1 Quoted in “Antonio Cassese: The Stubborn Sparrow”, Episode 0: “The Knight and the Sparrow”, Geneva Graduate Institute, 8 December 2021, available at: www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/new-podcast-series-antonio-cassese (all internet references were accessed in April 2023).

2 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization, confirmed that the global average temperature has been increasing since the mid-twentieth century and that anthropogenic GHG emissions have been the dominant cause – in other words, that the human influence on Earth's climate system is clear. IPCC, AR4 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report – Summary for Policymakers, 2007, pp. 2–5; IPCC, AR5 Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report – Summary for Policymakers, 2015, pp. 2–7.

3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 107, 9 May 1992 (entered into force 21 March 1994) (UNFCCC).

4 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2303 UNTS 162, 11 December 1997 (entered into force 16 February 2005) (Kyoto Protocol).

5 Paris Agreement, 3156 UNTS 107, 12 December 2015 (entered into force 4 November 2016).

6 Benvenisti defines a belligerent occupation as a situation where the forces of one or more States exercise control over the territory of another State without the latter's permission, a situation regulated by international law because occupation does not transfer sovereignty over the territory to the Occupying Power: Eyal Benvenisti, “Occupation, Belligerent”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, May 2009, para. 1. Belligerent occupations are characterized, therefore, by their non-consensual nature: see Dinstein, Yoram, The International Law of Belligerent Occupations, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Benvenisti, Eyal, The International Law of Occupation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 83–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Mikhail Orkin and Tristan Ferraro, “IHL and Occupied Territory”, Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 26 July 2022, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2022/07/26/armed-conflict-ukraine-ihl-occupied-territory/.

9 Hague Convention (IV) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex, 18 October 1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910) (Hague Convention IV).

10 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV).

11 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I).

12 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 vols, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl.

13 As explained by Lieblich and Benvenisti, the law of occupation interacts nowadays with many “neighbouring” international legal frameworks and institutions because when it emerged in the nineteenth century, it was the only body of law that regulated military control over hostile territory. Eliav Lieblich and Eyal Benvenisti, Occupation in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, p. 3.

14 ILC, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, with Commentaries, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part II, 2011 (ILC Draft Articles).

15 UNGA Res. 43/53, 6 December 1988.

16 Naomi Klein, “How Will Everything Change under Climate Change?”, The Guardian, 8 March 2015, available at: www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/08/how-will-everything-change-under-climate-change.

17 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the U.S. President at U.N. Climate Change Summit”, UN Headquarters, New York, 23 September 2014, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/remarks-president-un-climate-change-summit.

18 Ban Ki-Moon, “UN Secretary-General's Remarks at Climate Leaders’ Summit”, Washington, DC, 11 April 2014, available at: www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-04-11/secretary-generals-remarks-climate-leaders-summit.

19 Mike Hulme, “Why We Disagree about Climate Change”, May 2009, available at: www.mikehulme.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Hulme-Carbon-Yearbook.pdf.

20 Rajamani, Lavanya, “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Framework Approach to Climate Change”, in Daniel Farber and Marjan Peeters (eds), Climate Change Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2016, p. 206Google Scholar.

21 Ibid., p. 214.

22 Bakker also highlights that in the Paris Agreement, the term “armed conflict” is not even mentioned and there is no explicit reference to what States commit to do to prevent the effects of climate change from contributing to or intensifying armed conflicts. Bakker, Christine, “The Relationship between Climate Change and Armed Conflict in International Law: Does the Paris Climate Agreement Add Anything New?”, Peace Processes Online Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2016, p. 7Google Scholar.

23 Voigt, Christina, “Institutional Arrangements and Final Clauses”, in Daniel R. Klein, María Pía Carazo Ortiz, Meinhard Doelle, Jane Bulmer and Andrew Higham (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, p. 354Google Scholar.

24 ILC, Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part II, 2022 (ILC Draft Principles).

25 As the law of occupation is part of IHL, the ILC clarified that Draft Principle 19 shall be read in the context of Draft Principle 13. Ibíd., p. 159.

26 For instance, some scholars consider that international climate change law is not a self-contained regime because it sits squarely within the fields of IEL and public international law more broadly. See Bodansky, Daniel, Brunnée, Jutta and Rajamani, Lavanya (eds), International Climate Change Law, 1st ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, p. 11Google Scholar. Others believe that although international climate change law can be considered as a sub-area of IEL, due to its contemporary significance and the active negotiations and cooperation taking place between States, it is considered a unique area of international law. See Carlarne, Cinnamon Piñon, Gray, Kevin and Tarasofsky, Richard (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law, 1st ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 6–7Google Scholar. Despite the academic divergences on whether the UN climate change regime is or is not a new branch different from IEL, here it is considered that the regime is part of IEL.

27 ILC Draft Principles, above note 24, p. 159.

28 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996 (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), paras 27–33. See also Weiss, Edith Brown, “Opening the Door to the Environment and to Future Generations”, in de Chazournes, Laurence Boisson and Sands, Philippe (eds), International Law, the International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 338–353Google Scholar.

29 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 28, para. 97.

30 During the International Environmental Law Conference organized by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (Oslo, 3–6 October 2022), Professor Cymie Payne mentioned in her presentation that “the environment is marginalized as soon as a commercial or security reason appears”.

31 The expression “carbon bootprint” has been being used by NGOs advocating for increasing awareness and understanding of the environmental and derived humanitarian consequences of conflicts and military activities, and transparency from the military sector when reporting its GHG emissions. See, for example, the websites of the Conflict and Environmental Observatory, available at: https://ceobs.org/about/; Scientists for Global Responsibility, available at: www.sgr.org.uk; and The Military Emissions Gap, available at: https://militaryemissions.org/.

32 On the relationship between armed conflicts and GHG emissions, see Eoghan Darbyshire and Doug Weir, “How Does War Contribute to Climate Change?”, Conflict and Environment Observatory, 14 June 2021, available at: https://ceobs.org/how-does-war-contribute-to-climate-change/; Linsey Cottrell and Eoghan Darbyshire, “The Military's Contribution to Climate Change”, Conflict and Environment Observatory, 16 June 2021, available at: https://ceobs.org/the-militarys-contribution-to-climate-change/.

33 As they did before the ICJ when they argued that the principal purpose of environmental treaties and norms was the protection of the environment in times of peace. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 28, para. 28.

34 Spoerri, Philip, “The Law of Occupation”, in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 192Google Scholar.

35 See the Geneva Academy's Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts website, available at: www.rulac.org.

36 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 12 August 1992. Principle 23 establishes: “The environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation shall be protected.” Principle 24 states: “Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and co-operate in its further development, as necessary.”

37 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (VCLT).

38 Tougas, Marie-Louise, “Principle 24”, in Jorge E. Viñuales (ed.), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 573Google Scholar.

39 As clearly highlighted by Pavoni and Piselli, this principle does not contain specific normative prescriptions, but it has over the years become a significant and vibrant international law standard. Riccardo Pavoni and Dario Piselli, Armed Conflicts and the Environment: An Assessment of Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration Thirty Years On, University of Siena, February 2022, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4071106. This can be observed in the ICJ's Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, when this principle was cited to support the Opinion's interpretation and conclusion that environmental considerations must be taken into account when assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 28, para. 30.

40 Mara Tignino, “Principle 23”, in J. E. Viñuales (ed.), above note 38, p. 559.

41 E. Lieblich and E. Benvenisti, above note 13, p. 1; Cuyckens, Hanne, Revisiting the Law of Occupation, Brill Nijhoff, Boston, MA, 2018, p. 103CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Gross considers that this provision became the cornerstone in the determination of the nature and scope of the Occupying Power's responsibility: the occupation is temporary, and the Occupying Power is to manage the territory in a manner that protects civil life, exercising its authority as a trustee of the sovereign. Gross, Aeyal, The Writing on the Wall: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 Sassòli, Marco, “Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2005, p. 669CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 Ibid.; Yoram Dinstein, “Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding”, Occasional Paper Series, No. 1, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University, Autumn 2004, p. 4; Arai-Takahashi, Yutuka, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and Its Interaction with International Human Rights Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, p. 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 See Meron, Theodor, “Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Territories”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1978CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Longobardo, Marco, The Use of Armed Force in Occupied Territory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, p. 45Google Scholar.

46 E. Benvenisti, above note 7, pp. 83–86; Jong, Daniëlla Dam-de, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015, p. 157CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 As an example, Hulme mentions that in drought-prone regions, those acting as occupiers must ensure the right to survival of the affected population, and one way to achieve this might be by actively rebuilding facilities or reconnecting damaged services. Karen Hulme, “Climate Change and International Humanitarian Law”, in Rosemary Rayfuse and Shirley V. Scott (eds), International Law in the Era of Climate Change, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012, pp. 209–210.

48 See the UN Treaty Collection website, available at: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en.

49 See the UN Treaty Collection website, available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en. Due to the number of States Parties to both legal instruments, it can also be argued that the UN climate change regime has become general customary law. Whether or not this has happened, Baxter explains that in the case of treaties with a high number of States Parties, it is difficult to demonstrate the existence of the customary rule outside the treaty because of the low number of non-party States whose practices or behaviours can be surveyed or analyzed for that purpose. Richard Baxter, “Treaties and Customs”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 129, Hague Academy of International Law, Leiden, 1970, p. 64.

50 UNFCCC, above note 3, Art. 25; Paris Agreement, above note 5, Art. 28.

51 Scott explains that according to this territorial system boundary, emissions are allocated to the country in which goods and services are produced rather than the country in which they are consumed. Scott, Joanne, “Unilateralism, Extraterritoriality and Climate Change”, in Daniel Farber and Marjan Peeters (eds), Climate Change Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2016, pp. 168–169Google Scholar.

52 Ibid.

53 Duvic-Paoli and Viñuales mention that the prevention principle performs important interpretive functions of treaty provisions relating to other matters, such as to clarify or update their content or to conciliate different considerations. Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli and Jorge Viñuales, “Principle 2”, in J. E. Viñuales (ed.), above note 38, p. 120.

54 Duvic-Paoli, Leslie-Anne, The Prevention Principle in International Environmental Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, p. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sands, Philippe, Peel, Jacqueline, Fabra, Adriana and Mackenzie, Ruth, Principles of International Environmental Law, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 191CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55 L.-A. Duvic-Paoli and J. Viñuales, above note 53, p. 107.

56 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 28, para. 29; ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, para. 101.

57 An example of the application of the harm prevention principle to other international law regimes is the case of the law of the sea. Article 194(2) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that States “shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other states and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with [the] Convention”. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3, 10 December 1982 (entered into force 16 November 1994).

58 See Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. Brunnée explains that the harm prevention rule finds its conceptual origins not in the protection of the environment but in the mutual limitation of sovereign rights to the use and enjoyment of territory. She further clarifies that the harm prevention rule should be understood as an obligation of conduct that requires States to exercise due diligence in the face of risks of significant transboundary environmental harm. Brunnée, Jutta, “Harm Prevention”, in Lavanya Rajamani and Jacqueline Peel (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, pp. 269Google Scholar, 283.

59 ICJ, Pulp Mills, above note 56, para. 101.

60 Kalandarishvili-Mueller points out that the notion of control is not only important for classifying situations of military occupation, but also plays a significant role in wider international law as each branch uses and positions control in different tests and with different thresholds: Natia Kalandarishvili-Mueller, Occupation and Control in International Humanitarian Law, Routledge, Abingdon, 2020, p. 3.

61 Benvenisti considers that the occupation's authority derives not from a right to control but from the fact of control that depends on a factual determination of the occupant's effective control over certain territory: E. Benvenisti, above note 7, p. 43.

62 Vité, Sylvain, “Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 873, 2009, p. 74CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Posse, Hortensia Gutierrez, Elementos de derecho internacional humanitario, Editorial Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 2014, pp. 94–95Google Scholar; Tristan Ferraro (ed.), Expert Meeting: Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory, ICRC, Geneva, 2011, pp. 16–26; ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 173.

63 As an example of the extraterritorial application of the UN climate change regime, some States party to the Paris Agreement with territorial disputes made interpretative declarations when expressing their consent to be bound (as reservations are prohibited). For instance, in the case where the United Kingdom ratified the Agreement and its application was extended to the territory of Gibraltar, the king of Spain declared that Gibraltar is a non-autonomous territory subject to a decolonization process, whose international relations come under the responsibility of the United Kingdom. The declaration can be read at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en. Moreover, the war between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Ukraine has motivated these two States to rely on the Paris Agreement as a source of legal argument to assert their sovereign rights over the disputed territories by including the Crimean GHG emissions as part of their respective territories. See Michael Birnbaum, “At War, Russia Aims to Claim Ukraine's Land – and Its Carbon Emissions”, Washington Post, 18 October 2022, available at: www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/10/18/russia-ukraine-crimea-emissions/. Regardless of the legality or illegality of the exercise of sovereign powers in a given territory, and the diplomatic strategies that countries can implement to support their legal claims, the measuring and reducing of GHG emissions from an occupied territory should be depoliticized in the interests of the protection of Earth's climate system. A practical approach should be implemented to shed light on this issue for all States party to the UN climate change regime. This could take the form, for instance, of a resolution by the Conference of the Parties which clarifies that the inclusion of GHG emissions from territories under occupation in reporting by the Occupying Power shall not constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty or create any rights of sovereignty over an occupied territory, as was successfully agreed in Article 4 of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty for disputed territories in that area. This would help to ensure that territorial disputes and belligerent occupations do not affect the continuous application of the UN climate change regime and, consequently, the effective measurement and reduction of GHG emissions.

64 ILC Draft Articles, above note 14, Art. 3. The Draft Articles follow the criteria developed previously by the Institute of International Law in its 1985 resolution on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties. In Article 2 of that resolution, the Institute proposed that “[t]he mere outbreak of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties in force between the parties to the armed conflict”. And in Article 3 of the resolution, it is proposed that “[t]he outbreak of an armed conflict renders operative between the parties the treaties which expressly provide that they are to be operative during an armed conflict or which by reason of their nature or purpose are to be regarded as operative during an armed conflict”. See Institute of International Law, Yearbook, Vol. 61, Part I, Session of Helsinki 1985, Preparatory Work, pp. 25–27. The principle of legal stability and continuity of treaties is also one of the arguments that the ILC invoked to support the conclusion that treaties relating to the international protection of the environment may continue in operation during armed conflict. ILC Draft Principles, above note 24, p. 160.

65 ILC Draft Articles, above note 14, p. 119.

66 Some of these factors are related to the general rule of interpretation of treaties established in Article 31 of the VCLT.

67 ILC Draft Articles, above note 14, p. 120

68 Ibid.

69 Halldór Thorgeirsson, “Objective (Article 2.1)”, in D. R. Klein et al. (eds), above note 23, p. 124.

70 Voneky, Silja, “Peacetime Environmental Law as a Basis of State Responsibility for Environmental Damage Caused by War”, in Jay Austin and Carl Bruch (eds), The Environmental Consequences of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, August 2010, pp. 211–212Google Scholar; UNEP, Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law, November 2009, p. 44.

71 Koutroulis, Vaios, “The Application of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situation of Prolonged Occupation: Only a Matter of Time?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 885, 2012, p. 167CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cuyckens highlights that since occupation disrupts the normal order of things, creating a distinction between effective control and sovereign title, it has been construed to be of a short-term duration and the law advocates for a quick return to normality by any form of bringing the conflict to an end. H. Cuyckens, above note 41, p. 108.

72 Eyal Benvenisti, “The Origin of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation”, Law and History Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2008, p. 622.

73 This explains why the regime is both “permissive (accepting that an occupier exercises certain powers) and prohibitive (putting limits on the occupier's actions)”. P. Spoerri, above note 34, pp. 185–186.

74 Koutroulis clarifies that neither conventional nor customary IHL distinguishes between “short-term” occupations and “prolonged” ones; hence, no distinct legal category of prolonged occupation exists in IHL, and the adjective “prolonged” is descriptive. However, this author points out that the duration of an occupation does not leave the interpretation and application of IHL and IHRL completely unaffected, the central question being how much leeway the Occupying Power should be accorded when administering the occupied territory. V. Koutroulis, above note 71, pp. 168, 170, 176.

75 Bakker explains that the vulnerability of the environment and the civilian population caused by the hostilities themselves is often exacerbated by the effects of climate change (severe drought and water shortages, rising sea levels, extreme weather events): C. Bakker, above note 22, p. 7. In this regard, the ICRC has pointed out that countries in conflict are the most vulnerable to the climate crisis because their capacity to adapt to a changing climate is drastically limited by the disruptive impact that wars have on them, and because they are among those most neglected when it comes to climate action and finance. See ICRC, “Seven Things You Need to Know about Climate Change and Conflict”, 9 July 2020, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/climate-change-and-conflict; ICRC, “COP27 – The ICRC's Call to Strengthen Climate Action in Conflict Settings”, 24 October 2022, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/cop27-icrc-calls-ahead-of-cop27-climate-change-and-conflict.

76 ILC Draft Articles, above note 14, p. 66. An example of a similar international legal regime that confirms the ILC's approach is the treaties adopted in the late 1980s to deal with the depletion of the ozone layer, which are also silent about their application during armed conflict.

77 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, as corrected by UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1, 11 August 2006 (finalized by Marti Koskenniemi).

78 See Droege, Cordula, “The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2007CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nehal Bhuta (ed.), The Frontiers of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Oberleitner, Gerd, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Law, Practice, Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Odon, Daniel Ivo, Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law Protecting Civilians and International Humanitarian Law, Routledge, London, 2021CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jens David Ohlin (ed.), Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016.

79 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, paras 106–113. This interpretation was later confirmed by the Court in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, paras 216–217. See also Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 28, para. 25.

80 The UN Human Rights Committee has the same approach concerning the application of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as expressed in its General Comment No. 31, in which it interpreted that “a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party”. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, “The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant”, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, paras 10–12.

81 María Pía Carazo, “Contextual Provisions (Preamble and Article 1)”, in D. R. Klein et al. (eds), above note 23, p. 114.

82 UNEP and Sabin Center for Climate Change, Climate Change and Human Rights, Nairobi, 2015, pp. 2–10; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), Understanding Human Rights and Climate Change, Report Submitted during the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, 2015; Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, 14 November 2007.

83 UN Human Rights, UNEP and United Nations Development Programme, What Is the Right to a Healthy Environment?, Information Note, 2022, available at: www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-01/UNDP-UNEP-UNHCHR-What-is-the-Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment.pdf.

84 Many States have already recognized the human right to a healthy environment in their constitutions or domestic law. See David Boyd, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc. A/73/188, 19 July 2018; Boyd, David, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment (Law and Society), UBC Press, Vancouver, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

85 HRC Res. 48/13, 18 October 2021. This resolution was historic because it was the first time that this right had been recognized at the global level.

86 UNGA Res. 76/300, 28 July 2022.

87 Article 24 provides: “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development.”

88 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Environment and Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, 15 November 2017, paras 58–59.

89 It is worth recalling that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has confirmed the application of the European Convention on Human Rights in situations of occupation: see ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment, 18 December 1996; ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment, 10 May 2001.

90 Although not in situations of armed conflict, climate change applications have been submitted before the ECtHR, and future decisions taken by the Court can be an important precedent for all States (including Occupying Powers) concerning human rights and climate change. See ECtHR, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 53600/20, 17 March 2021; ECtHR, Carême v. France, Appl. No. 7189/21, 28 January 2021.

91 H. Cuyckens, above note 41, p. 104.

92 As clearly pointed out by Sassòli, today it is no longer possible to divide international law (and its branches) into the law of war and the law of peace because IHL is not the only branch of public international law that provides answers to humanitarian problems arising in armed conflicts. Sassòli, Marco, International Humanitarian Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019, p. 422CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

93 Slade, Tuiloma Neroni, “International Humanitarian Law and Climate Change”, in Suzannah Linton, Tim McCormack and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), Asia-Pacific Perspectives on International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 655Google Scholar.

94 Sassòli, Marco, Bouvier, Antoine and Quintin, Anne (eds), How Does Law Protect in War?, Vol. 1, ICRC, Geneva, 2011, p. 149Google Scholar.