1. Kinglun Ngok, Labor Policy in China: Marketization and Globalization Perspectives (Beijing, 2007).

2. Gordon White, “The Politics of Economic Reform in Chinese Industry: The Introduction of the Labor Contract System,” China Quarterly 111 (1987), 365–89.

3. Michael Korzec, Labor and the Failure of Reform in China (New York, 1992).

4. As a basic socioeconomic institution in Mao's China, danwei refers to SOEs, state agencies, government departments, and other organizations in the public sector. Among them, SOEs were typical. Danwei controls personnel, provides communal facilities, operates independent accounts and budgets, has an urban or industrial role, and is in the public sector. Functioning as a self-sufficient “mini welfare state”, the danwei system was composed of three basic elements: job tenure (iron rice bowl), an egalitarian wage (big rice pot), and a welfare package.

5. CCPCC (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee), The Decision on the Economic System Reform (Beijing, 1984).

6. Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 1997 (Beijing, 1997), 8.

7. “Dingti” refers to the practice of passing the job of the retired parent to his/her child so as to increase job opportunities for young people. Such a practice was very popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s, so it was very common for parents and their children to be employees of the same work unit. For the details, see Korzec, Labor and the Failure of Reform in China.

8. Lanrui Feng, Six Questions Concerning Employment (Beijing,1982).

9. Zhongguo Laodong Renshi Nianjian 1949–1987 (Beijing, 1988), 136.

10. Linda Wong and Kinglun Ngok, “Unemployment and Policy Responses in Mainland China,” Issues & Studies 33.1 (1997), 43–63.

11. White, “The Politics of Economic Reform in Chinese Industry.”

12. These are Provisional Regulations on the Implementation of the Labor Contract System in State-Owned Enterprises; Provisional Regulations on the Hiring of Workers in State-Owned Enterprises; Provisional Regulations on the Dismissal of Workers and Staff for Work Violations in State-Owned Enterprises; and Provisional Regulations on Unemployment Insurance for Workers and Staff in State-Owned Enterprises.

13. For details of the varieties of law and their hierarchy in China, see the Law on Legislation of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the 3rd Session of the Ninth National People's Congress on March 15, 2000.

14. Shouqi Yuan, Labour Legislation in China (Beijing, 1994), 338.

15. Zhongguo Laodong Nianjian 1988–1989 (Beijing, 1989), 1577.

16. In Chinese lawmaking practices, a basic principle followed by lawmakers is to make a law according to the maturity of the legislative conditions for such a law (tiaojian shifou chengshu). Only when the legislative conditions for a law have matured can it be passed (chengshu yige zhiding yige). According to Chinese legal experts, the legislative conditions include mainly two aspects: objective conditions and subjective conditions. The objective conditions refer to, among other concerns, the need for a law, the situation of the problem that the law targets, and socioeconomic conditions for law enforcement. The subjective conditions are relevant to the recognition of the policy problem, attention of lawmaking organizations to the law, and consensus-building among the related government agencies. When the objective and subjective conditions are mature and the time is appropriate, a law will be enacted. For details, see Daohui Guo, Legislative System in China (Beijing, 1988). According to the Law on Legislation (Article 56, section 2), once the conditions for an administrative regulation that has been issued by the State Council to be enacted as a law have matured, the State Council shall, in a timely fashion, submit a request to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee for enactment of the relevant national law.

17. Efforts to make a national labor law were initiated in 1979 and the early 1980s. In March 1983, a draft law for deliberation was approved in principle by the State Council and submitted to the National People's Congress (NPC) as a formal bill in July 1983. However, the NPC held that the conditions for the Labor Law were not ripe due to the ongoing economic reform, especially the reforms of labor system and the state-owned enterprises. As a result, the Labor Law could not get a place on the NPC Standing Committee agenda. For details, see Kinglun Ngok, “The Formulation Process of the Labor Law of the People's Republic of China: A Garbage Can Model Analysis” (Ph.D. diss., City University of Hong Kong, 1998).

18. Mattias Burell, “The Rule-Governed State: China's Labor Market Policy, 1978–1998” (Ph.D. diss., Uppsala University, Sweden, 2001).

19. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1995 (Beijing, 1995).

20. Tongqing Feng, “Chinese Workers and Employees in 1994–1995,' in The Analysis and Forecast of Chinese Social Situation in 1994–1995, ed., Liu Jiang et al. (Beijing, 1995), 294–308.

21. Tongqing Feng, Speaking without Reservation (Beijing, 1994).

22. China Daily, April 30, 1994.

23. South China Morning Post, May 17, 1994.

24. Kai Chang, ed., Labor Relation, Laborer, and Labor Rights: Labor Issues in Contemporary China (Beijing, 1995).

25. Anita Chan, “Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 29 (1993), 31–61; D. Solinger, “The Chinese Work Unit and Transient Labor in the Transition from Socialism,” Modern China 21.2 (1995): 155–183.

26. The most shocking case of labor abuse in the early 1990s was the Zhili disaster. On November 19, 1993, a terrible fire took place in the Zhili Toy Factory, a Hong Kong-China joint venture based in the Shenzhen special economic zone. Officials claimed that eighty-seven people died and fifty-one were injured in the blaze. One reason for the high death toll was that it was a so-called “three-in-one” factory with workplace, workers' dormitories, and a warehouse all under one roof. In this “three-in-one” system, windows were barred and doors locked to combat theft, and exits were obstructed.

27. CCPCC, The Decision on Some Issues on the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure (Beijing, 1992).

28. John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (New York, 1995).

29. Kinglun Ngok, “The Formulation Process of the Labor Law of the People's Republic of China: A Garbage Can Model Analysis” (Ph.D. diss., City University of Hong Kong, 1998).

30. Kinglun Ngok, “The Development of the Labor Law of the People's Republic of China: A Comparison of Three Versions,” Chinese Law & Government 33 (January-February 2000): 3–21.

31. The Labor Law accords workers' equal opportunities for employment and the right to choose their occupations, the right to receive remuneration for their work, the right to have rest and vacations, the right to labor protection with regard to safety and sanitation, the right to receive vocational training to improve their skills, the right to have social insurance and welfare, and the right to demand the settlement of labor disputes and have other statutory labor rights.

32. Kinglun Ngok, “The Development of the Labor Law of the People's Republic of China,” 20–21.

33. Hilary Josephs, “Labor Law in a ‘Socialist Market Economy: The Case of China,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 33 (1995): 559–81.

34. The labor contract system was first introduced in the mid-1980s and extended nationwide during the mid-1990s. It aims to regulate the labor-management relationships within the enterprise on the basis of contract. The collective negotiation system was piloted in the early 1990s and was implemented systematically in enterprises nationwide in China since the mid-1990s on the initiative of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the headquarters of Chinese official labor movement. The labor dispute resolution system was established in the late 1980s and improved in the mid-1990s. All these three mechanisms have been legalized by the Labor Law of 1994.

35. Gongren Ribao, December 29, 2004.

36. Zhongguo Qingnianbao, June 30, 2007.

37. Jian Qiao, and Ying Jiang, “An Analysis of the Labor Disputes and Labor-related Mass Incidents in the Process of Marketization,” in The Analysis and Forecast of Chinese Social Situation in 2005, ed. Xin Ru et al. (Beijing, 2005), 297–8.

38. MLSS, The Situation of the Settlement of Labor Dispute Case in 2005 (Beijing, 2006).

39. Joseph Cheng and Kinglun Ngok, “The Potential for Civil Unrest in China,” in Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific, ed. Simmonds Heijmans and H. van de Veen (Boulder and London, 2004), 166–180.

40. The Information Office of the State Council, The White Paper: The Situation of Labor and Social Security in China (Beijing, 2002).

41. Nanfang Zhoumo, January 31, 2002.

42. Rob Lambert and Anita Chan, “Global Dance: Factory Regimes, Asian Labor Standards and Corporate Restructuring,” in Globalization and Patterns of Labor Resistance, ed. Jeremy Waddington (London, 1999), 72–104.

43. Guangdong Nianjian 1999 (Guangzhou, 1999), 173

44. Zhongguo Gongyun, No.1 (2001), 19.

45. Meixia Shi, “The Trends of Labor Relations in the Context of China's WTO Entrance,” in Labor Relations and Labor Policy in the Context of Globalization, ed. Kai Chang et al. (Beijing, 2003), 59–71.

46. Qiao and Jiang, “An Analysis of the Labor Disputes and Labor-related Mass Incidents in the Process of Marketization.”

47. Liqun Wei and Changfu Hang, Survey and Research Report on Migrant Workers in China (Beijing, 2006).

48. Renmin Ribao, March 28, 2006.

49. MLSS and the State Bureau of Statistics, The Statistical Bulletin of the Development of Labor and Social Security Undertaking in 2006 (Beijing, 2007).

50. Renmin Ribao, March 28, 2006.

51. MLSS, An Investigation Report on the Shortage of Peasant Workers (Beijing, 2004).

52. The State Council, The Notice on Doing a Better Job Concerning the Employment Management of and Services for Migrant Workers (Beijing, 2003).

53. Renmin Ribao, March 28, 2006.

54. During the formulation of the Labor Contract Law, the most controversial issue concerned the guiding principle of the Law. Two competing groups formed. While one group argued that the Law should give top priority to the legal protection of labor, the other group fought for the equal treatment for both employers and employees in light of the spirit of contract. Meanwhile, business communities lobbied very actively as they worried that stricter contract requirements could raise costs and give them less flexibility to hire and fire employees. Some foreign chambers even warned that the strict regulations could force foreign companies to reconsider new investments or discontinue their activities in China because of possible cost increases. In order to pacify the foreign investors, the final version of the Law modified some controversial provisions in the draft laws. The debates around the Law were extensively covered by the Chinese media, and it is easy to find online information on the drafting of the Labor Contract Law.

55. Regarding the impacts of the exposure of forced labor in the brick kilns in Shanxi Province on the making of Labor Contract Law, please refer to “Comments Made by the Members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Draft Labor Contract Law, June 24, 2007.” http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2007-07/03/content_368454.htm

56. Zhinian Ye and Jinsen Li, A Discussion of the Legal Protection of Migrant Workers’ Labor Rights, http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=7502&page=3 (accessed January 23, 2008).