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Enhanced labour protection for prisoners of war

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 May 2024

Christian Via Balole*
Affiliation:
Doctoral Student, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, and Catholic University of Bukavu, Bukavu, Democratic Republic of the Congo FRESH Fellow, Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research, Brussels
Raphaël van Steenberghe*
Affiliation:
Professor, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium Research Associate, Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research, Brussels, Belgium

Abstract

The principle of prohibiting forced labour exists in both treaty and customary international law. However, there are limits to this prohibition, in that certain types of forced labour are actually permitted; this is the case for forced labour performed by prisoners of war (PoWs). This paper examines the legal regime applicable to such labour. It starts by setting out the current rules, following a brief historical review. It then explains the shortcomings of those rules, which are open to abuse and are not focused exclusively on the rights and interests of the PoWs, before proposing two possible ways of improving the situation by means of a systemic approach. The first is based on international humanitarian law itself, while the second is based on the complementary relationship between that body of law and international human rights law. Such improvements would give PoWs the right to perform any available work while continuing to require them to carry out work exclusively dedicated to running the PoW camp.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of International Committee of the Red Cross

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Footnotes

The advice, opinions and statements contained in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. The ICRC does not necessarily represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided in this article.

References

1 International armed conflicts also include wars of national liberation (as stipulated in Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions), armed conflicts between international organizations and States, and those between international organizations. ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2016 (ICRC Commentary on GC I), paras 245–252, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gci-1949 (all internet references were accessed in February 2024).

2 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber I), 31 March 2003, available at: www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/icty/2003/en/40183.

3 See Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Prisoners of War – Ethiopia's Claim 4, between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea, The Hague, 1 July 2003, available at: https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/752; Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Prisoners of War – Eritrea's Claim 17, between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Hague, 1 July 2003, available at: https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/751.

4 See Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Geneva Academy), “Military Occupation of Azerbaijan by Armenia”, RULAC, available at: www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/military-occupation-of-azerbaijan-by-armenia#collapse2accord.

5 See Geneva Academy, “Military Occupation of Ukraine by Russia”, RULAC, available at: www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/military-occupation-of-ukraine#collapse2accord.

6 See Geneva Academy, “International Armed Conflict between India and Pakistan”, RULAC, available at: www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/international-armed-conflict-between-pakistan-and-india#collapse3accord; Geneva Academy, “International Armed Conflict between India and China”, RULAC, available at: www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/international-armed-conflict-between-india-and-china#collapse2accord.

7 See Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC III), Art. 13, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949.

8 Ibid., Arts 84, 99 ff.

9 See Human Rights Watch, “Azerbaijan: Armenian Prisoners of War Badly Mistreated”, 2 December 2020, available at: www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/02/azerbaijan-armenian-prisoners-war-badly-mistreated; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), Treatment of Prisoners of War and Persons Hors de Combat in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine (24 February 2022 to 23 February 2023), 24 March 2023, available at: www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2023/23-03-24-Ukraine-thematic-report-POWs-ENG.pdf.

10 UN Human Rights, above note 9, para. 54.

11 Ibid.

12 ICRC, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention: Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2021 (ICRC Commentary on GC III), para. 2665, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949.

13 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-ii-1899.

14 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (Hague Regulations), Annexed to Hague Convention (IV) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907.

15 Hague Regulations, above note 14, Art. 6.

16 Ibid.

17 See Marquis, Hugues, “La Convention et les prisonniers de guerre des armées étrangères”, Histoire, Économie et Société, No. 2008/3, 2008, p. 68CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: www.cairn.info/revue-histoire-economie-et-societe-2008-3-page-65.htm.

18 Werner, Georges, “Un commentaire du Code des prisonniers de guerre”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge, Vol. 14, No. 159, 1932Google Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/S1026881200183953a.pdf.

19 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929 (1929 Geneva Convention), Art. 27(1), available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gc-pow-1929.

20 Ibid., Art. 31.

21 Ibid., Art. 28.

22 Ibid., Art. 27(2–3).

23 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2667.

24 GC III, Art. 49.

25 Ibid., Art. 57.

26 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Prisoners of War – Ethiopia's Claim 4, 1 July 2003, para. 127, available at: https://legal.un.org/riaa/vol_26.shtml.

27 GC III, Art. 49(2).

28 Emphasis added.

29 ICTY, Naletilić, above note 2, para. 254.

30 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2675.

31 GC III, Art. 54.

32 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2676. See also Catherine Maia, Robert Kolb and Damien Scalia, La protection des prisonniers de guerre en droit international humanitaire, 1st ed., Bruylant, Brussels, 2015, pp. 323–324.

33 Ibid.

34 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2655.

35 GC III, Art. 50(1).

36 Ibid., Art. 50(a), (d–e).

37 Ibid., Art. 50(b) (emphasis added)

38 Ibid., Art. 50(b–c), (f).

39 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber III), 29 May 2013, para. 159, available at: https://ucr.irmct.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Judgement/NotIndexable/IT-04-74/JUD251R2000462232.pdf. According to the jurisprudence, work that serves a military purpose “cannot, in any event, be made compulsory for prisoners of war”: ibid., para. 159.

40 This is the case for the removal of mines or similar devices (GC III, Art. 52(2–3)). However, case law indicates that other work may not be permitted, setting out three specific situations: “(1) work which is not dangerous in itself but which may be dangerous by reason of the general conditions in which it is carried out: this situation is intended to cover particularly work done ‘in the vicinity either of key military objectives … or of the battlefield’, (2) work which by its very nature is dangerous or unhealthy, and (3) work which is not in itself dangerous but which may be or may become so if it is done in inadequate technical conditions”. ICTY, Naletilić, above note 2, para. 257.

41 GC III, Art. 52(1).

42 ICTY, Naletilić, above note 2, para. 258. See the practice and doctrine mentioned by the ICRC in ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2715 fn. 35.

43 Under this provision, “[p]risoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention”.

44 Camille Jacquot (ed.), Le statut des détenus de Guantanamo capturés en Afghanistan au regard du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme: Quelle protection dans le cadre de la “guerre contre le terrorisme”?, Geneva, 2011, p. 69.

45 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2716.

46 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case Nos IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber I), 12 June 2002, para. 120, available at: www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/.

47 ICTY, Naletilić, above note 2, para. 259.

48 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 17 October 2003, para. 87, available at: www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/icty/2003/en/40195.

49 ICTY, Naletilić, above note 2, para. 260.

50 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005CrossRefGoogle Scholar (ICRC Customary Law Study), Rule 95, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1 (emphasis added).

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 C. Maia, R. Kolb and D. Scalia, above note 32, p. 329.

54 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2701.

55 ICTY, Naletilić, above note 2, para. 256.

56 Ibid., para. 256.

57 ICTY, Prlić, above note 39, para. 159.

58 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2709. This is a more flexible definition of military character, which makes the ultimate purpose of the activity in question the determining factor: see ICTY, Prlić, above note 39, para. 159. As we see, such an interpretation is broad but realistic: see C. Maia, R. Kolb and D. Scalia, above note 32, p. 330.

59 Elodie Rivalin (ed.), “Des ‘Boches’ à Lyon et dans le Rhône entre 1915 et 1920: Le travail des prisonniers de guerre allemands entre économie de guerre et cohabitation avec l'ennemi”, master's thesis, Université de Lyon, 2016, p. 7, available at: https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/MEM-UNIV-BDL/dumas-01354310.

60 Billig, Joseph, “Le rôle des prisonniers de guerre dans l’économie du IIIe Reich”, Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, Vol. 10, No. 37, 1960, p. 53Google Scholar, available at: www.jstor.org/stable/25731981.

61 C. Maia, R. Kolb and D. Scalia, above note 32, p. 321 (authors’ translation).

62 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2695.

63 According to the UK representative at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, Article 50 of GC III, which lists authorized work, “had been the most disputed article in the whole Convention, and the most difficult of interpretation” (quoted in ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2697).

64 See Hemptinne, Jerôme de and d'Aspremont, Jean, Droit international humanitaire: Thèmes choisis, Pedone, Paris, 2012, p. 324Google Scholar.

65 C. Maia, R. Kolb and D. Scalia, above note 32, p. 7 (authors’ translation).

66 GC III, Art. 38.

67 C. Maia, R. Kolb and D. Scalia, above note 32, p. 315 (authors’ translation); Woehrle, Christophe, “Les prisonniers de guerre français dans l'industrie de guerre du Reich (1940–1945)”, Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains, Vol. 2, No. 270, 2018, p. 129Google Scholar.

68 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2446.

69 GC III, Art. 15.

70 C. Maia, R. Kolb and D. Scalia, above note 32, p. 147 (authors’ translation). See also Remacle, Robert and Warnotte, Pauline, La psychologie du combattant et le respect du droit des conflits armés: Étude des facteurs pouvant influencer le comportement du combattant au regard du droit international humanitaire, Presses Universitaires de Namur, Namur, 2018, p. 69Google Scholar.

71 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber I), 16 November 1998, para. 1117, available at: www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/.

72 C. Maia, R. Kolb and D. Scalia, above note 32, p. 147.

73 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 1716.

74 Ibid., para. 1710.

75 Ibid., para. 1721.

76 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 95, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949.

77 GC III, Art. 82.

78 Under GC III, Art. 89, “[t]he disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following: (1) A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the prisoner of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more than thirty days. (2) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention. (3) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily. (4) Confinement.”

79 The Commentary on the Convention shares this opinion in the following terms: “Despite the clear and unambiguous wording of these rules, ICRC experience shows that imposing disciplinary sanctions strictly within the limits of Article 89 can raise a number of issues. These include, in particular, the point at which a restriction of privileges turns into a deprivation of a prisoner's fundamental rights; the types of tasks falling within the definition of fatigue duties; and the conditions and duration of confinement.” See ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 3738.

80 Ibid., para. 3754.

81 ICTY, Kunarac, above note 46, para. 259.

82 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, paras 2699–2700.

83 International Labour Office, General Survey concerning the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), Report III, Part 1B, International Labour Conference, 96th Session, 2007, para. 51.

84 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 39 UNTS 55, 28 June 1930 (Forced Labour Convention), Art. 2(2)(c).

85 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 171 UNTS 999, 16 December 1966 (ICCPR), Art. 8(3)(c)(i).

86 European Convention on Human Rights, 213 UNTS 221, 4 November 1950 (ECHR), Art. 4(3)(c).

87 American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 UNTS 123, 22 November 1969 (ACHR), Art. 6(3)(a).

88 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, Appl. Nos 2832/66, 2835/66, 2899/66, Judgment, 18 June 1971, paras 89–90; ECtHR, Stummer v. Austria (Gd Ch.), Appl. No. 37452/02, Judgment, 7 July 2011, paras 119–120.

89 Council of Europe, European Prison Rules, June 2006, Rule 5, available at: https://rm.coe.int/european-prison-rules-978-92-871-5982-3/16806ab9ae. See Dufaux, Florence, “L'emploi des personnes incarcérées en prison: Pénurie, flexibilité et précariat. Une normalisation?”, Déviance et Société, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2010CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: www.cairn.info/revue-deviance-et-societe-2010-3-page-299.htm.

90 Former Article 30(3) of the Belgian Penal Code.

91 Beernaert, Marie-Aude, Manuel de droit pénal pénitentiaire, 4th ed., Anthémis, 2023, p. 150Google Scholar (authors’ translation).

92 Ibid. (authors’ translation).

93 UN, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 13 May 1977, Art. 7(20), available at: www.refworld.org/legal/otherinstr/un/1955/en/108625.

94 UN, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 2015, Art. 4(2), available at: www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf.

95 ECtHR, Cenbauer v. Croatia, Judgment, 9 March 2006, para. 47, available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72704.

96 Kolb, Robert, “Aspects historiques de la relation entre le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l'homme”, Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 37, 1999, pp. 7580Google Scholar, available at: https://tinyurl.com/uate4cvd; Droege, Cordula, “Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, 2008, p. 501CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/elective-affinities-human-rights-and-humanitarian-law.

97 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, para. 216, available at: www.icj-cij.org/case/116/judgments; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 106, available at: www.icj-cij.org/case/131/advisory-opinions; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, “The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para. 11, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2F21%2FRev.1%2FAdd.13&Lang=en.

98 Steenberghe, Raphaël van, “The Impacts of Human Rights Law on the Regulation of Armed Conflict: A Coherency-Based Approach to Dealing with both the ‘Interpretation’ and ‘Application’ Processes”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 104, No. 919, 2022Google Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/the-impacts-of-human-rights-law-on-the-regulation-of-armed-conflict-919.

99 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 15 March 2002, para. 181, available at: www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/icty/2002/en/19276; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 December 1998, paras 143 ff., available at: www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/icty/1998/en/20418; ICTY, Delalić, above note 71, paras 452–493, 534–542.

100 ICC, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, Corrigendum to the Decision relating to the Confirmation of the Charges Brought against Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, 13 November 2019, paras 378–380, 383–384, 483, 492, available at: www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-01/12-01/18-461-corr-red.

101 The elements of crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC use the definition of hostage-taking found in the 1979 Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention) to define the similar concept in IHL, with respect to both non-international (ICC, Elements of Crimes, 2013, pp. 12, 23, available at: www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf) and international (ibid., p. 23) armed conflicts. Article 12 of the 1979 Hostages Convention stipulates explicitly that it does not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of an armed conflict where IHL imposes a duty on States to prosecute hostage-takers, as is the case in international armed conflict. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 29 July 2009, para. 639, available at: www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf; Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber I), 26 October 2009, paras 577–579, available at: www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/scsl/2009/en/92027.

102 See e.g. Merkouris, Panos, “Interpreting the Customary Rules on Interpretation”, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 19, 2017Google Scholar.

103 Ibid., pp. 140–142 fn. 45–60.

104 See Linderfalk, Ulf, “Who Are ‘the Parties’? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited”, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2008CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://tinyurl.com/3aypf6x6.

105 See e.g. Roni Katzir and Hadar David, “Identifying Customary LOAC in Practice”, EJIL: Talk!, 29 August 2023, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/identifying-customary-loac-in-practice/; Michael Wood and Omri Sender, “Between Theory, Practice, and ‘Interpretation’ of Customary Law’”, CIL Dialogues, November 2022, available at: https://cil.nus.edu.sg/blogs/between-theory-practice-and-interpretation-of-customary-international-law/.

106 See ILC, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, UN Doc. A/73/10, 2018, Conclusion 2, p. 124.

107 Regarding widely ratified treaties as relevant practice for the formation of customary law, see e.g. ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 73. Regarding treaties as relevant practice for the formation of customary IHL, see e.g. ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 50, pp. xlviii–xlix.

108 See ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 1, paras 39–41; ICRC, Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention: Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2017, paras 41–42, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gcii-1949; ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, paras 99–105. For concrete cases, see ibid., paras 651–659 (esp. para. 655), 665–669.

109 See e.g. ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 50, pp. xxxvi–xxxvii.

110 Ibid.

111 Regarding the capacity of custom to rapidly take account of practices “that give rise to impatient compromises impossible to reach through the more brutal procedure of diplomatic agreement on the text of a treaty” (authors’ translation), see Daillier, Patrick, Forteau, Mathias and Pellet, Allain, Droit international public, 8th ed., LGDJ, Paris, 2009, p. 373Google Scholar.

112 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 25, available at: www.icj-cij.org/case/95/advisory-opinions; Human Rights Committee, above note 97, para. 11; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, “Article 6: Right to Life”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, para. 64, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3884724; ECtHR, Hassan v. United Kingdom, Judgment, 16 September 2014, para. 104, available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-146501; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 Rev. 1 Corr., 22 October 2002, para. 61, available at: www.cidh.org/Terrorism/Eng/intro.htm; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C, No. 148, 1 July 2006, para. 179, available at: www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_148_ing.pdf; African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Communication 227/99: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, 29 May 2003, available at: https://achpr.au.int/en/decisions-communications/democratic-republic-congo-burundi-rwanda-uganda-22799.

113 Most human rights instruments allow parties to derogate from some of the rights that they establish. See ICCPR, above note 85, Art. 4; ECHR, above note 86, Art. 15; ACHR, above note 87, Art. 27.

114 See ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, Judgment, 7 July 2011, paras 136–139, available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=002-428; Human Rights Committee, above note 97, para. 10.

115 It is traditionally held that human rights do not bind armed groups, although there is a trend towards holding those groups responsible for respecting such rights when they exercise quasi-governmental functions and/or occupy a significant part of a territory. See Kretzmer, David, “Rethinking the Application of IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 42, 2009, p. 38Google Scholar, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2666425; Sivakumaran, Sandesh, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 95Google Scholar; Clapham, Andrew, “Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 863, 2006CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. p. 508, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_863_clapham.pdf.

116 ECtHR, Georgia v. Russia (II), Judgment, 21 January 2021, para. 139, available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-207757.

117 Forced Labour Convention, above note 84, Art. 2(2).

118 ICCPR, above note 85, Art. 8(3)(3).

119 ECHR, above note 86, Art. 4(3)(c).

120 ACHR, above note 87, Art. 6(3)(c).

121 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2682.

122 See the modifications made to the definition of torture set out in the 1984 Convention against Torture when it was used by the ICTY to interpret the concept of torture in international humanitarian law: ICTY, Kunarac, above note 46, para. 496; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 2 November 2001, para. 138, available at: www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf.

123 In reality, prisoners other than PoWs would appear to be under such an obligation, even though they do have freedom regarding work.

124 Regarding freedom of work, see Charles Dunoyer, De la liberté du travail ou simple exposé des conditions dans lesquelles les forces humaines s'exercent avec le plus de puissance, Librairie de Guillaumin, Paris, 1846, pp. 11–12.

125 This is the same as the solution adopted by GC III regarding non-commissioned officers, officers and persons of equivalent status. See ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2688.

126 Authors’ translation. Regarding this concept, see Véronique Van Der Plancke and Guido Van Limberghen, La sécurité sociale des (ex) détenus et de leurs proches, La Charte, Brussels, 2008, p. 107.

127 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2679.

128 While certain scholars criticize this status, it is accepted that it is inherited from military traditions that should be observed. See H. Marquis, above note 17, p. 68.

129 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 12, para. 2699.