¹ Piketty, Thomas, Capital and Ideology, trans. Goldhammer, Arthur (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020)Google Scholar; Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Goldhammer, Arthur (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

² Piketty, Capital and Ideology. In this book, regalian functions mean “security, justice, and legitimate use of violence”; see p. 1044.

³ According to the Ming scholar Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–1682), the first appearance of simin was in the book Guanzi 管子; see Gu Yanwu, “Shi heshi” 士何事, in Rizhilu jishi 日知錄集釋 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2006), 439–41. Guanzi recorded the deeds and major policies implemented by Guan Zhong 管仲 (?–645 BCE) in the early Chunqiu period for the Qi 齊 state. It was probably compiled across the Zhanguo period and the middle of Western Han; see the date analysis in Xie Haofan 謝浩范 and Zhu Yingping 朱迎平, trans., Guanzi quanyi 管子全譯 (Guizhou: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), Preface, 9. A similar text on simin also appeared in the Chunqiu Zhanguo history compendium Guoyu 國語; see Shang Xuefeng 尚學鋒 and Xia Dekao 夏德靠, trans. Guoyu 國語 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2007), 72–76. Simin or the four categories of commoners were also mentioned in other texts recording pre-Qin events, which were compiled in the Han or before, for example; see Li Xueqin 李學勤 ed., Shisan jing zhushu: Chunqiu Guliangzhuan zhushu 十三經注疏: 春秋穀梁傳注疏 (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1999), 211; and Kong Anguo 孔安國 and Kong Yingda 孔穎達, Shangshu Zhengyi 尚書正義 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2007), 704; Wu Zeyu 吳則虞, Yanzi chunqiu jishi 晏子春秋集釋 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1982), 509. The usual translation of the term shi 士 as “scholars” is followed here in the general context of simin. However, considering the sweeping coverage of this book's trifunctional model and assuming its “scholar” and “literati” are the English translations of shi, we must be aware of the complexity that the social group represented by shi could vary over time and did not necessarily always mean “scholars” or “literati” across premodern China. For example, it could mean lower rank nobles before the Qin; see Yang Tianyu 楊天宇, Liji yizhu 禮記譯注 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2004), 141. We should also be aware of another complexity that this book's “Confucian literati” or “scholars” could also mean ru 儒 in premodern China. Ru could be a household category in certain dynasties (e.g. in the Ming, see note 42 below), having different rights and obligations, which, in terms of inequality, could complicate this book's blanket explanatory model for premodern China.

⁴ Li Xiangfeng 黎翔鳳 and Liang Yunhua 梁運華 eds., Guanzi jiaozhu 管子校注 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2004), 400–401.

⁵ For example, see Zhang Shuangli 張雙隸, et al. trans., Lüshi chunqiu yizhu 呂氏春秋譯注 (Jilin: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 1986), 915–16.

⁶ For example, see Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 trans., Mengzi yizhu 孟子譯注 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1988), 117, for the Zhanguo period scholar Mengzi's 孟子 view that property was important in incentivizing the people's loyalty and social stability; and see Ban Gu 班固, Han shu 漢書 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1964), 1131, on the problems of youshizhimin if the people were not tied to their property.

⁷ For example, in the Qin, commoners were granted land and taxed accordingly; see “Shuihudi 11 hao Qin mu zhujian” 睡虎地 11 號秦墓竹簡, in Qin jiandu heji 秦簡牘合集, edited by Chen Wei 陳偉 (Wuhan: Wuhan Daxue Chubanshe, 2014), vol. 1, 47.

⁸ For example, see the Han's following of the Qin policy of allowing commoners to sell their land, which led to the inequality and wealth concentration problems in the Han, in Ban, Han shu, 1137; see also Zhu Honglin 朱紅林, Zhangjiashan hanjian ernian lüling jishi 張家山漢簡二年律令集釋 (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2005), 201.

⁹ For example, in the early Han, there were property ownership restrictions for merchants; see Sima Qian 司馬遷 et al., Shiji huizhu kaozheng fujiaobu 史記會注考證附校補 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1986), 830. However, in reality, the legal discriminations were not effective in curtailing the wealth growth of the merchants; see Ban, Han shu, 1133.

¹⁰ Li and Liang, Guanzi jiaozhu, 400.

¹¹ The status superiority sequencing of simin was not very rigid before the Qin and Han. For example, in the xiaokuang 小匡 chapter of the book Guanzi mentioned above, simin was sequenced as “scholars, farmers, craftsmen and merchants,” but in the zhiguo 治國 chapter of the same book, the sequence was changed to “farmers, scholars, merchants and craftsmen.” It also stated that inequalities could be reduced by mutual exchange of roles among the four categories; see Li and Liang, Guanzi jiaozhu, 926. In the Guliang 穀梁 interpretation of the Chunqiu 春秋 history compendium, the sequence was “scholars, merchants, farmers and craftsmen,” see Li, Shisan jing zhushu: Chunqiu Guliangzhuan zhushu, 211. In another book Zhou li 周禮, which emerged in Han and was probably first compiled in the Zhanguo period, the status superiority sequence of all the people in the country was “nobility, scholars, craftsmen, merchants, farmers and women workers” (merchants were ahead of farmers); see Yang Tianyu 楊天宇, ed., Shisan jing yizhu: Zhouli yizhu 十三經譯注: 周禮譯注 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2004), 598–99. In the early Han, although the status of merchants was lowered, some restrictions were later relaxed; see Sima, Shiji huizhu kaozheng fujiaobu, 824; see also the different sequencing in the book Zhou shu 周書 as quoted in Shiji versus Sima Qian's own sequencing, in Sima, Shiji huizhu kaozheng fujiaobu, 2042; and the mentioning of five categories of commoners, “scholars, farmers, travelling merchants, craftsmen and stationary merchants,” according to Fu Qian's 服虔 annotation, in Sima, Shiji huizhu kaozheng fujiaobu, 2046.

¹² Ban, Han shu, 1133. Similar situations happened in the Qing. The status superiority of farmers over merchants was emphasized by the government but there were difficulties in enforcing this superiority in reality because society regarded merchants and craftsmen as superior to farmers; see Shi Zong shilu 世宗實錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985), 277–78, 866–67.

¹³ For example, see the Tang official Liu Zongyuan's 柳宗元 (773–819) argument, in his biography of a pharmaceutical merchant, that it was wrong to discriminate against merchants; Liu Zongyuan, “Song Qing zhuan” 宋清傳, in Liu Zongyuan ji 柳宗元集 (Beijing: Zhounghua Shuju, 1979), 471–72. See also the Song official Sima Guang's 司馬光 (1019–1086) argument that the three categories of farmers, craftsmen and merchants all made important contributions to the country's fiscal resources, in Sima Guang, “Lun caili shu” 論財利疏, in Wenguo Wenzheng Sima Gong wenji 溫國文正司馬公文集, collected in Sibu Congkan Chubian Jibu 四部叢刊初編集部 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shangwu Yinshu Guan, 1919), 23.5b; and see the Song official Fan Zhongyan's 范仲淹 (989–1052) four poems on simin, which highlighted the important contribution from all four categories and argued against discrimination, especially against the merchants, in Fan Zhongyan, “Simin shi” 四民詩, in Fan Zhongyan quanji 范仲淹全集 (Chengdu: Sichuan Daxue Chubanshe, 2007), 23–25. For examples of similar arguments in later dynasties, see Chen Qiqing 陳耆卿, Jiading Chicheng zhi 嘉定赤城志 (The Zhongguo Guojia Tushuguan Collection, Hongzhi Period), 37.13b; Wang Shouren 王守仁, “Jiean Fanggong mubiao” 節庵方公墓表, in Wang Yangming quanji 王陽明全集 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1992), 25.941; Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, “Mingyi daifanglu” 明夷待訪錄, in Huang Zongxi quanji 黃宗羲全集 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji, 1985), vol. 1, 41; Wang Daokun 汪道昆, “Yubu Chen Shijun quezhengbei” 虞部陳使君榷政碑, in Taihan ji 太函集, collected in Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1995), vol. 1347, 65.16b.

¹⁴ For example, see Shen Yao 沈垚, “Fei Xishan xiansheng qishi shuangshou xu” 費席山先生七十雙壽序, in Luofanlou wenji 落帆樓文集, collected in Congshu jicheng xubian 叢書集成續編 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian, 1994), vol. 135, 24.12a.

¹⁵ For example, see merchant activities of Han officials in Ban, Han shu, 2643, 2652 and 3204; see criticisms of government officials’ competing with the people in merchant activities, and other policy advice on forbidding Han officials’ engagement in merchant activities, in Ban, Han shu, 2520–21 and 3077.

¹⁶ For example, see Wang Anshi 王安石, “Shang Renzong Huangdi yanshi shu” 上仁宗皇帝言事書, in Linchuan Xiansheng wenji 臨川先生文集 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1959), 39.416; and Shen, Luofanlou wenji, 24.11b–12a. Even officials with a scholarly reputation and family heritage of occupying senior government positions were actively involved in merchant activities; see the example in Sima Guang 司馬光, Sushui jiwen 涑水記聞 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2009), 199.

¹⁷ For example, see Huang Zongxi, “Songyuan xuean” 宋元學案, in Huang, Huang Zongxi quanji, vol. 6, 90.533.

¹⁸ For an example of the purchase of official positions by craftsmen and merchants in the Chunqiu and Zhanguo periods, see Wang Xianshen 王先慎, Hanfeizhi jijie 韓非子集解 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2003), 455; for the purchase of noble titles in the Qin see Sima, Shiji huizhu kaozheng fujiaobu, 155; for examples in the Han, see Ban, Han Shu, 1133–34, and Sima, Shiji huizhu kaozheng fujiaobu, 825; for an overview from the Han to Tang, see Du You 杜佑, Tongdian 通典 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1988), 241–44; for examples in the Tang, see Liu Xu 劉昫, et al., Jiu Tang shu 舊唐書 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1975), 2087 and Yuan Jie 元結, “Wen jinshi—dier” 問進士—第二, in Quan Tang wen 全唐文, edited by Dong Gao 董誥 et al. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), 380.9a; for an example in the Song see Xu Song 徐松, Song huiyao jigao 宋會要輯稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1957), 3613; for an example in the Yuan see Tao Zongyi 陶宗儀, Nancun chuogenglu 南村輟耕錄 (Beijing, Zhonghua Shuju, 2004), 93; for an overview in the Qing see Oda Yorozu 織田萬, Qingguo xingzhengfa 清國行政法 (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), 306, 313–14. To avoid clutter, the many examples of purchasing official positions and nobility titles across premodern China are not exhaustively listed here.

¹⁹ For example, see Ban, Han Shu, 131, 1128.

²⁰ For example, in the Ming, there was a scheme of demoting the nobles across generations, and a noble could be demoted to the status of commoner if he committed a serious crime; see Zhang Xuan 張萱, “Xiyuan wenjianlu” 西園聞見錄, in Xuxiu siku quahshu, vol. 1169, 46.1b. There were also other situations in which nobles could become commoners in the Ming. For example, the number of registered nobles increased from about fifty-eight in the early Ming to 28,492 in 1569. Because of the increase, the government was no longer able to provide stipends for all of them (e.g. in 1574, the annual stipend which had to be provided to the registered nobility was about 9,000,000 shi of grains, but the total reserve across all relevant provincial granaries could only meet less than half of this amount), and therefore had to allow them to live and work as commoners or take the civil service examinations and become officials; see Ming Muzong shilu 明穆宗實錄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), 32.9b–13a; Ming Shenzong shilu 明神宗實錄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), 23.9a, 25.6a–7a. Also, the nobility in the Ming was not a homogeneous social group. The side branches of those nobles who were not entitled to a stipend (mumingliang shuzong 無名糧庶宗) were allowed to be farmers or merchants to earn a living, and were liable to the same criminal laws as commoners (i.e. no exemption privileges in terms of criminal liabilities); see Ming Shenzong shilu, 224.5a. It is therefore difficult to argue for mutually exclusive trifunctional groupings of nobility, officials and commoners.

²¹ Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, Chunqiu zuochuan zhu 春秋左傳注 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1995), “Zhaogong Qinian” 昭公七年, 1284.

²² For example, the Tang official Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824) mentioned in one of his essays that the number of categories of commoners was increased from four to six, which meant adding the monks and priests to the four categories under simin; see annotations in Han Yu, “Yuan dao” 原道, in Han Yu wenji huijiao jianzhu 韓愈文集彙校箋注 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2010), 31. See also his memorial to the Emperor Muzong 穆宗 in 821–824, in which monks and priests were identified alongside simin, in Ma Duanlin 馬端臨, Wenxian tongkao 文獻通考 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), Kao 考 153. For another example of expanding simin to include monks and priests after the Tang see the policy recommendation in 1303, in Ke Shaomin 柯紹忞, Xin Yuan shi 新元史 (Shanghai: Kaiming Shudian, 1935), 385; see also p. 386 on their significant social influence and the popular tax avoidance arrangement of parking property under them. The exact date of first expanding simin to resolve its inadequacy by including monks and priests cannot be ascertained. However, the Qing official Jin Fu 靳輔 (1633–1692) suggested that simin was expanded to include the monks and priests after the Zhou Dynasty; see Jin Fu 靳輔, “Shengcai yuxiang diyishu” 生財裕餉第一疏, in Huangchao jingshi wenbian 皇朝經世文編, edited by He Changling 賀長齡 (Taibei: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1972), 26.952. Jin Fu's view was probably impressionistic, but similar views on expansion of simin from four to six categories to include monks and priests after the “ancient time” was also suggested by the Ming official Wang Shuying 王叔英 (?–1402); see Wang Shuying 王叔英, “Zizhi ceshu (fumin zhishu)” 資治策疏(富民之術), in Huang Ming jingshi wenbian 皇明經世文編, edited by Chen Zilong et al., collected in Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. 1655, 12.3b.

²³ Yao Lü 姚旅, Lu shu 露書 (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), 9.202–3.

²⁴ For example, see Cibu's 祠部 (the government unit which was once responsible for regulating the monks in the Tang) memorial in 830 on banning the tax avoidance practices: “Qing shenjin sengnizou” 請申禁僧尼奏, in Dong, Quan Tang wen, 966.7b; see also the comments from the senior official Li Deyu 李德裕 (787–849) that to avoid taxes, on average, one third of the taxable headcount (ding 丁) in each household became monks, and Li believed that if no action was taken, the loss of taxable headcount could be up to 600,000 in less than a year just in the southern Jianghuai 江淮 area, in Liu, Jiu Tang shu, 4514.

²⁵ For example, see Liu, Jiu Tang shu, 3421.

²⁶ See Du Mu 杜牧, “Fanchuan wenji” 樊川文集, in Wenyuange sikuquanshu 文淵閣四庫全書 (Taiwan: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1986), vol. 1081, 7.9b–10a; Liu, Jiu Tang shu, 606; Wang Pu 王溥, Tang huiyao 唐會要 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1955), 864; Sima Guang 司馬光, Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1976), 8017; and Zhang Ruyu 章如愚, Qunshu kaosuo houji 羣書考索後集 (Zhengde shisannian Jianyang Liushi Shendushuzhai kanben 正德十三年建陽劉氏慎獨書齋刊本), 63.2a. One mu in Tang is about 522.15 square meters (i.e. 240 bu 步x (5 chi 尺 x 0.295 m)²). This is assuming the Tang official standard of 1 mu = 240 bu (square) and 1 bu = 5 chi (see Liu, Jiu Tang shu, 2088, and Li linfu 李林甫 et al., Tang liudian 唐六典 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2016), 74), and 1 chi = 29.5 cm; see Chen Mengjia 陳夢家, “Muzhi yu lizhi” 畝制與里制, in Zhongguo gudai duliangheng lunwenji 中國古代度量衡論文集, edited by Henan Sheng Jiliang Ju 河南省計量局 (Henan: Zhongzhou Guji Chubanshe, 1990), 231.

²⁷ Sima, Zizhi tongjian, 8029–30.

²⁸ This was from the Zhenguan period (627–649) to approximately the Kaiyuan period (713–741); see Wang Pu 王溥, “Wudai huiyao” 五代會要, in Congshu jicheng chubian 叢書集成初編, edited by Wang Yunwu (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1936), vol. 832, 305.

²⁹ The land area was 1,440,386,213 mu and 1,430,386,213 mu respectively; see Lü Xiaqing 呂夏卿, Tang shu zhibi 唐書直筆 (n.p.: Guangya Shuju, 1899), 4.3a; and Du, Tong dian, 32. Similar land area (i.e. 1,430,386,213 mu) for the middle of the Tianbao period was also documented in Zheng Qiao 鄭樵, Tong zhi 通志 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1987), Zhi 志 735, and Ma, Wenxian tongkao, Kao 45.

³⁰ See Lü, Tang shu zhibi, 4.3a. The Tang government did encourage land development; for example, see the performance metrics of rewarding officials for successfully encouraging development of government or private farmland, in Du, Tongdian, 371.

³¹ For example, see the land grant regulations in 624, in Liu, Jiu Tang shu, 2088, though the execution and the actual land grant amount could deviate from the regulations.

³² Zhongguo Shehuikexueyuan Lishiyanjiusuo Tianshengling zhengli ketizu 中國社會科學院歷史研究所天聖令整理課題組 ed., Tianyige Ming chaoben Tianshengling jiaozheng 天一閣藏明鈔本天聖令校證 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2006), 38; Li, Tang liudian, 74.

³³ 5,210,000 mu = 260,500 x 20 mu; 7,815,000 mu = 260,500 x 30 mu.

³⁴ Ouyang, Xin Tang shu, 4279.

³⁵ See the example of assigning taxable households to be servants of the priests in 748, in Wang Qinruo 王欽若 et al., Cefu yuangui 册府元龜 (Nanjing: Fenghuang Chubanshe, 2006), 568.

³⁶ For the support ratio, see Sima, Zizhi tongjian, 8047. It was estimated that the 845 revoked monks were supported by around 1.7 million households. Please note that the number of 170,000 monks recorded by Zizhi tongjian on p. 8047 referred only to the revoked monks, excluding nuns. The total number of revoked monks and nuns was around 260,500 as per its detailed event narrative on p. 8017; this total number is consistent with the number documented in the other sources as cited in note 26.

³⁷ Du, Tongdian, 244.

³⁸ For examples, see Ouyang, Xin Tang shu, 1347; Liu, Jiu Tang shu, 244. The approval could require difficult examinations such as reciting 500 pages of Buddhist text from memory; see Hui Jiao 慧皎 et al., Gaosengchuan Heji 高僧傳合集 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2011), 476.

³⁹ Shi Zanning 釋贊寧, “Da Song sengshilue” 大宋僧史略, in Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. 1286, 685.

⁴⁰ For example, see “Wanli Yangzhou fuzhi” 萬曆揚州府志, in Beijing Tushuguan guji zhenben congkan 北京圖書館古籍珍本叢刊, edited by Beijing Tushuguan Guji Chuban Bianji Zu (Beijing: Shumu Wenxian Chubanshe, 1988), vol. 25, 3.2a.

⁴¹ Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, Tianxia junguo libing shu 天下郡國利病書 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2012), 579; Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al., Ming shi 明史 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1974), 77.1878. These four groups were often collectively referred to in the Ming rules and regulations, such as the Da Ming huidian 大明會典, as representation of the general population.

⁴² For example, the craftsman household, in the early Ming, had about sixty-two sub-categories based on their specializations; see Shen Shixing 申時行 and Zhao Yongxian 趙用賢, “Da Ming huidian” 大明會典, in Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. 792, 189.2a–5a. There were also many peripheral groups other than the four basic groups, such as monks, priests, doctors, Confucian literati or scholars (ru 儒), etc.; see Shen and Zhao, Da Ming huidian, 9.6b. Those other groups could be secondary groups derived from these four basic groups, and these basic groups were viewed in the Ming as like the root of a large tree with many branches, and despite the many variations of the households groups, those variations could be traced back to these four basic groups; see Zhao Guan 趙官 et al., Houhu zhi 後湖志 (Nanjing: Nanjing Chubanshe, 2010), 202.

⁴³ For example, see Ye Mengzhu 葉夢珠, Yueshi bian 閱世編 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1981), 1.24; and Fang Yuegong 方岳貢 and Chen Jiru 陳繼儒, “(Chongzhen) Songjiang fuzhi” (崇禎) 松江府志, in Ribencang Zhongguo kanjian difangzhi congkan 日本藏中國罕見地方志叢刊 (Beijing: Shumu Wenxian Chubanshe, 1991), 14.2b–3b and 14.12b–13a for the granting of land, and 14.14a–16b for the size of the land grants at the various salt production sites in Songjiang Prefecture.

⁴⁴ Shen and Zhao, Da Ming huidian, 17.18a.

⁴⁵ Shen and Zhao, Da Ming huidian, 104.2a–3b.

⁴⁶ Ying Jia 應檟, “Da Ming lü shiyi” 大明律釋義, in Zhongguo lüxue wenxian 中國律學文獻, edited by Yang Yifan 楊一凡 (Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin, 2005), Series 2, 1.274–5.

⁴⁷ Shen and Zhao, Da Ming huidian, 61.36b.

⁴⁸ Shen and Zhao, Da Ming huidian, 17.24b–27a.

⁴⁹ Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 3074–5, 3081.

⁵⁰ For example, see Guyu Zhangshi zongpu 古虞章氏宗譜 (1920) (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (hereafter, “CJCLS”) Collection), Image 132; Cheshi zongpu 車氏宗譜 (1902) (CJCLS Collection), Image 832, for examples of parking land in temples and using temples for gate maintenance in irrigation systems. Also, see Shangyu Zhoushi zongpu 上虞周氏宗譜 (1926) (CJCLS Collection), Images 242, 347, 350, 351, and 360, for an example of civilian land being indirectly controlled through a temple and the monks being expelled if they failed to fulfill their patron's expectations.

⁵¹ Ming Taizu shilu 明太祖實錄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), 232.6b.

⁵² Beijing Tushuguan Guji Chuban Bianji Zu 北京圖書館古籍出版編輯組, ed., Huang Ming zhishu 皇明制書 (Beijing: Shumu Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000), 287.

⁵³ For example, see Wang Jixiang 王繼香, ed., Chongke wuxiang shuili benmo 重刻五鄉水利本末 (1883) (The Columbia University Library Collection), “Shuili Benmo Xia” 水利本末下.6b, 15b and 26b.

⁵⁴ Zhang Xueyan 張學顏, “Wanli kuaijilu” 萬曆會計錄, in Beijing tushuguan guji zhenben congkan 北京圖書館古籍珍本叢刊 (Beijing: Shumu Wenxian Chubanshe, 1989), 1.13. One mu in Ming is approximately 639.22 square meters (i.e. 240 bu 步 x (5 chi 尺 x 0.3264 m)²). This is assuming the Ming official standard of 1 mu = 240 bu (square), 1 bu = 5 chi (see Qing Gaozong chizhuan 清高宗敕撰, Xu tongdian 續通典 (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1935), juan 3, Shihuo 食貨 3, Dian 典 1122), and 1 chi = 32.64 cm (this chi to centimeter conversion is based on the length of the Baoyuan Ju land measurement brass ruler (寶源局量地銅尺); see Chen, Muzhi yu lizhi, 231. Please also note that the Ming mu to square meters conversion in Chen, Muzhi yu lizhi, 232, has an arithmetic error: its Ming mu calculation is based on the construction ruler 營造尺, and it should be 606.744m²; instead of 607.744m²; this arithmetic error persists in the latest compilation of Chen's works (i.e. Chen Mengjia 陳夢家, Chen Mengjia xueshu lunwenji 陳夢家學術論文集 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2016), 543). Since this total taxable land area is taken from the central government's fiscal publication, the Ming official mu to bu and bu to chi standard ratio (i.e. 1 mu = 240 bu (square), and 1 bu = 5 chi) is used here. However, please note that because of the land measurement and tax manipulations during land surveys, the size of one mu (e.g. the mu to bu and bu to chi conversion ratios) could vary widely across locations in the Ming, for example; see Gu, Rizhilu jishi, 586–87.

⁵⁵ Huang, Huang Zongxi quanji, vol. 1, 25.

⁵⁶ Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, “Guantian shimokao” 官田始末考, in Jiankang gujin ji, wai bazhong 建康古今記, 外八種 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2012), 584–85.

⁵⁷ “Qinding Da Qing huidian” 欽定大清會典, in Wenyuange siku quanshu, vol. 619, 10.1b–13b.

⁵⁸ For example, for centuries the beneficiaries in the Lake Xiagai irrigation system (whose primary water reservoir, the Lake Xiagai, was probably over 280 square kilometers at its peak size, over three times the size of Hong Kong island) committed and paid almost double taxes to protect their lake land and water rights against infringement attempts by other local elites and the state; see Wang, Chongke wuxiang shuili benmo, “Shuili Benmo Shang” 水利本末上. 43a–60a, “Shuili Benmo Xia” 水利本末下. 1a–32a, for a detailed history of the double taxes, attempted violations and defenses from the eleventh to sixteenth century; also see “Dongqianhu zhi” 東錢湖志, in Zhonghua shanshui zhi congkan.shuizhi 中華山水志叢刊.水志 (Beijing: Xianzhuang Shuju, 2004), vol. 36, 3.7b, for the Lake Dongqian irrigation system; and Mao Qiling 毛奇齡, “Xianghu shuili zhi” 湘湖水利志, in Zhongguo shuilizhi congkan 中國水利志叢刊 (China: Guangning shushe, 2006), vol. 68, 31, for the Lake Xiang irrigation system.

⁵⁹ Daitian was a type of coastal land which was fenced off from the sea by dikes, and fresh water was artificially channeled behind the dikes for irrigation. The dikes and irrigation facilities required regular maintenance and because of the salinity, the land thus developed was regarded as a medium productivity land; see Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 3073.

⁶⁰ Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 3074.

⁶¹ Wang Qizuo 王啟祚, “Zumin yuguo ershishu (Shunzhi shiliunian)” 足民裕國二事疏(順治十六年), in He, Huangchao jingshi wenbian, 26.973. The per mu tax liabilities were usually lower for zaodi than normal civilian land, which caused many evasions and conflicts between salt households and civilians, and between the salt administration and county administration.

⁶² Yang Changjun 楊昌濬, Liangzhe yanfa xuzuan beikao 兩浙鹽法續纂備考, 1874, 9.3b–4a and 9a–9b.

⁶³ There are many studies on the relationship between taxation and privileges; for example, Bai Jingming 白景明, et al., “Dongbei diqu zhengfujian shiquan yu zhichu zeren huafen gaige yanjiu” 東北地區政府間事權與支出責任劃分改革研究, Caizheng Kexue 2018.3, 36, reports findings in northeast China.

⁶⁴ For example, see Gong Hui 龔輝, “Zhongguo xianjieduan difangzhengfu caizheng jingzheng wenti yanjiu” 中國現階段地方政府財政競爭問題研究 (PhD diss., Liaoning Daxue, 2016), 58. See Sun Xiulin孫秀林 and Zhou Feizhou 周飛舟, “Tudi caizheng yu fenshuizhi: yige shizheng jieshi” 土地財政與分稅制: 一個實證解釋, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 2013.4, 40–59, for an example of the intertwining property and tax relationships.

⁶⁵ This book's supporting Excel spreadsheets can be downloaded from its website: piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology. The spreadsheet used in the analyses below was accessed on November 15, 2020.

⁶⁶ Richard von Glahn, An Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 361.

⁶⁷ See the footnote on China in the book's supporting spreadsheet page “Data F9.1” from the companion website to Piketty, Capital and Ideology, piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (accessed November 15, 2020). The spreadsheet Data F9.1 is under the link “Data series (xls).”

⁶⁸ Sng and Moriguchi, “Asia's Little Divergence,” 3n3 and 4, Figure 1.

⁶⁹ Von Glahn, An Economic History of China, 354; the concerns about data quality and comparability are so important that they are reiterated by Von Glahn two more times, on pp. 358 and 359. In addition to Von Glahn, the many scholars who have raised concerns about data quality and statistical analysis for premodern China, especially macro long run analysis, include Tsurumi Naohiro 鶴見尚弘, Zhongguo Mingqing shehui jingji yanjiu 中國明清社會經濟研究, trans. Jiang Zhenqing (Beijing: Xueyuan Chubanshe, 1989), III; Kent Deng and Patrick O'Brien, “How Well Did Facts Travel to Support Protracted Debate on the History of the Great Divergence between Western Europe and Imperial China?” Working Paper No.257, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History, March 2017, 12–13; Kent G. Deng, Mapping China's Growth and Development in the Long Run: 221 BC to 2020 (Singapore: World Scientific, 2016), 5.

⁷⁰ For example, see Ming Shizong shilu 明世宗實錄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), 417.3a–3b, 436.1b, 437.3a, 439.4a, 443.2b, 446.5b, 454.1a–2a, 456.4a; Zhang, Ming shi, 205.5414; and Zheng Ruozeng 鄭若曾, Chouhai tubian 籌海圖編 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2007), 710, for information and events related to tibian. Advanced collection was not unique to the Ming; the practice existed in as early as the Tang; see Gu, Rizhilu jishi, 608–10, Sima, Zizhi tongjian, 7165-66 and 7559, Wang et al., Cefu yuangui, 5755, and Lu Zhi 陸贄, Lu Xuangong quanji 陸宣公全集 (Shanghai: Shijie Shuju, 1936), 156.

⁷¹ There was no fixed rule on the frequency and number of years of advanced extractions; for example, in 1554, there was advanced extraction for the taxes in 1556, i.e. collection of taxes two years in advance; see Ming Shizong shilu, 417.3b.

⁷² For example, the tibian silver extracted from Henan was used to pay for the nobility's stipend in 1556; see Ming Shizong shilu, 434.3b.

⁷³ See Ming Shizong shilu, 447.3a, for an example of continuous advancement.

⁷⁴ Ming Shizong shilu, 433.6a.

⁷⁵ For example, a number of officials in charge of the military campaigns were criticized by the censors for extravagance and misappropriation of funds; see Ming Shizong shilu, 474.7954–7, 454.7683–5; Yan Congjian 嚴從簡, “Shuyu zhouzi lu” 殊域周咨錄, in Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. 735, 544–45. There were observations that a majority of the “Japanese” pirates were in fact, Chinese; for example, see Yan, Shuyu zhouzi lu, 554, 556, and Xiqiangmen Zhi Chenshi zongpu 西牆門支陳氏宗譜 (1922) (CJCLS Collection), Image 345.

⁷⁶ See Ming Shizong shilu, 514.8a, in which the government was still, in 1562, chasing the collection of tibian silver from many locations. See also the tibian practice of advancing one year of regular taxes (i.e. not only commuted services obligations, tibian junyao) in 1591 across the prosperous Su, Song, Chang, and Zhen prefectural areas, in Ming Shenzong shilu, 243.3b. In fact, in addition to tibian, there were other advanced collection practices; for example, see the 70 percent advanced collection in Sichuan in Wang Dewan 王德完, “Sichuan yichang kunku qiciteen yijiudaoxuanshu” 四川異常困苦乞賜特恩以救倒懸疏, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 444.37.

⁷⁷ Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 7.256.

⁷⁸ Charles O. Hucker's translation of the Ming zhen 鎮 is followed here; see Charles O. Hucker, “Governmental Organization of The Ming Dynasty,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 21 (1958), 63.

⁷⁹ [(445,315—418,860) + 364,568]/418,860. There was no explicit record of cancellation of the silver commuted grain.

⁸⁰ The taxation details and data in this paragraph are taken from Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 24.850–1. Please note that, although the core Datong extractions were supposed to be fixed at the commuted grain equivalent target of 481,975 shi from 1524, there were continued tax increases through manipulations of surcharges and commutation rates. For example, in 1555 (five years from the 1550 data point), there was a 17.6 percent tax increase through new transportation surcharges for the tax grain and horse hay (i.e. an increase of 90,568 taels of silver from the 1524 commuted target of 481,975 shi, which was further commuted to a silver equivalent of 513,992.68 taels); see Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 24.850. This increase was mild when compared to other border defense areas’ increase. For example, in the Gansu Defense Area, one military provision target was increased from around 76,900 tales in 1566 to around 175,400 taels in 1585, a 128 percent increase (see Ming Shenzong shilu, 202.1b–2a). In fact, the overall border defense expenditure had never been stagnant throughout the Ming, and there were skyrocketing increases in the late sixteenth to mid-seventeenth century (see the last section and note 125 below). One tael in Ming is approximately 36.9 grams. This is based on the benchmark weight of a silver ingot (yinting 銀鋌) in 1383; see Wang Li, Wang Li guhanyu zidian 王力古漢語字典 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2003), 1815.

⁸¹ Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 7.216–7.

⁸² Ming Xiaozong shilu 明孝宗實錄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), 192.8b–9b; which also shows tax increases in other categories in provinces like Zhejiang, Yunnan, etc.

⁸³ Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 7.217–9. Please note that the Summer and Autumn Tax number was the collection target and the registered headcount was the population in the government's fiscal records, and probably not the actual population. The Summer and Autumn Tax target and registered headcount used here and in the following paragraph were fiscal figures from the same government fiscal publication, which was meticulously compiled by the Ministry of Revenue with an objective of strengthening fiscal control. In other words, they were numbers over which the government believed they could exercise fiscal control. Also, unlike the southern regions, the registered headcount in the north probably did not deviate greatly from the actual population in the sixteenth century; see Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 2443; Fan Weicheng樊維城 and Hu Zhenheng 胡震亨, “(Tianqi) Haiyanxian tujing” (天啟) 海鹽縣圖經, in Siku quanmu congshu 四庫全書存目叢書 (Tainan Xian Liuying Xiang: Zhuangyan Wenhua Shiye Youxian Gongsi, 1996), vol. 208, 5.3a–b. Therefore, they are consistently used here, instead of mixing historical fiscal figures with modern day proxies, to obtain a rough understanding of the then fiscal capacity and extraction burden using the methodology of Capital and Ideology.

⁸⁴ 2,314,802.6/5,319,359 = 0.44. It must be emphasized that this and the following calculations on unitizing tax liabilities per registered headcount are only hypothetical attempts to understand the reasonableness of this book's using its methodology. The taxation realities in the Ming were a lot more complex than and different from our modern conception. For example, the unitized liabilities called “tax rates” in the Ming are different from our modern day tax rates, and tax burden analyses based on the modern conception of tax rate could lead to erroneous conclusions. First of all, tax liabilities in the Ming were not assessed by applying a set of universally promulgated extraction percentages on production outcome. It was, in a way, a reverse process, and was very location or scope specific. The desired extraction targets were usually set first, and then unitized within a specific scope. So, the setting of “tax rates” in the Ming was the outcome of extraction targets distributed to a particular scope of liabilities distribution and then unitized per assessment unit (e.g. per mu of registered taxable land) within that scope. The unitization could involve considerations of historical precedents and negotiations with the local power groups in the scope. However, regardless of the precedents and negotiations, it was of paramount importance that the overall desired extraction targets within that scope were met. As the desired extraction target was not dependent on production outcome, the risks of revenue variability (e.g. crop failure, flood, etc.) were transferred to the taxpayers. For example, in case of a flood, even if there was a benevolent waiver of the tax liabilities distributed to the flooded area, the waived liabilities could still be redistributed to another scope (such as another xian 縣) which was not subject to the flood damage (see Ming Shenzong shilu, 6.8b–9a). To further complicate matters, taxpayers were liable for joint and several liabilities and there was a passed up hierarchy of the liabilities distribution scopes (e.g. passed up from li 里 or tu 圖, to du 都, and then to xian 縣) for distribution of the extraction targets and redistribution of any collection shortfalls. Also, Summer and Autumn Tax was not the only extraction target for distribution (please see further examples on other extractions below). Collection shortfalls could be redistributed across the liabilities distribution scopes within a passed up hierarchy, with an attempt to meet the overall targets. Therefore, it could be very misleading to draw a conclusion on high or low tax burden or inequalities by simply comparing hypothetical unitized liabilities, or average “tax rates” with a hypothetical subsistence national income, without considering the scopes of liabilities distribution and redistribution (e.g. the “spilled over” from other scopes). It was entirely possible that the final liabilities in certain scopes after repeated redistributions could be crippling and beyond the people's subsistence limit, while the liabilities distributed/redistributed across other scopes could be less onerous, and averaging could mask extreme inequalities. There were indeed serious inequalities in terms of ruinous tax liability redistribution, which impacted property inequalities. Therefore, it is hard for generalized low tax conclusions to be convincing without the support of detailed scoping analyses. Liability redistribution and scoping are complex and much neglected topics among Ming taxation studies, for case examples and details on liability redistribution and scoping, see Leung Waiming, “Redistribution Arenas: Taxation, Property Rights and Elites Competition in Sixteenth Century China Shangyu” (PhD diss. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2019), 218–467.

⁸⁵ Based on Capital and Ideology's cited source of Sng and Moriguchi, Asia's Little Divergence, 3n4, the annual subsistence consumption per capita is assumed to be 345 liters of grain. Since 1 shi is about 107.4 liters (this Ming shi to liter conversion ratio is based on Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), xiv), the annual subsistence consumption per capita in terms of shi is thus around 3.2 shi (345 liters/107.4 liters). For a 0.44 shi of per registered headcount tax target, the extraction in terms of subsistence national income is thus at around 13.8 percent (0.44 shi /3.2 shi).

⁸⁶ Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 1.11–16, assuming the same subsistence national income proxy of 3.2 shi per registered headcount.

⁸⁷ As explained in notes 83 and 84, because of the differences in the practices of tax liability distribution/redistribution, the registered headcount in the south probably deviated more from the actual population than it did in the north. Registered headcount in the south was evolving into a basis on which the government distributed/redistributed tax liabilities interchangeably with land in the late sixteenth century. Also, there were certainly off-register headcounts. If we spread the same tax revenue target across a population including all those off-register headcounts, the hypothetical per capita tax burden will certainly be lower. It is in a way analogous to the situation of today's working population who are outside of the tax net and official population (e.g. illegal immigrants, illegal workers on visitor visas, etc.). It is arguable whether we should exclude the “dilution effect” of those “tax free” people when we assess a country's tax burden. However, the 1578 registered headcount from the official fiscal record did represent the extraction scope which the government exercised fiscal control over, and from which the government understood the then extraction burden. So, it is used here as a starting point for scenario analyses to gauge the reasonableness of this book's conclusion about the extraction level at “1–2 percent” of national income.

⁸⁸ For example, Ge Jianxiong 葛劍雄 estimates a population of 160–197 million in 1600 (see Ge Jianxiong, Yizhao simin 億兆斯民 (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin, 2014), 434–35); He Bingdi's 何炳棣 estimate is 130–150 million in 1600; see He Bingdi, Mingchu yijiang renkou jiqi xiangguan wenti 明初以降人口及其相關問題 (1368–1953) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2017), 312. Cao Shuji's 曹樹基 estimates are 192 million in 1630 and 152 million in 1644; see Cao Shuji, Zhongguo renkou shi 中國人口史 (Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe, 2000), 451–52.

⁸⁹ For example, the royal supply vaults had their own extraction targets. The extraction orders could be regular or ad hoc and the amount was not fixed, especially in the early to mid-Ming. One extraction item was the order for wax. In the early Jiajing period (1522–1566), the targets were at 85,000 catties of yellow wax and 4000 catties of white wax. By the end of the Jiajing period, the yellow wax extraction was increased to more than 200,000 catties (an increase of over 135 percent) and white wax was increased to over 100,000 catties (an increase of over 2400 percent); see She Jideng 佘繼登, Diangu jiwen 典故紀聞 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1997), 18.324. There were also other notoriously heavy extractions from the royal supplies vaults, such as the weaving and porcelain orders; for example, see Wang Dewan, “Ji caiyongguijie zhiyuan zhuo yingzao huanji zhiwu yiguangshengde yijishijian shu” 稽財用匱竭之源酌營造緩急之務以光聖德以濟時艱疏, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 444.43-45; Ming Shenzong shilu, 156.6a, 434.10a; Zhang, Ming shi, 78.1907 (on the weaving orders exceeding the fiscal target by several times), and 235.6132 (on the weaving expenditure reached a height of over 2,700,000 taels of silver). The supply vaults could also impose their own surcharges. For example, in the sixteenth century, the vault for wooden fuel and charcoal had a 15 percent surcharge on the submitted wooden fuel and a 10 percent surcharge on the submitted charcoal; see Ming Shenzong shilu, 207.2a. Many location-specific extraction items can be found in the shihuo 食貨 chapters of the various local gazetteers; for example, see Wang Shangning 汪尚寧, “(Jiajing) Huizhou fuzhi” (嘉靖) 徽州府志, in Beijing tushuguan guji zhenben congkan 北京圖書館古籍珍本叢刊 (Beijing: Shumu Wenxian, 1988), vol. 29, 8.185–194, for the supply orders from the Ministry of Revenue in Nanjing and Beijing, Ministry of Works and Ministry of Rites in the case of Huizhou. See The History Department of The Chinese University of Hong Kong ed., Shandong jingkuai lu 山東經會錄 (Jinan: Qilu Shushe, 2017), passim, for items in Shandong.

⁹⁰ Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 1.11–16.

⁹¹ Zhang, Ming shi, 182.4841–2. Please note that this observation was well before the substantial nation-wide land tax increases in the early to mid-seventeenth century. There was also an observation of a roughly 40 percent land tax for the registered land owners in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth century in the Suzhou and Songjiang areas; see Xu Guangqi 徐光啟, Nongzheng quanshu jiaozhu 農政全書校注 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji, 1979), 15.359.

⁹² Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 7.217–8.

⁹³ Ming Yingzong shilu 明英宗實錄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), 55.3a; Zhang, Ming shi, 182.4842.

⁹⁴ Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 1313.

⁹⁵ Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 574.

⁹⁶ Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, “Qianliang lunxia” 錢糧論下, in Gu Tinglin Shiwen Ji 顧亭林詩文集 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2008), 1.19; Gu, Rizhilu jishi, 659.

⁹⁷ Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 574. The net regular tax target reduction was recorded in the book as 966 shi instead of 962 shi. The small difference is probably due to an arithmetic or transcription error.

⁹⁸ Zhu Guozhen 朱國禎, Yongchuang xiaopin 涌幢小品 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1959), 2.41–2, Ming Shenzong shilu, 437.4b, Ming Xizong shilu 明熹宗實錄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), 81.29b. The increase in the horse provision target was also substantial; for example, in 1490 the horse reserve target was about 10,000 horses; this extraction target was continuously increased; and in 1515, despite some reduction, the target was still at the level of 25,000 horses (i.e. 150 percent increase compared to 1490), see Xie Ruyi 謝汝儀, “Jiupianbi yiyu mazhengshi” 救偏弊以裕馬政事, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 168.405.

⁹⁹ Zhang, Ming shi, 79.1928.

¹⁰⁰ Zhang, Ming shi, 182.4842.

¹⁰¹ Shen and Zhao, Da Ming huidian, vol. 792, 207.444.

¹⁰² See Shen and Zhao, Da Ming huidian, vol. 792, 189.274, for the 1562 craftsmen extraction target; also see pp.188–89, 268–92 for craftsmen extraction details, and pp.190, 293–98 for materials extraction details. For more detailed rules and items extracted by the four major units sisi 四司 under Ministry of Works, see He Shijin 何士晉, “Gongbu changku xuzhi” 工部廠庫須知, in Beijing tushuguan guji zhenben congkan 北京圖書館古籍珍本叢刊 (Beijing: Shumu Wenxian Chubanshe, 1987), vol. 47, 311–703; for an overview of the fiscal related functions of the Ministry of Works, see Sun Chengze 孫承澤, Chunming mengyu lu 春明夢餘錄 (Beijing: Beijing Guji Chubanshe, 1992), 46.961–1004.

¹⁰³ Chongzhen changbian 崇禎長編 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), “Ming Shilu,” Appendix 4, 2.23. Please note that this was just the official expenditure and did not include many indirect extractions. For example, during the mausoleum construction for the Wanli Emperor, there were onerous indirect extractions through government procurement at unfair prices. As a result, many suppliers had to abandon their homes and became monks; see Ming Shenzong shiliu, 207.1b–2a. It must also be noted that the figures cited were for construction only and did not include ongoing maintenance, which could be substantial. For example, in 1593, the repair of the mausoleum of Emperor Hongxi 洪熙 (who only reigned for one year, in 1425) had a budget of 40,000 taels of silver; see He Zhongshi, 賀仲軾, “Lianggong dingjianji” 兩宮鼎建記, in Congshu jicheng chubian 叢書集成初編 (Changsha: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1937), xia.18. In about 1603, heavy rain damaged at least six mausoleums. Repair projects had been ongoing for six years with no known end date. Up to 1609, over 70,000 taels of silver had been spent on repairing just one of the mausoleums; see Ming Shenzong shiliu, 461.5b.

¹⁰⁴ For example, in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth century, there were on average over 23,000 registered nobility, see Wang Shizhen 王世貞, Yanshantang bieji 弇山堂別集 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985), 1.6–9. Given the large number of registered nobility, their total mausoleum construction expenditure was not negligible. For example, in 1594, the mausoleum construction budget for a princess or her husband was supposed to be about 14,000 taels of silver, and this amount was increased to 24,000 taels (over 70 percent increase); see He, “Lianggong dingjianji,” xia.19.

¹⁰⁵ Ming Wuzong shilu 明武宗實錄 (Taibei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiu Suo, n.d.), 119.1a, 4b. The extraction was mild when compared to the extractions for palace construction when the capital was moved to Beijing in the early Ming; see Zou Ji 鄒緝, “Fengtiandian zaishu” 奉天殿災疏, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 21.257–58.

¹⁰⁶ Wang Shixing 王士性, Guang zhi yi 廣志繹 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), 46. As a more specific example, for the repair project initiated in 1557, an additional silver levy in the amount of 1,000,000 taels was imposed, and in this project about 20,000 people were drafted for twenty-eight days in the Shuntian Prefecture 順天府 and nearby areas to move a large piece of stone into the palace; see He, “Lianggong dingjianji”, shang.1–2. For those households distributed with the actual repair supplies obligations, the liabilities were so onerous that some simply abandoned their homes and fled; see an example in He, “Lianggong dingjianji”, xia.25. As another perspective, the palace projects cost over 20,000,000 taels of silver in the early sixteenth century, and during the Jiajing period, the cost was about 6,000,000–7,000,000 taels of silver before 1536 and was increased by over ten times in the rest of the period; the expenditure in the Wanli period similarly exceeded the fiscal targets by several times; see Zhang, Ming shi, 78.1907.

¹⁰⁷ Ming Shenzong shilu, 344.10b.

¹⁰⁸ Ming Shenzong shilu, 347.10b.

¹⁰⁹ Ming Shenzong shilu, 415.10b.

¹¹⁰ Zhang, Ming shi, 226.5938–9; Xie Zhaozhi 謝肇淛, Wu zazu 五雜組 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1959), 10.278. The death rate in Sichuan could be over 100,000 people per supply order; and the supposed procurement reimbursement, if any, was very limited. It was essentially additional extraction; see Wang, “Sichuan yichang kunku qiciteen yijiudaoxuanshu,” 444.35–37, and Wang, “Ji caiyongguijie zhiyuan zhuo yingzao huanji zhiwu yiguangshengde yijishijian shu,” 444.44–45.

¹¹¹ Huang Tinggui 黃廷桂, et al., Sichuan tongzhi 四川通志, in Wenyuange siku quanshu, vol. 559, 16 shang.655–56.

¹¹² Zhang, Ming shi, 182.4842. As a more specific example, the construction of one princely residence in Sichuan required 7,960 people (see Ming Taizu shilu, 177.5a); and the cost of one repair project of this residence was estimated at 700,000 taels of silver (see Zhang, Ming shi, 288.7400).

¹¹³ Zhao Shiqing 趙世卿, “Ti guoyong guifa youyou shu” 題國用匱乏有由疏, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 411.315–6. The 8,000,000 taels were probably only the expenditure that had to be funded by the Ministry of Revenue. The total military expenditure for the three military campaigns could be up to 12,000,000 taels of silver, and taxes were increased by distributing the desired extraction across the taxable land; see Zhang, Ming shi, 78.1903, 235.6132 and 305.7805.

¹¹⁴ See Zhang, Ming shi, 220.5805–6; and Cha Jizuo 查繼佐, Zui wei lu 罪惟錄 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji Chubanshe, 1986), 2110. The total marriage and crowning expenses for all Wanli Emperor's sons were around 9,340,000 taels of silver; see Zhang, Ming shi, 235.6132. These were not isolated examples, there were similar special funding requests in other Ming periods; for example, there was a 400,000 taels of silver request to Ministry of Revenue in the Zhengde period (1506–1521) for covering the royal wedding ceremony's expenses; see Ming Wuzong shilu, 15.18b.

¹¹⁵ Pan Huang 潘潢, “Hongyuanlü zeshixiao yi jifuqiang shu” 弘遠慮責實效以濟富強疏, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 199.62. The four fiscal control figures were also stated by Pan Huang in his memorial. In fact, for the six to seven years after 1550, Taicang's nominally stable annual revenue target (around 2,000,000 taels of silver) could only cover less than half of the annual funding needs. The deficit was covered by inter-vaults borrowing, covert tax increases such as the tibian junyao explained above, commuting service obligations to silver, etc.; see Ming Shizong shilu, 456.3b–4a. Taicang's deficit was eventually extracted from the people; see Pan Huang 潘潢, “Huiyi diyi shu” 會議第一疏, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 198.32. Please also note that, under the complicated cash basis accounting, Taicang's “actual expenditure” could include prepayments rather than actually incurred expenditure, especially for the border defense's military expenditure; for examples, see Ming Shenzong shilu, 71.11a (for prepayment of 50 percent of the 1578 border defense expenditure target in the first lunar month of 1578), and 218.8b–9a (for prepayment of the first six lunar months of the 1590 border defense expenditure target in the twelfth lunar month of 1589).

¹¹⁶ See Ming Shenzong shilu, 574.11b (for the 1618 increase), 589.10a (for the 1619 increase), and 592.6a (for the 1620 increase). The order of magnitude of the 1620 increase could be approximated by applying the 0.002 taels of silver per mu tax target increase to the registered taxable land area in 1578 (i.e. about 701,397,628 mu, see Zhang, “Wanli kuaijilu,” 1.13) as per Ming Shenzong shilu, 574.11b and 592.6a. See also Zhang, Ming shi, 220.5807 for the total tax target increase of 5,200,000 taels of silver in 1618–1620. Please note that there are discrepancies in the exact tax target increase numbers between Ming Shenzong shilu and Ming shi, but their orders of magnitude are similar. There were also very substantial tax target increases in 1630, 1635, 1637, and 1639, and the total tax target increase in 1618–1639 amounted to over 20,000,000 taels of silver; see Zhang, Ming shi, 78.1903–4. These are examples of more significant tax target increases, and there were also other relatively smaller increases in the regular tax targets after 1550. For example, in 1587, the actual Autumn Tax target in Guangxi province was increased by about 15 percent (i.e. from around 369,202 shi to 424,889 shi); see Ming Shenzong shilu, 186.6a.

¹¹⁷ The nominal land transfer normally happened during the year of Yellow Register compilation (i.e. Huangce dazao zhinian 黃冊大造之年), which was supposed to be a regular household account and property update exercise conducted every ten years. There were many ways to profit from the tax avoidance arrangement, for example, the person who accepted the liability transfer could resell the liabilities to a third party, and the third party could simply vanish or just refuse to pay the tax (e.g. if the third party was one of those powerful local elites (shihao zhijia 勢豪之家) who became tax consolidators (lannahu 攬納戶)); see Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 3073.

¹¹⁸ Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 3120.

¹¹⁹ Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 3072 and 3074.

¹²⁰ The above details are from Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 3074–75 and 3081. The land owned by the monks was notorious for its dubious origins and the monks were actively involved in various tax avoidance arrangements, about 30–40 percent of the taxable land in Nanjing and Longxi County were registered under the monks; see Gu, Tianxia junguo libing shu, 3074 and 3081. These examples might seem extreme, but affordability and subsistence impact were not necessarily the officials’ primary consideration when imposing new extractions, especially those related to material supplies and service obligations; for example, see He Tang 何瑭, “Mincai kongxu zhibiyi” 民財空虛之弊議, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 144.128.

¹²¹ On land disposal, in addition to the previous examples of land “parking” tax avoidance schemes, there were also people who simply abandoned their land to avoid tax redistribution; for example, see the Minister of Revenue's observations in 1567, in Ming Muzong shilu, 7.13a, and She, Diangu jiwen, 18.325. Incidentally, the grandfather of Ming's founding emperor had also to abandon his land and run away to avoid the ruinous tax liabilities, see Lang Ying 郎瑛, Qixiu leigao 七修類稿 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, 2001), 75, and Lin Shidui 林時對, Hezha congtan 荷牐叢談 (Taibei: Taiwan Yinhang, 1962), 1.10. For explanations of tax liability redistribution and scoping, see note 84 above.

¹²² On the fiscal state history scholarships, for the western countries, see the various essays in Richard Bonney ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, Patrick K. O'Brien and Franciso Comín Comín ed., The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History 1500–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Andrew Monson and Walter Scheidel ed., Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). For Song China, see William Guanglin Liu, “The Making of a Fiscal State in Song China, 960–1279,” Economic History Review, 68.1 (2015), 48–78; Kent Deng, Demystifying growth and development in North Song China, 960–1127, Working Papers No.178/13, June 2013, Department of Economic History, London School of Economics; and Kent Deng, “Imperial China under the Song and late Qing,” in Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States, 321-26; which argue that to meet the threats and demands of the nomads, Song had to strengthen its tax capacity and promote industry and commerce; the Song state pioneered and architected many financial innovations, and as a result, had sustained prosperity (i.e. not modern economic growth). Deng, “Imperial China under the Song and late Qing” also covers Qing, and please note that the 8 percent low tax burden conclusion on p. 316 (i.e. “the Qing per capita tax burden in 1766 was merely 8 percent of the 1381 level under Ming rule (1368–1644)”) seems to be an underestimation: the 8 percent was probably calculated by taking only the average per capita in-kind grain tax (i.e. 3.96 shi in 1766/ 49.27 shi in 1381 = 8%) from the secondary source of Liang Fangzhong 梁方仲, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji 中國歷代戶口田地田賦統計 (Shanghai: Renmin Chuban She, 1980), 428, and the substantial 1766 silver land tax in the amount of 29,917,761 taels of silver on p. 428 was not included in the calculation. For other Ming and Qing fiscal state scholarships arguing for low taxation leading to weak state capacity and then the absence of modern economic growth, for example, see Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), which argues that China's low taxation and weak state capacity prevented it from developing growth inducing institutions and attributes Ming's demise to low taxation. His argument is further developed in Ray Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration,” in The Cambridge History of China, v. 8, The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, pt. 2, edited by Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 107, 113; Huang Renyu黃仁宇, “Zhongguo jindaishi di chulu” 中國近代史的出路, in Da Lishi Buhui Weisuo 大歷史不會萎縮 (Taipei: Lianjing, 2004), 103, 105-106; and Huang Renyu黃仁宇, “Ming Taizong Shilu zhong di nianzhong tongji” 明太宗實錄中的年終統計, in Fangkuan lishi di shijie 放寬歷史的視界 (Beijing: Joint Publishing Company, 2007), 65. There are also studies which take for granted the persistently low and stagnant taxation argument and attempt to explain it. For example, see Debin Ma, “State Capacity and Great Dvergence, the Case of Qing China (1644–1911),” Eurasian Geography and Economics 54.5–6 (2014), 484–499, which argues that China had a different economic development trajectory from Western Europe because it had to keep its taxes low, and China had to levy low taxes because its size and the centralized political structure caused information asymmetry and incentives misalignment problems. Similar explanations of China's different economic development trajectory because of low taxes and with fundamental causes attributed to the size of China, information asymmetry problems, etc. are also posited by Sng, T.H., “Size and dynastic decline: the principal-agent problem in late imperial China, 1700-1850,” Explorations in Economic History 54 (2014) 107–127CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Sng, Tuan-Hwee and Moriguchi, Chiaki, “Asia's Little Dvergence: State Capacity in China and Japan before 1850,” Journal of Economic Growth, 19.4 (2014), 439–470CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹²³ Sun, Chunming mengyu lu, 574. The increase was over 700 percent from the late fifteenth century to the late sixteenth; see Zhang, Ming shi, 235.6132, and Ming Shenzong shilu, 186.7a.

¹²⁴ Sun, Chunming mengyu lu, 573. The Emperor Xizong also questioned the lack of soldiers despite transferring millions of taels of silver from the royal vaults to the border defense forces, see Ming Xizong shilu, 15.20a. The failure was attributed by some to the soldiers’ recruitment system, which attracted fraudsters and people without incentive to fight, instead of a conscription system based on household registers, for example, see Chongzhen changbian, 35.36–39.

¹²⁵ Ni Yuanlu 倪元璐, “Ni Wenzhen zoushu” 倪文貞奏疏, in Wenyuange siku quanshu, vol. 1297, 8.19b–20a.

¹²⁶ See Ma, Wenxian tongkao, Kao, 7. The idea and argument in this paragraph are developed from Leung, “Redistribution Arenas,” 512–17.

¹²⁷ See Zhang Juzheng 張居正, “Da hecao Wangjingsuo” 答河漕王敬所, in Zhang Wenzhong Gong quanji 張文忠公全集 (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshu Guan, 1935), vol. 4, 313. In 1577, the royal supply vault was so excessively stocked with the extracted rice that the rice was left to rot; see Ming Shenzong shilu, 68.4a; and in 1583 to 1584, the main granary in Beijing had a large grain stock surplus which could cover seven to nine years’ needs; see Ming Shenzong shilu, 144.4a, and 156.5b.

¹²⁸ It was not an exception. There were other periods of strong fiscal capacity or high extractions without modern economic growth; the early Ming was another example; see Zhang, Ming shi, 78.1895, and Ming Taizu shilu, 110.8b.

¹²⁹ See Zhang, “Chen liushi shu” 陳六事疏, in Zhang Wenzhong Gong quanji, vol. 1, 6, for Zhang's conception mentioned in his policy recommendation to the emperor.

¹³⁰ See Zhang, Ming shi, 220.5804 for Zhao Shiqing's view, and p. 5942 for Lü Kun's view; and Pan Huang, “Hongyuanlü zeshixiao yi jifuqiang shu” 弘遠慮責實效以濟富強疏, in Chen, Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, 199.62, for Pan Huang's view; see also the idea in He, “Mincai kongxu zhibiyi,” 144.126, that it was more important for the wealth to be with the people than the state. The idea and argument in this and the following paragraph are developed from Leung, “Redistribution Arenas,” 214.

¹³¹ See Sun, Chunming mengyu lu, 992, and Gu, Rizhilu jishi, 700, respectively. In fact, under normal circumstances, the fiscal principle of keeping the wealth among the people instead of revenue maximization by the state (cangfu yumin erbu cangfu yuguo 藏富於民, 而不藏富於國) was a common belief among policy makers, for examples, see Ming Taizu shilu, 34.3b and 176.3a, Ming Shizong shilu, 239.2b, Ming Muzong shilu, 42.19b-20a, Ming Shenzong shilu, 301.4b, and Zhang, Ming shi, 79.1929.

¹³² Huang Huai 黃淮 and Yang Shiqi 楊士奇, Lidai mingchen zouyi 歷代名臣奏議 (Taibei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1985), 264.24a.