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The Evolution of Tunisian Salafism after the Revolution: From La Maddhabiyya to Salafi-Malikism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2021

Fabio Merone
Affiliation:
Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche sur l'Afrique et le Moyen-Orient, Universite Laval, Quebec, Canada
Théo Blanc
Affiliation:
Department of Social and Political Sciences, European University, Florence, Italy
Ester Sigillò
Affiliation:
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Corresponding
E-mail address:

Abstract

What shape does Salafism take in Tunisia after the ban of the Salafi-Jihadi group Ansar al-Shari‘a and the wave of securitization carried out by national authorities? This article argues that a constraining legal context put Salafism's doctrinal rigidity in tension with its survival and ultimately prompted a residual current of Salafi actors to accommodate their stance toward Malikism, the prevalent school (madhhab) in the country. This adaptation is at odds with contemporary Salafism, which traditionally dismisses all four law schools (lā madhabiyya), rejects their blind imitation (taqlῑd), and claims the superiority of the Qur'an, hadith, and consensus of the salaf (pious predecessors) over jurisprudence (fiqh). To account for this puzzle, this article scrutinizes the historical development of Salafism and the evolution of its stance toward Malikism across three generational waves. It notably shows how religious securitization associated with the promotion of a “moderate” Islam pushed Salafi actors to redefine their ideology to preserve their preaching and teaching activities. We call Salafi-Malikism the outcome of this adaptive strategy. Drawing on the Tunisian case, we argue that, despite its purist claims, Salafism is not an immutable religious current, but can take different trajectories to survive in constraining environments.

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Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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10 Salafi movements in the Arab world have for the most part refrained from political participation. The issue of Salafi political participation gained academic and political attention in North Africa after the Arab uprisings, with the Salafist al-Nour party in Egypt as the most emblematic example. See Torelli, Stefano, Merone, Fabio, and Cavatorta, Francesco, “Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges and Opportunities for Democratization,” Middle East Policy 19, no. 4 (2012): 140–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Georges Fahmi, “The Future of Political Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 16 November 2015, https://carnegie-mec.org/2015/11/16/future-of-political-salafism-in-egypt-and-tunisia-pub-61871; Merone, Fabio, “Between Social Contention and Takfirism: The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Tunisia,” Mediterranean Politics 22, no. 1 (2017): 71–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.973188; and Blanc, “La politisation du salafisme.”

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14 See for instance Ostebo, Terje, “Growth and Fragmentation: The Salafi Movement in Bale, Ethiopia,” in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Meijer, Roel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 344–65Google Scholar; and Kursani, Shpend, “Salafi Pluralism in National Contexts: The Secular State, Nation and Militant Islamism in Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 18, no. 2 (2018): 301–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In Egypt, for example, Salafi political parties obtained representation in the People's Assembly in 2011 (127 of 498 seats) and the Consultative Council (45 of 180) and proved particularly skillful at co-opting local elites and tribe chieftains; see Clément Steuer, “Les salafistes dans le champ politique égyptien,” Politique étrangère, no. 4 (2013): 133–43.

15 The entire article is the by-product of a joint writing effort. The three authors jointly wrote the introduction, “Malikism and Salafism in Tunisia before 2011,” and the conclusion. Fabio Merone led the work for “Salafism and Malikism in Tunisia after 2011”; Ester Sigillò led the work for the third section, “The 2013–2014 Turning Point: Securitization and Domestication of the Religious Field,” and Théo Blanc led the work for the section entitled “Salafi-Malikism: The Discourse of Theological Compromise.”

16 Malikism's foundational book is Malik's Muwatta (Well-Trodden Path), a compendium of fiqh composed in the second half of the 8th century, which also constitutes the oldest source of hadith (the Prophet's deeds and sayings). The second reference for Malikism is the book al-Mudawwana (corpus, code) elaborated by Sahnun ibn Habib al-Tanukhi (776–854); Turki, Abdel-Magid, “Le Muwatta’ de Mâlik, ouvrage de fiqh, entre le hadîth et le ra'y, ou Comment aborder l’étude du mâlikisme kairouanais au IV/Xe siècle,” Studia Islamica 86 (1997): 535CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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18 Bredow, Mathias von, Der heilige Krieg (gihad) aus der Sicht der malikitischen Rechtsschule (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994)Google Scholar; Bonner, Michael, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006): 109CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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20 Russell Hopley, “Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani,” in Dictionary of African Biography, ed. Henry Louis Gates et al. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 100.

21 Mahmud Abd al-Mawla, L'université zaytounienne et la société tunisienne (Tunis: Maison Tiers-Monde, 1984), 33.

22 Mary Dewhurst Lewis, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881–1938 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013).

23 Major families of Zaytuni Maliki ‘ulama’ include the Ennaifer family, the Djait family, and the Ben Achour family.

24 Marion Boulby, “The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1988): 593.

25 Ibid., 592.

26 Haugbolle, Hostrup R. and Cavatorta, Francesco, “Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia,” Middle East Report 262 (2012): 2025Google Scholar; Wolf, Anne, Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 Mohamed Hamdi, The Politicisation of Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 13–14.

28 Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia, 122. Interview with H'mida Ennaifer, 1 August 2020, Bardo. On the ideological divide between the Islamists and Salafists, see Ranko, Annette and Nedza, Justyna, “Crossing the Ideological Divide? Egypt's Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 6 (2016): 519–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Interview with H'mida Ennaifer, 1 August 2020, Bardo.

30 Interview with Rafiq al-‘Ouni, historic leader of al-Jabha al-Islamiyya, 30 June 2019, Tunis.

32 Longo, “Salafism and Takfirism in Tunisia.”

33 Ibid., 9.

34 Interview with Abdelmajid Charfi, president of the Bayt al-Hikma Foundation, 21 February 2018, Carthage.

35 Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, “Salafist Mouvance and Sheikh-ism in the Tunisian Democratic Transition,” (Working Papers in International Studies, Centre for International Studies, Dublin City University, 2012), 4.

36 Alaya Allani, “Islamism and Salafism in Tunisia after the Arab Spring,” Right to Nonviolence, Tunisia Constitutional e-Forum, 2012; Fahmi and Meddeb, “Market for Jihad.”

37 Interview with Kamel Marzouqi, 21 November 2019, Soussa.

38 Thierry Brésillon, “Tunisie: un parti ‘salafiste’ pour quoi faire?,” L'OBS, 7 July 2012, https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-tunisie-libre/20120710.RUE1156/tunisie-un-parti-salafiste-pour-quoi-faire.html.

39 Marzouqi interview, 21 November 2019.

40 Blanc, Théo, “Salafisme(s) postrévolutionnaire(s) en Tunisie: un ‘paradoxe tunisien’?Moyen-Orient 44 (2019): 33Google Scholar. For Salafi-Jihadis, the main resource was the website Platform for Unification and Jihad (minbar al-tawhid wa-l-jihad), http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/d.html.

41 Interview with Sami Brahem, Islamic intellectual and researcher, 12 March 2013, La Marsa.

42 Interview with Kamel Marzouqi, 20 February 2013, Tunis.

44 Interview with Muhammad Amin, director of the Imam Malik Association, 19 March 2018, El Manar 1, Tunis.

45 Marzouqi interview, 20 February 2013. Marzouqi also taught shari‘a sciences at the Ibn Massoud Association from 2008–9 onward, before creating the University Imam Malik in 2012.

46 David S. Powers, Law, Society and Culture in the Maghrib: 1300–1500 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.

47 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1964), 1Google Scholar.

48 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Shari'ah,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21.

49 Ulrika Martensson, “The Quran, the Constitution, ‘the Natural’: Divisive Concepts within Scholarly Islam,” in Fundamentalism in the Modern World, vol. 1, ed. Ulrika Martensson, Jennifer Bailey, Priscilla Ringrose, and Asbjorn Dyrendal (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 39; see also, Laoust, Henri, La profession de foi d'Ibn Taymiyya (Paris: Geuthner, 1986), 84Google Scholar.

50 Laoust, La profession de foi, 23–24; Martensson, “The Quran, the Constitution, ‘the Natural,’” 39.

51 Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” 44; Brynjar Lia, “‘Destructive Doctrinarians’: Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current,” in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 285. There is some disagreement on whether the rejection of taqlīd originated with Ibn Taymiyya (Martensson's argument) or his disciple Ibn Qayyim (Haykel's argument).

52 Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” 38; Zahab, Mariam Abou, “Salafism in Pakistan: The Ahl-e Hadith Movement,” in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Meijer, Roel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 129Google Scholar.

53 Lauzière, “Construction of Salafiyya,” 209.

54 Griffel, Franck, “What Do We Mean by ‘Salafī’? Connecting Muhammad ʿAbduh with Egypt's Nur Party in Islam's Contemporary Intellectual History,” Die Welt Des Islams 55 (2015): 204–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55 Griffel, “What Do We Mean by ‘Salafī’?” 207.

56 Ibid, 209. Italics and transliteration added by the authors.

Ibid

57 Lauzière, Making of Salafism, 8.

58 Lacroix, Stéphane, “Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism,” in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Meijer, Roel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 5880Google Scholar; Lacroix, Stéphane, Les islamistes saoudiens: Une insurrection manquée (Paris: Proche-Orient, 2010), 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59 Griffel, “What Do We Mean by ‘Salafī’?” 210; see also Vogel, Frank E., Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 125–26Google Scholar.

60 Lauzière, Making of Salafism, 8.

61 Zelin, Aaron Y., Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, “Salafist movement and Sheikh-ism in the Tunisian Democratic Transition,” Middle East Law and Governance 5, no. 3 (2013): 308–30, https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-00503004.

63 Merone, Fabio, “Enduring Class Struggle in Tunisia: The Fight for Identity beyond Political Islam,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 1 (2014): 74–87Google Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.973188.

64 Interview with Shaykh Houcem al-Ajmi, teacher of Usul al-Fiqh, Imam Malik Association, 28 September 2019, El Manar 1, Tunis.

65 The official name is al-Jabha al-Tunisiyya li-l-Jamaʿiat al-Islamiyya, commonly known simply as Rabita, which means “league,” not to be confused with the Rabita Qur'aniyya, created at the end of the 1960s under Bourguiba.

66 We distinguish between autodidact Salafi scholars, who often have a learning experience in Salafi circles or universities abroad (Marzouqi, Bechir Ben Hassan), and ‘ulama’ who have acquired a religious diploma from a major religious school anchored in a school of law (Mokhtar Jibeli and Farid El Beji, who both studied at the Zaytuna). These ‘ulama’ are distinguishable by the white and red turban (‘amama) they wear, which symbolize the rank of a religious shaykh. They usually have a solid foundation in Maliki fiqh and do not reject legal schools. Jibeli obtained a doctorate in 2014, writing a dissertation entitled “Renewal in Maliki Jurisprudence between 1300 and 1431,” and El Beji published several books on Maliki fiqh, which he teaches at the association Dar al-Hadith al-Zaytuniyya that he founded in Tunis in 2011. Moreover, El Beji has criticized Salafis harshly, including Bechir Ben Hassan in 2012.

67 Interview with Muhammad al-Kharraf, secretary general of Imam Malik University, 20 February 2013, Tunis.

68 Stefano Maria Torelli, “A Portrait of Tunisia's Ansar al-Shari ‘a Leader Abu Iyad al-Tunisi: His Strategy on Jihad,” Militant Leadership Monitor 4, no. 8 (2013).

69 Interview with Abu Abdallah al-Tounsi, one of the members of this council, winter 2012, Sidi Bouzid.

70 At its peak, the group claimed a membership 70,000 strong. Interview with Bilal Chawachi, former Ansar al-Shari‘a leader, 5 November 2012, Tunis.

72 The state cracked down on the group as early as May 10–11, when security services rounded up Ansar al-Shari‘a members who were delivering public lectures or distributing their literature on the street. See Aaron Y. Zelin, “Standoff between the Tunisian Government and Ansar al-Sharia,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 14 May 2013, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/standoff-between-the-tunisian-government-and-ansar-al-sharia.

73 “Les Brigades Okba Ben Nafii ont pris la place des Ansar Chariaa,” African Manager, 26 March 2015, https://africanmanager.com/les-brigades-okba-ben-nafii-ont-pris-la-place-des-ansar-chariaa; Fabio Merone, “Between Social Contention and Takfirism,” 14–15.

74 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Tunisian Jihadism Five Years after Ansar al-Sharia,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 16 September 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/tunisian-jihadism-five-years-after-ansar-al-sharia.

75 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2016): 207–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004.

76 Marzouqi interview, 21 November 2019.

77 Personal observation by Théo Blanc, summer 2019. According to Muhammad, secretary general of the Tunisian section of the International Association of Muslim Scholars (interview, 18 November 2019, Tunis), they assist the police by giving information on “suspicious” people attending the prayers in the mosques.

78 Stéphane Lacroix, “Between Revolution and Apoliticism.”

79 At the beginning of 2012, three small Salafist parties, Jabhat al-Islah, Hizb al-Asala, and Hizb al-Rahma, were able to register with the Ministry of the Interior.

80 Torelli et al., “Salafism in Tunisia,” 142.

81 Interviews with Muhammad Khouja, 24 October 2013 and 17 April 2018, Tunis.

82 Théo Blanc and Ester Sigillò, “Beyond the ‘Islamists vs. Secularists’ Cleavage: The Rise of New Challengers after the 2019 Tunisian Elections,” Policy Brief, European University Institute, 2019, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/65592/PB_2019_27_MED.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.

83 Blanc, “La politisation du salafisme,” 159–71.

84 Ansar al-Shari‘a did not claim responsibility for the attack and most analysts agree that it was unlikely ordered by its leadership. The two assassinations were later claimed by ISIS and attributed to Abu Bakr al-Hakim, aka Abu Mouqatil, a French Tunisian who joined ISIS after the attack. See Christine Petré, “Tunisian Salafism: The Rise and Fall of Ansar al-Sharia,” Policy Brief no. 209, Hivos/FRIDE, October 2015, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194178/PB209_Tunisian_Salafism.pdf.

85 Monica Marks, “Tunisia,” in Rethinking Political Islam, ed. Shadi Hamid and William McCants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 32–53.

86 Sigillò, “Islamism and the Rise of Islamic Charities.”

87 Alaya Allani, “Radical Religious Movements during the Transition: The Example of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia: Growth and Development; Prospects: 2011–2014,” United Nations Development Programme, 2012, 8; Fabio Merone, Ester Sigillò, and Damiano De Facci, “Nahda and Tunisian Islamic Activism,” in New Opposition in the Middle East, ed. Dara Conduit and Shahram Akbarzadeh (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 182.

88 “Entretien avec Mounir Tlili, ministre des Affaires religieuses: ‘des mosquées encore otages des radicaux,’” Réalités Online, 8 July 2014, https://www.realites.com.tn/2014/07/entretien-avec-mounir-tlili-ministre-des-affaires-religieuses-des-mosquees-encore-otages-des-radicaux; “La Tunisie renforce l'enseignement de l'islam modéré,” http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/23153-la-tunisie-renforce-l-enseignement-de-l-islam-modere-video.html.

89 After 2011, organisms regulating the control of associative activities were created under decree-law 88: the general directorate for political parties and associations, a body linked to the presidency of the republic, which has a more technical role, and the ministry for relations with civil society, which has a more political role. See Ester Sigillò, “Mobilizing for or through Development? Trajectories of Civic Activism in Post-Authoritarian Tunisia” (PhD diss., Scuola Normale Superiore, 2018), 158.

90 Interview with `Ali Amira, 3 July 2018, Tunis.

91 Sigillò, “Islamism and the Rise of Islamic Charities.”

92 Interview with Muhammad Amin, director of the Imam Malik Association, 25 February 2020, El Manar 1, Tunis.

93 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2 July 2018, Tunis.

94 Amin interview, 19 March 2018.

95 Tunisia's Constitution of 2014, article 42, 9, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf.

97 Interviews with the secretary general of the Rabita Qur'aniyya and an official of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, July 2018, Tunis.

98 Interview with vice director of the Rabita Qur'aniyya, 20 June 2018. The role played by the 9th-century scholar Sahnun ibn Sa'id ibn Habib at-Tanukhi, who systematized the Maliki school of law, is particularly emphasized in Tunisia. See also the discourse of Mounir Tlili, Minister of Religious Affairs: “ترشيد الخطاب الديني والاحاصة بدور العبادة ودعم التعليم الزيتوني” (Orientation of the religious discourse, awareness of the role of worship and support to Zaytuni teaching), YouTube, 27 June 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vY5G9V2PgRw&feature=emb_title.

99 Whereas Tunisian Maliki Islam is sponsored by the government as a moderate alternative, Maliki fiqh is not moderate in absolute terms. For instance, Malikism punishes homosexuality with death by stoning, whereas Shafiism and Hanbalism sanction it with whipping, and Hanafism does not recognize it as a ḥadd (breach of shari‘a). Therefore, the process of Malikization we describe here is not tantamount to ideological moderation, as we do not address the substantive ideology of the actors.

100 Lefèvre, Raphaël, “North Africa's Maliki Crisis,” Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 5 (2015): 683CrossRefGoogle Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1091162; Longo, “Salafism and Takfirism in Tunisia.”

101 Lefèvre, “North Africa's Maliki Crisis,” 684.

102 Ibid., 687.

103 Interview with the secretary general of the Rabita Qur'aniyya, 20 June 2018, Tunis.

104 Interview with anonymous imam of the Association of Shari‘a Sciences, 3 July 2019, La Marsa.

105 Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia.

106 Dell'Aguzzo, Loretta and Sigillò, Ester, “Political Legitimacy and Variations in State-Religion Relations in Tunisia,” Journal of North African Studies 22, no. 4 (2017): 511–35Google Scholar.

107 Interview with H'mida Ennaifer, 8 January 2020, Bardo.

108 “Concluding Statement of the 9th Ennahdha Party Conference,” 12–16 July 2012, https://www.facebook.com/Nahdha.International/posts/245449198891679.

109 Interview with anonymous person, 2 July 2018, Tunis.

110 Interview with Oussama Sghaier, Ennahda's spokesperson, 22 May 2016, Hammamet. Article 6 of the constitution enshrines the principle of state control and supervision of the partisan neutrality of mosques.

112 Sigillò, “Ennahdha et l'essor des associations islamiques.”

113 Ghannouchi keynote speech, Ennahda's 10th congress, 22 May 2016, Hammamet.

114 Redissi, Hamadi, Une histoire du wahhabisme; Comment l'islam sectaire est devenu l'islam (Paris: Points, 2016)Google Scholar.

115 Bechir Ben Hassen can be considered the pioneering intellectual in creating a Maliki-friendly Salafi discourse. This speech was given in November 2012 at the presidential palace in Carthage following an invitation from President Moncef Marzouki. Bechir Ben Hassan, “محاضرة الشيخ بشير بن حسن حول الظاهرة السلفية في تونس ج1” (Shaykh Bechir Ben Hassan Conference on the Salafi phenomenon in Tunisia, part 1), YouTube, 26:00, November 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=keMXSIj9VEE.

116 Interview with Hassine, 19 November 2019, El Manar 1, Tunis.

117 Imams cited by Ben Hassen are Muhammad Mekki Ben Azuz, Shaykh Muhammad Hacine, and Othman Bin Mekki al-Tuzri Zubaidi.

118 Shaykh Bechir Ben Hassan Conference, part 1, 27:26.

119 Marzouqi interview, 20 February 2013.

120 Interview with anonymous student of the association, 24 June 2019, Tunis.

121 “الشيخ بشير بن حسن ـ عبد الفتاح موروـ السلفية في تونس” (Shaykh Bechir Ben Hassan and Abd al-Fatah Mourou: Salafism in Tunisia), Al Watania 2 TV, YouTube, 30:18–31:20, March 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kGrZYiMd1tM.

122 Bechir Ben Hassan, “محاضرة الشيخ بشير بن حسن حول الظاهرة السلفية في تونس ج2” (Shaykh Bechir Ben Hassan Conference on Salafism in Tunisia, part 2), YouTube, 26:17, November 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBje5d4983I&t=1632s.

123 Marzouqi interview, 20 February 2013.

124 Interview with Houcem al-Ajmi, 19 November 2019, El Manar 1, Tunis.

125 Lauzière, Making of Salafism; Lauzière, Henri, “L'histoire du salafisme: ses pièges et ses mythes,” Moyen-Orient 33 (2017): 1823Google Scholar.

126 Al-Ajmi interview, 28 September 2019.

127 Blanc, “Être ‘islamiste’ ou ‘salafiste’ en 2018.”

128 Bechir Ben Hassan: “When I was in the country of emigration, I used to teach Ibn Taymiyya and Abd al-Wahhab's books. I used to teach fiqh following the Hanbali school. When I came to stay here, I saw a Tunisian specificity and respected it.” See “لبشير بن حسنحول الفكر الوهابي و تأثيره في تونس ” (Bechir Ben Hassan on Wahhabi Thought and Influence in Tunisia), TNN TV, YouTube, 7:21–8:40, May 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dIon_cxrusk.

129 Cavatorta, Francesco and Merone, Fabio, “Post-Islamism, Ideological Evolution and ‘La Tunisianité’ of the Tunisian Islamist Party al-Nahda,” Journal of Political Ideologies 20 (2015): 2742CrossRefGoogle Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2015.991508.

130 Shaykh Bechir Ben Hassan and Abd al-Fatah Mourou: Salafism in Tunisia, 01:05:00–01:08:00.

131 Interview with anonymous former student, 19 November 2019, El Manar 1, Tunis.

132 Al-Ajmi interview, 28 September 2019.

133 Amin interview, 25 February 2020.

134 Interview with anonymous Salafi, 29 January 2020, Tunis.

135 Amin interview, 25 February 2020.

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