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From Pinstripe Wool to Ripstop Poplin: The US President, Symbolic Politics, and the Salute

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2010

THOMAS JAY NISLEY
THOMAS JAY NISLEY
Affiliation:
Department of International Studies, Southern Polytechnic State University. E-mail: tnisley@spsu.edu
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Abstract

In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan began the tradition of returning military personnel's salutes. At his inauguration, President Barack Obama returned the salutes of the troops as they paraded by the reviewing stand. Some may suggest these actions are simply a sign of respect by Presidents for the service of the military. Nevertheless, we must also understand how Presidents have used military ritual and symbols to enhance their powers. By embracing military symbols, the President is transformed from a civilian to a military figure. This transformation diminishes Congress's ability to exercise its constitutional war power. Congress is less likely to challenge a President perceived as part of the military than one perceived as the civilian chief executive.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of American Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 131 - 144
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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2 I thank JaeSun Riley for his research assistance, and I thank Marc G. Pufong and the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

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