¹ Cook Inlet is larger than Great Salt Lake and Lake Ontario.It is about the same size as Lake Erie. It dwarfs Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay, and Long Island Sound, all of which the United States has claimed as historic bays.

² It would appear that the case qualifies, under Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, for our original jurisdiction. United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. 463, 470 (1935). We are not enlightened as to why the United States chose not to bring an original action in this Court.

³ Section 6 (m) of the Alaska Statehood Act of July 7, 1958, provides that the Submerged Lands Act 7#x201C;shall be applicable to the State of Alaska and the said State shall have the same rights as do existing States thereunder.” 72 Stat. 343, 48 U. S. C. c. 2, note. Section 2 of the Act provides, “The State of Alaska shall consist of all the territory, together with the territorial waters appurtenant thereto, now included in the Territory of Alaska.” 72 Stat. 339, 48 U. S. C. c. 2, note.

⁴ Section 3 (a) of the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U. S. C. § 1311 (a) provides:

“It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such hinds and waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States . . . .”

Section 2 (b), 43 U. S. C. 1301 (b), defines a State's boundaries:

“The term ‘boundaries’ includes the seaward boundaries of a State . . . as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union . . . but in no event shall the term ‘boundaries’ or the term ‘lands beneath navigable waters’ be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or.the Pacific Ocean . . . .”

⁵ Section 2 (c) of the Act, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 (c), reads:

“The term ‘coast line’ means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.”

⁶ “The full text of Article 7 is as follows:

“1. This article relates to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State.

“2: For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation.

“3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the water areas of the indentation.

“4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters.

“5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.

“6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called ‘historic’ bays, or in any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied.”

⁷ Brief for Respondent 1; Brief for Petitioner 2, 32.

⁸ Some disagreement exists as to whether there must be formal acquiescence on the part of foreign States, or whether the mere absence of opposition is sufficient. United States y. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case) 394 U. S. 11, 23-24, n. 27 (1969)

⁹ Petition for Certiorari 25a. In addition to its reported opinion, 352 F. Supp. 815, the District Court made detailed written findings and conclusions that are not published. These are reproduced in the Petition for Certiorari lla-55a. The reported opinion of the District Court did not discuss the exercise of sovereignty prior to 1906, but the unreported findings indicate that the court relied on assertions of authority dating from Russian territorial times as well as the early American period.

¹⁰ As with many colonial enterprises of the day, the governance of Alaska in the Russian period, for the most part, was exercised through semi-private corporations. See generally H. Chevigny, Russian America: The Great Alaskan Venture, 1741-1867 (1965). The most important of these corporations, the Russian-American Company, was chartered in 1799, several years before the incident near Port Graham. Id., at 75. The record and findings are silent on the relationship between the fur trader and the interests asserted. Thus, we have no occasion to consider whether the acts of a semi private colonial corporation are to be given the same weight as the direct acts of a national government for purposes of establishing a claim to historic waters.

¹¹ The Cannon Shot Rule was to the effect that a coastal state possessed sovereignty over the waters within range of cannon shot from its shore. Many modern scholars believe that the present 3-mile limit is derived from the traditional range of 18th century cannon. Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 Am. J. Intl L. 537 (1954); Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 210 (1945). The actual range of the cannon fired by the fur trader is, of course, now irrelevant. The significant fact is that the incident can be viewed as an assertion of jurisdiction only over those waters ill Cook Inlet that were within range of cannon shot from nhore.

¹² For a discussion of the events surrounding the issuance and withdrawal of the ukase, see H. Chevigny, supra, at 174-188.

¹³ By the Treaty of Cession in 1867 Russia ceded to the United States “all the territory and dominion now possessed [by Russia] on the continent of America and in the adjacent islands.” 15 Stat. 539. The cession was effectively a quitclaim. It is undisputed that the United States thereby acquired-whatever dominion Russia had possessed immediately prior to cession.

¹⁴ In June 1892 a United States revenue cutter, the Mohican, entered Cook Inlet to enforce Rev. Stat. § 1956. The Mohican arrested three American vessels in the lower inlet on charges of violating the statute. The prosecutions ultimately were dismissed on the ground that the vessels merely had been purchasing pelts from natives who were authorized by § 1956 to hunt sea otter for commercial sale. See. The Kodiak, 53 Fed. 126 (Alaska 1892). In 1893 two other American vessels were stopped in the lower inlet by a revenue cutter. Since these vessels, like the Kodiak, were carrying only native hunting parties, they were allowed to proceed without further incident. The District Court made no findings about the enforcement of § 1956 after June 1893.

¹⁵ The District Court acknowledged that no foreign vessels had ever been arrested in Cook Inlet on charges of violating the Alien Fishing Act. The court sought to explain this fact on the ground that foreign vessels entered the inlet infrequently. The court relied on statements of certain former wildlife officials that “they would have taken affirmative action” against foreign vessels if they had seen any in the inlet. 352 F. Supp., at 819-820. In the absence of any actual enforcement or official announcement of intentions to enforce the Alien Fishing Act in lower Cook Inlet, the private intentions of witnesses are largely irrelevant.

¹⁶ The testimony of John T. Gharrett, who was called as a witness by the State of Alaska, is indicative of the predominance of fish and wildlife concerns in the preparation of the Gharrett-Scudder line:

On direct examination:

“Q. What was your role in the preparation of that line?

“A. My role was to decide where the line goes.

“Q. Did you have assistance from anyone?

“A. Mr. Clay Scutter [sic].

“Q. Has the line since been given any kind of name?

“A. Oh, I don't know since. At the time we drew it, jather than to say ‘a line beyond which we proposed,’ et cetera, et cetera, we call it the Gharrett-Scutter [sic] line for short.

“Q. In your preparation of the line what criteria did you use for placing the line on the chart?

“A. We used two basic criteria: 1) we wanted to encompass within the line existing salmon net fisheries along the Coast of Alaska, and 2) we wanted in some areas to allow for a modest, perhaps, expansion of existing fisheries, salmon net fisheries.”

App. 292-293.

On cross-examination by counsel for the United States:

“Q. Did the lines you drew enclose areas in which you knew foreigners had previously fished?

“A. Yes.

“Q. By drawing these lines did you intend to stop those fisheries?

“A. No.

“Q. Was the line you drew with Mr. Scutter [sic] intended to represent the outer limit of the territorial sea?

“A. No.

“Q. Was the line you drew with Mr. Scutter [sic] intended to represent the base line from which the territorial sea was to be measured ?

“A. No.

“Q. Were the lines you drew with Mr. Scutter [sic] used for law enforcement purposes while you were in Alaska?

“A. No.”

App. 294.

¹⁷ The United States has argued that historic title to Cook Inlet is defeated by several United States disclaimers of sovereignty over the waters of lower Cook Inlet. The Court previously has discussed the importance of governmental disclaimers in weighing claims to historic title in actions of this kind. Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 76-78; United States v. California, 381 U. S., at 175. The District Court rejected the disclaimers on the grounds that they were ill-advised and, perhaps, self-serving. 352 F. Supp., at 818-819. Inasmuch as we have concluded that none of the facts relied upon by the District Court suffice to establish historic-title, we have no occasion to consider whether the disclaimers of the United States could have defeated otherwise sufficient facts.