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A Theoretical Framework for Viewing Pollution Problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2015

Max R. Langham
Max R. Langham*
Affiliation:
Agricultural Economics at the University of Florida
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Extract

In the 1960's, we developed a strong public conscience about the environment. The 1970's will reveal a great deal about our ability to better understand and manage the environment in socially acceptable ways. This task will require both theories and measurement techniques to empirically verify them. A welfare theory (based largely on Paretian welfare economics) states that we can say one system is preferable to another if the system makes at least one person better off and no one worse off. Most alternative systems in the real world, including those available to resolve pollution conflicts, do not meet this criterion. A change in the system normally makes someone worse off. Thus, Paretian, or the “new,” welfare economics, is not really useful in making most policy decisions. The problem is compounded, because often we do not know how to measure the real effects of pollution on parties involved in and influenced by pollution. This later problem is aggravated by the fact that we have done very little to systematically record observations on pollution processes.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , December 1971 , pp. 1 - 8
Copyright
Copyright © Southern Agricultural Economics Association 1971

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