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Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2014

Abraham S. Goldstein
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Extract

It is becoming increasingly apparent to criminal justice scholars that single theory models of criminal procedure — whether termed inquisitorial or adversarial — are being stretched beyond their capacity by the phenomena they are designed to control. Virtually everywhere, formal systems of charge and adjudication cannot possibly be enforced in accordance with the premises underlying them. There are simply too many offenses, too many offenders and too few resources to deal with them all. One result has been a steady movement towards a convergence of legal systems — towards borrowing from others those institutions and practices that offer some hope of relief.

In this transnational effort to cope with system overload, two issues have emerged as more than ordinarily significant: The first is the desirability of abandoning the principle of obligatory prosecution, so common in Continental Europe, and turning instead to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The second is the question whether the ban on guilty pleas and plea bargains should be lifted, as in adversarial systems.

Type
Research Article
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 31 , Issue 1-3 , Winter-Summer 1997 , pp. 169 - 182
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1997

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Footnotes

*

Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This article appeared in a somewhat different version in (1996) 49 S.M.U. L. R. 567.

References

1 Hermann, Joachim, “Bargaining Justice — A Bargain for German Criminal Justice?”, (1992) 53 U. Pitt. L.R. 755 Google Scholar.

2 Fassler, Lawrence J., “The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe”, (1991) 29 Col. J. Transnat. L. 245 Google Scholar; Freccero, Stephen P., “An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal Procedure”, (1994) 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 345, at 373–5Google Scholar.

3 See the newsletters and reports of the Central and East European Law Initiative of the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., regarding law reform efforts in the Czech Republic, Hungary and elsewhere.

4 See, e.g., Frase, Richard S., “Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform”, (1990) 78 Calif. L.R. 53 Google Scholar; Frase, Richard S. and Weigend, Thomas, “German Criminal Justice As A Guide to American Law Reform”, (1995) Boston Coll. Int. and Comp. L.R. 317 Google Scholar; Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Great Britain), A Report on the Administration of Justice in the Pre-trial Phase in France and Germany (1992) (by Leonard H. Leigh and Lucia Zedner)Google Scholar.

5 Goldstein, Abraham S., “Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure”, (1974) 26 Stan. L.R. 1009 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 See, e.g., Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-2 (1980). As to jury trial and public confidence, see State v. Dunne, 590 A.2d 1144, 1149-50 (N.J. 1991).

7 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); see generally Goldstein, Abraham S., The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Guilty Plea (1981)Google Scholar.

8 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11; see generally Lafave, Wayne R. and Israel, Jerold H., Criminal Procedure, ch. 21 (2nd ed., 1992)Google Scholar.

9 See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225, 1226-27 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1992).

10 American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, §§ 1.8(a), 3.3(c) (1968)Google Scholar; See Gifford, Donald G., “Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion”, (1983) U. Ill. L.R. 37, at 54 Google Scholar.

11 United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Escobar Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 36-7 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 555, 558-9 (D. C. 1995); United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1461-2 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3rd 1423, 1436-39 (10th Cir. 1995); State v. Blanchard, 409 A.2d 229, 234 (Me. 1979); State v. Perez, 457 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Neb. 1990); State v. Matulonis, 230 N.W. 2d 347, 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).

12 Miller, Lowell B., “Judicial Discretion to Reject Negotiated Pleas”, (1974) 63 Geo. L.J. 241, at 246 Google Scholar.

13 United States v. Ammidown, supra n. 11, at 622.

14 United States v. Greener, 979 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cruz, 539 F.Supp. 231 (D. Puerto Rico, 1982), remanded 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1983); State v. Roubik, 404 N.W. 2d 105, 107 (Wis. App. 1987).

15 See, e.g., State v. Menucci, 514 N.E. 2d 758, 762-3 (Ct. Com. Pleas, Ohio, 1986); United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stamey, 569 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1978).

16 United States v. Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. 851, 853 n.2 (D. Utah, 1989).

17 United States v. Carrigan, supra n. 11, at 1458.

18 State v. Leisy, 295 N.W. 2d 715, 718 (Neb. 1980).

19 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); but see United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354 (Ct. Mil. App. 1983) (military justice system; Ross v. State, 456 N.E. 2d 420, 422-3 (Ind. 1983).

20 United States v. Bednarski, 445 F. 2d 364, 365-6 (1st Cir. 1971).

21 Ibid., at 366; see also United States v. Biscoe, (1st Cir. 1971) 518 F.2d 95, 96 (1st Cir. 1975); Comm v. Dilone, 431 N.E. 2d 576 (Mass. 1982).

22 United States v. Cox, 923 F.2d 519, 525-26 (7th Cir. 1991).

23 United States v. Gomez, 822 F.2d 1008, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987); see also State v. Pringle, 336 N.W. 2d 675 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Jackson, 366 A. 2d 148, 150 (R.I. 1976).

24 See supra n. 19.

25 To the same effect, see American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, § 1.6 (1968)Google Scholar; and see Barkai, John L., “Accuracy Inquiries for all Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants”, (1977) 126 U. Penn. L.R. 88 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; United States v. Johnston, 546 F.2d 1225, 1226-27 (5th Cir. 1977).

26 United States v. Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1305 (5th Cir. 1985), cert, denied 474 U.S. 818 (1985). It must be the same type of offense or part of the same course of conduct which led to the original charge, People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 420 (Cal. 1970).

27 Jones v. State, 505 S.W.2d 903, 906-7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Sanders, 309 N.W. 2d 144 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981).

28 State v. Norris, 558 P.2d 903 (Ariz. 1976).

29 John F. Archbold, Jr., Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (1991) 449-56; R. v. Soanes, 32 Cr. App. R. 136, 138 (1948).

30 People v. Clairborne, 280 N.E. 2d 366, 367 (App. Div. N.Y. 1972).

31 See also People v. Francis, 341 N.E. 2d 540 (N.Y. 1975); People v. Griffin, 166 N.E. 2d 684, 686-7 (N.Y. 1960); People v. Johnson, 181 N.W. 2d 425 (Minn. Ct. App. 1970); People v. Israel, 335 N.E. 2d 53, 56 (Ill. 1975); People v. Genes, 227 N.W. 2d 241, 243 (Mich. App. 1975); Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309 (Del. 1988); People v. Waits, 695 P. 2d 1176, 1178-9 (Colo. App. 1984).

32 People v. Foster, 225 N.E. 2d 200 (N.Y. 1967).

33 See Newman, Donald J., Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial (1966) 99–104 Google Scholar.

34 People v. Foster, supra n. 32, at 202.

35 Newman, Donald J. & NeMoyer, Edgar C., “Issues of Propriety in Negotiated Justice”, (1970) 47 Denver L.J. 367 Google Scholar.

36 Newman, Donald J., “The Agnew Plea Bargain”, (1974) 10 Crim. L. Bull. 85 Google Scholar; but cf. Kress, Jack, “The Agnew Case: Policy, Prosecution and Plea Bargaining”, (1974) 10 Crim. L. Bull. 80, at 84 Google Scholar: “Spiro Agnew was a charismatic politician who inspired fervent admirers and emotional critics. His trial could well have become the most divisive event in recent American history… It is unthinkable that this nation should have been required to endure the anguish and uncertainty of a prolonged period in which the man next in line of succession to the Presidency was fighting the charges brought against him by his own Government”.

37 See, e.g., Peel v. State, 150 So.2d 281, 293 (Fla. 1963), cert denied 380 U.S. 986; State v. Watkins, 194 S.E. 2d 800, 809-810 (N.C. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1000 (1973). A statute now authorizes such pleas, N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-2001 (1992). The only jurisdictions which now prohibit guilty pleas to capital crimes are Louisiana, L.A. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 557 (West. 1981), discussed in State v. Fabre, 525 So. 2d 1222, 1228 (La. Ct. App. 1988), and the military courts, Manual for Courts — Martial (1984) (10 U.S.C. §845, Art. 45). Professor Beattie says that guilty pleas were allowed in capital cases at common law but they were “actively discouraged” by trial judges. In a period when most felonies were capital offenses, judges often wished to avoid the death sentence and such a record could provide a basis for doing so. Beattie, J.M., Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800, (1986) 336 Google Scholar.

38 Halsbury's, , Laws of England (4th ed., Reissue 1990) 823 Google Scholar.