Since the entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights there have been many serious conflicts in Europe. This article examines the role played by the Convention in two of those conflicts: that in Northern Ireland between supporters of the territory remaining part of the United Kingdom and supporters of Northern Ireland becoming part of a reunified Ireland, and that in Turkey between those who advocate for a unified Turkish State and those who want a Turkey which grants greater rights to Kurds and accepts greater autonomy for the Kurdish-dominated southeast region. The principal goal is to compare how the institutions in Strasbourg have responded to applications lodged by victims of human rights abuses allegedly committed during the two conflicts. The comparison seeks to identify to what extent the European Court of Human Rights has adopted principles and practices which can contribute to a reduction in human rights abuses during times of conflict.

In 2015, frustrated by the slow pace of negotiations in the International Maritime Organisation, the EU issued Regulation 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting, and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport. Echoing the controversial Aviation Directive, the Regulation is intended to support a unilateral market-based measure, and includes emissions from outside EU territory. This raises the question whether, according to international law, the EU has jurisdiction to regulate such ‘extraterritorial’ circumstances. In exploring the appropriate jurisdictional bases, we argue that neither the Law of the Sea Convention, nor world trade law definitively decide this issue. We therefore devote more detailed attention to the customary international law of State jurisdiction supplementing these regimes. We seek to build on the existing analysis by examining climate change as a ‘common concern of mankind’. We argue that this emerging concept has distinct legal implications that can and should be accommodated within the interest-balancing exercise underlying the jurisdictional analysis.

The law of unilateral acts and the law of treaties are generally considered to be two distinct areas of international law. While the former governs the effect of unilateral undertakings by States, the latter governs, inter alia, the formation, interpretation, termination, and suspension of treaties. In 2011, the International Law Commission (ILC) concluded a two-decade study on reservations. One of its most remarkable insights is the argument that reservations ought to be considered ‘unilateral acts’. Thus, certain rules pertaining the law of unilateral acts ought to apply to reservations. This article critically examines the ILC's novel proposal as well as its attempt to provide answers to contemporary questions on reservations through conceptualizing reservations as unilateral acts.

The legal and technical issues relating to the outer continental shelf entitlements in the Central Arctic Ocean present several challenges, most of which are to be resolved in accordance with Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Recently, two coastal States in the Central Arctic Ocean have made fully fledged submissions relating to the Arctic to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Russia has made a revised submission that is currently being considered by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The submission of Denmark/Greenland will most likely only be considered in 10 or 15 years time.

This article challenges the idea, both in domestic and international law, of defining terrorism. Using section 1 of the UK's Terrorism Act 2000 as an illustrative example, this article argues that a single definition of terrorism is invariably broad owing to the need to accommodate the lowest common denominator. This is damaging to the ‘principle of legality’ as recognized in British public law and the ECHR. Moreover, this problem is further exacerbated by the increasing application of counterterrorism legislation to non-international armed conflicts. This article therefore suggests an alternative solution: multiple definitions of terrorism whose breadth is dependent upon the specific circumstances for which they are designed. Fears that such an approach may amount to an ‘expression of inconsistency’ will be addressed by arguing that law's capacity to shape and frame public and political debate on the concept of terrorism is over-exaggerated. Legal definitions of terrorism therefore should remain primarily concerned with the legal rather than political function of defining terrorism.

The ongoing Syrian civil war calls for a re-evaluation of using force to protect human rights. This article does not rake over the much-debated issue of whether a right of humanitarian intervention exists as lex lata. Instead, it addresses the little reviewed normative issue of whether the right should exist in international law to support and reflect a pluralistic understanding of sovereignty. Despite advancements in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, this wider fabric of international law preserves Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. It denies any right of humanitarian intervention.

Non-execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights is a matter of serious concern. In order to address it, the reasons for and dynamics of non-execution need to be fully considered. This paper engages with non-execution by sketching the underpinning issues that help to explain it and, we argue, must shape our responses to it. Through this engagement, we conclude that non-execution is properly understood as a phenomenon that requires political rather than legal responses. This calls into question the usefulness of the infringement proceedings contained in Article 46(4) of the Convention and which it has recently been suggested ought to be embraced in attempts to address non-execution. We argue that, even if the practical difficulties of triggering Article 46(4) proceedings could somehow be overcome, the dynamics of non-execution suggest that such proceedings would be both futile and counterproductive, likely to lead to backlash against the Court and unlikely to improve States’ execution of its judgments.

In his Fourth Report on the Identification of Customary International Law (2016), Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood confirmed that ‘[i]n certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the expression, or creation, of rules of customary international law’. That the practice of international organizations can be relevant when identifying customary international law is relatively uncontroversial. The issue that is more debated is the extent to which the practice of international organizations as such may contribute to the development of customary international law. Using examples from the European Union's treaty practice and from the Court of Justice of the European Union, this article argues that international organizations may contribute to such practice, not only by representing the collective will of States, but as autonomous actors in their own right.