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Human Dignity and Victims' Rights in the German and Israeli Criminal Process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2013

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Abstract

Human dignity is constitutionally protected in both the German and the Israeli legal system. This article examines to what extent respect for victims' human dignity has influenced the development of victims' rights within the criminal process in Germany and Israel, bearing in mind the differences between the two legal systems regarding the definition of “human dignity” and the scope of constitutional protection. Following a detailed examination of the role and rights of victims within each jurisdiction and a short comparative analysis, this article concludes that, in both countries, the concept of human dignity has played a relatively minor role in the context of victims' procedural rights. The main, albeit tentative, explanation for this conclusion is that, although their trial rules differ considerably, both legal systems share common concerns and difficulties regarding the participation of victims in legal proceedings.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2011

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References

1 CrimFH 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel 49(4) PD 589, 622 [1989].

2 See, e.g., CrimA 446/02 State of Israel v. Kobi 57(3) PD 769 [2002]; CrimA 5121/98 Yissasharov v. The Chief Military Prosecutor 61(1) PD 461 [2006].

3 See, e.g., Karp, Judith, The Criminal Law—Janus of Human Rights: Constitutionalization in right of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 42 Hapraklit 64, 76 (1995) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar; Gross, Emanuel, The Constitutional Rights of the Victim: A Comparative Study, 17 Bar Ilan Studies In Law 419, 420 (2002) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

4 For a discussion of the use of the term “victim” in connection with the criminal process, see infra section II.

5 It is interesting to take a closer look at Justice Shamgar's argument in Ganimat. He starts out by comparing the claim to dignity of the victim and the “accused,” which is a legitimate statement as to the need of balancing the rights of these two parties in the criminal process. But he then loads the scales by juxtaposing not the rights of (alleged) victims and suspects in the criminal process, but the rights of victims and the “interests” of the “batterer-husband” and the “rapist.” Justice Shamgar thus links a supposed “right” of the accused “not to be detained” and the risk that he, if released, will commit a crime. Of course, this subtle shift is bound to backfire against the suspect: no one will uphold a suspect's right to freedom when that means that he will rape a woman. The concept of victims' human dignity (in the sense that the victim should be free from fear of being victimized again) is thus turned into an argument for limiting procedural rights of suspects. See also the analysis of the Ganimat decision by Justice Arbel, Edna, The Constitutional Revolution in the Criminal Law: The Balance Between the Defendant's Rights and the Rights of His Victims, in 2 Shamgar Book 255, 283 (Barak, Aharon ed., 2003) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

6 For similar sentiments, see Dubber, Markus D., Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victim's Rights 7 (2002)Google Scholar.

7 This warning does not apply to the vast literature that promotes proceedings aimed at mediating between victims and offenders with a view toward reconciliation. See, e.g., Zehr, Howard, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (1990)Google Scholar; Singer, Linda R., Settling Disputes: Conflict Resolution in Business, Families, and the Legal System (1990)Google Scholar. One may well encourage restorative and reconciliatory models, but such models thrive best when they are taken out of the shadow of the criminal law and are left to exist by themselves. Sebba, Leslie, Will the “Victim Revolution” Trigger a Reorientation of the Criminal Justice System?, 31 Isr. L. Rev. 379 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Sebba, Leslie, Victims' Rights and Legal Strategies: Israel as a Case Study, 11 Crim. L. F. 47, 56 (2000)Google Scholar.

9 See Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) Law, 5715-1955 SH No. 187 p. 96, § 2.

10 Libai, David, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offence in the Criminal Justice System, 15 Wayne L. Rev. 977, 997 (1969)Google Scholar.

11 Amendment no. 10, 2004, SH No. 1957 p. 532.

12 See, e.g., van Dijk, Jan J.M., Regaining a Sense of Community and Order: General Report and Conclusions of the Conference, in Research on Victimization: Reports Presented to the Sixteenth Criminological Research Conference 145 (European Committee on Crime Problems ed., 1985)Google Scholar; Duff, Peter, Shapland, Joanna & Willmore, Jon, Victims in the Criminal Justice System (1985)Google Scholar.

13 LCrimA 5877/99 Yanos and Others v. State of Israel 59(2) PD 97, 116 [2004].

14 German criminal law theory regards the distinction between justification and excuse as crucial for this and other issues, whereas the Israeli legal system, like most common law systems, does not attach much significance to this distinction. See, e.g., Gur-Arye, Miriam, Should a Criminal Code Distinguish Between Justification and Excuse?, 5 Can. J. L. & Jur. 215, 219–20 (1992)Google Scholar; Hörnle, Tatjana, Die Rolle des Opfers in der Straftheorie und im materiellen Strafrecht, 19 Juristenzeitung 950, 957 (2006)Google Scholar. Albin Eser has claimed that “there seems no greater cleavage between civil law and common law schools of criminal theory than that of whether there does or, if not, should be a distinction between justification and excuse.” Eser, Albin, Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime, in Justification and Excuse, Comparative Perspectives 19 (Eser, Albin & Fletcher, George P. eds., 1987)Google Scholar.

15 See, e.g., Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, 5762-2001, SH No. 1782 p. 183, § 2. Family members of the direct victim, even if they were harmed by the offense, cannot claim victim's rights. See, e.g., CrimA 7609/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel (Nov. 13, 2008) Takdin Legal Database (by subscription), 1818. See also Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 1987, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] at 1074, § 395, para. 2, no. 1, granting survivors of homicide victims the right to join a criminal prosecution.

16 Baurmann, Michael C. & Schädler, Wolfram, Das Opfer nach der Straftat—Seine Erwartungen und Perspektiven. Eine Befragung Von Betroffenen Zu Opferschutz und Opferunterstützung Sowie Ein Bericht über Vergleichbare Untersuchungen 16 (1991)Google Scholar; Kilchling, Michael, Opferschutz und der Strafanspruch des Staates—Ein Widerspruch?, 2002 Neue Zeitschrift Für Strafrecht [NStZ ] 57, 58Google Scholar.

17 Cf. Bung, Jochen, Zweites Opferrechtsreformgesetz: Vom Opferschutz zur Opferermächtigung, 2009 Strafverteidiger (StV) 430Google Scholar; Kilchling, supra note 16, at 57.

18 For linguistic and philosophical explanations for this phenomenon, see, for example, 1 Fletcher, George, The Grammar of Criminal Law: Foundations 119–33 (2007)Google Scholar. An uncritical assumption of the status of victims can also be found in the substantive criminal law, which tends to avoid attaching blameworthiness to victims of crimes. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see, for example, Harel, Alon, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Doctrine of Comparative Fault, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1181 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; 1 Roxin, Claus, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil 605–10 (4th ed. 2006)Google Scholar (discussing failed attempts in German doctrine to introduce “Viktimodogmatik” to reduce the offender's criminal responsibility when the victim could have avoided the harm).

19 References to numerous studies on reasons for (not) reporting crime to the police can be found in Eisenberg, Ulrich, Kriminologie 250–56 (6th ed. 2005)Google Scholar. Studies on sexual offenses have shown between 6 and 10% of false complaints, id. at 680.

20 A unitary definition of the victim (Verletzter) does not exist in German criminal procedure law. For example, “victims” are defined differently in the context of their right to appeal a prosecutor's decision not to bring charges (StPO § 172; see Graalmann-Scheerer, Kirsten, in 5 Die Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz § 172, marginal notes 48-100 (Erb, Volker et al. eds., 2008))Google Scholar, and in the context of claiming civil damages in the criminal process (StPO § 403; see generally Hilger, Hans, in 8 Die Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz § 374, marginal notes 15-20e (Erb, Volker et al. eds., 2008))Google Scholar.

21 See Bendor, Ariel & Sachs, Michael, The Constitutional Status of Human Dignity in Germany and Israel, 44 Isr. L. Rev. 25 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Barak, Aharon, Human Rights in Israel, 39 Isr. L. Rev. 12 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Barak, Aharon, The Constitutionalization of the Legal System following the Basic Laws and its Impact on the Criminal Law (Substantive and Procedural), 13 Bar Ilan Studies in Law 5 (1996)Google Scholar.

24 HCJ 7357/95 Barki Feta Humphries (Israel) Inc. v. Stateo f Israel 50(2) PD 769, 785 [1996].

25 See, e.g., HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality of Government in Israel v. The Knesset 61(1) PD 619 [2005]; CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor 61(1) PD 461 [2006].

26 CrimApp 3239/08 Shukron v. State of Israel (Apr. 16, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

27 See, e.g., HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Organization and Others v. Minister of Finance and Others 60(3) PD 464 [2005].

28 See, e.g., HCJ 4593/05 The United Mizrachi Bank v. The Prime Minister and Others (Sep. 20, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

29 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 p. 150, § 8.

30 3 Barak, Aharon, Interpretation In Law 377–82 (1995) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

31 Barak, Aharon, Protected Human Rights: Scope and Limitations, 1 Law & Government in Israel 253, 262–65 (1993)Google Scholar.

32 75 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 369 (380) (1987)Google Scholar; Dreier, Horst, in Grundgesetz Kommentar art. 1, marginal note 44 (Dreier, Horst ed., 2d ed. 2004)Google Scholar; Sachs, Michael, in Grundgesetz Kommentar art. 1 § 1, marginal notes 10 & 17 (Sachs, Michael ed., 5th ed. 2008)Google Scholar; Starck, Christian, in 1 Grundgesetz Kommentar art. 1 § 1, marginal notes 15 & 33 (Mangoldt, Hermann von et al. eds., 6th ed. 2010)Google Scholar.

33 Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law prohibits any amendment of the Basic Law that interferes with the protection of human dignity as guaranteed in article 1 of the Basic Law. See Grundgesetz Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I.

34 See, e.g., 9 BVerfGE 89 (95) (1959)Google Scholar; 27 BVerfGE 1 (5) (1969); 30 BVerfGE 1 (25) (1970)Google Scholar; 45 BVerfGE 187 (228) (1977)Google Scholar; 84 BVerfGE 90 (120) (1991)Google Scholar; 96 BVerfGE 375 (399) (1997)Google Scholar; 109 BVerfGE 279 (311) (2004)Google Scholar. The “subject vs. object” formula has been criticized as vague and as permitting arbitrary decisions. See Dreier, supra note 32, marginal note 53, with further references.

35 109 BVerfGE 279 (311-57) (2004)Google Scholar.

36 Dreier, supra note 32, marginal notes 47-49, correctly warns of an “inflation” of human dignity if that concept were used to correct any minor indignity a person is subjected to.

37 See Herdegen, Matthias, in 1 Grundgesetz Kommentar art. 1, marginal note 46 (Maunz, Theodor & Dürig, Günter eds., 2010)Google Scholar.

38 For a controversial case where the Federal Constitutional Court found such a violation in relation to the Air Security Law, see 115 BVerfGE 118 (2005)Google Scholar.

39 Examples include a prisoner who had to live in a cell that was frequently flooded with feces, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 16, 1993, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 3190, 1993, and a case in which state agents had secretly installed microphones in a suspect's home and thereby kept him and his family under total surveillance, 109 BVerfGE 279 (315) (2004)Google Scholar. For further case law, see Sachs, supra note 32, marginal notes 40-45.

40 See supra notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text.

41 Article 2(1) of the Basic Law states: “Everyone has the right to unfold his personality, to the extent that he does not violate the rights of others or offends against the constitutional order or the moral law.” For a broad interpretation of the “right to develop one's personality” as a general freedom of action, see 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957)Google Scholar; Lagodny, Otto, Strafrecht vor den Schranken der Grundrechte 116 et seq. (1996)Google Scholar; Starck, Christian, in 1 Grundgesetz Kommentar art. 2, marginal notes 8-13 (Mangoldt, Hermann von et al. eds., 6th ed. 2010)Google Scholar.

42 The limit set by the “constitutional order” has been interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court to include any legislation passed in conformity with the Basic Law. See, e.g., 6 BVerfGE 32 (37-41) (1957)Google Scholar; 103 BVerfGE 197 (215) (2001)Google Scholar; 113 BVerfGE 88 (103) (2005)Google Scholar.

43 HCJ 5100/94, 4054/95 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel Government 53(4) PD 817 [1999]; StPO § 136a.

44 See Shachar, Yoram, History and Sources of Israeli Law, in Introduction to the Law of Israel 1 (Shapira, Amos & Dewitt-Arar, Keren C. eds., 1995)Google Scholar.

45 For a short description of the history of private prosecution in Israel, see CrimApp 3503/91 Shubert v. Tzafrir 46(4) PD 136 [1992].

46 Section 43 of the Criminal Ordinance (1936) authorized judges to order the offender to pay compensation to the victim as part of the sentencing decision. See LCrimA 2976/01 Assaf v. State of Israel 56(3) PD 418, 469 [2002].

47 For this and other reasons, Israel deviates in several respects from the adversarial model. See Gross, Emanuel, The Adversarial Mode of Trial in the Criminal Process—Does it Allow Judicial Activism?, 7 Iyunei Mishpat [Tel Aviv U. L. Rev.] 867 (1993)Google Scholar; Jackson, John D. & Doran, Sean, Addressing the Adversarial Deficit in Non-Jury Criminal Trials, 31 Isr. L. Rev. 645 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 In the sphere of sentencing, for example, an agenda “bordering on penal abolitionism” was adopted. See Sebba, Leslie, Sanctioning Policy in Israel—An Historical Overview, 30 Isr. L. Rev. 234, 237 (1996)Google Scholar.

49 Sebba, Leslie & Gal, Tali, Rights of Persons Harmed by Offences in Israel, in 2 Shamgar Book 157, 165 (Barak, Aharon et al. eds., 1993) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

50 For a description of the statute, see Harnon, Eliahu, Children's Evidence in the Israeli Criminal Justice System with Special Emphasis on Sexual Offences, in Children's Evidence in Legal Proceedings: An International Perspective 81 (Spencer, J. et al. eds., 1990)Google Scholar.

51 Amendment of Procedure (Interrogation of Witnesses) Law, 5718-1957, SH No. 237, § 2.

52 Karp, Judith, Ministry of Justice, Victims of Crime (1987)Google Scholar.

53 See Ministry of Justice, Directive 14.7—Assistance to Victims of Crime and Prosecution Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings, http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/37E738A8-5A79-4E3C-9AE2-13632DA2CAC6/18096/147.pdf (last visited May 1, 2011) (in Hebrew).

54 Penal Law (Amendment no. 22), 5748-1988, SH No. 1246 p. 62, § 2.

55 See, e.g., Mawby, Robert & Walklate, Sandra, Critical Victimology 6994 (1994)Google Scholar.

56 Bassiouni, Cherif M., International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 203 (2006)Google Scholar.

57 Sebba & Gal, supra note 49, at 157.

58 See Criminal Procedure Law, 5742-1982, SH No. 1043 p. 41, § 187(b). For a recent inter-pretation of this section, see CrimA 7609/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel (Nov. 5, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

59 For an overview of the statute and the case law relating to it, see Bar-Ofir, David, Rights of Persons Harmed by an Offence Act as Reflected in the Case-Law (2007) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

60 For a recent discussion of the process underlying this legislation, see Yanay, Uri & Gal, Tali, Lobbying for Rights: Crime Victims in Israel, in International Handbook of Victimology 373 (Shoham, Shlomo Giora et al. eds., 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61 This is true, for example, for criminal trespass (Strafgesetzbuch [StGB ] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBl. I at 3322, § 123) and violation of private secrets (§ 205). With regard to several other offenses, a victim's application is normally necessary, but public prosecution can be brought even against the victim's wishes when there is a special public interest in prosecuting the case. This applies, for example, to simple assault (§ 230), petty theft (§ 248a), stalking (§ 238, para. 4) and abduction of children (§ 235, para. 7).

62 Id. § 77.

63 StPO § 374 et seq.

64 Id. § 172.

65 Id. § 403 et seq.

66 Id. §§ 395 & 397. Victims of sexual offenses and of attempted homicide can demand the court to assign them a lawyer even before trial (§§ 397a & 406g).

67 Kury, Helmut & Kaiser, Michael, The Victim's Position within the Criminal Proceedings: An Empirical Study, in Victims and Criminal Justice, Legal Protection, Restitution and Support 579, 581 (Kaiser, Günther et al. eds., 1991)Google Scholar; Rieß, Peter, Entwickhingstendenzen in der deutschen Strafprozessgesetzgebung seit 1950, 10 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (ZiS) 466, 476 (2009)Google Scholar; Schöch, Heinz, Die Rechtsstellung des Verletzten im Strafverfahren, 1984 NSTZ 385, 386Google Scholar.

68 Kilchling, Michael, Opferinteressen und Strafverfolgung 30-33, 311–14 (1995)Google Scholar; see also Sautner, Lyane, Opferinteressen und Strafrechtstheorien 215 et seq. (2010)Google Scholar.

69 Michael C. Baurmann, & Schädler, Wolfram, Das Opfer nach der Straftat—Seine Erwartungen und Perspektiven 29 (1.2.2.1.) (1991)Google Scholar; Kaiser, Günther, Kriminologie 563–64 (3d ed. 1996)Google Scholar.

70 Erstes Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Stellung des Verletzten im Strafverfahren [OpferSchG] [First Act to Reform Victims' Rights], Dec. 18, 1986, BGBl. I at 2496.

71 StPO § 406d. This information right was introduced only in 2009 by the Second Act to Reform Victims' Rights (Gesetz zur Stärkung der Rechte von Verletzten und Zeugen im Strafverfahren [2. OpferRRG] [Second Act to Reform Victims' Rights], July 29, 2009, BGBl. I at 2280).

72 Id. § 406f.

73 Id. § 406e.

74 According to StPO § 406, para. 1, the criminal court can decline to decide on the victim's civil claim only when the claim is not suited for a decision in criminal court because it would cause significant delay. In fact, however, the court retains broad discretion in this matter, and neither judges nor lawyers encourage victims to join their civil claims to the criminal case.

75 StPO § 68(3).

76 See Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, 5762-2001, SH No. 1782 p. 183, § 7. A recent innovation in Israeli law has been the establishment of the Protection of Witnesses Authority, which provides various forms of protection to threatened witnesses and their families (see Protection of Witnesses Law, 5769-2008, SH No. 2192 p. 98).

77 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] [Code on Court Organisation], May 9, 1975, BGBl. I at 1077, § 171b.

78 See Courts Law, 5744-1984, SH No. 1123 p. 198, § 68(b)(5). The Israeli Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as purporting to encourage women to file criminal complaints (Yanos, supra note 13).

79 Section 247a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 15, provides that a witness can be interrogated by video link if there exists an urgent risk of a serious harm to his well-being, or if he cannot appear in court due to illness or due to a long distance from his place of residence. In Israel this possibility is more restricted and only exists in respect to children (see Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) Law, supra note 9, § 2), mentally disabled persons (see Interrogation and Testimony Procedures Law (Adapted to Mentally Disabled Persons), 5766-2005, SH No. 2038 p. 42, § 22), and in cases where the witness is an alleged victim of a sexual offense or human trafficking (see Amendment of Procedure (Interrogation of Witnesses) Law, 5718-1957, SH No. 237 p. 16, § 2b).

80 Many victimological studies support this observation. See, e.g., Snowden, Jessica & Lurigio, Arthur J., The Mentally Ill as Victims of Crime, in Victims of Crime 189 (Davis, Robert C. et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2007)Google Scholar.

81 See Busse, Detlef, Steller, Max & Volbert, Renate, Belastungserleben von Kindern in Hauptverhandlungen 185–97 (1996)Google Scholar; Kett-Straub, Gabriele, Die Pflichten Minderjähriger Zeugen in der Hauptverhandlung des Strafverfahrens 5765 (2003)Google Scholar; Kleinert, Tino, Persönliche Betroffenheit und Mitwirkung 3137 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 Zacharias, Klaus, Der Gefährdete Zeuge Im Strafverfahren 87101 (1997)Google Scholar.

83 Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, supra note 15, § 6.

84 Id. § 7.

85 Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers—Arrests) Law, 5756-1996, SH No. 1592 p. 338, § 13(a)(2).

86 Id. § 21(a)(1)(b).

87 For an analysis of this law, see, for example, CrimApp 962/10 Anonymous v. State of Israel (Jan. 17,2010), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

88 See Protection of Witnesses Law, supra note 76.

89 Amendment of Procedure (Interrogation of Witnesses) Law, supra note 51, § 2A.

90 Id. § 2B.

91 Id. § 2C.

92 Courts Law, supra note 78, § 68(b)(4), (5) & (7).

93 Id. § 70.

94 See, e.g., Doerner, William D. & Lab, Steven T., Victimology 4748 (1995)Google Scholar.

95 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 58, § 74.

96 Masrawa, Alaa & Shmueli-Mayer, Noga, Disclosure of Investigative Materials and the Right to Privacy—Is the Supreme Court Developing a New Approach?, 39 The Defense Attorney 3 (2000) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

97 See, e.g., CrimApp 6022/96 The State of Israel v. Mazor 50(3) PD 686 [1996].

98 See, e.g., HCJ 9264/04 The State of Israel v. The Jerusalem Magistrates' Court and Others 60(1) PD 360, 389 [2005]. The legal basis for the court's approach is section 1 of the Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, supra note 15, which unequivocally states that victims' rights are secondary to the legal rights of suspects, defendants, and convicts.

99 Böttcher, Reinhard, Wieviel Opferschutz verträgt der rechtsstaatliche Strafprozess?, in Verbrechen—Strafe—Resozialisierung. Festschrift Für Heinz Schöch Zum 70. Geburtstag 929 (Dölling, Dieter et al. eds., 2010)Google Scholar; Dolling, Dieter, Zur Stellung des Verletzen im Strajverfahren, in Festschrift für Heike Jung 77 (Müller-Dietz, Heinz et al. eds., 2007)Google Scholar; Heger, Martin, Die Rolle des Opfers im Strafverfahren, 2007 Juristische Arbeitsblätter [JA] 244Google Scholar.

100 StPO § 68a, para. 1, provides that a witness should not be asked questions affecting his honor or concerning his private sphere unless that question is indispensable for the determination of the truth. The courts tend to give prevalence to the determination of the truth when there is a conflict between privacy and truth-finding interests, even if the criminal process concerns only a less serious offense and the question is relevant only for the witness's credibility. See 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] [Decisions Of The Federal Court Of Appeals] 252 (254); Rogall, Klaus, in Systematischer Kommentar Zur Strafprozessordnung und zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz § 68a, marginal note 32, with further references (Rudolphi, Hans-Joachim & Wolter, Jürgen eds., 2005)Google Scholar. A trial judge's decision to allow a question that touches on the intimate sphere cannot be appealed. See Meyergoßner, Lutz, Strafprozessordnung mit Gvg und Nebengesetzen. Kommentar § 68a, note 9 (53d ed. 2010)Google Scholar.

101 StPO § 68, paras. 2 & 3.

102 Id. § 200, para. 1.

103 The legal basis of witness protection programs is the Gesetz zur Harmonisierung des Schutzes gefährdeter Zeugen [ZSHG] [Law for the Harmonization of the Protection of Witnesses at Risk], Dec. 11, 2001, BGBl. I at 3510. See Soiné, Michael & Engelke, Hans-Georg, Das Gesetz zur Harmonisierung des Schutzes gefährdeter Zeugen, 2002 NJW 470Google Scholar.

104 For example, care must be taken that civil claims of and against the witness can still be enforced. See ZSHG §§ 7 & 9. For other problems (e.g. testimonial privilege of witness in protection program), see 50 BGHSt 318 (2005).

105 According to section 5 of the ZSHG, public and private agencies can be obliged to provide identity papers for the witness under a different name.

106 StPO § 240, para. 2.

107 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 11, 2005, NJW 1519 (1520), 2005 (emphasizing that the task of a social state built on the rule of law (sozialer Rechtsstaat) is not only to make sure that criminal offenses are being investigated but also to safeguard the interests of victims).

108 StPO § 58a.

109 Id. § 255a. For a thorough analysis of this provision, see Wollmann, Susanne, Mehr Opferschutz ohne Abbau liberaler Strukturen im Verständnis der Prinzipien der Strafprozessordnung 106 et seq. (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

110 GVG § 171b.

111 StPO § 247.

112 Id. § 247a.

113 See, e.g., Miers, David, State Compensation for Criminal Injuries (1997)Google Scholar.

114 See, e.g., Edray, Joseph, Human Rights and Social Rights, in 2 Berenson Book. 45 (Barak, Aharon & Berenson, Haim eds., 2000) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

115 See, e.g., Yanay, Uri, Support and Compensation Provided to Victims of Violent Crimes in Israel, in Allocating Resources to Social Services 227–50 (Kop, Jacob ed., 2000)Google Scholar (in Hebrew). In recent years, various Knesset members have proposed to adopt some form of state compensation for victims of violent crimes. However, the fate of these proposals is yet unclear.

116 See Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Organization and Others, supra note 27.

117 It is interesting to note that Israel compensates victims of terror for their losses and injuries. See Persons Harmed by Hostile Operations Law, 5730-1970, SH No. 600 p. 126.

118 See Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 5768-1998, SH No. 1661 p. 166, § 1: “The purpose of this Act is to prohibit sexual harassment in order to protect human dignity, liberty and privacy and to advance equality between the genders.”

119 Sebba & Gal, supra note 49, 204-5.

120 Under certain conditions, a victim can file a tort case against the police for negligence, but the Supreme Court has emphasized that the duty of the police is not to prevent harm but only to take reasonable precautions to avoid harm. See CA 429/82 State of Israel v. Sohan 42(3) PD 733 [1988].

121 The maximum compensation amount is increased periodically to reflect the changing value of the Israeli shekel.

122 See, e.g., Eliram, Osnat, Compensation for Crime Victims: A Suggestion for a New Model, 19(1) Bar Ilan Studies in Law 205 (2002)Google Scholar.

123 See, e.g., LCrimA 228/05 Yagudayov v. State of Israel 59(4) PD 518 [2005]; LCrimA 9727/05 Gliksman v. State of Israel (Aug. 8, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription); CrimA 70914/06 State of Israel v. Kaplan (Aug. 29, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

124 CrimC (Jer) 209/08 State of Israel v. Yonah (Nov. 19, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription). A decision on the appeal filed by the defendant (Yonah) to the Supreme Court is pending (CrimA 11141/08 Yonah v. State of Israel).

125 See Karp, Judith, Restitution of Victims by the Offenders, 30 Isr. L. Rev 331, 332 (1996)Google Scholar.

126 See, e.g., Assaf, supra note 46; LCrimA 8884/09 Masoudin v. State of Israel (Nov. 29, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

127 See, e.g., CrimA 5761/05 Magdalawi v. State of Israel and Others (July 24, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription). In some decisions, the court adopted a modified version of this approach, claiming that the compensation order, although basically being a civil award, possesses certain criminal characteristics that should not be overlooked (Gliksman v. State of Israel, supra note 123). In recent years, however, the former approach was reaffirmed, see CrimA 1281/06 Borstein v. State of Israel (Apr. 16, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription), and the court emphasized that, if the defendant challenges the compensation award before the appellate court, the victim must be party to the appeal, see CrimA 3314/06 Eisencott v. State of Israel (Jan. 11, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

128 See CrimA 11178/04 Anonymous and Others v. State of Israel (Jan. 9, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription); Bar-Ofir, supra note 59.

129 It is important to note that, according to section 77 of the Courts Law, supra note 78, following the conclusion of the criminal case a civil claim can be filed by the victim of offense, and the same judge who tried the criminal case is authorized to hear the civil case if the offender is the sole party sued by the victim.

130 Gesetz über die Entschädigung für Opfer von Gewalttaten [OEG] [Law on the Compensation of Victims of Acts of Violence], Jan. 7, 1985, BGBl. I at 1. Victim compensation was originally limited to German citizens and has only hesitantly been extended to non-citizens. See OEG § 1, paras. 4-7.

131 Id. § 1, para. 1.

132 Id. § 2, paras. 1 & 2.

133 StPO § 403 et seq.

134 Id. § 155a.

135 See, e.g., Janke, Manon, Der Täter-Opfer-Ausgleich im Strafverfahren (2005)Google Scholar; Pelikan, Christa, Jahrbuch für Rechts- und Kriminalsoziologie 1999: Mediationsverfahren—Horizonte, Grenzen, Innensichten (1999)Google Scholar; Tränkle, Stefanie, Im Schatten des Strafrechts (2007)Google Scholar.

136 StPO § 153a, para. 1, nos. 1 & 5.

137 StGB § 56b, para. 2, no. 1.

138 Id. § 57, para. 3.

139 The victim can of course enforce any civil claim for damages through the civil courts.

140 See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 58, § 58.

141 A police officer can decide to refrain from investigating a complaint if the offense is not a felony and the police officer is of the opinion that there is no public interest in investigating the complaint. Id. § 59.

142 Id. § 63.

143 Id. § 64.

144 Id. § 68.

145 See, e.g., Shubert v. Tzafrir, supra note 45.

146 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 58, § 70.

147 CrimA 2124/91 Ron v. Cur Industries Ltd. and Others 47(5) PD 289 [1993].

148 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 58, § 71.

149 Id. §§ 231-32.

150 A famous example is HCJ 156/56 Shor v. The Attorney General 11 PD 285 [1957]. It is difficult, however, to find many other examples. See Gavison, Ruth, Discretion in Enforcement of the Criminal Law: The Power to Stay and Renew Proceedings 498 (1991)Google Scholar.

151 See, e.g., LCrimA 2401/07 Altchuler v. State of Israel and Others (July 16, 2008), Takdin Legal Database (by subscription).

152 Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, supra note 15, §§ 8-11.

153 See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 58, § 187(b). For an evaluation of this practice, see Yanay, Uri, Innovation in Criminal Law: Filing a Report Regarding a Victim of a Sex Offence by the Probation Services, in Trends in Criminology: Theory, Policy and Practice 235 (Hovav, Meir et al. eds., 2003)Google Scholar (in Hebrew). For a discussion of the value of victim impact reports in general, see Cassel, Paul G., In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 611, 619–25 (2009)Google Scholar.

154 Excluding traffic offenses and private prosecutions. See Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, supra note 15, § 2.

155 Id. § 18.

156 HCJ 1141/08 G.N.N. Diamonds Ltd. and Others v. Adv. Ruth David, Chief Prosecutor for the Tel-Aviv District and Others (Sep. 4, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

157 For a discussion of the various forms of victim participation at sentencing, see CrimA 9150/08 State of Israel v. Biton (July 13, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) 1404. In her opinion, Justice Arbel commented that judges ought to allow victims to speak in court during sentencing proceedings and that one of the functions of the court is to serve as the victim's protector.

158 In certain cases, when their interests are directly affected, victims may enter the proceedings, as a party. This can happen, for example, when the offender files an appeal against a compensation order included in the sentencing decision. See Gliksman v. State of Israel, supra note 123.

159 Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, supra note 15, § 8.

160 Id. § 16.

161 Id. § 17. Courts, however, have approved plea bargains even when the prosecution did not consult the victim prior to signing the plea bargain. See, e.g., CrimA 3193/07 Tabaga v. State of Israel (Feb. 4, 2009), Takdin Legal Database (by subscription). For a general discussion of the victims' role in plea bargaining under Israeli law, see Hamon, Eliahu, Plea Bargaining in Israel—The Proper Functions of the Prosecution and the Court and the Role of the Victim, 31 Isr. L. Rev. 245 (1997)Google Scholar.

162 See, e.g., HCJ 2477/07 Anonymous v. State Attorney and Others (May 27, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription); HCJ 2511/09 Soydan and Others v. Haifa District Attorney and Others (May 31, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription); HCJ 1801/10 The Estate of the Late Manhal Fahum v. Attorney General (Mar. 4, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).

163 Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, supra note 15, § 19.

164 Id. § 20. According to the interpretation of this section by the courts, see HCJ 9631/07 Katz and Others v. The President and Others (Apr. 14, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription), the victim's opinion should be filed in writing, and he does not have the right to appear and present his opinion orally before the committee. In LCrimA 10349/08 State of Israel v. Ganama (July 20, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription), the Supreme Court clarified that despite the language of the section, in certain cases the committee may decide, on the basis of the broad discretion granted to it under the relevant statute, to allow victims to appear before the committee in person and voice their concerns.

165 Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, supra note 15, § 1.

166 Id. § 8.

167 Id. § 11.

168 The Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law (2001) grants victims of violent and sexual offenses a wider array of rights than other victims of crime. This also finds expression in the amount of information that victims of these crimes may receive as compared to other victims.

169 StPO § 406d, para. 1. The right to information thus does not apply to intermediate procedural steps that may also be of interest to the victim.

170 Id. § 406d, para. 2.

171 Id. §§ 406e & 406f.

172 Id. §§ 374 et seq.

173 StGB §§ 77-77d.

174 StPO §§ 172-177.

175 Id. § 395 et seq.

176 In 2007, victims participated as subsidiary prosecutors in only 2% of local court trials. In district court—where the most serious cases are tried—the participation rate was 21%, due mostly to the high percentage of victims of sexual offenses taking part as subsidiary prosecutors. See data collected in Barton, Stephan & Flotho, Christian, Opferanwälte im Strafverfahren 6067 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

177 See Bischoff, Georg, Die Praxis des Klageerzwingungsverfahrens, 1988 NStZ 63Google Scholar; Graal-mann-Scheerer, supra note 20; Werner, Karin, Die Rechtsstellung des Verletzten im Strafverfahren bei staatsanwaltlichen Verfahrenseinstellungen aus Opportunitatsgriinden, 1984 NStZ 401.Google Scholar Michael Kilchling found in a victimization survey that many victims wished to have greater influence on the criminal process. See Kilchling, supra note 68, at 377.

178 The victim can be ordered to pay court costs when the defendant has been acquitted or when the court, in its discretion, has dismissed the case. See StPO § 383, para. 2 & § 471, paras. 2 & 3.

179 Id. § 383, para. 2.

180 Id. § 395.

181 Id. § 397.

182 Id. § 400.

183 See section IV. 1.a.

184 On the other hand, it is possible that the reason Israel, like many other Anglo-American legal systems, has embraced victims' rights in recent years, despite its common law heritage, is that victims officiated as prosecutors in English adversarial criminal trials up until the middle of the 19th century. See Taylor, David, Crime, Policing and Punishment in England 17501914 (1998)Google Scholar.

185 William Pizzi has observed that in a civil law system—such as Germany—“it is easier to accommodate the interests of victims at trial without disturbing the adversarial balance.” See Pizzi, William T., Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 Stan. J. Int'l L. 37, 41 (1991)Google Scholar. See also Blondel, Erin C., Victims Rights in an Adversarial System, 58 Duke L. J. 237 (2008)Google Scholar.

186 Since the sentencing stage in Israel, like in other Anglo-American legal systems, somewhat resembles the inquisitorial model, the victim's input is considered to be less of a deviation from the regular mode of the proceeding. It is therefore not surprising that the Israeli legislature has found it easier to accommodate the victim during the sentencing stage rather than during the first part of the criminal trial.

187 The Israeli legal system's decision to accommodate victims' interest in active participation at the sentencing stage may be based on the recognition that many victims are interested in having the offender punished for the injury he caused. Victims' advocates in Israel push for an even stronger involvement of victims in sentencing hearings. See, e.g., Pogatch, Dana, The “Victims Revolution”—The Day After—Towards a Model that Acknowledges Private Penal Considerations?, 4 Ono Academic College L. Rev. 268 (2004) (in Hebrew)Google Scholar. For similar developments in the American Federal system, see, for example, Kaster, Julie, Note: The Voices of Victims: Debating the Appropriate Role of Fraud Victim Allocution Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1682 (2010)Google Scholar.

188 StPO § 257c. On this law, see Weigend, Thomas, Plea Bargaining in Germany, in Current Trends in Criminal Procedure and Evidence: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Professor Eliahu Harnon 265 (Horovitz, Anat & Kremnitzer, Mordechai eds., 2009)Google Scholar.

189 Barton, Stephan, Die Reform der Nebenklage: Opferschutz als Herausforderung fur das Strafverfahren, 2009 JA 753, 757Google Scholar.

190 For a first hand analysis of a victim's desire to make himself heard in court, see Hassemer, Winfried & Reemtsma, Jan-Philipp, Verbrechensopfer. Gesetz und Gerechtigkeit 112 et seq. (2002)Google Scholar. The co-author Jan-Philipp Reemtsma, heir to a large German tobacco firm and a social scientist and philosopher, had been abducted and kept in a dark basement for several weeks.

191 See, e.g., Bradley, Craig M., Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study (2d ed. 2006)Google Scholar; Delmas-Marty, Mireille, Reflections on the “Hybridisation” of Criminal Procedure, in Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context 251 (Jackson, John et al. eds., 2008)Google Scholar; Grande, Elisabetta, Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on Systemic Differences and the Search for the Truth, in Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and international Context 145 (Jackson, John et al. eds., 2008)Google Scholar; Joerg, Nico et al. , Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?, in Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study (Fennell, Phil et al. eds., 1995)Google Scholar.

192 For Israel, see, for example, Rights of Persons Harmed by Crime Law, supra note 15, § 1.

193 See GVG § 171b; StPO § 247, second sentence; Courts Law, supra note 78, § 68(b)(4), (5), and (7).

194 See StPO § 68a, para. 1. According to section 2a of the Amendment of Procedure (Interrogation of Witnesses) Law, supra note 79, the victim must disclose such facts if a miscarriage of justice could otherwise occur.

195 The German Strafantragsrecht makes public prosecution of certain offenses depend on a formal complaint filed by the victim, and thus grants the victim a veto right. However, the number of offenses where such a complaint is necessary has shrunk to a very short list of petty offenses such as trespass (StGB § 123) or slander (StGB § 185). Such an arrangement does not exist in Israel. However, the prosecution services can take these considerations into account when they decide whether to file criminal charges. See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 58, § 62.

196 See Pizzi, William T., Victim's Rights: Rethinking our Adversary System, Utah L. Rev. 349, 365 (1999)Google Scholar: “ A trial system that fails to treat victims well will often end up treating most defendants poorly too.” Dubber, supra note 6, at 7, has suggested that respect for victims' rights, understood correctly, could also serve to set proper limits to the criminal law and to decrease the severity of punishment.

197 That is, at least, the view of the German Federal Constitutional Court. In its decision on the constitutionality of an Air Security Law that would have allowed shooting down a hijacked airplane threatening innocent citizens on the ground, the Court argued that the passengers in the hijacked plane, who are in a dilemma “without issue” (ausweglose Lage), are turned into mere objects for the saving of those on the ground when a state agent orders the plane to be shot down. The Court therefore found that a statute authorizing such orders violated human dignity. See 115 BVerfGE 118 (154) (2005)Google Scholar. For a discussion, see Hörnle, Tatjana & Kremnitzer, Mordechai, Human Dignity as a Protected Interest in Criminal Law, 44 Isr. L. Rev 143 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

198 Weigend, Thomas, “Die Strafe für das Opfer”? Zur Renaissance des Genugtuungsgedankens im Straf- und Strafverfahrensrecht, 1 Rechtswissenschaft 39, 52 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

199 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

200 For a view favoring victims' rights to be heard and to participate actively at the trial, see Walther, Susanne, Zum Anspruch des Deliktsopfers auf rechtliches Gehör und auf ein faires Verfahren, 154 Goltdammer's Archiv für Strafrecht 615, 619–20 (2007)Google Scholar. For a similar position, see Rieß, Peter, Zur Beteiligung des Verletzten im Strafverfahren, in Festschrift für Heike Jung 751, 755 (Müller-Dietz, Heinz et al. eds., 2007)Google Scholar. In Israel, one of the advocates for increasing victims' role in sentencing is Dana Pogatch, Director of Noga Legal Center for Victims of Crime. See, e.g., Pogatch, supra note 187.

201 For example, the Federal Constitutional Court has rejected a victim's claim that he had a constitutional right to have “his” offender prosecuted. See BVerfG Nov. 5, 2001, NJW 815, 2002; BVerfG Mar. 28, 2002, NJW 2589 (2590), 2002. For a discussion, see Bung, Jochen, Zweites Opferrechtsreformgesetz: Vom Opferschutz zur Opferermächtigung, 2009 Strafverteidiger [StV] 430Google Scholar; Weigend, Thomas, Das Opfer als Prozesspartei?, in Verbrechen—StrafeGoogle Scholar, supra note 99; Wenske, Marc, Weiterer Ausbau der Verletztenrechte?, 2008 NStZ 434Google Scholar.

202 See supra section IV.D.

203 This holds true even where an obligation to pay restitution to the victim is part of the criminal sentence, as the victim cannot directly enforce such restitution orders. See, e.g., StGB § 56f, para. 1, no. 3 in connection with § 56b, para. 2, no. 1 (the court revokes probation if the offender persistently fails to fulfill a court-imposed condition to make restitution).

204 For a more detailed discussion, see Weigend, Thomas, Deliktsopfer und Strafverfahren 428–34 (1989)Google Scholar.

205 See Entwurf eines Ersten Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Stellung des Verletzten im Strafverfahren, Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache [BT] 10/5305, 13, 16; Hilger, supra note 20, marginal note 9; Rieß, supra note 200, at 756-57.

206 See StPO § 406e (granting a victim's lawyer the right to inspect the prosecution file provided that he has a “justified interest” not overridden by countervailing interests of other persons).

207 At the trial, a subsidiary prosecutor has the right to ask questions of the defendant, witnesses, and experts. Id. § 397, para. 1.

208 The European Union has granted crime victims in its member states a minimal right to be informed of: (a) the outcome of their complaint; (b) relevant factors enabling them, in the event of prosecution, to know the conduct of the criminal proceedings regarding the person prosecuted for offenses concerning them, except in exceptional cases where the proper handling of the case may be adversely affected; and (c) the court's sentence. See Council Framework Decision No. 220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings, art. 4(2), 2001 O.J. (L 82) 1-4 (EU). Article 2(1) of the Framework Decision explicitly refers to the dignity of the victim: “Each Member State … shall continue to make every effort to ensure that victims are treated with due respect for the dignity of the individual during proceedings and shall recognise the rights and legitimate interests of victims with particular reference to criminal proceedings.”

209 See Weigend, supra note 204, at 502-8.

210 Council Framework Decision, supra note 208, art. 4(2)(b), wisely leaves open the possibility of withholding information “in exceptional cases where the proper handling of the case may be adversely affected.”