1 See U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report, 2-3 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1999) (studying the relationship between economic integration, global poverty, and inequality), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/pdf/hdr visited Feb. 12, 2005). The income gap between the fifth of the world's people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, an increase from 1990 when the same ratio was 60 to 1 and 1960 when it was 30 to 1. Id. at 3. The wealthiest twenty percent of the world's population share in eighty-six percent of the world's GDP, while the poorest twenty percent receive only one percent of the world's GDP. Id. at 2.Google Scholar

2 See Gijsbert van Liemt, Towards a different kind of globalization, or how the anti-globalists view the world, 3-5 (Mar. 2004) (explaining that anti-globalist reasons against globalization range from agriculture to cultural identity).Google Scholar

3 Cf. Arne Melchior et. al., Globalization and Inequality: World Income Distribution and Living Standards, 1960-1998, 1 (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000) (arguing that globalization has in fact contributed to a reduction in global poverty as evidenced by the fact that global inequality as a whole has decreased since the 1960s), available at http://odin.dep.no/archive/udvedlegg/01/01/rev_016.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).Google Scholar

4 See Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An Analytical Guide, 10 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 13-15 (Fall 2003) (providing the recent historical background of labor provisions appearing in trade agreements beginning with the International Trade Organization's Havana Charter).Google Scholar

5 See Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement, Jan. 20, 1999, U.S.-Cambodia [hereinafter USCBTA], at http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/data/commerce_html/tcc_2/cambodiatextilebilat.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2005); see also Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Represenative, U.S.-Cambodian Textile Agreement Links Increasing Trade with Improving Workers’ Rights (Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights] (celebrating the USCBTA as a unique agreement linking trade incentives with labor rights promotion), at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2002/January/U.S.-Cambodian_Textile_Agreement_Links_Increasing_Trade_with_Improving_Workers'_Rights.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

6 See generally Making Globalization Work: Expanding the Benefits of Globalization to Working Families and the Poor, brookings institution, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, The Int'l Labor Org. (Dec. 2, 2002) (surveying the general problems that globalization has been unable to address and discussing the possible reasons why globalization has left them unaddressed), at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/comm/events/20021202panel1.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).Google Scholar

7 See discussion infra Part III (answering the questions that the USCBTA failed to address adequately).Google Scholar

8 See discussion infra Part II (providing the background behind the treaty, the mission it set out to accomplish, and the role of the International Labor Organization in helping to ensure substantial compliance in the garment industry with Cambodia's Labor Code).Google Scholar

9 See discussion infra Part I (providing the relevant treaty language and explaining what the treaty sough to accomplish).Google Scholar

10 See discussion infra Part I (placing the treaty's labor provisions in the context of Cambodia's long history of war and political infighting). As the labor movement has developed, it has remained tethered to the major political parties, which are themselves remnants of the conflict between warring domestic factions and international enemies. Id. Google Scholar

11 See discussion infra Part I (explaining the major labor challenges that the USCBTA sought to address, including freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, child labor, working conditions, and employment discrimination, among others).Google Scholar

12 See discussion infra Part II (examining how the USCBTA confronted the challenges described in the background section).Google Scholar

13 See discussion infra Part II (providing opposing sets of commentary and criticism from authoritative observers in an attempt to provide a complete discourse on what the treaty was intended to do and what the actual effects were).Google Scholar

14 See discussion infra Part III (including issues that the commentary missed). This legal field is relatively small. Id. The discourse is incomplete, which might explain why the USCBTA and other treaties have had difficulty in effectuating their intended results. Id. Google Scholar

15 See discussion infra Part III (arguing that factors like race, class, gender, age, and culture complicate the field of trade, finance, and labor in a way that treaty negotiators largely ignore). Ignoring these complexities begs for failure. Id. See also Amy Kazmin, Cambodia Makes a Final Break With the Past: Three Decades After the “Killing Fields,” the Country is to Join the WTO in an Experiment That Could Backfire, Fin. Times, Sept. 12, 2003 (showing that approximately thirty years ago the Khmer Rouge murdered anyone with an education); discussion infra Part III (arguing that the USCBTA's mistreatment of the history of ethnic strife is an impediment towards a successful protection of labor rights). The USCBTA also ignores that the textile industry mostly employs Cambodian women, while the managers and owners are foreign men. Id. The treaty misses the race and gender issues as well. Id. Google Scholar

16 See Polaski, supra note 4, at 14, 15 (surveying the development of the trend to protect labor rights through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties).Google Scholar

17 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA], available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?CategoryId=42 (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

18 See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature Sept. 8, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC] (protecting, in theory, labor rights through dispute resolution panels), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

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20 See J.F. Hornbeck, CRS Issue Brief: The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, (Mar. 5, 2001) (The Clinton Administration emphasized the need for future trade agreements to make up for what NAFTA lacked), at http://fpc.state.gov/6123.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).Google Scholar

21 Agreement on Labour Cooperation, Feb. 6, 1997, Can.-Chile, 36 I.L.M. 1213 [hereinafter Canada-Chile FTA], available at http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/spila/ialc/06Canada_Chile_Agreement.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).Google Scholar

22 Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.- Jordan, 41 I.L.M. 63, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_ 5112.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).Google Scholar

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24 Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing. [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore FTA], at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf (last visisted Feb. 12, 2005).Google Scholar

25 Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2467 (2004).Google Scholar

26 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (2004).Google Scholar

27 African Growth and Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3741 (2004), available at http://www.agoa.gov/agoa_legislation/agoatext.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).Google Scholar

28 Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991, 19 U.S.C. § 3201 et. seq. (2004) (expired Dec. 4, 2001, renewed through Dec. 31, 2006) amended by Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002 in the Trade Act of 2002 §§ 3101-3108 (Pub. Law No. 107-210) (2002)).Google Scholar

29 See generally Wayne Arnold, Translating Union Into Khmer, N. Y. Times, sec. C (July 12, 2001) (explaining the obstacles that unions have faced in the Cambodian textile industry).Google Scholar

30 USCBTA supra note 5, para. 10(A); see also Labor Code (1997) (Cambodia) [hereinafter Labor Code] (relying very heavily on the Ministry of Labor to provide inspectors to enforce the labor provisions), at http://www.moc.gov.kh/laws_regulation/rkm_labor_law_97.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). The Labor Code was similar to the USCBTA in that both approaches relied on inspectors to enforce the provisions. Id. art. 25.Google Scholar

31 See Sandra Polaski, Cambodia Blazes a New Path to Economic Growth and Job Creation, 7-8 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Trade, Equity, and Development Project, 2004) (explaining the critical role of the ILO in the determination of increasing Cambodia's export quota).Google Scholar

32 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 16-17 (advancing similar structures for future trade agreements as a mechanism for incentivizing compliance with labor laws).Google Scholar

33 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 16-17 (showing that the USCBTA's approach to labor enforcement was unique because of the use of the ILO's inspection regime and the use of the quota system as a reward for industry compliance with the Labor Code).Google Scholar

34 See David Chandler, Killing Fields, [hereinafter Killing Fields] (explaining that the world may never know exactly how many people died in Pol Pot's killing fields), available at http://www.cybercambodia.com/dachs/killings/killings.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). The mystery surrounding Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge has made it impossible to know exactly how many people died during the revolution. Id. See also Kazmin, supra note 15, at 1 (contrasting Cambodia's dark history with its rapid development and lucrative economic opportunities and discussing the cultural struggle that existed before, during, and after Pol Pot's brutal regime, which provides the background for Cambodia's unique economic successes in the face of dire national despair). The Khmer Rouge ruled until the Vietnamese took control of Phnom Penh in 1979, although the Khmer Rouge remained powerful until the early 90s when the group split into two forces, and ultimately lost all power after Pol Pot's death in 1998. Id. Pol Pot's reign of terror began with his deceptive utopian plan to modernize the country and create perfect equality. Killing Fields, supra note 34. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge captured Cambodia's capital, bringing to the country's war-ravaged people a renewed hope for peace and prosperity. Id. See also Bruce Sharp, The Banyan Tree: Untangling Cambodian History, 2, (demonstrating the dichotomy between Cambodians’ support of Pol Pot before his reign and the devastation that occurred after he usurped government authority), available at http://www.mekong.net/Cambodia/banyan2.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005). An estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died, which was nearly thirty percent of the population. Id. See also Veron M. Y. Hung, Cambodia, in Asia-Pacific Constitutional Yearbook 1996, at 69-70 (Cheryl Sanders & Graham Hassall eds., 1998) (explaining that the Paris peace treaty called for the United Nations to assume administrative control over the government in 1992). The country's first democratic free elections occurred the following year. Id. See also Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution, 441-42 (1998) (stating that Hun Sen's party, the Cambodian People's Party (“CPP”), earned the second largest bloc in the National Assembly); see generally David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945 (1991) (surveying the history of conflict that ensued well into the 90s). Not until 1987 in Paris did peace talks begin between warring factions, including principally the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese-supported indigent government, the leader of which was the current Prime Minister, Hun Sen. Id. In 1989 Vietnamese officials announced that they would remove their forces from Cambodia, which preceded the signing of the 1991 peace treaty. Id. In 1998, Hun Sen's political party, the CPP, gained additional seats in the National Assembly, and an agreement between rival political factions and the CPP made Hun Sen the country's sole Prime Minister. Id. In return, Prince Ranariddh, leader of the CPP's political rival the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacafique, et Copartif (“FUNCINPEC”), became President of the National Assembly. Id. Google Scholar

35 See Siphana Sok & Denora Sarin, The Cambodia Legal Resources Development Center, Legal System of Cambodia 139 (1988) (the 1997 Labor Code “has clearly provided the necessary legislative reform more conducive to a free market economy”).Google Scholar

36 See John A. Hall, Human Rights and the Garment Industry in Contemporary Cambodia, 36 Stan. J. Int'l L. 119, 146 (explaining the weaknesses in the Labor Code's enforcement). The Code is only as strong as the will of labor inspectors to enforce it. Id. The Ministry of Labor is rife with corruption, where low-paid inspectors receive bribes in the form of money and food to augment their government income in exchange for turning a blind eye to Code violations. Id. Google Scholar

37 See discussion infra Part II.D.1-3 (discussing the labor problems that the ILO had to deal with).Google Scholar

38 See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, Foreign Labor Trends: Cambodia (2003) [hereinafter Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau] (summarizing the state of Cambodia's economy), at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/flt/cambodia-2003.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).Google Scholar

39 See Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working to Improve Conditions in Cambodia s Garment Factories, 7 yale hum. rts & dev. L.J. 79, 82 (2004) (describing the Cambodian garment industry's demographics).Google Scholar

40 See Amy Kazmin, Nike Weighs Return to Cambodia: ILO Move to Monitor Factories May Prompt a Change of Heart by the US Sportswear Giant, fin. times, June, 18, 2002 (describing Nike's return to the sizable Cambodian garment industry).Google Scholar

41 See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 3 (reporting that these numbers include “cumulative, overlapping, out-of-date or entirely fictional information”).Google Scholar

42 See id. (noting that despite the existence of these large labor federations and the protections offered to workers in the Cambodian constitution and the Labor Code, the Cambodian government seldom enforces these rights).Google Scholar

43 See, 3rd man charged in killing of Cambodian labor leader, asian political News, Feb. 9, 2004 (discussing the conspiracy behind the death of Chea Vichea, a powerful labor leader who died as a result of an assassination). Government opposition leaders argue that the dominant political parties arranged for Vichea's death because of his leadership in Cambodia's most independent labor union, the FTUWKC. Id. Google Scholar

44 See Hall, supra note 36, at 146 (providing the history behind Cambodia's labor unions and the struggle for freedom of association rights). Cambodia's oldest union is the Independent Trade Union of Cambodian Workers (“ITUCW”), which descends from the Ministry of Unions that existed from 1979 until 1992. Id. The Ministry of Unions was the sole labor organization in Cambodia at a time when all enterprises were state-owned. Id. The ITUCW claimed to represent 18,591 members throughout nineteen of the registered garment unions as of 1998. Id. Its leader is Men Samon, who is a Member of Parliament under Hun Sen's CPP. Id. Through Men Samon, the CPP uses the ITUCW for political purposes and not necessarily for the good of the ITUCW's members. Id. The largest of Cambodia's labor unions is the Cambodian Unions Federation (“CUF”), which claims to represent 55,700 members of whom ninety percent works in the textile industry. Id. at 145. Chuon Mom Thol, who leads the CUF, also serves as the vice-chairman of Cambodia's Labor Advisory Committee, which is a forum for employers, workers, and the government to address labor-related issues, and frequently represents Cambodia's labor movement at international functions, including the ILO. Kolben, supra note 39, at 87. However, Chuon Mom Thol suffers criticism for leading nothing more than a “paper union,” designed to present a friendly face to the international community, but which in practice does very little for the employees it represents. Id. Philip Robertson of the AFL-CIO's Bangkok office in explained in an interview with Hall that paper unions usually consist of representatives who the factory management has elected, not the workers. Hall, supra note 36, at 145. The factory management creates election ballots of “approved” candidates who function for management's purposes after their election. Id. The Free Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (“FTUWKC”) is potentially the most independent of Cambodia's unions. Id. With unions in sixteen garment factories representing 117 male and 2,213 female workers, the FTUWKC is Cambodia's largest union. Id. Sam Rainsy, of the Sam Rainsy Party, founded the FTUWKC. Id. As with the other unions, the FTUWKC has received criticism that it functions for its leader as a source of political power. Id. Of course, the Sam Rainsy Party is not a part of the CPP-FINCINPEC coalition government and is far from approaching the power of either party. Hall, supra note 36, at 145. Some commentators have noted that the FTUWKC may be the start of an independent and credible labor movement in Cambodia. Id. Google Scholar

45 See Hall, supra note 36, at 149 (providing the history of the Free Union Federation of Cambodia (“FUFC”), which is a coalition of around one hundred unions in garment, cement, lumber, and brick factories). Ted Ngoy, who founded the union in 1993, is a Khmer-American who owns several factories that employs the FUFC's members. Id. At the same time that Ngoy founded his union, he also founded the Development Republican Party. Id. The AFL-CIO has condemned the FUFC as an illegitimate union that serves as a vehicle for Ngoy's political and financial ambitions. Id. Google Scholar

46 See U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000 (Feb. 23, 2001) (explaining that trade unions became more numerous active because the Government eased the process of union registration and improved labor law enforcement), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/681.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). Despite this growth in union activity, enforcement of the Labor Code remained a problem. Id. Google Scholar

47 See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (explaining that although the Labor Code provides for protections of these internationally recognized core worker rights, the inspectors rarely enforce them because of a lack of proper funding). See also Kolben, supra note 39, at 85 (documenting evidence of government corruption as an obstacle to effective labor law enforcement).Google Scholar

48 See Hall, supra note 36, at 139-40 (explaining the election of shop stewards and the fraudulent circumstances surrounding the elections).Google Scholar

49 See Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (describing the process by which management influenced steward elections).Google Scholar

50 See id. (demonstrating the way the Labor Code allowed factory management to circumvent the role of labor unions by using stewards).Google Scholar

51 See id. (discussing the new regulation providing for a process to determine who has the right to negotiate with management).Google Scholar

52 See id. (observing that despite the new regulation, collective bargaining rights remain elusive).Google Scholar

53 See Kolben, supra note 39, at 84 (elaborating on the difficulties surrounding enforcement of the Labor Code due to government corruption).Google Scholar

54 See U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002, sec. 4 (Mar. 31, 2003) (describing the conditions in Cambodian industry that give rise to gender imbalances in the work place), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18238.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

55 See U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003 (Feb. 25, 2004) (explaining that women comprise 52 percent of the population, 60 percent of agricultural workers, 85 percent of the business work force, 70 percent of the industrial work force, and 60 percent of all service sector workers), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27766.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). Women often are concentrated in low-paying jobs in these sectors and largely were excluded from management positions. Id. Google Scholar

56 See Kolben, supra note 44, at 82 (describing the employment situation Cambodia's garment industry).Google Scholar

57 See id. (using factory demographic figures to suggest that the labor rights agenda is more complex than the employer-employee relationship; gender, race, and age also play critical roles in deciphering the poor conditions in Cambodia's textile industry).Google Scholar

58 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., ¶¶ 108-17, U.N. Doc. A/53/400 (1998) [hereinafter SG Report: Cambodia] (describing the laws designed to protect Cambodian women in contrast to the significant problems women face with regard to employment, health care, education, and equitable treatment from law enforcement), available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/genassembly/a-53-400.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). Cambodian law grants women significant protection from employment discrimination. Id. ¶ 108; see also Hall, supra note 36, at 158 (asserting that the Constitution provides for equal rights for women, including equal pay for equal work).Google Scholar

59 SG Report: Cambodia, supra note 58, at 108.Google Scholar

60 See id. at 110 (suggesting that discrimination against women continues to persist because of a lack of political will to change it).Google Scholar

61 See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 46, at sec. 6(a) (explaining that the Cambodian constitution contains explicit language providing for equal rights for women, equal pay for equal work, and equal status in marriage, but cultural traditions continue to limit the ability of women to reach senior positions in business and other areas).Google Scholar

62 USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A).Google Scholar

63 See discussion infra Part III (showing that while the agreement called for the promotion of the Labor Code, the ILO program never achieved that goal because of the ILO's weak enforcement role).Google Scholar

64 See discussion infra Part III (focusing on these critical failures because these are internationally recognized core labor standards).Google Scholar

65 But see PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 5 (proclaiming the success of the USCBTA).Google Scholar

66 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (agreeing that the benefits of trade should include improved working conditions and living standards for workers in the Cambodian garment industry, while remaining silent on how the ILO should implement the Labor Code to achieve those goals). This silence allowed the ILO to adopt its own organizational structure, removing from the U.S and Cambodian governments the onus of determining this element in the agreement itself. Id. Compare Capitalism in the Raw: Labour Rights and Free Trade with the United States, Economist, Jan. 24, 2004 [hereinafter Capitalism in the Raw] (suggesting that the Central American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) may never pass through the U.S. Congress if the agreement fails to include essential enforcement provisions, which are generally highly contentious when states negotiate trade agreements because enforcement encroaches on sovereignty), available at 2004 WLNR 15258863 (last visited Feb. 12, 2005), with Russo, supra note 19, at 112-19 (questioning whether NAFTA's labor side agreement managed to provide an effective dispute resolution structure despite bargaining and compromise).Google Scholar

67 See Cambodian Govt Expands Partnership With Private Sector, xinhua General News Service, July 5, 2000 (illustrating the confluence of interests of the government, the garment industry, and labor interests that the ILO needed to address because of the great economic value that the industry represented for Cambodia and its people).Google Scholar

68 See, e.g., Int'l Labour Org., Third Synthesis Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambodia's Garment Sector: Statement of the Project Advisory Committee on the Release of the Third ILO Synthesis Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambodia's Textile and Apparel Sector (June 24, 2002) [hereinafter Third Synthesis Report] (stating the opinions of representatives from the government of Cambodia, the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia, and the Cambodian trade union movement regarding the ILO's third synthesis report on the working conditions situation in the garments industry), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia3.htm (last visted Feb. 4, 2005).Google Scholar

69 See Int'l Labour Org., Seventh Synthesis Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambodia's Garment Sector: Statement of the Project Advisory Committee on the Release of the Seventh ILO Synthesis Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambodia's Textile and Apparel Sector (Sept. 19, 2003) (expressing appreciation that the ILO ensured that all parties involved had fulfilled their duties, which in turn led to improved respect for worker rights), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia7.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).Google Scholar

70 But see ILO report reveals improved Cambodian work conditions, women's Wear Daily, April 20, 2004 (presenting reports that ILO inspections led to improved working conditions in textile and apparel factories), available at 2004 WLNR 12873960 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).Google Scholar

71 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (discussing in general terms that the U.S. and Cambodian governments should promote and rely on transparency, while not including language defining what constitutes sufficient transparency or how the parties intended to achieve that goal).Google Scholar

72 But see Amy Kazmin, Garment Factories Are Being Forced to Mend Their Ways, Fin. Times, Dec. 10, 2002, at 3 (praising the model of transparency as “unrivalled”), available at 2002 WLNR 6785214 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). The article also mentioned that factory owners “frantically” telephoned ILO inspectors to ensure a clean report before the inspectors named their factories individually. Id. Google Scholar

73 See Int'l Labour Org., First Synthesis Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambodia's Garment Sector, sec. 1.3.1 (Nov. 22, 2001) [hereinafter First Synthesis Report] (explaining that the Ministry of Commerce corrected this problem by promulgating a regulation that permitted only registered factories to use allocated export quotas to trade with U.S. markets or to buy export quotas through the official quota bidding process), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).Google Scholar

74 See Amy Kazmin, Garment Buyers Prefer Cambodia, Fin. Times, Dec. 4, 2004, at 9 (reporting that while buyers know that Cambodia's labor standards outrank those of other major Asian textile exporters, such as Vietnam, China, Thailand, and Bangladesh, Cambodia ranks worst in terms of “red tape” and customs delays), available at 2004 WLNR 13022063 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).Google Scholar

75 See First Synthesis Report, supra 73, sec. 1.3.1 (explaining the details of the contract between the ILO and the participating parties).Google Scholar

76 Compare Anthony DePalma, Nafta's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2001, sec. 3 (reporting criticism that NAFTA tribunals, which investors can use to sue governments for violations of NAFTA Chapter Eleven provisions, are too secretive, even though they are effective at protecting investor rights), available at 2001 WLNR 3421720 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). Unlike the ILO program, which uses a regulatory approach, the NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunals use an adversarial model, which provides transparency to the fact-finder through pleadings, arguments, and evidence. Id., with Public Citizen, Another Americas is Possible: The Impact of NAFTA on the U.S. Latino Community and Lessons for Future Trade Agreements, 14 (asserting that similar NAFTA provisions are too weak to protect labor rights), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/LatinosReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). Even though workers can bring complaints like those that the investors can bring under Chapter Eleven, the transparency is ineffective because the labor provisions are too dilute. Id. Google Scholar

77 See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.1 (explaining further that while the ILO was interested in obtaining full access to factory employees, the factories were concerned with inaccuracies that this system could have generated). In exchange, the ILO agreed that monitoring visits would occur in a fair and objective manner, that inspections would take place in such a manner as to cause the least disruptions, that basic information would be kept confidential, and that the ILO would have considered any allegation of inspection-related misconduct in good faith. Id. Google Scholar

78 See Kolben, supra note 39, at 91 n. 72 (explaining that the United States rejected earlier proposals for the program that would have granted the ILO greater power because of concerns for Cambodia's state sovereignty). Mark Barenberg, professor of law at Columbia University Law School and an expert on international labor regulation, designed a stronger proposal that would have granted the ILO a greater enforcement role. Id. The American Union of Needle Trades and Industrial and Textile Employees (“UNITE”) in turn lobbied for the agreement to adopt this plan. Id. Google Scholar

79 But see Sheridan Prasso, Case Study: Bringing Labor Issues Into the Cambodian Textile Agreement, initiative for Pol'y dialogue, 2003 (asserting that the mere presence of the ILO gave to Cambodian workers too much power to defend their own rights), at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/j_cambodia.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

80 See, e.g., id. (lauding the ILO program's impressive strengths such as improvements in correct payment of wages, improvements in mandatory overtime, and improvements with regard to freedom of association protections). Although Prasso cites to the ILO's Sixth Synthesis Report, she provides no guidance as to what constituted a noteworthy improvement or how those improvements related to the original working conditions. Id. Nor does Prasso articulate whether those improvements correlated to improved working conditions. Id. Because these reports contain little information, no one can. Id. Google Scholar

81 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (linking improved working conditions in part to transparency into the enforcement of the Labor Code).Google Scholar

82 But see PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 5 (heralding the ILO project as exemplary for using trade to increase respect for workers’ rights).Google Scholar

83 See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 23, Annex 18.5 (providing an entire section for the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement's Labor Cooperation Mechanism).Google Scholar

84 Compare Id. para. 5(a)-(g) (elucidating seven distinct, but illustrative, methods of achieving the goals of the U.S. and Chilean governments), with USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (lacking similar specificity, particularly with regard to frequency of inspections).Google Scholar

85 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Workers in Saudi Arabia, 6-8 (July, 2004) (asserting that Human Rights Watch's reports of Saudi Arabian working conditions would have been more complete if the inspectors could have conducted interviews of all the available workers), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/saudi0704/saudi0704.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains closed to human rights inspectors. Id. The report acknowledged that without sufficient access to work sites, the conclusions drawn from the reports were an incomplete picture of the full labor scene. Id. Google Scholar

86 See Third Synthesis Report, supra note 68, sec. 2 (emphasizing that reported information for the named factories only represents changes in the situation from the first visit to the follow-up visit).Google Scholar

87 See id. sec. 1.3.2 (stating that the ILO mainly derived the checklist from provisions located in the Labor Code).Google Scholar

88 But see U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, US-Cambodian Economic and Trade Relations (proclaiming that the USCBTA was an “unqualified success” in promoting Cambodian economic growth while promoting Cambodia as a labor-friendly country) at http://usembassy.state.gov/cambodia/wwwf0040.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

89 See id. (reporting that in 2003 Cambodian exports to the United States amounted to over $1.2 billion). Eighty-five percent of that amount came from the textile trade. Id. Google Scholar

90 See USCBTA, supra note 5 (adopting a hollow goal-oriented approach by specifying goals to which the parties aspired while ignoring the steps by which the parties would achieve those goals).Google Scholar

91 Compare id. (agreeing to promote “general labor rights” that were “embodied” in the Labor Code), with First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 2 (elaborating all of the elements that the ILO chose to incorporate), and Labor Code, supra note 30, chs. III-XIV (enumerating with great specificity particular protections that workers should receive).Google Scholar

92 See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (stating that the United States was willing to trade with any company in the Cambodian garment industry as long as the industry as a whole substantially complied with the Labor Code).Google Scholar

93 See, e.g., Third Synthesis Report, supra note 68, sec. 2 (noting simply whether the named factories complied in full, in part, or not all).Google Scholar

94 But see Prasso, supra note 79 (championing the success of the USCBTA in the field of labor rights protection).Google Scholar

95 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI (providing a sliding scale of penalties depending on the kind of labor provision that a factory owner violated).Google Scholar

96 See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.4 (explaining that the first report only included sixteen percent of the factories participating in the program and that the monitoring of the factories was not an objective in itself, but rather part of a larger process to improve the industry as a whole). The report is silent on what the other parts of the larger process consist of. Id. Google Scholar

97 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(D) (conditioning these statements based on consultations between the U.S. and Cambodian governments).Google Scholar

98 But see Polaski, supra note 31, at 14 (remarking that an impressive number of factories made rapid changes and corrections to practices that routinely confronted apparel workers in many countries). The author bases her claims on the flawed ILO reports. Id. Google Scholar

99 See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (stating the conditions for which the United States would increase the quota).Google Scholar

100 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 7 (stating that nonparticipating firms could have shared in the increased trading without the related costs of more stringent labor policies).Google Scholar

101 See, e.g., Cambodia: U.S. increases garment quota, asian labour news Dec. 5, 2003 (reporting the quota increases, which yielded over $1 billion in revenue for Cambodian industry), available at http://www.asianlabour.org/archives/000183.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).Google Scholar

102 See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures (unpublished document, on file with author) (showing that despite the presence of the labor inspectors and the positive incentives from the USCBTA, several factories failed to implement the inspectors’ recommendations). This document, compiled from all nine ILO synthesis reports, lists all of the suggestions that the inspectors made in the areas of freedom of association, collective bargaining, employment discrimination, and child labor. Id. This document lists all of the suggestions that the inspectors made with regard to these issues, how many factories followed these inspections, and the percentage rate of compliance. Id. It also lists the total number of factories that received suggestions from each reporting period and from the aggregate of all nine reports. Id. Google Scholar

103 See PR: Linking Trade and Labor Rights, supra note 82 (explaining that industry-wide substantial compliance was sufficient for individual factories to participate in the increased quotas).Google Scholar

104 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 7 (discussing the free-rider problem in economics terms, but ignoring the fact that that working conditions will not improve for a large segment of the work force).Google Scholar

105 See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.1 (reporting that even though the Ministry of Commerce required that all factories interested in trading with the United States needed to register with the ILO program, there was no requirement that any of the factories adopt the ILO's suggestions at all).Google Scholar

106 Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (providing in five brief paragraphs a list of goals and describing the incentive structure, but listing no methods for achieving those goals), with U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 23, ch. 18 (devoting eight pages and an entire chapter to labor provisions).Google Scholar

107 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (connecting the goal of improved working conditions with the Labor Code's freedom of association articles).Google Scholar

108 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XI, art. 266 (articulating the extensive freedom of association provisions in twelve articles, but which call upon the Ministry of Labor to undertake a significant enforcement role, which the ILO lacked under the USCBTA); see, e.g., Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 (demonstrating the insufficiency of the ILO's inspections in this regard). Thirty-three factories received suggestions that they “ensure that workers have the right to freely form and join trade unions and freely participate in union activities.” Id. Upon the follow-up visit, the monitors found that seventy-six percent of the factories had complied with the recommendation. Id. The monitors suggested to fourteen factories that “management refrain from taking measures that would prevent workers from freely forming or joining unions and engaging in union activities.” Id. Of these, seventy-nine percent had complied. Id. The monitors recommended to ten factories that “management should ensure that union leaders are dismissed only in accordance with the requirements of the law.” Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102. Ninety percent of the factories complied. Id. Twenty-two factories received suggestions that management ensure that “no worker suffers disadvantages because of union membership or participation in union activities.” Id. Seventy-three percent of the factories complied. Id. The inspectors suggested that thirty-two factories hold new shop steward elections. Id. Seventy-five percent of the factories complied. Id. Ninety-three factories received suggestions to ensure that “the next shop steward elections are held in accordance with the relevant rules and procedures.” Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102. Only twenty-eight percent of these factories complied. Id. One-hundred seventy-eight factories received suggestions to ensure that shop stewards are provided two office hours per week, an office, and working materials to undertake their duties. Id. Only twenty-one percent of these factories complied. Id. Google Scholar

109 See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 55, sec. 6(a) (explaining the reports of antiunion harassment by employers, including the dismissal of union leaders, in more than 20 garment factories and other enterprises during the year).Google Scholar

110 See Labor Code, supra note 30, at ch. XII, art. 301 (granting authority to the Ministry of Labor's inspectors to intervene in labor disputes). The USCBTA fails to empower the ILO with similar authority. Id. Google Scholar

111 See First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.3.2 (describing all of the monitoring procedures that the ILO used, including the checklist).Google Scholar

112 See, e.g., Seventh Synthesis Report, supra note 69, sec. 2 (illustrating that the contents of the checklist consisted of questions that only reflected the contents of the Labor Code). The checklist method failed to accompany the enforcement power that the Labor Code contained. Id. Google Scholar

113 See Int'l Labour Org., Eighth Synthesis Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambodia's Garment Sector, sec. 2.1.3.1 (Feb., 2004) [hereinafter Eight Synthesis Report] (reporting that the inspectors gave this suggestion only to eleven factories, of whom seven complied in full), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia8.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).Google Scholar

114 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI, art. 359 (granting to the Ministry of Labor's inspectors the power to enforce penalties).Google Scholar

115 See id. ch. XVII, arts. 387-89 (creating labor courts that would have the authority to determine the precise meanings of these words so as to give guidance as to how the violators of this provision actually treated its workers).Google Scholar

116 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Women's Work: Discrimination Against Women in the Ukrainian Labor Force, 18-26 (Aug., 2003) (providing an example of a reporting method that other investigators have used that give enough details to create a complete image of employment discrimination in the Ukraine), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ukraine0803/ukraine0803full.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

117 See United Nations, Situation of human rights in Cambodia, para. 107 (Sept. 18, 1998) (reporting that management often assumed control over unions and that the government did little to prevent worker intimidation), available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/genassembly/a-53-400.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

118 But see Eighth Synthesis Report, supra note 113, sec. 4 (indicating that the ILO's successes in the area of freedom of association compensates for problems that continue to persist in other fields, despite the lack of guidance as to what constitutes truly free union formation).Google Scholar

119 But see AFL-CIO & UNITE, Central America: Labor Rights And Child Labor Reports Pursuant To The Trade Act Of 2002, Section 2102(C)(8)-(9), 19 (June 5, 2003) (arguing that CAFTA should replicate the Cambodian example because of the ILO's success, despite the clarity in the checklist's language), available at http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/globaleconomy/upload/CAFTA.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

120 Compare Seventh Synthesis Report, supra note 69, sec. 1.3.2 (suggesting that the regulatory approach works best when the inspectors are in a position to see Labor Code violations, which is problematic because some of the most egregious violations could go unhidden, especially if factory management is particularly coercive), with NAALC, supra note 18, arts. 4, 5 (creating a private action for workers and granting them access to a full tribunal with due process of law). The NAALC's adversarial approach allows workers to bring to light through pleadings labor law violations that a purely regulatory approach otherwise might miss. Id. Google Scholar

121 Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (leaving an open-ended labor law enforcement mechanism, which permitted the ILO to adopt the least stringent means of enforcement), with NAALC, supra note 18, (devoting over fifty articles, including specific definitions and an entire dispute settlement procedure, as well as several annexes to developing a stronger enforcement structure). However, while the NAALC offered workers direct access to the dispute settlement process, the enforcement structure failed to provide adequate remedies. Id. art. 22.Google Scholar

122 See USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A) (lacking sufficiently specific information to guarantee that the ILO would adopt the most effective standards to achieve the agreement's otherwise lofty goals).Google Scholar

123 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XII, art. 309(a)-(c) (defining the three separate ways that the Ministry of Labor may intervene to resolve disputes between management and labor, including a provision that creates a dispute resolution structure even without a previously written conciliation agreement).Google Scholar

124 But see Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 (demonstrating that the ILO inspectors found that high numbers of factories violated this right and only small percentages of the participating factories actually followed the ILO's suggestions). One-hundred twenty-seven factories received a suggestion to ensure that workers understood the terms of their employment contract. Id. Only thirty percent of the factories complied. Id. Sixty-six factories received a suggestion to amend employment contracts to comply with the law. Id. Only thirty-three percent of the factories complied. Id. Twenty-two factories received a suggestion to ensure that dispute settlement procedures comply with the law. Id. Thirty-six percent of the factories complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102. Twenty-eight factories received a suggestion to that management should implement conciliation agreements. Id. Fifty-four percent of the factories complied. Id. Twenty factories received a suggestion that management should ensure that conciliation agreements are posted in the workplace. Id. Eighty-five percent of the factories complied. Id. Google Scholar

125 Int'l Labor Affairs Bureau, supra note 38, at 11 (noting that the low number of collective bargaining agreements is indicative of failed government policy).Google Scholar

126 See Labor Code, supra note 30, art. 309(a) (noting that the parties could resolve their dispute through any procedure that they devised in the mutual agreement).Google Scholar

127 See id. art. 303 (allowing the Ministry of Labor's inspector to intervene in labor disputes not only when one of the parties notifies the inspector, but even if the inspector becomes aware of the dispute through other means).Google Scholar

128 Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E)(calling for the promotion of compliance with the Labor Code, but failing to specify whether the ILO should usurp the Ministry of Labor's authority as the Labor Code provides), with Labor Code, arts. 302-08 (granting significant authority to the Ministry of Labor to intervene in labor disputes, including the power to bind parties to a collective agreement when the party representing the workers is a trade union).Google Scholar

129 See, e.g., Labor Code, arts. 302-08 (granting the Ministry of Labor a monitory role, but also providing authority to resolve conflicts). This illustrates that the National Assembly envisioned that while the Ministry of Labor would conduct its role through inspections, it also should have significant enforcement authority over those areas of the Labor Code that factories or workers abrogated. Id. Google Scholar

130 See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 (reporting that the ILO documented only fourteen instances of child labor throughout the four years of inspections and the two hundred factories that they visited); see also Ministry of Planning, Cambodia Human Development Report 2000: Children and Employment, 33-35 (2000) (indicating that the ILO reports may be troublingly erroneous), at http://hdrc.undp.org.in/APRI/NHDR_Rgn/Cambodia/cmbda_nhdr_2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). Approximately forty-two percent of children aged ten to thirteen were “economically active” during the time period under review. Id. at 31. Of the children who held jobs, approximately seven to eleven percent worked in the manufacturing sector, which the report defined as jobs in the garment and apparel manufacturing, brick-making, and salt production. Id. On average, these children worked around forty-four hours per week for around thirty-five weeks per year. Id. at 32. The report emphasized that because of its methodology, the reported numbers “may grossly understate the number of child workers in the country.” Id. at 29.Google Scholar

131 See Labor Code, supra note 30, art. 177 (mandating that the minimum age for employment is fifteen years old).Google Scholar

132 Compare USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (lacking any discussion of child labor), with Labor Code, supra note 30, arts. 177-181 (banning child labor and regulating the means by which children between fifteen and eighteen may seek employment), and Canada-Chile FTA, supra note 21, art. 25 (offering at least a mechanism by which to discover and remedy instance of child labor), and U.S.- Singapore FTA, supra note 24, ch. 17, art. 17.7(1)(d) (providing that children shall be protected through the enforcement of domestic child labor laws).Google Scholar

133 See Labor Code, supra note 30, ch. XVI (granting the Ministry of Labor the authority to institute stiff penalties for Labor Code violations). If the ILO cooperated with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry could have instituted penalties for the violations that the ILO discovered. Id. Google Scholar

134 But see USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (indicating that even if the USCBTA's drafters sought to fight child labor, they believed that the ILO effectively could have done so using alternate methods).Google Scholar

135 See, e.g., First Synthesis Report, supra note 73, sec. 1.1 (describing the USCBTA as an agreement that provided solely an incentive structure). The agreement contained no punitive measures. Id. Google Scholar

136 Cf. Andrew Wells-Dang, Linking Textiles to Labor Standards: Prospects for Cambodia and Vietnam, 2-3 (June 2002) [hereinafter Linking Textiles to Labor Standards] (asserting that the growth of the Cambodian garment industry may not be attributable solely or even mostly to the USCBTA's positive incentives) available at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/reports/PRtxt-labor.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). If this is true, then there would have been little if any correlation between the trade agreement's incentive structure and improved working conditions. Id. That would include women's rights. Id. Google Scholar

137 See Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102 (showing that the inspectors found that forty-seven factories received a suggestion to ensure that no worker had to pay a fee in order to get a job, while only forty-seven percent complied). Fifty-four factories received a suggestion to ensure that the piece rate was set at such a level to permit a worker of average ability working normal hours to earn the minimum wage. Id. Twenty-one percent complied. Id. Eighty-seven factories received a suggestion to ensure that ninety days maternity leave is provided, with half pay for workers who had worked at least one year. Id. Fifty-one percent complied. Id. Fifteen factories received a suggestion to ensure that workers were not subject to negative changes in their contract status when returning from maternity leave. Id. Eighty percent complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102. One-hundred ninety-two factories received a suggestion that management should ensure that time-off for breast feeding is provided and that workers are aware of this right. Id. Twenty-eight percent complied. Id. Nineteen factories received a suggestion that management should take steps to address problems related to sexual harassment. Id. One-hundred percent complied. Id. One-hundred nineteen factories received a suggestion that management should refrain from engaging in indecent behavior. Id. Twenty-nine percent complied. Cumulative ILO Synthesis Report Figures, supra note 102.Google Scholar

138 See Labor Code, supra note 30, arts. 172-76, 182-87, 363 (listing the protections that women receive under the Labor Code as well as the penalties that discriminating employers will suffer for violating those provisions). A typical penalty consists of a fine of thirty-one to sixty days of the base daily wage. Id. art. 368. However, only the Ministry of Labor has the power to impose this penalty. Id. at 359.[hereinafter U.S.-SingaporeGoogle Scholar

139 See Hall, supra note 36, at 158 (explaining that labor violations in the garment industry will have a disparate impact on women because of the overwhelming numbers of women working for men). According to one interview that Hall conducted, a European consultant for the garment industry discussed Chinese male managers’ relationships with their Cambodian female employees, They really don't like Khmer women at all. Joke [sic] about them being ugly and stupid and lazy. They keep complaining about how the women here don't work as hard as women in China or Malaysia, and how they don't want to do over time … They say if they paid these women more money they would gamble it away, or just get drunk … I've seen these men hit and shout at women, calling them fucking whores, and slapping them on the face. Then they laugh about it, joking with each other. Id. at 159.Google Scholar

140 See SG Report: Cambodia, supra note 58, ¶ 116 (discussing the alarming instances of discrimination against women, especially violent incidents).Google Scholar

141 See Linking Textiles to Labor Standards, supra note 136, at 2 (asserting that the ILO was unable to overcome many other challenges to the Cambodian labor environment). For instance, internal corruption, a lack of resources, and a weak judicial system has resulted in gross under-enforcement of the Labor Code, which is why the ILO needed to compensate in some degree for these inadequacies. Id. Google Scholar

142 See, e.g., USCBTA, supra note 5, para. 10(A)-(E) (creating a prototypical incentive structure that should be studied, modified, and then replicated).Google Scholar

143 See Polaski, supra note 31, at 9 (explaining that textile quotas disappeared for Cambodia when it joined the WTO).Google Scholar

144 See id. at 9, 16-17 (describing the many reasons why Cambodia has chosen to continue adhering to the ILO inspections even though the quota system has ended, including the commercial benefits that flow from consumer confidence in labor-friendly garments). Polaski argues that future trade agreements can replicate the USCBTA program through the use of positive incentives. Id. at 17. However, Polaski leaves unaddressed the merits of a hybrid structure that incorporates both positive and negative incentives. Id. Google Scholar

145 See, e.g., Codigo de Trabajo (El Sal.) (1972)(amended 1994, 2004) (providing relatively weak labor protection), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/49592/65113/S95SLV01.htm; see also Capitalism in the Raw, supra note 66 (explaining that, unlike the USCBTA, CAFTA cannot depend on countries, like El Salvador, to enforce their own labor codes on the grounds that those labor laws are too lax).Google Scholar

146 See generally Labor Code, supra note 30 (providing relatively thorough labor protections). The Labor Code relies primarily upon the Ministry of Labor for enforcement, which is notorious for under-enforcement. Id. Google Scholar

147 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Judiciary on Trial, (June 20, 2001) (condemning Cambodia's judiciary for corruption and lack of political independence), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/06/20/cambod149.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

148 See U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004: Cambodia, sec. 6(a) (Feb. 28, 2005) (asserting that the Labor Code went unenforced in 2004 due to a lack of political will), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41638.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

149 See, e.g., NAALC, supra note 18, Annex 1 (providing a list of labor principles that guide the parties’ domestic legislative priorities). While this language is merely aspirational, it remains more prototypical than the USCBTA, which lacks any guiding labor principles. Id. Google Scholar

150 See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (explaining that two inspections during a four-year time period is insufficient to conclude, infer, or even speculate that Cambodian factories abided by anything more than the worst labor standards imaginable).Google Scholar

151 See Int'l Labour Org., Ninth Synthesis Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambodia's Garment Sector, sec. 1.3 (July 2004) (reporting that the project, which by the ninth report had included at least 243 factories, had recruited only eleven inspectors), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/publ/cambodia9.pdf (last visted Feb. 4, 2005). However, the small number of inspectors may have been sufficient since the program so infrequently sent them to inspect participating facilities. Id. Google Scholar

152 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating the need for more inspections in order to achieve credible results).Google Scholar

153 But see supra notes 70, 72, 79, 82, 88, 98, 119 and accompanying text (showing that the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Embassy in Cambodia, two mighty super unions, an international trade scholar, and at least two reputable journalists proclaimed the ILO program as an exemplary success story on the meager basis of two inspections conducted in a four-year time span with methods of dubious reliability).Google Scholar

154 See supra discussion Part III.A.4 (explaining that the incentive structure allowed grossly noncompliant and defiant facilities to trade with the United States).Google Scholar

155 See supra discussion Part III.A.4 (proving that the free-rider problem was directly related to industry-wide standard).Google Scholar

156 But see Polaski, supra note 31, at 17 (eschewing any use of negative incentives, which logically would include the sliding-scale approach advocated here).Google Scholar

157 See Linking Textiles to Labor Standards, supra note 136, at 3 (arguing that the disconnect between factory compliance and quota allocations served as a challenge to effective implementation and monitoring).Google Scholar

158 See Regina Abrami, Worker Rights and Global Trade: The U.S.- Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement, Harvard Business School Case Study, No. 9-703034, at 15 (Aug. 2003) (arguing that consumer pressure will be strong enough to encourage socially responsible business practices).Google Scholar

159 See, e.g., Laurence Hefler & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273 (1997) (comparing and contrasting different methods of international dispute resolution systems); see also John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The Submission Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ecology L.Q. 1 (2001) (arguing for a different method for compliance in NAFTA-related environmental disputes).Google Scholar

160 But see Kolben, supra note 39, at 91 n. 72 (implying that approaches such as this, which encroach on state sovereignty, will face significant political obstacles).Google Scholar

161 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (showing that the ability to bring a lawsuit in an adversarial setting might increase transparency into the administration of law law).Google Scholar

162 But see supra note 156 (demonstrating the opposition to hybrid positive-negative incentive structures).Google Scholar

163 See Michael Posner, An Open Letter to Ambassador Robert Zoellick, (November 26, 2001) (arguing for changes in the USCBTA that would have allowed nongovernmental actors to play at least a minimal role in the administration of the Labor Code), at http://ur.rutgers.edu/news/ACLA/lchrcambodia.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).Google Scholar

164 See Russo, supra note 19, at 112-18 (describing the faults in the NAFTA dispute settlement procedures).Google Scholar

165 See NAALC, supra note 18, art. 27 (aspiring to redress labor violations through ministerial consultations).Google Scholar

166 See generally NAFTA, supra note 17, ch. Eleven (describing the procedures by which investors can obtain redress for violations of enumerated investment protections).Google Scholar

167 See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (revealing the weaknesses in the regulatory model alone).Google Scholar