Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2009
Two ideas contrary to those of the existing literature are advanced. First, the early years of the Hudson's Bay Company/Northwest Company duopoly were characterized by passive rather than by predatory competition. Second, the Hudson's Bay Company initiated the changes that eventually led to predatory competition. The Company's financial crisis of 1809–1810 brought about by the decline in demand due to the Napoleonic Wars shocked it out of complacency and into aggressive competition.
1 Rich, E. E., The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857 (Toronto, 1967), p. 194.Google Scholar
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3 Merk, Frederick, “Fur Trade and Empire,” George Simpson's Journal 1824/25 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931), p. x.Google Scholar
4 London Correspondence Outward-Official, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), HBC MG20A6, Albany Factory, 1803.Google Scholar
5 Ibid., 1806.
6 Ibid., 1808.
7 Ibid., 1803 para. 5; 1809 para. 3.
8 Ibid., 1803.
9 Morton, Arthur, A History of the Canadian West to 1870/71 (London, 1939).Google Scholar
10 Harmon, Daniel, A Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America (New York, 1922).Google ScholarCoues, Elliot, ed., New Light on the Early History of the Greater Northwest (New York, 1897).Google Scholar
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12 Coues, New Light, p. 594.Google Scholar
13 Eastmain and Moose Factories were situated on the eastern and southern shores of James Bay.Google Scholar
14 Minutes of Transactions between HBC and NWC 1804–1806, PAC HBC MG2OA1, Reel 18.Google Scholar
15 Ibid., Letter, 31st 01 1806, para. 39.
16 Ibid., para. 40. The Committee was informing the NWC agents that since it was required by a Navigation Act clause in its charter to sell its furs only on the English market, the NWC would have to be bound also by the same clause.
17 London Correspondence Outward, 1798/1806.Google Scholar
18 The sales records are not complete. The records only list the furs sold and their prices for 1798, 1799, 1800, 1801, 1807, and 1808.Google Scholar
19 Minute Book, PAC HBC MG2OA 1, Reel 18. The Company's assets were its total stock valued at £103,950, its funded property in London, and its bonds consisting of £30,000 invested in 3 percent consols, £10,000 in old south sea annuities, and £366. 14.6 in 3 percent reduced annuities.Google Scholar
20 Ibid., 1807. This sum of £30,000 was not credited directly to the company's account, but placed in the names of three committee members: Mainwaring, Neaves, and Raikes. In 07 1808, the Company become responsible for the full £50,000 credit facility.
21 Ibid., 1808, or Rich, E. E., The Hudson's Bay Company (London, 1958–1959), p. 266.Google Scholar
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24 Minute Book, Minutes of Transactions, Reel 18.Google Scholar
25 Sir Alexander McKenzie Papers, Letter Book XY, Public Archives of Canada, MG49, M 1349. 1351, 1808. Astor, John Jacob, the chief figure involved in the U.S. fur trade, formed the American Fur Company in 1809.Google Scholar
26 Sir Alexander McKenzie Papers, 23rd October, 1807.Google Scholar
27 Ibid., 28th 07 and 22nd 10, 1808.
28 Fine beaver prices were: 1804, 21/7; 1805, 23/9; 1806, 28/7; 1807, 27/11; 1808, 27/1. Auction Catalogue of Fur Trade Produce, PAC HBC MG20A54.Google Scholar
29 Sir Alexander McKenzie Papers, 22nd October 1808.Google Scholar
30 Minute Book, 1808.Google Scholar
31 Ibid., 17th 05, 1809.
32 London Correspondence, 1806.Google Scholar
33 It is difficult to measure the elasticity because of the lack of information concerning the quantities of furs sold on the English market by the Northwest Company and the lack of precise data on income levels in the United Kingdom and Europe for these years.Google Scholar
34 London Correspondence, 1807.Google Scholar
35 Ibid., 1808.
36 London Correspondence, Annual letter to Churchill Factory, 1804.Google Scholar
37 Ibid., 1807.
38 Coues, New Light, p. 558. By “in season” Henry means the fur season on the London market.Google Scholar
39 Colin Robertson was an ex-northwesterner whom the Company ultimately hired to outfit a brigade destined for Athabasca. Robertson's, Colin suggestions to the Company, 1810; Selkirk Papers, Papers relating to the Red River Settlement PAC MG 19. P. 530.Google Scholar
40 1809 was a bad year because of the severe winter. Sir Alexander McKenzie Papers, Letter Book XY. Wolf, mink, and marten were demanded principally in Europe. The stickiness of prices appears to contradict Ray, Arthur and Freeman, Donald, “Give us Good Measure”: An Economic Analysis of Relations Between the Indians and the HBC before 1736 (Toronto, 1978). But two very different periods are involved.Google Scholar
41 London Correspondence, Annual letter to all Factories, 1809.Google Scholar
42 Ibid., 1809, para. 8.
43 Ibid., para. 10.
44 Storing unsaleable furs at the Bay lasted only one year. In their 1810 letter, the Committee ordered “you will send home all the furs, skins and every article of trade as well of this year as those left behind last year.” London Correspondence, 1810.Google Scholar
45 This fits in with the Rich-Rotstein thesis on the importance for the fur trade of the alliance structure among the Indian tribes.Google Scholar
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47 Selkirk Papers, p. 25.Google Scholar
48 Carlos, Ann, “The Birth and Death of Predatory Competition in the North American Fur Trade: 1810–1821,” University of Western Ontario Working Paper, 1980.Google Scholar