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Implications of Integrated Commodity Programs and Crop Insurance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2015

Keith H. Coble  and
Barry J. Barnett
Keith H. Coble
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Mississippi State University, Mississippi State, MS
Barry J. Barnett
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Mississippi State University, Mississippi State, MS
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Abstract

Moving from price-triggered to area revenue–triggered programs was perhaps the most common theme among 2007 farm bill proposals. Area revenue–triggered commodity programs may make farm-level revenue insurance products seem redundant, raising questions about why the federal government should continue both programs. Area revenue–triggered programs would remove much of the systemic risk faced by producers. As a result, private sector insurers may be able to insure the residual risk without federal involvement. This paper examines the effects of moving to area revenue–triggered commodity programs with a focus on public policy issues that would likely arise.

Keywords

commodity programsrevenue insurancesystemic riskD81G22Q18
Type
Invited Paper Sessions
Information
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , August 2008 , pp. 431 - 442
Copyright
Copyright © Southern Agricultural Economics Association 2008

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