The legal systems of the vast majority of the Black African countries can either be reckoned among the common-law family of English origin or the civil-law family in its French version. This is a result of Africa's colonial past; France and England ruled the lion's share of the continent as colonies and gradually transferred their own legal systems to their African possessions. By the time most African territories gained their independence in the sixties, the European legal systems had obtained a firm footing, albeit often still applicable only to a limited extent and in a modified version of the occidental model. After independence, practically all African states maintained the legal system imposed on them by their former colonial masters; since then, they have further developed their laws on the pattern of those legal systems. One effect of this evolving state of affairs, despite all national legal peculiarities, has been a strengthening of the basic adherence of African states to the English or French legal system. On the other hand, it has widened the gap between Anglophone and Francophone countries, at least as far as legal development is concerned. In view of both long-term political goals such as African unity, and also current intra-African relations, such as trade and administrative co-operation between the states, separate legal development in Africa might become a deplorable stumbling block.

This article is concerned with the situation when, at the end of the prosecution or defence case, in a criminal trial, it emerges that the accused is not guilty as charged but that he has certainly committed a criminal offence of a similar type to the offence charged. To take four examples: A is charged with murder, malice aforethought is not proved, yet A has committed manslaughter. Secondly, A is charged with murder or manslaughter and the prosecution fails to prove that the death resulted from A's actions. A has, however, committed the offence of unlawfully doing grievous harm or assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Next, the charge is attempted murder and it fails because the prosecution cannot prove the stringent mental element (an actual, not just constructive, intention to kill), yet A has committed the offence of unlawfully doing grievous harm or of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Finally, A is accused of theft but since the complainant consented to the taking he is again not guilty of the offence charged, but has committed the crime of obtaining by false pretences. This type of situation may arise because the evidence does not go as anticipated by the prosecution, or because the prosecutor trips up over some subtle legal point like the difference between theft and obtaining by false pretences. Without the exceptional principles which form the subject of this article, the upshot would be that (after the expense of a trial) the accused would go free although he had clearly committed a crime.

The problem of abortion is not primarily a problem of law. The law clearly addresses the social practice of abortion, it influences the means of practice and may, at its best, resolve the social consequences of abortion, but the problem of abortion is located in social experience and prevailing social philosophies, rather than in statute books and judicial decisions. Abortion lies at the heart of a number of concerns of particular sensitivity, but it can also have a severe medical and personal impact.

The patent system has been claimed to be one of the ways of facilitating the transfer of technology from the industrialised North to the less developed countries of the South. It is by no means the only way in which this can be done. For one thing, not all technology is patented. Also, quite often before a patented process can be successfully worked there is need for the transfer of unpatented know-how along with the technology covered by the patent. Besides, it is not the patent itself which enables the transfer of the technology; rather, by making the title and exclusive rights of the patentee secure, it emboldens him to transfer his technology to others for commercial exploitation. Nevertheless, the patent is an important factor in the technology transfer process. As one United Nations report has put it:

This paper aims to describe dispute settlement processes among Yeyi, a Bantu-speaking people living in the Okavango Delta, North West Botswana. The account is contemporary and focuses on a single neighbourhood, North Valley, which lies in the floodplains in the northern half of the Delta. North Valley is a small egalitarian community which is encapsulated within a larger administrative and economic order. As part of this larger order, it is subject to a plurality of influences which intrude on it from the outside. Its population is well aware of this larger order and strives to maintain a fair measure of independence from it, particularly from Riverside, the local administrative centre. I aim to show how North Valley people actively negotiate their autonomy in a specific institutional context, that of the neighbourhood moot. I describe how they do this, by borrowing and inverting the formal legal procedures and language of the dominant Tswana culture in an effort to preserve and protect local Yeyi values and interests. Their model for Tswana legal procedures is taken mainly from Riverside where, tempered by modern influences, the local government court operates along traditional Tswana lines. With the aid of case material, I illustrate how North Valley elders adapt Tswana idioms, symbols and legal procedures to suit their local circumstances.

In the Department of Law, University of Malawi, if not also in the chambers of law officers and legal practitioners, the controversy is whether statutes of general application still form part of the sources of law in Malawi. This article will argue (in support of Mr. Haynes and Dr. Wanda) that these statutes are no longer applicable in Malawi; it will argue further that some of these statutes have been adopted nominatim by some independent legislation. Finally, it will suggest that the legislature should intervene in the controversy by making declaratory provisions.

This article attempts to reflect upon the present state of indigenous customary law in South Africa, more particularly as codified in Natal, and to assess the suitability of the system today, as well as its place in the South African legal order. Verloren van Themaat has argued for the retention of indigenous law as follows:

The countries of Southern Africa are facing growing demands for water, mainly generated by the requirements of agricultural and industrial development. An examination of the historical development of the water laws in the region indicates a trend towards increased government control over water rights. The extent to which rights that existed prior to the institution of government control are entrenched in, and protected by, new legislation is particularly worthy of study in respect of underdeveloped countries, where the traditional sector's developmental needs for water may only be recognised at a relatively late date. In the case of Swaziland, a series of broadly riparian water laws, and a primarily irrigated estate-based system of agriculture have led to a markedly unequal distribution of surface-water rights.