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The Predominance and Dilemmas of Theocratic Populism in Contemporary Iran

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Kambiz Afrachteh
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Extract

In July 1980, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi died in Egypt, approximately a year and a half after the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic. Once asked whether Madame de Pompadour's celebrated phrase, “Après nous le déluge” echoed his own sentiments, the shah had willingly agreed, and indeed, Iran has in the period since his ouster experienced the turbulent existence of a society in the throes of revolution. The prevailing climate of instability, interspersed by alleged conspiracies and widespread purges and executions, has given every indication of developing into a chronic condition, if it has not already done so. The economy has faltered under the burden of inflation, unemployment, and the inadequacy of managerial skills, and in the process, become wholly reliant on the revenues that accrue from the export of petroleum.

Type
Articles
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 14 , Issue 3-4 , Summer-Autumn 1981 , pp. 189 - 213
Copyright
Copyright © Association For Iranian Studies, Inc 1981

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Footnotes

The author would like to express his gratitude to Dr. Paul Keal of the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National University, and to Professor James Bill of the Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, for passing comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

References

Notes

1. The three major Marxist organizations are the orthodox, pro-Moscow Tudeh Party, the radical Islamic People's Mojahedin, and the Marxist-Leninist People's Fedayeen. In contrast to the two latter organizations, the Tudeh has generally given its tactical support to Khomeini's regime. The most important social-democratic leaders still in Iran are Mehdi Bazargan and Karim Sanjabi, the former prime minister and foreign minister, respectively.

2. Sharif Arani, “Iran: From the Shah's Dictatorship to Khomeini's Demagogic Theocracy,” Dissent (Winter 1980), p. 11.

3. See Thaiss, Gustav, “The Conceptualisation of Social Change through Metaphor,” Journal of Asian and African Studies XIII (19), pp. 1–18Google Scholar on the synthesis of religion and politics in Iran.

4. Arani has translated “mostazefin” as “disinherited.” See loc. cit., pp. 12-13.

5. Ionescu, Ghita and Gellner, Ernest (eds.), populism - Its Meanings and National Characteristics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

6. Alistair Hennesy, “Latin America” in Ionescu and Gellner, ibid., p. 28.

7. Sharif Arani, “The Iranian Revolution: Year Zero,” Dissent (Spring 1980), p. 147.

8. Since the overthrow of the shah, the most serious ethnic rebellions have occurred in Kurdistan, the Caspian littoral provinces, Khuzistan, Azerbaijan, and Baluchistan. There are also the numerically weak religious minorities including the Bahais, the Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, who can never be anything but secondclass citizens in a Shi'i theocracy. For consideration of Arabs in Khuzistan, the Baluchis and the Kurds see, respectively: Philippe Rondot, “La Guerre du Chatt al-Arab: Les Raisons de l'Irak,” politique Etrangère, No. 4 (December 1980); Selig Harrison “Un Nouvel Enjeu International: le Baloutchistan,” ibid; Andrew Whitely, “The Kurds: Pressures and Prospects,” Round Table (July 1980).

9. Ionescu and Gellner, op. cit., p. 3.

10. Donald MacRae, “Populism as an Ideology,” in Ionescu and Gellner, ibid., p. 164.

11. Amir Taheri, Canberra Times, June 3, 1981.

12. Sunday Times, September 6, 1981.

13. The Times, September 10, 1981.

14. According to Taheri, the opposition has recently adopted four basic, guerrilla tactics: to interrupt road and rail communications to and from Tehran; to destroy food reserves; to decimate the Revolutionary Guards, and; to force the regime to spread its troops thinly as opposed to allowing them to remain concentrated around Tehran and the oil industry center. Sunday Times, August 9, 1981.

15. There have occurred several abortive military coups in the short history of the Islamic Republic. The ideological chasm between the Revolutionary Guards and Islamic militias, on the one hand, and the military establishment on the other, has potentially devastating consequences should they come face to face. The military establishment could conceivably splinter into different factions, opposed to and in favor of the Islamic Republic.

16. For a detailed development of this scenario, see my article entitled, “Theocratic Populism, Superpower Rivalry and the Balkanisation of Iran: A Scenario,” World Review XX, No. 3 (August 1981), pp. 31–48.Google Scholar