1 Of course Medellín, or the State of Texas, can seek certiorari in this Court from the Texas courts’ disposition of the state habeas corpus application. In that instance, this Court would in all likelihood have an opportunity to review the Texas courts’ treatment of the President's memorandum and Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I. C. J. No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31), unencumbered by the issues that arise from the procedural posture of this action.

2 The Federal District Court reviewing that finding observed: “Medellin's allegations of prejudice are speculative. The police officers informed Medellín of his right to legal representation before he confessed to involvement in the murders. Medellín waived his right to advisement by an attorney. Medellín does not challenge the voluntary nature of his confession. There is no indication that, if informed of his consular rights, Medellín would not have waived those rights as he did his right to counsel. Medellín fails to establish a ‘causal connection between the [Vienna Convention] violation and [his] statements.’ ‘’ App. to Pet. for Cert. 84a-85a (brackets in original).

3 In Breard v. Greene, 523 U. S. 371 (1998) (per curiam), we addressed the claim that Virginia failed to notify a Paraguayan national of his Vienna Convention right to consular access. In denying various writs, motions, and stay applications, we noted that the Vienna Convention “arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest''; that Virginia's procedural default doctrine applied to the Vienna Convention claim; and that a successful Vienna Convention claimant likely must demonstrate prejudice. Id., at 375-377. At the time of our Breard decision, however, we confronted no final ICJ adjudication.

4 On March 8, 2005, Medellín filed a successive state habeas action based on Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 11.071, §5(a)(1) (Vernon 2005), claiming that both the President's memorandum and the Avena judgment independently require the Texas court to grant review and reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim. See Subsequent Application for Post-Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus in Ex Parte Medellín, Trial Cause Nos. 67,5429 and 67,5430 (Tex. Crim. App.), p. 6 (filed Mar. 24, 2005) (“First, the President's determination requires this Court to comply with the Avena Judgment and remand Mr. Medellín's case for the mandated review and reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim. Second, the Avena Judgment on its own terms provides the rule of decision in Mr. Medellín's case and should be given direct effect by this Court“).

1 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 484(1989) (cautioning lower courts against disturbing this Court's decisions)But cf.post,at 2(Souter j.dissenting),

2 The principal dissent maintains that the second question on which we granted certiorari asks whether and what weight [short of binding effect] American courts should give to ,Avena”,in the course of indenpendtly interpreting the treaty perhaps for sake of uniform treaty interpretation.'’ Post, at 13 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); see post, at 13-14, and n. 2 J(same).Significantly, Medellín chose not to break out for discrete review in this Court questions underlying and subsumed in the ICJ's judgments in Avena, 2004 I. C. J. No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31), and LaGrand, 2001 I. C. J. 466 (Judgment of June 27), i.e., whether the Vienna Convention ”creates a judicially enforceable individual right“ and whether it ’sometimes requires state procedural default rules to be set aside so that the treaty can be given full effectpost, at 1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Nor does Medellín's pretation or application of the Convention by that court.“);invocation of “international comity,” Brief for Petitioner 45,or his plea for “uniform treaty interpretation,” id., at 48, seek this Court's independent interpretation of the Convention.Instead, he urges that comity is accorded, and uniformity achieved, by recognizing as authoritative the ICJ's interpretation as elaborated in successive judgments against the United States. See id., at 49 (’ ‘Given its consent to the ICJ’ s jurisdiction, the United States should treat as authoritative any interpretation or application of the convention by that court. “)see also Reply Brief 16 (observing that the United States )“ agreed that the ICJ would have final authority to resolve disputes over the treaty's interpretation and application”(emphasis added).

1 The Court suggests that Medellin's reliance on Avena may be a distinct claim, and that he may not have properly exhausted it in state court. Ante, at 6. But Medellin has maintained a single claim throughout the state and federal habeas proceedings— that Texas violated his rights under the Vienna Convention and that he is entitled to a remedy for that violation. Pointing to Avena as a rule of decision for the adjudication of that claim is akin to pointing to a new decision from this Court to bolster an existent claim for relief. In neither case has petitioner made a new claim as opposed to a new argument supporting his pending claim. Cf. Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534-535 (1992).

2 Justice Ginsburg gives an unduly narrow construction to the second question presented. It asks: “should a court in the United States give effect to the judgments in Avena and La-Grand“? Brief for Petitioner i. This question cannot be read to ask for “ ‘effect’ “ to be given in the strict sense of the law of judgments, ante, at 4-5 ﹛Ginsburg, J., concurring): Because Medellín was not a beneficiary of the judgment in LaGrand Case (F. R. G. v. U. S.), 20011. C. J. 466 (Judgment of June 27), a case between Germany and the United States, the judgment in LaGrand cannot be enforced as to Medellín. What he asks is that American courts reach the same interpretation of the Vienna Convention as did the body charged with adjudicating international disputes arising out of the Convention—in part for the sake of “uniform treaty interpretation.” Brief for Petitioner i. This understanding of the second question takes account, as it should, of the fact that the correct, independent interpretation of the Vienna Convention was the central question in the habeas proceedings below. Moreover, it is consistent with the practical way we decide what is ‘ ‘fairly included” in a question presented. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., ante, at 13, n. 6; Bollard v. Commissioner, ante, at 4, n. 2.