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The Anglo-French Compromise on Arms Limitation, 1928*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2014

David Carlton
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Extract

The British General Election of May 1929 was a disaster for Stanley Baldwin's Government. The Conservatives lost 155 seats in all and in consequence became the second largest party in the House of Commons for the first time since the General Election of December 1910. The formation of a Labour Government appeared to be so unavoidable that the Prime Minister did not even wait to meet Parliament but resigned office at once, advising King George V to send for Ramsay MacDonald.

In attempting to explain this Conservative failure, historians have tended to stress the persistence of the unemployment problem and the alleged folly of Baldwin in choosing “Safety First” as his campaign slogan. Even a cursory examination of the Government's record during 1927 and 1928, however, lends support to the suspicion that a succession of controversial decisions in the field of foreign affairs may also have contributed, albeit marginally, to the magnitude of the Conservative failure in 1929. Certainly more than one well-wisher thought it necessary to warn the Conservative cabinet that its conduct of foreign policy — and especially those aspects relating to international disarmament negotiations — might have significant electoral implications. For example, on October 12, 1928, the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir William Tyrrell, wrote to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Lord Cushendun:

I think this question [disarmament] is going to play a great part next year in the coming election and I feel convinced that if you succeed in persuading the country that you have already done a great deal to promote disarmament and have a settled policy with regard to it you will defeat both Ramsay MacDonald and Lloyd George.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of British Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , May 1969 , pp. 141 - 162
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1969

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Footnotes

*

Extracts from Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of the Controller of H. M. Stationery Office. The following kindly gave consent for the reproduction of copyright material for which they have responsibility: Francis Noel-Baker, M.P., Lord Hankey, Professor Ann Lambton, Colonel Terence Maxwell, the Librarian of the University of Birmingham, and the Trustees of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. D. C.

References

1. PRO, Sir William Tyrrell to Lord Cushendun, Oct. 12, 1928, Cushendun Papers, FO 800/228.

2. PRO, Cabinet Paper by Cushendun, June 16, 1928, Cab. 24/195, 189(28). For a second memorandum containing more detailed criticism of William Bridgeman's approach, see PRO, ibid., 191(28).

3. See Carlton, David, “Great Britain and the League Council Crisis of 1926,” Historical Journal, XI (1968), 354–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. See Roskill, Stephen, Naval Policy between the Wars, I, The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London, 1968), 498–516Google Scholar; Carlton, David, “Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927,” P.S.Q., LXXXIII (1968), 573–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. The third session of the Preparatory Commission was of exceptional significance, since it marked the first attempt to draw up a comprehensive draft convention. For details of its proceedings see Toynbee, Arnold J., Survey of International Affairs, 1927 (London, 1929), pp. 11–20Google Scholar.

6. For details see PRO, memos. by Alexander Cadogan, Jan. 31, May 1, 1928, FO 411/7, Nos. 13, 18.

7. See Johnson, Douglas, “Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Agreements,” University of Birmingham Historical Journal, VIII (1961), 71–73Google Scholar; Carlton, David, “Disarmament with Guarantees: Lord Cecil 1922-1927,” Disarmament and Arms Control, III (1965), 156–57Google Scholar.

8. PRO, Cabinet Paper by Sir Austen Chamberlain, Mar. 10, 1928, Cab. 24/193, 81(28). Printed in Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), No. 10, Parliamentary Papers, XXIII.

9. PRO, Cabinet Paper by Chamberlain, Mar. 10, 1928, Cab. 24/193, 81(28). Both sentences quoted here were expurgated from the record later published in Cmd. 3211 (1928-29). No indication was given that the version was incomplete.

10. PRO, Cabinet Paper by Chamberlain, Mar. 10, 1928, Cab. 24/193, 81(28). Not printed in Cmd. 3211 (1928-29). The British Admiralty's proposals were essentially in line with those pressed by Great Britain and the United States at the Preparatory Commission in the spring of 1927, namely, limitation of all sizeable naval vessels in the following five classes:

1. Capital ships

2. Aircraft carriers

3. Cruisers between 10,000 and 7,000 tons

4. Surface vessels under 7,000 tons

5. Submarines, in two classes, if this could be arranged.

In a minor concession to the French desire for flexibility, the Admiralty also proposed that “states would be allowed to transfer tonnage from a higher to a lower category in all classes, excluding 1 and 2, subject to there being a limit to the proportion of total tonnage which might be utilised for submarines.” PRO, memo, by Cadogan, May 1, 1928, FO 411/7, No. 18.

11. PRO, Cabinet Paper by Chamberlain, Mar. 10, 1928, Cab. 24/193, 81(28). Not printed in Cmd. 3211 (1928-29).

12. Ibid.

13. PRO, Chamberlain (Geneva) to Foreign Office (tel.), June 3, 1928, reproduced in Cabinet Paper, June 18, 1928, Cab. 24/195, 192(28).

14. PRO, Foreign Office to Chamberlain (Geneva) (tel.), June 5, 1928, reproduced in ibid.

15. Ibid. In a conversation with Chamberlain on 9 June, Joseph Paul-Boncour confirmed that the French did indeed wish distance to overseas possessions to be the basis for estimating cruiser strength. See PRO, Cabinet Paper by Chamberlain, June 9, 1928, Cab. 24/195, 184(28).

16. PRO, Conclusions of Meetings of the Cabinet (hereafter cited as Cabinet Minutes), June 6, 1928, Cab. 23/58, 31(6)1. Bridgeman's memorandum is given in full in PRO, Cabinet Paper, May 11, 1928, Cab. 24/195, 190(28).

17. University of Birmingham, Sir Maurice Hankey to Chamberlain, June 7, 1928, Austen Chamberlain Papers.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. PRO, Cabinet Minutes, June 6, 1928, Cab. 23/58, 31(6)1.

21. National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, Howard Kelly, “Memoirs” (unpublished manuscript), MS 53/001, KEL 6, pp. 42-43.

22. Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), No. 16.

23. Nat. Mar. Mus., Kelly, “Memoirs,” MS 53/001, KEL 6, p. 44.

24. Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), No. 18.

25. Ibid., No. 19.

26. The origins of this rumour lay in a conversation on Mar. 15 between Kelly and a French admiral. According to Cadogan of the British Foreign Office, “the French admiral thought that there was little separating the French from the Americans, and that an agreement with the latter was quite possible.” PRO, memo, by Cadogan, May 1, 1928, FO 411/7, No. 18. This possibility was evidently considered by the cabinet Disarmament Committee chaired by Lord Salisbury. Chamberlain's subsequent recollection was that he “understood the committee to hold that as it was impossible to find any scheme on which all four Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States) could agree it was better to have one friend and so be two against two rather than find ourselves confronted by the other three, and very possibly Japan also, and thus have thrown upon us the odium of a breakdown.” PRO, Chamberlain (Geneva) to Foreign Office (tel.), June 7, 1928, reproduced in Cabinet Paper, June 18, 1928, Cab. 24/195, 192(28). For further evidence that ministers were conscious of the danger of a Franco-American deal, see PRO, Cabinet Paper by Salisbury, June 18, 1928, ibid., 193(28). This Cabinet Paper, though inaccurately cited, is admirably summarized in Roskill, , Naval Policy, I, 545–46Google Scholar.

27. 220 H. C. Deb. 1837 (July 30, 1928). Of this event Hankey wrote: “I am told that Austen Chamberlain has publicly expressed regret for this mistake, which he made when on the brink of his illness. I believe he was pressed rather hard in the Debate by the Labour Party; at any rate it seems certain that he did not consult many, if any, of his colleagues on the subject.” BM, Hankey to Earl Balfour, Oct. 25, 1928, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49705. Kelly subsequently stated categorically that Chamberlain's remarks were made “without any reference to the Admiralty.” With little plausibility he also maintained that American and Italian agreement to the Anglo-French compromise could have been obtained if private soundings had taken place before Chamberlain “made the air blue with flames.” He further claimed “that quite a short time afterwards the American admiral on the League told me they certainly would have accepted the proposal if it had been put forward in the proper way.” Nat. Mar. Mus., Kelly, “Memoirs,” MS 53/001, KEL 6, pp. 45, 47.

28. 220 H. C. Deb. 1838 (July 30, 1928).

29. For the text of Chamberlain's telegrams of July 30 to Washington, Tokyo, and Rome, see Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), No. 20. The despatch of these telegrams was authorized by the cabinet on July 24. In the official record of the proceedings, no reference was made to the question of trained reservists; hence it is not possible to state with certainty whether or not the cabinet as a whole intended that this aspect of the Anglo-French accord should be concealed from the other principal naval powers. PRO, Cabinet Minutes, July 24, 1928, Cab. 23/58, 41(28)7.

30. Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), No. 22.

31. Ibid., No. 23. Chamberlain's claim that “the text of the compromise itself refers exclusively to naval limitation” was presumably a feeble attempt to explain his act of suppressio veri in the House of Commons. Actually the concession on trained reservists had been explicitly included in the terms offered by the French in their final note of July 20, 1928. The French proposals had been accepted by the British in toto four days later. See ibid., Nos. 18, 19.

32. Ray Atherton to Frank Kellogg (paraphrase), Aug. 4, 1928, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, I (Washington, 1942), 272–73Google Scholar (hereafter cited as F.R.U.S.).

33. PRO, memo, by R. L. Craigie, Aug. 7, 1928, Cushendun Papers, FO 800/228. This memorandum was endorsed with the pencilled comment, “Seen by Lord Cushendun.”

34. Atherton to Kellogg, Aug. 10, 1928, in F.R.U.S., 1928, I, 273-75. Cushendun's account of the meeting contains no indication that he had said that “he did not feel any agreement had been reached” on trained reservists. PRO, Cushendun to Henry Chilton (Washington), Aug. 10, 1928, FO 411/8, No. 8.

35. The United States Government received a completely frank account of the agreement regarding trained reservists only on Sep. 21. This followed leakages in the press, an expression of irritation at British secretiveness by American diplomat William Castle, and the receipt by Cushendun of an implied rebuke for inconsistency from Chilton. See PRO, Chilton to Cushendun, Sep. 16, 20, Cushendun to Chilton, Sep. 21, Ronald Campbell (Washington) to Cushendun, Sep. 21, 1928, ibid., Nos. 15, 17, 18, 19.

36. Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), No. 26.

37. Toynbee, Arnold J., Survey of International Affairs, 1928 (London, 1929), p. 75Google Scholar.

38. Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), Nos. 27, 28.

39. Ibid., No. 29. For details of the process of American decision-making on this question, see Ellis, L. Ethan, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations 1925-1929 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1961), pp. 187–90Google Scholar. See also O'Connor, Raymond G., Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930 (Lawrence, Kan., 1962), p. 21Google Scholar.

40. Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), No. 30.

41. Ibid., No. 31. For accounts of the unfavourable Italian political and press reactions to die Anglo-French accord, see PRO, Ronald Graham to Cushendun, Oct. 12, 19, 26, 1928, FO 411/8, Nos. 32, 35, 36.

42. Toynbee, , Survey, 1928, pp. 75–76Google Scholar. Both Cushendun and Sir Ronald Lindsay had initially hoped to avoid having to take this step. See PRO, Cushendun to Lindsay, Sep. 4, Lindsay to Cushendun, Sep. 8, 1928, Cushendun Papers, FO 800/228.

43. 72 H. L. Deb. 40 (Sep. 6, 1928).

44. Times, Oct. 26, 1928.

45. Toynbee, , Survey, 1928, pp. 78–79Google Scholar. Stanley Baldwin's remarks should be compared with those made by Chamberlain to Aristide Briand on Mar. 9. See unexpurgated record in PRO, Cabinet Paper by Chamberlain, Mar. 10, 1928, Cab. 24/193, 81(28). See above, p. 145. The version in Cmd. 3211 (1928-29), No. 10, conceals the avowedly anti-German character of Chamberlain's approach.

46. Toynbee, , Survey, 1928, p. 79Google Scholar.

47. Times, Sep. 27, 1928; J. L. Garvin quoted by George, David Lloyd, 222 H. C. Deb. 730 (Nov. 13, 1928)Google Scholar.

48. 72 H. L. Deb. 62 (Nov. 7, 1928).

49. 222 H. C. Deb. 731 (Nov. 13, 1928). In point of fact it was not British policy at the Washington Conference to favour “a definite limitation of naval craft, great and small.” In a letter written to Balfour six days after this speech was made, Hankey recalled the actual policy of the British Government at the time of Washington: “Your original Instructions, drawn up by the Committee of Imperial Defence under your Chairmanship, included the following:— ‘As the result of a comprehensive examination of all the available methods of naval disarmament, the Admiralty have come to the conclusion, and have satisfied the Committee, that the only method which is sufficiently simple to be really practicable is an international agreement as to the limitation of Capital Ships.’ When you had come to terms in regard to Capital Ships you had really accomplished your mission. It was part of your objective to avoid discussion of cruisers, if possible, owing to difficulties in which it would have entangled you, which we always foresaw. You had the foresight to keep these questions back from discussion until the French did the work for you.” BM, Hankey to Balfour, Nov. 19, 1928, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49705. Balfour had of course been the principal British delegate at the Washington Conference. The British Prime Minister at the time had been Lloyd George!

50. 222 H. C. Deb. 834 (Nov. 17, 1928).

51. See Carlton, David, “The Foreign Policy of the Second Labour Government, 1929-1931” (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1966)Google Scholar.

52. U. of Birmingham, Cushendun to Chamberlain, May 1, 1928, Austen Chamberlain Papers.

53. Ibid.

54. PRO, Cabinet Paper by Bridgeman, May 11, 1928, Cab. 24/195, 190(28).

55. Nat. Mar. Mus., Kelly, “Memoirs,” MS 53/001, KEL 6, p. 41.

56. U. of Birmingham, Chamberlain to Cushendun, June 9, 1928, Austen Chamberlain Papers.

57. F.R.U.S., 1928, I, 278-79.

58. BM, Viscount Cecil to H. A. St. George Saunders, Nov. 28, 1928, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood Papers, Add. MSS, 51099. It is difficult to appreciate how even S. W. Roskill, though pro-British in general and pro-Admiralty in particular, was able to assert that “in retrospect the Anglo-French compromise certainly seems entirely reasonable; but the big Navy propagandists in the United States chose to use it as a means of spreading mistrust of Britain and France — especially the former.” Roskill, , Naval Policy, I, 60Google Scholar. Roskill's disappointingly short treatment of this subject contains no hint of the fluctuations in Bridgeman's policy. Ibid., I, 545-49.