After having acquired a prominent place in economic life—and therefore also in the life of law—advertising has begun to draw the attention of both law-maker and legal analyst.

Indeed two fronts are distinguishable which the potential victims of advertising seek to open up against the advertiser—the first by his business competitors and the second by the actual direct and indirect customers. As to the first front, the law has already taken regard of it ever since it took a stand against unfair competition, since advertising is the main instrument to effect some of the different forms of unfair competition (which in Israeli law, following the English pattern, takes the shape of “injurious falsehood” and “passing off”).

In Israel, in the field of the law of personal status, at the center of which stand the laws of marriage, the law is not territorial but personal, and the law applying to an individual changes in accordance with his religious affiliation. Consequently, any discussion of the comprehensive position of Israeli law on the institution of marriage would seem to be impossible, for Israeli law lacks its own, independent regulations on matters of marriage. The law of the State on these matters has been likened to a mirror, having no image of its own and serving only to reflect the religious law. In this mirror, various laws are reflected, and it is difficult to find in them a common denominator of the differing and contradictory conceptions they express towards the institution of marriage.

In its landmark decision In re Gault (1967), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a minor brought before the juvenile court was in principle entitled to the guarantees of due process available to adult defendants in criminal trials. That momentous decision sparked off a debate which has continued ever since in academic and policy-making circles, both on the national and international levels. In essence, the controversy relates to the question of the nature of social control measures to be adopted by the legal system to deal with errant juveniles. Should these be essentially criminal and punitive in character, or are they better considered as welfare proceedings, the essential purpose of which is to determine the appropriate treatment? Thus, the legal, or punitive, model of juvenile justice may be juxtaposed to the welfare or treatment (or even “therapeutic”) model.

In 1941, the Banking Ordinance enacted by the High Commissioner of Palestine defined “banking business” as the “business of receiving from the public on current account money which is to be repayable on demand by check, and of making advances to customers”. The most recently enacted Israeli Banking Law (Licensing), 1981 contains a very extensive definition of banking business which includes no less than thirteen types of transactions.

This certainly reflects a new legal approach towards the economic reality of banking which in and of itself has not changed drastically. Moreover, the peculiar dynamics of the banking business also inspired the legal rule that the Governor of the Bank of Israel should have the right to enlarge the legal definition by recognizing the banking character of other transactions.