1 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Armed Conflict, Crime and Criminal Violence”, in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 37–60. See also Weinstein, Jeremy, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Sebastian von Einsiedel, Louise Bosetti, James Cockayne, Cale Salih and Wilfred Wan, Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Occasional Paper 10, March 2017, New York, pp. 4–5. See also Cockayne, James, “Chasing Shadows: Strategic Responses to Organised Crime in Conflict-Affected Situations,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, No. 2, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Note, diamond smuggling was not the only illicit trade conducted by the parties to the conflict. Details are included in the judgments of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and Final Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC Report) relating to trade in drugs, arms and other natural resources, to name a few.

4 This connection has been noted in relation to other conduct described as organized crime, such as terrorism. See further, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflicts on the 70th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, Geneva, 2019, pp. 57–64. See further, Rodenhäuser, Tilman, “The Legal Protection of Persons Living Under the Control of Non-State Armed Groups”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 102, No. 915, 2020CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 See, for example, SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (the RUF Accused), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment (Trial Chamber I), 2 March 2009 (Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Trial Judgment), on crimes connected with diamond mining in Sierra Leone; and Human Rights Council, “They Came to Destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2, 15 June 2016, on slavery and genocide in Iraq.

6 ICRC, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention: Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, paras 151 and 584–5; International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 136, para. 79.

7 See further, Antonio Cassese, Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Submitted by the Independent Expert Antonio Cassese, 12 December 2006, available at: www.rscsl.org/documents.html (all internet references were accessed in August 2022); Human Rights Watch, Justice in Motion: The Trial Phase of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2 November 2005, available at: www.hrw.org/report/2005/11/02/justice-motion/trial-phase-special-court-sierra-leone; and Wayne Jordash and Scott Martin, “How the Approach to JCE in Taylor and the RUF Case Undermined the Demands of Justice at the Special Court for Sierra Leone”, in Charles Chernor Jalloh (ed.), The Sierra Leone Special Court and its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.

8 See further, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “The TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone”, in Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC Report), Vol. Three B, Chapter 6, Freetown, 2004, available at: www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-the-final-report/table-of-contents; Alpha Sesay, “To Compete or to Complement? Assessing the Relationship between the Sierra Leone Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, in C. C. Jalloh, ibid.

9 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 7–44; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (the AFRC Accused), Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 20 June 2007 (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) Trial Judgment), paras 155–209; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Trial Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 18 May 2012 (Taylor Trial Judgment), paras 18–70.

10 See further, “Nature of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 4.

11 See further, “Historical Antecedents to the Conflicts”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 1; and “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 1–71.

12 See further, “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 86–113. Prior to the start of the conflict, there had been incursions by the RUF and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) from Liberia in the 1990s, characterized by the TRC as “cross-border raised”. See paras 85 and 122–89.

13 See further, “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 32–54 for history and connection with the conflict in Liberia from 1991, and paras 114–21 for Taylor's link with his strategy in the conflict in Liberia. See also Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9; and RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 722–4.

14 “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 16–23. See also paras 123–6, particularly para. 125. See further, paras 24–31 on early formations of the group and the rise of Foday Sankoh as leader.

15 AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 162–3.

16 “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 646–93; RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 743 and 745. This followed an earlier coup in 1992 when junior ranks of the Sierra Leone Army staged a coup under the command of Captain Valentine Strasser and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) Government. Elections were subsequently held in 1996. The leader of the AFRC, Johnny Paul Koroma had also staged an earlier attempt of a coup in September 1996, but was unsuccessful, and subsequently jailed. See AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 158 and 161. See further, “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 273–343 and 580–621.

17 “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 558–79. See further, paras 694–849. See also RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 743; and AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 159, 161 and 164.

18 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 747. See also Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 6749.

19 “Mineral Resources, Their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three B, Chapter 1, para. 8.

20 AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 169. See also Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 6749.

21 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 763; AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 169 and 171–2.

22 “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 850–86. See further, paras 905–9. See also RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 777–8.

23 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 787–91; AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 179.

24 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 820. See further, paras 817–19. See also AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 189.

25 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 879–87.

26 AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 209.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., para. 43.

29 Ibid., para. 209. Issa Sesay was voted as interim leader after Sankoh was arrested in May 2000 following an incident at his house where his bodyguards killed several civilian protestors. RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 42. See further, Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 6611–12.

30 See further, “Historical Antecedents to the Conflict”, “Governance” and “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapters 1–3; Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The R.U.F. and the Destruction of Sierra Leone, Hurst, London, 2005; David Keen, Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone, James Currey, Oxford, 2005; and Charles C. Jalloh, “The Sierra Leone Conflict”, in C. C. Jalloh, The Legal Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020.

31 See “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 751–2; and “Mineral Resources, Their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three B, Chapter 1, paras 147 and 148. See also RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 1247. The TRC Report also highlights that in the earliest stages of the conflict, NPFL fighters also engaged in “looting and mining activities, using mostly forced labour” when they first took control of the southern front, Pujehun District: “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 231–2.

32 “Mineral Resources, Their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three B, Chapter 1, para. 7.

33 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Summary of the Findings and the Core Recommendations of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), para. 1, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/summary-findings-and-core-recommendations-sierra-leone-truth-and-reconciliation. See further, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Findings”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Two, Chapter 2.

34 “Mineral Resources, Their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three B, Chapter 1, para. 7.

35 Ibid., paras 11–16.

36 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 652–6. See further, “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 21–31 for history and links with the Pan-Africanism movement. See also “External Actors and Their Impact on the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three B, Chapter 2, paras 5–13. See also the RUF manifesto, “Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone”, published by the group in 1995, available at: www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html.

37 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 652–3.

38 Ibid., para. 652.

39 “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A Chapter 3, para. 171. See also, “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, paras 225–7, which includes an RUF mantra, “Arms to the People, Power to the People, Wealth to the People”.

40 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 743; AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para.164.

41 AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 169; Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 6749.

42 “Mineral Resources, Their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three B, Chapter 1, para. 207. See further, UN General Assembly Resolution 57/302, UN Doc. A/RES/57/302, 30 April 2003.

43 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 23.

44 Ibid., paras 776–82.

45 Ibid., paras 787–91.

46 Ibid., paras 794 and 796.

47 “Mineral Resources, Their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three B, Chapter 1, para. 50.

48 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 799.

49 Article 3(1)(a) common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP II), Arts 4(1), 4(2)(a) and 13. See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, Rule 1.

50 AP II, Art. 17; J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, ibid., Rule 129.

51 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, ibid., Rule 56.

52 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, ibid., Rule 8.

53 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, ibid., Rules 11 and 12. See further, Alexander Schwarz and Maria Grigat, “Scorched Earth Policy”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, para. 8.

54 AP II, Art. 14; J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, ibid., Rule 54.

55 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 813. The AFRC and RUF troops managed to maintain control over much of Kono District during this period, however. The RUF made further attempts in August 1998 and December 1998 to retake Koidu from ECOMOG. The attack in December was successful and the RUF regained control of the area. See RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 814, 823 and 861–5.

56 Ibid., para. 813.

57 Ibid., paras 1118–19. See further, J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rules 94 and 95.

58 See, for example, description of mining at Cyborg Pit in Tongo Field, Kenema, one of the largest diamond-producing areas in Sierra Leone at RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 1118, AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 1280–90; and Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 1616–22. The same conditions were found to have been implemented throughout Kono District from December 1998 until January 2000: RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 1328. The Trial Chambers findings relating to diamond mining were largely held up on appeal. Two grounds of appeal were granted in relation to Sesay and one in relation to Kallon. See SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 26 October 2009, paras 91–5, 146–51, 662–713, 863–75, 928–34, 998–1022 and 1071–99. See also SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 22 February 2008, paras 82, 170–4 and 260–5; and SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 26 September 2013, paras 260–73.

59 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 1119, 1243–7 and 1250; AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 229 and 1291–3; and Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 1627. There are some differences noted in the judgments of these rules and structure during different timeframes and in different places in the conflict. See, for example, RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 1248 and 1250.

60 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 1119. See also para. 1248; AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 1292–3; and Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 1627. The judgments also include different descriptions of mining rules. See, for example, Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 1624.

61 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 1119. See also paras 1129–30 and paras 1251–2. See further, Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 1627.

62 See further, T. Rodenhäuser, above note 4, pp. 995–6 and pp. 1001–9. In addition, these events also raise issues relating to the application of international human rights law and international criminal law, to name a few. As the focus of this article is to highlight how IHL may add to this mix of legal protections in relieving the impact of organized crime in armed conflict on those not participating in the hostilities, the application and standards of these other fields will not be considered further.

63 Common Article 3(1); AP II, Art. 4(1); and J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rules 87 and 95.

64 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 90.

65 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 1106–7. See J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 89. See further, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), Arts 6, 7 and 8; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Arts 7, 10(3), 11 and 12; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 1520 UNTS 217 (entered into force 21 October 1986), Arts 4, 5, 6, 15, 16 and 21.

66 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 1119, 1129–30 and 1251–2; Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 1625.

67 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 1259.

68 The judgment also includes details on RUF commanders similarly forcing civilians to work on farms owned by them privately, of which proceeds would go to the commander and not the general RUF. RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 1425–6.

69 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 153. See further, Rule 139.

70 This has been observed in other contexts, such as in the armed conflict in Myanmar, where an environment of impunity leads to further violations of IHL. See Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, paras 1380–4.

71 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 801 and 804. See further, J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 93.

72 AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 188; RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 801; Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 6754; and “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, footnote 535 in para. 1080.

73 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 801. See further, paras 802 and 804.

74 AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 184.

75 “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, footnote 535 in para. 1080. See also RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 801 and 804.

76 AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 188.

77 Ibid. Johnny Paul Koroma also informed that AFRC Commander Gullit also possessed diamonds, and Sesay was sent to arrest him, and his diamonds were also seized. Sam Bockarie of the RUF subsequently reorganized the command structure of the AFRC/RUF, appointing himself as the most senior commander for military operations. See RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 803–12.

78 AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 188; RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 801; Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 6754; and “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, footnote 535 in para. 1080.

79 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 801 and 804. “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, footnote 535 in para. 1080 also provides further details on the background to these events. It states that “Koroma and his wife were captured, searched and allegedly brutalised by RUF combatants under the command of Sam Bockarie (alias Mosquito).”

80 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 22 February 2001, paras 568–9.

81 Ibid., para. 568.

82 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 948.

83 Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, C. H. Beck and Hart Publishing, Munich and Oxford, 2008, 2nd ed., pp. 300–5, 323, 446–88 and 493. Interestingly, the AFRC Trial Judgment and Taylor Trial Judgment both concluded that the AFRC/RUF were the government of Sierra Leone during the period from the coup in May 1997 until ECOMOG's intervention in February 1998. See AFRC Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 225–66; and Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 6765. Although trade in diamonds was still done through illicit means, so in no way changing the criminal character of the conduct relating to exploitation of natural resources, this conclusion does have implications for other obligations under international law owed towards the civilian population, namely international human rights law. Such considerations were beyond the scope of the SCSL's jurisdiction and, unfortunately, this article.

84 See Stephen J. Rapp, “The Challenge of Choice in the Investigation and Prosecution of International Crimes in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone”, in C. C. Jalloh, above note 7, pp. 25–6.

85 See further, Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Conduct of Hostilities”, in S. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014.

86 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 52; AP II, Art. 4(2).

87 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 205–12. See further, International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, The Hague, 2011, Art. 8(2)(e)(v), p. 36; and Nuzban, Yulia, “‘For Private or Personal Use’: The Meaning of the Special Intent Requirement in the War Crime of Pillage under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 102, No. 915, 2020CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, para. 4542.

89 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 51. See further, Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and Its Interaction with International Human Rights Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009, pp. 167–82 and 195–260; and Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 122–3.

90 E. Benvenisti, ibid., p. 123.

91 Hague Convention (IV) on War on Land and its Annexed Regulations, 18 October 1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910), Art. 55: “The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.”

92 E. Benvenisti, above note 89, p. 123.

93 Ibid.

94 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, para. 1. Held by the ICJ to be custom in Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168, para. 244.

95 Hague Regulation (IV), 1907, above note 91, Art. 55.

96 ICJ, Armed Activities case, above note 94, paras 246–50.

97 Daniëlla Dam-de Jong, “Between Paradox and Panacea: Legalizing Exploitation of Natural Resources by Armed Groups in the Fight Against Conflict Resources, Armed Groups and International Law Blog”, Armed Groups and International Law, 18 June 2019, available at: www.armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2019/06/18/between-paradox-and-panacea-legalizing-exploitation-of-natural-resources-by-armed-groups-in-the-fight-against-conflict-resources/.

98 See Philip Spoerri, “The Law of Occupation”, in Andrew Clapham and Paula Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 185. See further, ICRC, Commentary on GC III, 2020, above note 6, paras 226 and 362–6. Note that the concept of “protected persons” under GC IV has developed to include persons of the same nationality as the attacking party, but who lack allegiance to the State of their nationality; see ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72-A, Judgement (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999, para. 166; International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Pre-Trial Chamber I), 30 September 2008, paras 289–93. Note, however, that nationality is not relevant in determining protected status in NIACs. See further, common Article 3; and AP II, Arts 4(1) and 13(1).

99 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 982–8.

100 Graham, Gael M., “Protection and Reversion of Cultural Property: Issues of Definition and Justification”, The International Lawyer, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1987, p. 759Google Scholar.

101 Note the implications of the conclusions of the AFRC and Taylor judgments that the AFRC/RUF were the “government” during the junta period. Whilst the AFRC/RUF continued to exploit diamonds through illicit trade, it raises an interesting point in relation to when non-State actors exercise State powers. See further, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Cornelius Wiesener, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: An Assessment Based on Recent Practice”, in Ezequiel Heffes, Marcos D. Kotlik and Manuel J. Ventura (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Policy, Springer, Sydney, 2020.

102 AP II, Art. 4(2)(g); J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 52.

103 See, for example, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić also known as “Pavo”, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo also known as “Zenga” (Mucić et al.), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 16 November 1998 (Čelebići judgment), para. 590; and N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and Others v. The War Damage Commission, Singapore Law Reports, 1956, p. 65. See further, James G. Stewart, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources, Open Society Justice Initiative, New York, 2011, para. 16.

104 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Trial Judgment, 1998, ibid., para. 590. See further, J. G. Stewart, ibid., paras 16–19.

105 See further, J. G. Stewart, above note 103, para. 16.

106 See, for example, RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 828, 1042 and 1088; and Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 6139–49.

107 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 1339.

108 AP II, Art. 4.

109 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 87. See further, T. Rodenhäuser, above note 4, p. 1000.

110 See, for example, RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 1420; and “Children and the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three B, Chapter 4, paras 126–33 and 149–50.

111 RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, para. 986. See also para. 1093.

112 See further, Kleffner, Jann, “The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 882, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

113 See, for example, ICRC, Displacement in Time of Armed Conflict: How International Humanitarian Law Protects in War, and Why it Matters, Geneva, 2019.

114 ICRC, Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention: Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, paras 1372, 1417 and 1418.

115 Ibid., para. 1418; ICRC, Commentary on GC III, 2020, above note 6, para. 1573.

116 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV), Art. 51(1).

117 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC III), Art. 62(1). See further, Arts 54 and 58–68.

118 GC III, Art. 53; and GC IV, Art. 51(3).

119 GC III, Art. 55.

120 GC III, Art. 54(2).

121 See Y. Sandoz et al., above note 88, para. 4579.

122 See further, GC III, Arts 49–57; and GC IV, Arts 51(2), (3) and (4), and 95 and 96. See also GC IV, Art. 52.

123 ICRC, above note 113, p. 40.

124 See further, ICRC, Allies, Partners and Proxies: Managing Support Relationships in Armed Conflict to Reduce the Human Cost of War, Geneva, 2021.

125 Common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See further, Robin Geiß, “Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect”, in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 120–3. See also Dörmann, Knut and Serralvo, Jose, “Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 96, No. 895–896, 2014CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

126 ICRC, Commentary on GC II, 2017, above note 114, para. 146.

127 R. Geiß, above note 125, pp. 120–3.

128 J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 49, Rule 144; ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, 26 November 1984, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 392, para. 220. See also ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 162. See further, ICRC, Commentary on GC II, 2017, above note 114, paras 193–5.

129 R. Geiß, above note 125, pp. 124–30.

130 Ibid., p. 123.

131 ICRC, Commentary on GC III, 2020, above note 6, para. 183. See further, Konstantinos Mastorodimos, Armed Non-State Actors in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law: Foundation and Framework of Obligations, and Rules on Accountability, Routledge, London and New York, 2016, pp. 55–137.

132 Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, para. 6345. See further, RUF Trial Judgment, above note 5, paras 40, 44, 556, 896 and 1610–11; and “The Military and Political History of the Conflict”, in TRC Report, above note 8, Vol. Three A, Chapter 3, paras 640, 1031–8, 1111 and 1113 on the West Side Boys.

133 See, for example, Taylor Trial Judgment, above note 9, paras 6414 and 6450.

134 Ibid., paras 6139(i), (ii) and (v), and 6140–3 and 6145.

135 ICRC, Commentary on GC III, 2020, above note 6, paras 191–6.

136 See further, UN Security Council, Resolution 1306 (2000), S/RES/1306 (2000), 5 July 2000.

137 See, for example, details of a criminal case relating to international crimes connected with diamond smuggling in Belgium: Civitas Maxima, “Michel Desaedeleer”, available at: https://civitas-maxima.org/legal-work/our-cases/michel-desaedeleer/. See, also, prosecution related to arms smuggling in the United States: Jonathan Stempel, “Russian Arms Dealer Viktor Bout's U.S. Conviction Upheld”, Reuters, 27 September 2013, available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-bout-idUSBRE98Q0PG20130927. See further, Jason Ryan, “New Charges Against ‘Merchant of Death’ Viktor Bout”, ABC News, 17 February 2010, available at: https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/russian-arms-dealer-viktor-bout-charges-merchant-death/story?id=9865996.

138 See, for example, Global Witness, Briefing: The Kimberly Process, 1 April 2013, available at: www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process/; and Global Witness, Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control Zimbabwe's New-Found Diamond Wealth, 2010, available at: www.globalwitness.org/documents/10521/return_of_blood_diamond.pdf. See also Howard, Audrie, “Blood Diamonds: The Successes and Failures of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe”, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2016Google Scholar.

139 ICRC, Commentary on GC III, 2020, above note 6, para. 200.

140 Amado Philip de Andrés, “West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism as the New Threats to Global Security”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 16, January 2008. See also Ismail Rashid, “Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front”, in Michelle Hughes and Michael Miklaucic (eds), Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and Transition, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2016, p. 201, available at: https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/780201/chapter-8-sierra-leone-the-revolutionary-united-front/, referencing Diane Frost, From Pit to Market: Politics and the Diamond Economy in Sierra Leone, James Currey, New York, 2012, p. 76.

141 Such as, for example, following the peace agreement between the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. See Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States, Twenty-Third Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), 2016, p. 2. See also International Alert, The Role of the Exploitation of Natural Resources in Fuelling and Prolonging Crisis in the Eastern DRC, January 2010, available at: www.international-alert.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/DRC-Natural-Resources-Conflict-EN-2010.pdf.