1 Schmitt, Michael N., ‘The conduct of hostilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom: an international humanitarian law assessment’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 6 (2003), p. 99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Paolo Fusco, ‘Legal status of human shields’, Corso in diritto umanitario internazionale Comitato Internazionale della Croce Rossa e dalla Croce Rossa Polacca Varsavia, Pubblicazioni Centro Studi per la Pace, 2003, available at http://studiperlapace.it/, p. 6 (last visited 13 October 2007).

3 Eric David, Principes de droit des conflits armés, Bruylant, Brussels, 2002, p. 267. In 1997, in connection with the conflict in Afghanistan, the UN General Assembly urged the Afghan parties to put an end to their use of human shields.

4 Fusco, above note 2, p. 10. There have been many allegations of use of human shields in the conflict in Chechnya, both by the Russian forces and by Chechen independence fighters.

5 Otto, Roland, ‘Neighbours as human shields? The Israel Defense Forces' “Early Warning Procedure” and international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 856 (2004), p. 771.CrossRefGoogle Scholar From 2002 onwards, the ‘early warning procedure’ allowed the Israel Defense Forces to obtain assistance from Palestinian neighbours in evacuating houses occupied by wanted people and convincing these people to give themselves up.

6 Skerker, Michael, ‘Just war criteria and the new face of war: human shields, manufactured martyrs, and little boys with stones’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 3 (2004), p. 29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In 1995, during the siege of Sarajevo, Serbian forces chained UN observers to military objectives in order to deter the international forces from carrying out air strikes.

7 The use of human shields by Hezbollah in that conflict appears to have been common currency. One consequence was the deaths of four UN observers when their observation post in South Yemen was bombed by Israeli forces.

8 Quéguiner, Jean-François, ‘Precautions under the law governing the conduct of hostilities’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 864 (2006), p. 815.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Fusco, above note 2, p. 7.

10 Josiane Haas, ‘Voluntary human shields: status and protection under international humanitarian law’, in Roberta Arnold and Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand (eds.), International Humanitarian Law And The 21st Century's Conflicts: Changes and Challenges, Editions interuniversitaires suisses – Edis, Lausanne/Berne/Lugano, 2005, p. 191.

11 Schmitt, above note 1, p. 100.

12 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (hereinafter: Protocol I), Art. 51(7).

13 In the case of prisoners of war, Art. 23(1) of the Third Geneva Convention explicitly addresses the question of human shields. It provides that the presence of a prisoner of war may not be used ‘to render certain points or areas immune from military operations’. Art. 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention repeats the same wording as Art. 23(1) of the Third in respect to ‘protected persons’. As explained in the Commentaries, the term ‘military operations’ has the advantage of covering a wide range of situations, from aerial bombardments to hand-to-hand fighting, either by regular armies or by groups such as resistance movements, which are placed in the same category as the regular armed forces under Art. 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. The wording ‘certain points or areas’ indicates that the prohibition applies to small sites as well as to wide areas. However, although the scope of the prohibition ratione loci covers the belligerents' own territory as well as to occupied territory, its application ratione personae is limited to ‘protected persons’ in the meaning of Art. 4 of the Convention.

14 These movements may be spontaneous or provoked by a party to the conflict or an occupying power.

15 Protocol I also prohibits the use of medical units (Art. 12(4)) and medical aircraft (Art. 28(1)) in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack. The expression ‘[U]nder no circumstances’, used in Art. 12(1), indicates that the prohibition is absolute. The absolute nature of this prohibition is not limited to the use of patients or staff of medical units as human shields but applies to the general prohibition on use of human shields, be they civilians or prisoners of war, which brooks no exception. Legal experts seem to agree that it is an absolute obligation of result. See Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 811.

16 Nuremberg Military Tribunal, The United States of America v. Wilhelm Von Leeb (The German High Command Trial), 28 October 1948; British Military Tribunal, Student Case, decision of 10 May 1946.

17 On 11 July 1996, after reviewing the indictments, the Trial Chamber confirmed all counts set out by the Prosecutor, among them several concerning the use of human shields: the use of civilians held in Bosnian Serb camps as ‘human shields’ and the taking hostage of UN peacekeepers, some of whom were subsequently used as human shields, ‘physically secured or otherwise held … at potential NATO air targets’. This last count is categorized as a war crime.

18 Louise Doswald-Beck and Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, I (hereafter the Study), pp. 337 ff.

19 The prohibition on the use of human shields in non-international armed conflicts is also affirmed by the above study (ibid., p. 337), and in Anthony P. V. Rogers and Paul Malherbe (eds.), Fight It Right: Model Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict for Armed Forces, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1999, pp. 169–70, para. 2119.

20 This is the position adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in Demiray v. Turkey, against the background of clashes between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). European Court of Human Rights, Demiray v. Turkey, Judgment of 21 November 2000, Application No. 27308/95. Eric David has also taken the view that inhuman treatment includes the use of human shields, which can also be regarded as humiliating or degrading treatment. David, above note 3, pp. 680, 683. Finally, in a judgment on the subject of the ‘early warning procedure’, the High Court of Justice of Israel held – admittedly in a situation of international armed conflict – that ‘Pictet correctly noted that the use of people as a “human shield” is a “cruel and barbaric” act’. High Court of Justice of Israel, Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. GOC Central Command, IDF, Judgment of 6 October 2005, p. 11, para. 21, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/990/037/a32/02037990.a32.pdf (last visited 15 October 2007). In this same judgment a judge of the Court also expressed the view that the use of someone as a human shield violated ‘his dignity as a human being’. Ibid., p. 17.

21 See European Court of Human Rights, Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Application No. 14038/88, in which the expectation of certain death was described as characteristic of the ‘death-row phenomenon’ which the Court deemed to be inhumane treatment.

22 Frédéric de Mulinen, ‘Distinction between military and civilian objects’, in Christian Tomuschat (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2002, p. 113.

23 Ibid.

24 Jean S. Pictet, Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 28, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, p. 208.

25 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, with the collaboration of Philippe Eberlin, Hans-Peter Gasser, Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, Jean S. Pictet, Claude Pilloud, Jean de Preux, Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, Claude F. Wenger and Bruno Zimmermann, International Committee of the Red Cross/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 435. Generally speaking, acts considered as ruses of war are contrasted with acts amounting to perfidy, as in Art. 37 of Protocol I. Art. 37(1) defines and illustrates the concept of perfidious acts, which are strictly prohibited, whereas Art. 37(2) deals with ruses of war, which are not prohibited. The reader might be led to conclude that, according to the Commentaries, the use of protected persons as human shields is not a ruse of war and is therefore an act of perfidy.

26 Ibid., p. 436, para. 1491; Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Parsch and Waldem A. Solf, New Rules for victims of armed conflicts, Martinus Nijhofff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London, 1982, pp. 203–4; Stefan Oeter, ‘Methods and means of combat’, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, p. 201. This ban has customary law status in both international and non-international armed conflict, irrespective of any doubt there may be as to the customary nature of the ‘capture’ factor. Doswald-Beck and Henckaerts, above note 18, pp. 221, 225.

27 Oeter, above note 26, pp. 201–2.

28 Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 815.

29 Haas, above note 10, p. 207.

30 Elements of Crimes, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC, 9 September 2002.

31 Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 816: ‘For example, where civilians gather on a bridge of military value in order to protest against the enemy's earlier destruction of other similar bridges will probably not imply an intention on the part of the belligerent. However, if, on the same bridge, civilian demonstrators set up camp for a long period of time and the authorities take no action to remove them, then this inaction will lead to a clear presumption that the authorities intend to use the civilians’ presence to shield the bridge from an enemy attack. An even clearer presumption of intention will arise where the civilian volunteers are briefed by the armed forces on which military sites are to be “protected”.'

32 It should be noted that there is debate as to whether or not Art. 58 represents customary law, particularly in a non-international armed conflict. According to the recent study on customary international humanitarian law, the obligations contained in this provision are indeed customary law, at least in an international armed conflict. Cf. Doswald-Beck and Henckaerts, above note 18, pp. 68, 71, 74; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘The conduct of hostilities: target selection, proportionality and precautionary measures under international humanitarian law’, in Netherlands Red Cross, Protecting Civilians in 21st-Century Warfare, 2001, p. 20. However, the Study considers that there is a good case for saying that these rules form part of the fabric of general international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts. Doswald-Beck and Henckaerts, above note 18, Vol. I, pp. 71, 74. Without these precautionary measures, the general protection accorded to the civilian population by Art. 13(1) of Protocol II against the dangers arising from military operations would remain a dead letter. However, not everyone shares this view. For J. Gardam, although Art. 51(7), which is complementary to Art. 58, is a customary rule, Art. 58 itself is a ‘new development’. Judith G. Gardam, Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993, p. 156. According to M. Sassòli and L. Cameron, only the United States and Iraq have ever claimed that the obligation not to place military targets in densely populated areas was customary, and only the prohibition on the use of human shields is truly customary. Marco Sassòli and Lindsey Cameron, ‘The protection of civilian objects – current state of the law and issues de lege ferenda’, in Natalino Ronzitti and Gabriella Venturini (eds.), Current Issues in the International Humanitarian Law of Air Warfare, Eleven, Utrecht, 2006, pp. 72, 73.

33 For further details on the obligations, positive and negative (abstention), under Art. 58, see Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, above note 25, p. 710, para. 2244; ibid., p. 711, paras. 2246, 2247; ibid., p. 712, paras. 2250, 2251, 2254, 2256, 2257. See also Bothe, Partsch and Solf, above note 26, p. 372, para. 2.4.2.; ibid., p. 373, para. 2.5.; ibid., p. 374, para. 2.8; Doswald-Beck and Henckaerts, above note 18, Rule 22, p. 70, pp. 73–4; Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 819; Jean-François Quéguiner, ‘Le principe de distinction dans la conduite des hostilités, un principe traditionnel confronté à des défis actuels’, doctoral thesis, Université de Genève, 2006, p. 403; Frédéric de Mulinen, Manuel sur le droit de la guerre pour les forces armées, ICRC, Geneva, 1989, p. 108, para. 439; ibid., p. 109, paras. 443–444; ibid., p. 109, para. 445; de Mulinen, above note 22, p. 111; Oeter, above note 26, p. 167; Rogers and Malherbe, above note 19, p. 78, para. 1201.5.b., 1205.5.c; Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘Protection of the civilian population’, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, pp. 223–4.

34 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (eds.), above note 25, p. 712, para. 2255. Occupying powers may not ‘ignore the fate of the population of the occupied territory and only take into account the fate and the safety of their own troops’.

35 Cf. Bothe, Partsch and Solf, above note 26, p. 372, para. 2.3.

36 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 129.

37 Bothe, Partsch and Solf, above note 26, p. 372, para. 2.4.2.

38 Gasser, above note 33, p. 224.

39 Protocol I, Arts. 48 and 52(2).

40 Protocol I, Art. 51(2), and Protocol II, Art. 13(2).

41 Protocol I, Art. 51(3), and Protocol II, Art. 13(3).

42 Ibid.

43 In occupied territories, protected persons can only be interned ‘for imperative reasons of security’. GCIV, Art. 78. Elsewhere than in occupied territories, ‘internment … of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary’. GCIV, Art. 42.

44 Regular procedure and competent body, even if organized by the occupying power, right of appeal, speedy processing and periodic review of the decision on internment, if possible every six months. Art. 78. ‘Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.’ GCIV, Art. 43. ‘The court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit’. Ibid.

45 Protocol I, Art. 51.

46 Protocol I, Art. 51(3).

47 Summary Report, Second Expert Meeting, Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, Co-organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the TMC Asser Institute, The Hague, 25–26 October 2004, p. 6.

48 Dinstein, above note 36, p. 130.

49 Schmitt, above note 1, p. 100.

50 Schmitt, Michael N., ‘Targeting and humanitarian law: current issues’, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 34 (2004), p. 95.Google Scholar

51 High Court of Justice of Israel, The Public Committee v. The Government of Israel, Judgment, 14 December 2006, para. 36, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (last visited 10 October 2007).

52 Laurent Colassis, cited by Ludovic Monnerat, Le problème des boucliers humains volontaires dans les opérations contemporaines, CheckPoint, information site of the Swiss military, 15 March 2003, available at www.checkpoint-online.ch/CheckPoint/Monde/Mon0047-ProblemeBoucliersHumains.html (last visited 10 November 2008).

53 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, above note 25, p. 633, para. 1943.

54 Protocol I, Art. 49.

55 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, above note 25, p. 633, paras. 1942, 1944.

56 Bothe, Partsch and Solf, above note 26, p. 301, para. 2.4.1.

57 The Public Committee v. The Government of Israel, above note 51, para. 37. See also Fenrick, William J., ‘The targeted killings judgment and the scope of direct participation in hostilities’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2007), p. 336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

58 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, above note 25, p. 522, para. 1679.

59 Summary Report, Second Expert Meeting, above note 47, p. 6.

60 Schmitt, above note 50, p. 96.

61 Summary Report, Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, Co-organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the TMC Asser Institute, Geneva, 23–25 October 2005, p. 30, available at www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205/$File/Direct_participation_in_hostilities_2005_eng.pdf (last visited 24 September 2007).

62 Summary Report, Second Expert Meeting, above note 47, p. 7.

63 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Judgement, 7 May 1997, Case No. IT-94-1-T, para. 616.

64 Human Rights Watch, ‘International humanitarian law issues in a potential war in Iraq’, 20 February 2003, available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm#1 (last visited 29 September 2007).

65 At first sight, Dinstein does not appear to share this opinion: ‘These civilians enjoy no immunity while at work.’ Dinstein, above note 36, pp. 124–5. However, there are grounds for supposing that Dinstein is not referring to the loss of legal immunity, but only to a de facto loss. He goes on to say, ‘If the industrial plants are important enough (munitions factories being the paradigm), civilian casualties – even in large numbers – would usually come under the rubric of an acceptable collateral damage.’ Ibid. So if Dinstein's workers are no longer protected, it is only after the proportionality calculation has been made and turned out in their disfavour, that is to say the commanders have taken the view that the military advantage is such that the collateral damage is acceptable (I shall return to questions of proportionality), rather than in a general way, simply because they are inside a military objective. ‘Upon leaving the factories, civilian labourers shed the risk of being subject to attack’ (emphasis added), or, more accurately, subject to the risk of an attack on the military objective being decided on (after a proportionality appraisal) and of suffering the consequences. Ibid. I hope that this interpretation of Dinstein's words is the correct one, as he goes on to say that ‘[s]hould the workforce live within the ‘target area’, civilian labourers are not protected in their homes'! Ibid. Moreover, he extends this vision of things to other civilians such as those who accompany armed forces and those who approach military targets such as major transport routes: ‘When civilians are travelling in wartime on a major motorway, taking a mainline train, going to an airport etc., they are running a discernible risk in case of an air raid’ (emphasis added). Ibid. It would certainly seem that Dinstein is speaking of a de facto risk and not a loss of legal protection, as he again refers to the proportionality principle: ‘Given the significant military advantage that can generally be gained from the destruction of a strategically located bridge, relatively high civilian casualties would ordinarily be deemed a reasonable collateral damage’ (it should be borne in mind that the proportionality calculation is a test to be applied in concreto, depending on ‘the circumstances ruling at the time’). Ibid.

66 De Mulinen, above note 33, p. 14, para. 56.

67 Haas, above note 10, p. 210 (emphasis added).

68 Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 817.

69 The question of the complicity of voluntary human shields in war crimes committed by the belligerent taking advantage of their presence could also arise.

70 Protocol II, Art. 13(3).

71 This is reflected in Art. 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which rules out suspension of a treaty for wrongful conduct of a party in the case of ‘provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties’.

72 Protocol I, Art. 50(3).

73 De Mulinen, above note 33, p. 14.

74 Protocol I, Art. 51(5)(b).

75 Protocol I, Art. 52(2).

76 However, according to E. David, the primacy of the principle of protection of civilians should cause the attacker not to go ahead with the attack. David, above note 3, p. 268. The author considers this position to be dangerous at a number of levels. David seems to believe that human shields have a privileged status in relation to other civilians. This could give the impression that the status of civilians is not uniform but carries variable degrees of protection, and that there is therefore a hierarchy among civilians. In international humanitarian law, a person either is or is not a civilian, and all civilians enjoy identical protection by virtue of that status. Moreover, a systematic prohibition on launching an attack on a military objective protected by human shields would be tantamount to rewarding violation of international humanitarian law, as the party in violation of the ban on use of human shields would benefit from the effective immunity from attack it has succeeded in giving the protected military objective. Violating international humanitarian law by using human shields would therefore become a veritable ‘force multiplier’. Michael Newton, ‘Human shields: can abuse of the law of war be a force multiplier?’, Discussion, in Andru E. Wall (ed.), Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO's Kosovo Campaign, US Naval War College, International Law Studies, Vol. 78, 2002, p. 298. As such, it would constitute a temptation to ignore the law and could ultimately jeopardize the very principle of distinction, which is one of the fundamental pillars of international humanitarian law. Finally, this line of reasoning also calls into question the whole principle of proportionality. If we accept the premise that a military objective protected by human shields cannot be attacked, the principle of humanity automatically prevails over military necessity. In absolute terms, that would not of course be a bad thing, as it would be in the victims' interests. However, it would be totally incompatible with the realities of war, which the proportionality principle, as a pragmatic compromise, takes into account. David also seems to be aware of the questionable nature of his position, as he remarks that ‘it will probably be argued that the right to attack military objectives close to concentrations of civilians should be transposed to apply to the present hypothesis’, which would subordinate the possibility of attack to respect for the principles of proportionality and precautions in attack. David, above note 3, p. 268.

77 Schmitt, above note 50, p. 91.

78 According to Dinstein, ‘the principle of proportionality remains prevalent’. Dinstein, above note 36, p. 131. But he goes on to say, ‘However, … the actual test of excessive injury to civilians must be relaxed. That is to say, the appraisal whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that … civilian casualties will be higher than usual.’ Ibid. If we suppose that human shields must be taken into account in an appraisal of proportionality, it is hard to understand why the fact that more civilian losses are anticipated should be used to weaken the importance of civilian losses in the equation! By analogy, the fact that there are more civilians living close to a military objective, so that there will potentially be greater damage to civilians, does not reduce the weight given to the ‘civilian losses’ side of the equation in relation to the ‘military advantage’ side; on the contrary, it gives it greater weight. Why would it be otherwise in the case of human shields, who are fully fledged civilians? To apply such reasoning would be tantamount to ‘punishing’ the civilians acting as human shields for the violation of the law committed by the attacked party. On this point, it is also possible to disagree with J.-F. Quéguiner, who considers that the wrong committed by the attacked party should be taken into account in the appraisal of proportionality: ‘authors have submitted that the enemy party's fraudulent conduct may be taken into account in the attacking commander's assessment of collateral damage versus military advantage. This approach … can indeed be considered appropriate.’ Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 814. This reasoning leads to the same result as Dinstein's: the human shield should be taken into account in the appraisal of proportionality, but less than any other civilian. I would tend to share the opinion expressed by Schmitt: ‘there is no de jure relaxation of the proportionality standard’. Schmitt, above note 50, pp. 92–3. Simply, the fact of being used as a human shield increases de facto, as we have seen earlier, the ‘chances’ of a civilian being part of collateral damage because he is on or near to a military objective.

79 Schmitt, above note 1, p. 100.

80 Schmitt, above note 50, p. 96. The author makes an exception only in the case of children acting as human shields, as their lack of legal capacity negates the voluntary nature of their participation.

81 In connection with the ‘prior warning procedure’, whereby the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) send Palestinian civilians into neighbouring houses to tell the occupants suspected of terrorism to leave, the President of the High Court of Justice of Israel, Aharon Barak, noted with good sense, that ‘It is very hard to verify willingness.’ B'Tselem, ‘Human shields’, timeline of events, available at www.btselem.org/english/Human_Shields/Timeline_of_Events.asp (last visited 10 October 2007).

82 When listing the conditions an attacker must respect when attacking a military objective guarded by human shields, Eric David refers to the principle of proportionality and the other precautions to be taken to avoid harming human shields, but the author also asserts that the attacker must have ‘épuisé tous les moyens licites possibles pour persuader l'attaqué de retirer les “boucliers humains”’. David, above note 3, p. 268. However, even if this measure seems desirable, it is not among the legal obligations incumbent on an attacker under international humanitarian law. Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 815.

83 Protocol I, Art. 57(1).

84 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, above note 25, p. 698, para. 2191.

85 Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(a)(i).

86 Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 798.

87 Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(a)(ii): those planning or deciding on an attack must ‘take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’.

88 Oeter, above note 26, p. 166.

89 Quéguiner, above note 8, pp. 802–3; Schmitt, Michael N., ‘Precision attack and international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 859 (2005), p. 462.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

90 Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(b).

91 Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(c).

92 Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 808.

93 Protocol I, Art. 57(3).

94 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, above note 25, p. 705, para. 2226.

95 Quéguiner, above note 8, p. 805.

96 Fusco, above note 2, p. 31.