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Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player I. Two-species haploid or randomly mating diploid

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

R. Cressman  and
A. T. Dash
R. Cressman*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
A. T. Dash*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
*
∗Postal address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1.
∗Postal address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1.
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Abstract

The evolution of strategies in animal contests is examined where the dynamical equation takes into account population growth rates. This leads to a different definition of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) from the usual one. Consequences for independent haploid species are then contrasted with the previous theory. Inheritance patterns for male–female contests with sex-dependent payoffs are considered. In particular, if males and females evolve independently to the same ESS, then so does the diploid species under random mating. Finally, the evolution of diploid populations where strategies are determined at a diallelic locus is investigated.

Keywords

MALE–FEMALE CONTESTSSEMI-DOMINANCE INHERITANCEINTRASPECIFIC COMPETITIONSPAYOFF MATRICESDYNAMICAL EQUATIONSEQUILIBRIUM AND GLOBAL STABILITY
Type
Research Papers
Information
Journal of Applied Probability , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , March 1985 , pp. 1 - 14
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1985 

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Footnotes

Research supported by an RAB grant from the University of Guelph.

References

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