¹ Research for this paper was undertaken with materials preserved by the National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C. Among the more important papers are Record Group 59, State Department records pertaining to Iran (records for the period before 1930 are on microfilm; records for the period 1930–1949 are at the National Archives Building, Washington); RG 59, file 1231ml, the personnel record of Robert W. Imbrie; and RG 84, the post records of the Iran Legation and Embassy and of the consulates. Also consulted were the archives of the British Foreign Office (at the Public Record Office, Kew; henceforth FO), the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (at the Quai d'orsay; henceforth QO), the records of the Presbyterian mission in Iran (at the Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia), and the papers of Allen W. Dulles (at the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton).

² LaGorce, John Oliver, Vice President of the National Geographic Society, denied that lmbrie would have caused offense to Iranians, New York Times, August 4, 1924. The NGS no longer has any record of the incident.Google ScholarMillspaugh, Arthur C., in The American Task in Persia (New York, 1925), pp. 216 and 223, also cites Imbrie's photography as having incited the crowd. Despite much evidence that Iranians loved to be photographed, the collective memory of Americans in Tehran held that Imbrie was killed because he photographed a religious event. In the 1950s, the American Embassy routinely warned Americans not to photograph religious events, citing the Imbrie murder as evidence of what might happen (personal information of the author).Google ScholarAlso note that Nicolson, Harold, British Councellor of Legation in Tehran, 1925–1927, “had an ineradicable … view that Persians resent being photographed,” according to his wife, Sackville-West, V., Twelve Days (London, 1928), pp. 99–100. On Seymour, see RG 59, 391.1113—Hall, J. N.Google Scholar

³ Statement of Melvin Seymour, RG 59, 1231m1, 218; also see FO 371, 10155/E6607, Ovey, Tehran, July 31, 1924; and E6707, Ovey, Tehran, July 19, 1924.Google Scholar

⁴ Depositions of witnesses contained in RG 59, 1231ml, 201, 218; FO 371, 10155/E6707, Ovey, Tehran, July 19, 1924.Google Scholar

⁵ RG 59, 1231ml, 255, letter of Katherine Gillespie Imbrie to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, Tehran, August 14, 1924.Google Scholar

⁶ Statement and autopsy report of DrPackard, Harry P., July 19–20, 1924, RG 59, 1231ml, 201.Google Scholar

⁷ RG 59, 1231ml, 290, August 31, 1924.Google Scholar

⁸ FO 371, 10146/E7152, Tehran, August 1, 1924; Fraser preferred to believe that Reza's enemies had provoked the incident, but he was clear that there were “among the crowd individuals who had been directly incited to promote attacks on foreigners.”Google Scholar

⁹ New York Times, July 20, 1924;Google ScholarImbrie, Robert Whitney, Behind the Wheel of a War Ambulance (New York, 1918);Google ScholarImbrie, Katherine, “Data Relating to the Assassination of…. Robert Whitney Imbrie…” (NP., 1939).Google Scholar

¹⁰ September 7, 1924.Google Scholar

¹¹ RG 59, 125.972, 1–3, 20 (Imbrie's telegrams and dispatches from Viborg); see also RG 59, 861.00, 8852, in which Imbrie called for an external remedy to regenerate Russia, March 29, 1919, Dispatch #3; also see the minutes of Sir L. Oliphant, July 29, 1924, FO 371, 10155/E6504.

¹² RG 59, 1231ml, 1–22; the British Government had reason to believe he had done “intelligence work in the Caucasus,” Oliphant, July 29, 1924, E6504.Google Scholar

¹³ Ravndal, G. Bie, Consul General, Istanbul, June 25, 1923, RG 59, 1231ml, 68; British accounts suggest that Imbrie's assignment was to combat Soviet influence at Ankara (“Mr. Dulles himself seems to regard the Kemalist movement as a genuine national revival and therefore deserving of American support,” Geddes, Washington, August 18, 1922, Dispatch #966), and to pave the way for American economic penetration of Anatolia, Sir H. Rumbold, Dispatch 715. Imbrie was instrumental in Admiral Chester's attempts to obtain a concession from the Nationalist Government, RG 59, 1231ml, 121, letter of Colby M. Chester, Rear Admiral United States Navy, Retired, July 22, 1924;Google ScholarEvans, Laurence, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914–1924 (Baltimore, 1965), pp. 329–38, 344–48, and passim.Google ScholarDeNovo, John A., American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900–1939 (Minneapolis, 1963), pp. 210–28.Google Scholar

¹⁴ RG 59, 1231ml, 75.

¹⁵ RG 59, 1231ml, 70.

¹⁶ RG 59, 1231ml, 75b.

¹⁷ RG 59, 1231ml, 48; Dulles came to know Imbrie in Istanbul, where Dulles was aide to Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, U.S. High Commissioner to Turkey. As Director of Central Intelligence (1953–1961), Dulles was instrumental in the coup that overthrew the Iranian Government of Muhammad Mossadeq and established the dictatorship of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

¹⁸ As Millspaugh put it, “Had Major Imbrie been ordinarily discreet, he would not have been the incitement or the object of a mob attack. The mob did not seek him; he went under provocative appearances into a place and into conditions which had the elements of danger,” Task, p. 223.

¹⁹ RG 59, 1231ml, 82, 142. The British government was informed that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company believed that “Mr. Imbrie was murdered at Bolshevik instigation,” E6505.

²⁰ RG 59, 1231ml, 157, 173, 183, 208, 249, 257, 264, 284, 315; testimony of Major Miles to the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, February 15, 1926, contained in box #1452.

²¹ RG 59, 1231Ml, 157, 169, 226, 239, 254, 264, 273, 278, 283, 283a, 291, 297, 306, 319, 332, 373, 396. Murray was Dulles's successor as chief of NEA; he was Ambassador to Iran during 1945–1946. The official U.S. government representative at the execution of Mortaza was the Legation translator, Allahyar Saleh, afterwards an important leader of the Iran Party, “the country's main secular nationalist organization” and a major part of Dr. Mossadeq's National Front; other early leaders of the Iran Party included Mehdi Bazargan and Karim Sanjabi; for this see Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982), pp. 188–92; Saleh was a member of several Mossadeq cabinets, and he was Ambassador to the United States in 1952–1953; his report on the execution is in RG 84, American Legation, Tehran, Confidential Correspondence, 1924–1925, October 2, 1924.Google Scholar

²² House of Representatives, Report #985, 69th Congress, 1st session; RG 59, 1231ml, 518. Mrs. Imbrie had applied for $40,000.

²³ RG 59, 391.113 Seymour, Melvin.

²⁴ RG 59, 1231ml, 333, 352; New York Times, November 12, 1924. The additional money appropriated for Mrs. Imbrie came from this fund, RG 59, 1231ml, 518.Google Scholar

²⁵ RG 59, 1231ml, 136, 165, 177, 180, 195, 209, 213, 264. The diplomatic archives preserve photographs of the several ceremonies held for the transfer of Imbrie's body to the United States. Imbrie is buried in Arlington National Cemetery; President Coolidge and Secretary of State Hughes attended the funeral, New York Times, September 30, 1924.Google Scholar

²⁶ RG 84, Murray, Tehran, November 6, 1924, Dispatch #726; Murray, Tehran, November 30, 1924, Dispatch #772; report of British Military Attaché Colonel W. A. K. Fraser, Tehran, November 1, 1924, FO 371, 10146/E10258.

²⁷ See, inter alia, Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution (New Haven, 1981), pp. 1–23;Google Scholar and Akhavi, Shahrough, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period (Albany, 1980), pp. 1–59.Google Scholar

²⁸ Keddie, Roots, pp. 24–78; Algar, Hamid, Religion and State in Iran, 1785–1906 (Berkeley, 1969);Google ScholarKeddie, Nikki R., Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892 (London, 1966);Google ScholarFischer, Michael M. J., Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 1–180;Google Scholar Akhavi, Religion, pp. 1–59; Keddie, Nikki R., ed., Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution (New Haven, 1983), pp. 1–124.Google Scholar

²⁹ Kazemzadeh, Firuz, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven, 1968);Google ScholarSykes, Christopher, Wassmuss: The German Lawrence (London, 1936);Google ScholarGeneral Arfa, Hassan, Under Five Shahs (London, 1964);Google ScholarLenczowski, George, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948: A Study in Big Power Rivalry (Ithaca, 1949);Google Scholar Keddie, Roots, pp. 79ff.

³⁰ The records of this missionary activity are preserved at the Presbyterian Historical Society in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

³¹ Ramazani, Rouhollah K., The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs,1500–1941 (Charlottesville, 1966);Google ScholarUpton, Joseph, The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation (Cambridge, 1960);Google ScholarKazemzadeh, , Russia and Britain; W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York, 1912);Google ScholarChubin, Shahram and Zabih, Sepehr, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley, 1974);Google Scholar Lenczowski, Russia; Ramazani, Rouhollah K., Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941–1973 (Charlottesville, 1974);Google ScholarRubin, Barry, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York, 1980).Google Scholar

³² On Baskerville, see RG 84, Tabriz Consulate, January 1908–November 1910; Baskerville was shot in the back while advancing toward the anti-Constitutional forces besieging Tabriz. An account of the episode by Rezazadeh Shafaq, one of Baskerville's students who subsequently became a leader of the Iran Party and a member of the Majlis and of the Senate, is to be found in Saleh, Ali Pasha, Cultural Ties between Iran and the United States (Tehran, 1976), pp. 311–28.Google Scholar

³³ Browne, Edward G., The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909 (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 269 and passim;Google Scholar Rubin, Paved, pp. 10–11; Shuster, Strangling.

³⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Vol. II, pp. 700ff.Google Scholar

³⁵ Millspaugh, Task; FRUS, 1927, Vol. III, pp. 523ff.; RG 59, 891.00, 1302; also see RG 59, 891.6363 Standard Oil, 16, a memorandum by A. C. Millspaugh, December 17, 1920, which suggests that Millspaugh was intimately involved in the negotiations for a northern Iranian oil concession in exchange for an American loan.Google Scholar

³⁶ Keddie, Roots, pp. 79–93; Lenczowski, Russia; RG 84, Caldwell, Tehran, telegrams, February 22, 1921, and February 26, 1921.Google Scholar

³⁷ Even Balfour, J. M., whose Recent Happenings in Persia (Edinburgh, 1922) was the first British book published about the coup, and who was highly critical of Lord Curzon's policy in Iran, maintained that “the movement was not engineered either by or with the knowledge of the British Legation,” p. 218.Google Scholar

³⁸ See, for example, Ullman, Richard, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1923, Vol. III, The Anglo- Soviet Accord (Princeton, 1972), pp. 354–69, 383–89;Google Scholar and Ironside, Lord, ed., High Road to Command: The Diaries of Major General Sir Edmund Ironside, 1920–1922 (London, 1972).Google Scholar

³⁹ Ironside, p. 147.

⁴⁰ FO 371, 6403/E4926.

⁴¹ FO 371, 6401/E2883.

⁴² Ironside, p. 117.

⁴³ FO 371, 6427, file 787; FO 371, 10156/E6954; Nicolson, Harold, Curzon: The Last Phase (London, 1934), p. 144;Google ScholarForeign Office List, 1923, 1926, 1927. Norman was retired at age 54; Bridgeman was 39. Dickson was alleged to be mentally unbalanced, but he was not permitted to remain in service even after his sanity ceased to be questioned. He had breached service etiquette by sharing his knowledge of British involvement in the coup with the American minister. All three men were retired on pensions.Google Scholar See also Lesueur, Emile, Les Anglais en Perse (Paris, n.d.—accessioned to the British Museum July 29, 1922); Lesueur, a professor in the Law School in Tehran at the time of the coup, specifically cites Smart as the instigator of the coup, pp. 148–53.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ FO 371, 9024/E4612 (1923), and 10156/E9418 (1924) and passim. The role played by Sir Percy Loraine, British Minister in Tehran, in encouraging Reza Khan to believe that the British government regarded any action to depose the Qajars as purely an Iranian internal matter that London did not oppose, deserves investigation.

⁴⁵ Keddie, Roots, pp. 79–112; Wilber, Donald, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran (Hicksville, 1975); Millspaugh, Task;Google ScholarCottam, Richard W., Nationalism in Iran, 2nd ed. (Pittsburgh, 1979).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Ovey, Tehran, June 17, 1924, FO 371, 10128/E5861; on October 23, 1924, Ovey noted (E9753) that “the Americans set out on their quest to reform Persia financially and morally with an unwarranted optimism.”Google Scholar

⁴⁷ RG 59, 891.51A; FRUS, 1927, Vol. III, pp. 547ff.;Google ScholarFO 371, 11498/E3779, Loraine, Tehran, May 25, 1926; E5058, Harold Nicolson, Tehran, August 14, 1926.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ This also met the needs of British policy; see FO 371, 11498/E3779, Loraine, Tehran, May 25, 1926, and FO 371, 11499/E6223, Oliphant, FO October 21, 1926, which noted that the success of the Milispaugh mission “might stand us in good stead,” and that “Lord Curzon's wish for the success of the mission was brought out with considerable force.”Google Scholar

⁴⁹ RG 84, Kornfeld, Tehran, March 18, 1924, Dispatch #422; Kornfeld, Tehran, March 23, 1924, Telegram #26; Kornfeld, Tehran, March 28, 1924, Dispatch #434; RG 59, 891.00, 1262, 1268. Modarres died in 1938, after having been imprisoned again by Reza Pahlavi in 1929. Iranian nationalist and religious opinion regards him as a martyr of the Pahlavi oppression, Keddie, Roots, pp. 93–94.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ RG 59, 891.51A, 175, 180, 198; FRUS, 1927, Vol. III, pp. 531–35;Google ScholarAvery, Peter, Modern Iran (New York, 1965), p. 263.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Keddie, Roots, p. 91; Cottam, Nationalism, pp. 111–14.

⁵² Keddie, Roots, pp. 89–90;Google ScholarRG 59, 891.6363 Standard Oil, 327, 343, 366; RG 59, 891.00, 1260. Millspaugh reported on December 17, 1920, that “if he could tell the Persian Government that they could obtain a loan from the United States …. there would be no doubt of the oil concession being granted as well as other valuable concessions” (memorandum of conversation with the Persian Minister and the Councellor of Legation).Google Scholar

⁵³ RG 59, 891.00, 1297, Imbrie, Tehran, July 14, 1924; FO 371, 10145/E6283, Ovey, Tehran, July 1,1924. The British Legation informed Whitehall that the most generally accepted rumor held Reza Khan responsible for the murder of Eshqi, July 18, 1924, FO 371, 10146/E6704.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ RG 84, Kornfeld, Tehran, April 22, 1924, Dispatch #466; June 14, 1924, Dispatch #550; June 16, 1924, Dispatch #551; June 29, 1924, Dispatch #575; July 9, 1924, Dispatch #586.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Keddie, Roots, pp. 48–52; RG 59, 891.00, 1297, Imbrie, Tehran, July 14, 1924; RG 59, 1231ml,203, 205. The British believed that “the Americans in Persia are usually looked upon as admirers of the Bahais,” FO 371, 10155/E6515. According to diplomatic accounts, the anti-Bahai agitation was attributed both to enemies of the government and to Reza Khan, FO 371, 10146/E6704.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ RG 59, 891.00, 1297, Imbrie, Tehran, July 14, 1924, Dispatch #57. One should note the State Department's judgment of Imbrie as a reporter-writer: “His work falls down when it comes to sending in reports. He is not able to put his observations on paper,” Dulles, memorandum, September 19, 1923, RG 59, 123G711,48.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ RG 59, 1231ml, 251. Susan Moody's obituary is in Baha'i World, 6 (1934–1936), 483–86.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Momen, Moojan, ed., The Babi and Baha'i Religions, 1844–1944: Some Contemporary Western Accounts (Oxford, 1981), p. 462.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Imbrie's decision to visit the site was so sudden that there was “no question of any premeditated assault,” Ovey, Tehran, July 29, 1924, FO 371, 10156/E7101.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ RG 59, 891.00, 1298; also see the report of Major Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, August 31, 1924, on board Trenton, RG 59, 1231ml, 290, which accepted this interpretation of the events leading up to Imbrie's murder; and Kornfeld, Tehran, September 29, 1924, RG 59, 891.00, 1229.Google Scholar

⁶¹ RG 59, 1231ml, 183, Kornfeld, Tehran, August 13, 1924: “The Prime Minister is a dictator whose power rests on his army. Whatever justice we obtain must come from him through his military courts. The only alternative is the Sheriat courts which in such a case as this would vindicate any Moslem regardless of evidence against him.” See also Murray, Tehran, November 2, 1924, RG 59, 1231ml, 333; FO 371, 10156/E8508, Kerman, August 1–15, 1924, lauding the army as standing for law, order, and strong government.Google Scholar Also see Bonzan, Lucien, French Minister at Tehran, August 21, 1924, QO, Perse, 18, pp. 223–24. Although British Minister Sir Percy Loraine reported approvingly on January 5, 1925, that Reza was “stronger and more popular than ever,” FO 371, 10840/E104, as late as July 31, 1924, Chargé Ovey reported that Reza “had lost power, prestige and popularity.” Ovey expected Reza to “essay a coup d'état,” but expected “chaos” to result because of Reza's “universal unpopularity and the lessened hold he now has over his army,” FO 371, 10146/E7105. Reza Khan, of course, also used the episode to strengthen his control over the army.Google Scholar

⁶² Acting Secretary Grew to Kornfeld (for Millspaugh), July 30, 1924, FRUS, 1927, Vol. III, pp. 532ff.; on September 18, 1924, Murray “urgently advised Millspaugh to give way in his demands,” RG 59, 891.51A, 191T.Google Scholar

⁶³ RG 59, 1231ml, 183, Kornfeld, Tehran, August 13, 1924.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ RG 59, 891.51A, 205, Murray, Tehran, October 6, 1924; Murray chose to describe this as “a signal victory for Dr. Millspaugh.” British accounts of the American Financial Mission are contained in FO 371, file 110/34(1924).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ RG 59, 891.51, 351T et seq. Also see FO 371, file 44/34 (1924). Chargé Ovey reported that the oil question was “overshadowed by…. the murder of Major Imbrie,” September 12, 1924, E6282, to which the Foreign Office noted, “so ends another chapter in this tedious story of the northern oil concession,” Mallet, January 1, 1925.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ DeNovo American Interests, pp. 283–86; Avery, Modern Iran, p. 258;Google ScholarLenczowski, Russia, pp. 81–84; British Chargé Ovey believed that Standard Oil “probably instigated the Sinclair Oil scandal” in revenge for Sinclair's role in spoiling the Standard-APOC proposal for a northern oil concession, letter to Sir L. Oliphant, April 7, 1924, FO 371, 10126/E6282.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Ovey, Tehran, September 12, 1924, FO 371, 10126/E6282. The Iranian Government still hoped for some sort of northern contract, however, and opened contacts with a French consortium, Bonzon, Tehran, November 6, 1924, QO, Perse, 50, pp. 87–93. Nothing came of this initiative.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ RG 59, 1231ml, 380, 433. There had been considerable debate among British officials as to the best course for British policy. On May 5, 1923, Sir Percy Loraine had requested that Whitehall support Reza Khan, arguing that to oppose him meant the “gradual collapse of our position and influence unless we uphold them and our friends by force.” In response to this, on May 9, 1923, G. P. Churchill of the Foreign Office argued that “if Reza Khan cannot be made to see the folly of his present course [attempting to extend central government control over Khuzistan], it is possible for us to exert pressure upon him by withholding that financial assistance without which he will be utterly incapable of maintaining his army,” FO 371, 9024/E4612. After the Imbrie murder, Whitehall still hoped that Sheikh Khazal could be maintained. The Foreign Office (Mallet) believed on October 29, 1924, that “If Reza Khan is forced by the U.S. Government to have the other two criminals executed, he will have considerable trouble with the mullahs.” Whitehall hoped that “the prospect of strained relations with America will make Reza Khan more ready to agree to our mediation in his quarrel with the Shaikh of Mohammerah,” FO 371, 10156/E9418. Events proved this analysis to be wishful thinking, and consequently Britain had little choice but to follow the policy advocated by Sir Percy Loraine, an “attitude of watchful inaction,” FO 371, 10840/E278, January 17, 1925.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Wilber, Riza Shah, pp. 89ff.; Avery, Modern Iran, p. 260;Google Scholar Keddie, Roots, p. 91.

⁷⁰ RG 59, 891.6363 Standard Oil, 16, Murray, Tehran, September 19, 1924, cited in Alexander, Yonah and Nanes, Allan, eds., The United States and Iran: A Diplomatic History (Frederick, Maryland, 1980), pp. 48ff.;Google Scholarletter of Sir Percy Loraine to MrOliphant, L., December 17, 1923, FO 371, 10125/E544.Google Scholar

⁷¹ “Assassinat du Consul americain et les pétroles persanes,” Tehran, n.d., QO, Sér. Perse, E., Pétroles, 1923–1925, #50, pp. 70–72; this unsigned French Legation report suggested that Imbrie was working actively for the Sinclair interests, and that he was killed by those who wanted to prevent the ratification and exploitation of the Sinclair concession.Google Scholar

⁷² RG 59, 891.00, 1596, August 28, 1934.Google Scholar

⁷³ See the letter of Secretary of State Hughes to DrSpeer, Robert E., Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., November 11, 1924, NE—123Iml, 317, Presbyterian Historical Society; also see FO 371, 10146/E9753, Ovey, Tehran, October 23, 1924.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ QO, Perse, Pétroles, 1923–1925, #50, pp. 70–72; the French wondered at the discipline of the American press, which of course was almost entirely dependent on the State Department for information.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ RG 59, 891.51A, 191T, September 18, 1924, and 205, October 6, 1924.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Kornfeld, Tehran, August 13, 1924, RG 59, 1231ml, 183.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ RG 59, 1231ml, 353, October 16, 1924.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ RG 59, 1231ml, 290, August 31, 1924; 291, September 3, 1924.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ FO 371, 10128/E110, November 26, 1923.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ FO 371, 10125/E544, letter of Loraine to Oliphant, December 17, 1923; FO 371, 10144/E1121, February 24, 1924.Google Scholar

⁸¹ FO 371, 10146/E7501, Ovey, Tehran, August 10, 1924.Google Scholar

⁸² FO 371, 10128/E9348.

⁸³ Introduction to Iran (New York, 1947), p. 99.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan (London, 1824, 1923).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ RG 59, Tehran, December 13, 1924, Dispatch #787.

⁸⁶ RG 59, 1231ml, 397.

⁸⁷ RG 59, 1231ml, 226.

⁸⁸ For an important critique of the “orientalist” tradition, see Edward, Said, Orientalism (New York, 1979).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ RG 59, 1231ml.

⁹⁰ RG 59, 1231ml, 239, 283, 313.