President Theodore Roosevelt, at CIE, Report, 1903, pp. 9–10; Roosevelt to U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate, 29 01 1903, enclosing Hay to Roosevelt, 28 01 1903, DS NA RG59. Hugh H. Hanna had been an initiator and the chairman of the executive committee of the Indianapolis Monetary Convention of 1897–1899, which played a major role in effecting passage of the Currency (Gold Standard) Act of 1900. Conant served Hanna and the Indianapolis Monetary Commission as an executive adviser.Google ScholarRoot, Cf. to Taft, , 23 07 1901, WD NA RG350.Google Scholar

³³ The National Commissions, which negotiated with the United States Commission on International Exchange, were representative of government and banking in their respective countries. For example, Sir James MacKay, who negotiated the British-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902, Sir Ewen Cameron, chairman of the board of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Robert Chalmers, a high British Treasury official, and George W. Johnson of the Colonial Office, represented Britain in the discussions; France was represented by G. Pallain, Governor of the Bank of France, G. de Liron d'Arioles, Vice Governor of the Bank of France, A. Arnaune, director of the French Mint, Robert Vaselle, director of the Asian Bureau of the Colonial Ministry, as well as Yves Guyot and Stanislav Simon, who were directors of the Bank of IndoChina; the German negotiators included President Rudolph Koch of the Reichbank, Karl Helfferich, the Chairman of the German Bankers Association, Roland Lucke, a director of the Deutsche Bank, Arthur Salomonsohn, a member of the Board of the Discontogesellschaft, and Fritz Urbig, a director of the Deutsche Asiatische Bank; Japanese Commissioners included the Vice Minister of Finance Y. Sakatani, F. Sugimura, chief of the Commercial Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs, S. Matsuo, President of the Bank of Japan, N. Soma, President of the Yokohama Specie Bank; Baron Y. Shibusawa and S. Hayakawa, directors of the Mitsui Bank; Russian Commissioners included Edward de Pleske, Governor of the Imperial Bank, Pierre de Bark, President of the Bank de Escompte of Persia, Dimitry Pokotiloff, Director of the Russo Chinese Bank, and Alexander Wyschnegradski, Chamberlain to the Tsar; CIE, Report, 1903, p. 139.

³⁴ Hanna to Hay, 6 06 1903, Acting Secretary of State George Loomis to Secretary of the Treasury Shaw, Leslie M., 28 08 1903, Hay to Shaw, 15 01 1904, all in DS NA RG59; also, CIE, Report, 1903, p. 139. Conant had stopped in Japan for consultations in late 10 1901, en route to the United States from the Philippines.Google ScholarConant, , Report on Coinage, pp. 5, 116–19.Google Scholar

³⁵ “Arguments Submitted by the [United States] Commission” to the British, French, Dutch, German, Russian, and Japanese commissions (15 June-23 July 1903), at CIE, Report, 1903, p. 101.Google Scholar

³⁶ “Suggestions for a Monetary System for China,” paper submitted by CIE to British Commission, 8 June 1903, at Ibid., p. 51 ff. Cf. Coyajee, J. C., The Indian Currency System, 1835–1926 (Madras, 1930), pp. 49–143;Google ScholarKemmerer, Edwin W., Modern Currency Reforms (New York, 1916), pp. 3–152, especially pp. 99–108.Google Scholar

³⁷ SirMacKay, James to Hsuan-huai, Sheng, 18 08 1902, at CIE, Report, 1903, pp. 210–21.Google Scholar

³⁸ Hay, to Conger, (Peking), 12 10 1903Google Scholar, Ibid., p. 224.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 53–55, 99, 88–89; cf. Hay to Jenks, 19 November 1904, DS NA RG59.

⁴⁰ “Resolutions and Reports of the Foreign Commissions,” at CIE, Report 1903, p 139–63; Hanna (London) to Hay, 6 06 1903, DS NA RGS9.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Keynes, , “A Memorandum on a Currency System for China,” 02 1910, Collected Writings, 15, pp. 60–65, at 62–63.Google Scholar

⁴² CIE, Report, 1903, pp. 14–24, 103–17.Google Scholar